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A b s t r a c t 
S t u d i e s i n the D o c t r i n e of Grace i n B r i t i s h Theology - James Penney 
to P.M. B a i l l i e . B.P. T h e s i s 1973. B.G. W o r r a l l ( S t . J o h n s ) 
The t h e s i s aims to c o n s i d e r some a s p e c t s o f B r i t i s h t h e o l o g y i n 
the f i r s t h a l f of the twente^th c e n t u r y through the t h i n k i n g o f f i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f i g u r e s on the theme of g r a c e . The f i r s t two c h a p t e r s 
g i v e a h r o a d h i s t o r i c a l i n t r o d u c t i o n ( i ) and an o u t l i n e o f t h e o l o g i c a l 
t h i n k i n g i n B r i t a i n d u r i n g the p e r i o d ( l l ) . 
James Penney ( i l l ) i s chosen as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f an 'orthodox' 
P r o t e s t a n t approach. Arguing c h i e f l y from the P a u l i n e e p i s t l e s he 
defends a ' s u b s t i t u t i o n a r y ' view o f atonement. I n c o n t r a s t H a s t i n g s 
R a s h d a l l ( I V ) working l a r g e l y from a h i s t o r i c a l s u r v e y and t r y i n g to 
p r e s e n t a moral view a c c e p t a b l e to modern man c r i t i c i s e d ' s u b s t i t u t i o n a r y 
t h i n k i n g and advoca t e d an ' A b e l a r d i a n ' or 'moral i n f l u e n c e 1 view. 
T h i s c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e s w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f the two views so f a r 
c o n s i d e r e d . John Oman (V) c r i t i c i s e s t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a s o f gra c e as 
omnipotent power and advances the view o f g r a c e as ' f a t h e r l y p e r s u a s i o n ' 
which i s always a v a i l a b l e . T h i s r e s t s on h i s view o f the r e l a t i o n 
between the N a t u r a l and the S u p e r n a t u r a l . O l i v e r Quick ( V I ) i s chosen 
f o r h i s more C a t h o l i c approach. He u n d e r s t a n d s the work o f C h r i s t 
under the ' s a c r i f i c i a l ' model and has a r i c h e r view of worship and. 
sa c r a m e n t s . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s i s the i d e a o f a s a c r a m e n t a l u n i v e r s e . 
F i n a l l y , Donald B a i l l i e ( V I I ) i s seen as a m e d i a t i n g f i g u r e . Here 
the s t r e s s i s more on the e x p e r i e n c e o f g r a c e , and the use of. the 
'paradox o f g r a c e ' as an approach to C h r i s t o l o g y i s c o n s i d e r e d . 
The c o n c l u s i o n ( V I I I ) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e have been two t r a d i t i o n a l 
approaches to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f g r a c e , the P r o t e s t a n t and the 
C a t h o l i c , b ut t h a t a t h i r d has emerged which b e g i n s from c r e a t i o n 
r a t h e r than redemption. As f a r as B r i t i s h t heology i s concerned i t 
i s c h i e f l y r e p r e s e n t e d by Oman. I t i s w i d e l y i n f l u e n t i a l but i t s 
i n f l u e n c e i s not always r e c o g n i s e d . 
B.G. WOREALL. 
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JAMES DENNEY TO D.M. B A I L L I E . 
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PREFACE 
T h i s t h e s i s i s an attempt to look a t some movements i n B r i t i s h 
Theology i n the f i r s t h a l f o f the p r e s e n t c e n t u r y "by a s t u d y o f f i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t h i n k e r s . The d o c t r i n e of g r a c e i s u s e d as a l i n k i n g 
theme bo t h because o f i t s c e n t r a l importance i n C h r i s t i a n thought, and 
a l s o because i t i s a s u b j e c t to which B r i t i s h T h e o l o g i a n s have always 
g i v e n a good d e a l of a t t e n t i o n . However, the p r e s e n t study i s 
i n t e n d e d to f a l l more i n the realm of H i s t o r i c a l Theology than t h a t 
o f D o c t r i n e . Because the T h e o l o g i a n s chosen are of such d i f f e r e n t 
t r a d i t i o n s and t h e o l o g i a a l o u t l o o k no attempt has been made to adopt 
the same method of p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r each o f them o r to make easy 
c o m p a r i s o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s I have t r i e d to keep i n mind the q u e s t i o n s 
r a i s e d on p 16 and to make some g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the c o n c l u s i o n . 
P a r t s o f Chapter I I are adapted from work a l r e a d y s u b m i t t e d i n 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n to my M.A. T h e s i s 'The D o c t r i n e of A u t h o r i t y i n the 
Theology of P.T. F o r s y t h ' (1964). O c c a s i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s to F o r s y t h 
throughout come from the same s o u r c e . 
I am g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r N.H.G. Robinson of S t . Mary's C o l l e g e 
i n the U n i v e r s i t y of S t . Andrews who a r r a n g e d f o r me to see some o f 
the u n p u b l i s h e d work o f h i s p r e d e c e s s o r D.M. B a i l l i e . 
I . HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
I t i s a commonplace observation i n h i s t o r i e s of Christian 
doctrine that the early church never formulated an orthodox doctrine 
of the work of Christ. While C h r i s t i a n i t y was cl e a r l y based on 
be l i e f s about the person and work of Jesus no orthodox answer was 
given to such questions as: What difference did his incarnation, 
death and resurrection make to men and the world? Why was his work 
necessary? To whom was i t directed? and, given that i t had some 
important e f f e c t , how i s that effect to be conveyed to men and women 
of l a t e r generations? 
We read of long, complicated, and often heated debates, f i r s t 
about Jesus relationship to the Father leading to the councils of 
Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (38l)» and then about the relationship 
of Godhead and Manhood i n his person leading to the d e f i n i t i o n of 
the Council of Chalcedon (451)• The deliberations of these councils 
did not at once lead to an end of the debates concerned, but 
increasingly t h e i r conclusions came to be accepted as normative, 
marking the boundaries with i n which Christian thought on these topics 
should move. As a r e s u l t the so-called Catholic creeds, accepted, 
at least i n theory, by orthodox Christians, and used by many of them 
i n worship, include assertions on Jesus' Godhead and person. Yet 
strangely, apart from one phrase 'for us men and f o r our salvation', 
the great creeds of Christendom are s i l e n t about Jesus' work. One 
could get the impression that the questions with which we began, 
questions about the very purpose of i t a l l and about the difference 
which he made to the human s i t u a t i o n and man's r e l a t i o n to God were 
never raised. Indeed i t i s sometimes asserted that they were not. 
This i s an over s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , but ce r t a i n l y these questions 
were not debated i n the early centuries with the same vigour as the 
other questions we have noted. They were not then the great storm 
centres of theological controversy they became i n l a t e r periods of 
the church's h i s t o r y . I t i s reasonable that we should ask why 
t h i s was so. 
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Paradoxically i t seems l i k e l y that the r e l a t i v e paucity of 
argument among the fathers regarding Christ's work i s due not to 
lack of interest i n i t hut to certainty about i t , and to the r e l a t i v e 
wealth of material r e l a t i n g to i t i n the New Testament. The 
Bishops at Nicaea seem to have been rather suspicious of the word 
•homoousion1, p a r t l y because of i t s meaning i n current and e a r l i e r 
Greek usage, but more p a r t i c u l a r l y because i t was not a B i b l i c a l 
word. They would have preferred a B i b l i c a l word f o r a B i b l i c a l 
idea, but could not f i n d one. Similarly, the protagonists i n the 
debates leading to Chalcedon were careful to buttress t h e i r 
arguments by reference to scripture. But the..fact that the same 
passages could be claimed f o r d i f f e r e n t schools of thought suggest 
that the question of the r e l a t i o n of Godhead and manhood i n Christ 
i s not to be se t t l e d by a simple appeal to scripture. 
The s i t u a t i o n seems quite d i f f e r e n t when we turn to the question 
of the work of Christ. Not only was i t d e f i n i t e l y dealt with by 
the New Testament w r i t e r s , i t was the great f a c t which had brought 
both the church and the New Testament i t s e l f i n t o existence. We 
have an almost embarrassing number of references. Indeed, f o r l a t e r 
ages the number of references and the v a r i e t y of metaphors used 
became a problem i n constructing 'theories of the atonement'. But 
the fathers seem largely content to accept and repeat the B i b l i c a l 
phrases, sometimes embellishing the metaphors but not doubting the 
underlying f a c t . 
The basic unarguable f a c t about the whole work of Christ was, 
as the creed was l a t e r to say, that i t was 'for us men and f o r our 
salvation'. Paul defines his Gospel b r i e f l y as "the power of God 
unto salvation to everyone that believes" (Rom 1:16). I t i s an 
a c t i v i t y of God by which men are saved. The basic idea i s 
eschatological. From r e f e r r i n g to deliverance i n purely human terms, 
that i s from an enemy or an i l l n e s s , the idea of salvation among the 
Jews had become by New Testament times p a r t i c u l a r l y associated with 
God's f i n a l judgement of the world. I n t h i s sense i t was a future 
hope f o r pious I s r a e l i t e s . 
Against t h i s background the f i r s t Christians spoke of the 
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Gospel as a message, or an active power, of salvation. The 
judgement, the l a s t days i n which God's purpose f o r the world was to 
he revealed, had somehow already come (Acts 2:16, Heb 1:1-4). They 
realised, of course, that the world as i t had always been was s t i l l 
going on. This they explained as an overlap of t h i s present age by 
the age to come ( l Cor 10:11), or as the p a r a l l e l existence of t h i s 
world and another (John 18:36). The period of overlap would l a s t 
u n t i l Christ returned i n glory. Meanwhile, to receive salvation 
was to be transferred by God from one age, or world, to the other, 
while apparently s t i l l l i v i n g i n the f i r s t . Hence the apparent 
contradiction, or confusion, about the time of salvation. Christians 
are i n some sense already saved (Rom 8:24, 11 Tim 1:9); they are i n the 
process of being saved ( l Cor 15*2, P h i l 2:12); yet t h e i r salvation 
i s s t i l l a future hope (Rom 13:11, 1 Pet 1:5). G.K. Barrett 
explains i t thus, "Salvation i t s e l f l i e s i n the future ... and means 
man's eventual safe passage through human t r i a l s and divine judgement 
to eternal b l i s s . I n p a r t i c u l a r salvation means being saved from 
the wrath of God ... (but f o r Christians) ... The salvation ready to 
be revealed at the l a s t time, though i t could be complete only at the 
return of the Messiah i n glory, was already, i n v i r t u e of his death 
and resurrection, anticipated i n the present." (Romans p 27f). 
Salvation, of course, i s not the only word used i n the New 
Testament to describe the work of Christ. I t i s also asserted that 
men are ' j u s t i f i e d ' or declared righteous at law (Rom 5 s i ) ; they are 
reconciled to God ( l l Cor 5tl8); they are forgiven, or granted 
remission of sins (Acts 10:43); and they are redeemed or ransomed 
(Gal 3 i l 3 ) . Furthermore the actual death of Christ i s referred to 
as a s a c r i f i c e (Rom 3s24); and his blood i s compared to that of the 
cleansing and covenant renewing sacrifices of I s r a e l (Heb 9sl4f). 
A l l these metaphors are used to express the work of Christ, or 
rather God's a c t i v i t y i n him on man's behalf. They seem to be 
summed up i n one a l l - i n c l u s i v e phrase covering a l l aspects of 
salvation, the expression 'the grace of God'. 
The Greek word 'charis* o r i g i n a l l y means beauty or charm, flowing 
i n t o the English sense of graciousness of manner or appearance. I n 
a secondary sense i t has the meaning of a 'favour' or 'kindness' 
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shown by one person to another, p a r t i c u l a r l y when shown by a 
superior to an I n f e r i o r when there i s no natural t i e between them 
and the one bestowing the favour can expect no commensurate return. 
This secondary meaning gives the basic New Testament understanding. 
I t i s taken over from the Septuagint where 'charis' i s used to 
translate the hebrew 'chen1, and the Old Testament phrase 'to f i n d 
favour* - 'masa chen' - i s rendered 'eurein charin*. ^ 
Just as Yahweh had shown favour to I s r a e l i n choosing them f o r 
no merit of t h e i r own and r e d i r e c t i n g them by his active love, so the 
early Christians f e l t that he had been active i n t h e i r l i v e s , choosing 
and red i r e c t i n g them. What the complex of events surrounding the 
Exodus and Covenant had been f o r the Old I s r a e l , Jesus, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y his cross and resurrection, was f o r the New I s r a e l . I n 
both cases we see undeserved favour from a superior, expressed i n 
action and leading to a covenant r e l a t i o n . 
The classic New Testament example of t h i s relationship i s found 
i n the case of Paul, and i t i s i n his writings that the word and 
idea i s most frequently found. Paul probably began his own thinking 
from his experience on the Damascus Road. Here, e n t i r e l y without 
regard to his own deserving, God had taken hold of him and redirected 
his l i f e . This involved the forgiveness of his past persecuting 
zeal, and a complete remoulding of his future plans and a t t i t u d e , 
( l Gor 15:10, Gal l : 1 5 f ) . Whereas he had previously found the centre 
and purpose of his l i f e i n the Law and devout Judaism, he came to a 
new valuation i n which these things were replaced by the knowledge of 
God i n Christ ( P h i l 3:4-ll)» A l l "this was based, he believed, on a 
personal encounter with the c r u c i f i e d and risen Christ i n whom God 
acted i n dealing with the sins of the world and c a l l i n g men to himself 
(Rom 3:24, 11 Cor 5:18ff). 
But Paul does not believe that he i s unique. A l l Christians, 
he implies, have known a similar experience. They have known an 
1. I t would be beyond the scope of t h i s study to trace the idea 
back to conceptions of 'mana' found i n p r i m i t i v e r e l i g i o n s . 
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encounter with God i n which he took the i n i t i a t i v e and acted upon them, 
changing t h e i r l i v e s by cancelling the past and s e t t i n g them on a new 
way. Their experience did not come with a b l i n d i n g f l a s h of l i g h t . 
I t came through the preaching of the 'Word of the Gross', ( l Thess 1:9» 
Gal 3:1, 1 Cor 1:18-31» 2:1-5). I n t h e i r response to the preaching 
the act of God i n Christ comes home to them. 
The case i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t , though expressed i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways, elsewhere i n the New Testament. The Synoptics 
present Jesus as the one who, i n his own person, brings the Kingdom or 
power of God; he releases men from physical and s p i r i t u a l bondage 
(Mk 2:1-10); breaks the power of Satan (Mk 3:21-30); c a l l s f o r 
s a c r i f i c i a l l o y a l t y to himself, involving a new d i r e c t i o n of l i f e 
(Mk 10:17-22); and f i n a l l y his work reaches i t s d i v i n e l y appointed 
conclusion, or i s summed up, i n his death by which he establishes a 
new covenant to replace the old, or rather l i f t i t to a new and f u l l e r 
meaning (Mk 14:22-25). I n John too we are presented with an act of 
God i n Christ by which the unmerited favour of God i s shown f o r man's 
good, or, paradoxically, his judgement (John 3sl6ff). Those who 
respond are, by that f a c t , transferred to another sphere or mode of 
existence (John 8:12; 11:25), which they could not have attained alone. 
New Testament ideas of grace seem to come to a head i n Ephesians 
2:1-10. I t has been argued, largely from t h i s e p i s t l e , that Paul 
understands grace c h i e f l y as the extension of the covenant privileges 
of I s r a e l to the Gentiles.^ No doubt t h i s i s a strand of his thought, 
but here we see not only the breaking down of b a r r i e r s , but the 
s e t t i n g of the entire covenant relationship on a new foundation i n the 
work of Christ. When he writes "we were dead" and "God quickened us", 
he i s not merely using a preacher's technique i n including himself 
w i t h his hearers, or readers, he i s st a t i n g what i s i n f a c t the case. 
I n t h i s passage we see most c l e a r l y that grace i s God's favour 
personally active i n Christ. We see also that i t i s the more 
remarkable i n that, though men's sins may have deserved a very 
d i f f e r e n t treatment, God has acted from sheer mercy and love on t h e i r 
behalf, bestowing a g i f t they could not earn and f o r which they can 
1. cf J. Armitage Eobinson: Ephesians pp 221-228. 
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take no credi t f o r themselves. We need not ask here whether t h i s 
passage i s Pauline. Certainly i t does not mention a l l the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Pauline emphases, but i n the sense of wonder that suffuses i t , i t 
seems correctly to r e f l e c t the apostle's basic understanding of grace 
and his thankful confidence i n the work of God i n Christ. 
But the New Testament contains other ideas of grace which seem 
to flow from t h i s basic one of God's redemptive a c t i v i t y . The 
favour of God confers a status and seems to flow over i n t o a power 
which keeps men i n that status. I t i s probably i n t h i s sense that 
the word i s to be understood i n the salutations with which Paul begins 
his l e t t e r s . The readers had already experienced the i n i t i a l 
transforming encounter with God i n Christ. Therefore, unless these 
greetings are to be understood as a regression to normal pagan Greek 
usage, we must reckon with a weakening of the word's normal Christian 
meaning, or at least a lessening of the stress on immediate 
experience. 
Similarly the g i f t of grace can easily become ' g i f t s ' or 'graces'. 
Paul refers to his apostleship as a 'charin' (Rom 15:15); the 
willingness of Macedonian Christians to give to the c o l l e c t i o n i s 
likewise the 'charin' apparently given by God f o r that purpose; and 
individual talents are 'graces according to grace' - 'charismata kata 
charin' (Rom 12:6). Later the g i f t of ordination i s referred to as 
a 'charismatos' ( l Tim 4*14)• 
The l a s t usage mentioned seems to have moved some way from the 
main use we have noticed. There seems to be something of a drop i n 
temperature, a lessening of the immediacy of the experience of God's 
personal i n i t i a t i v e i n Christ, though the idea of dependence on God 
f o r what man could not expect or achieve alone i s B t i l l present. 
This i s referred to by some as a move towards a more 'catholic' 
p o s i t i o n , and the development of t h i s position i n the early church, 
and indeed much l a t e r , i s often considered to be a decline from a 
purer New Testament position. I t may well be that i t i s a decline, 
but i t s beginning i n the New Testament i t s e l f should be noted. 
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To return to the questions from which we "began i t may well he 
that t h i s wealth of B i b l i c a l material explains the r e l a t i v e lack of 
debate on t h i s subject i n the early church. I t was natural too 
that the mind of the early church should be given to matters which 
seemed to raise the greatest problems f o r thinkers of the day. Thus 
there i s a tendency to concentrate on the one-ness and unit y of God, 
and the h i s t o r i c i t y of Jesus. The work of Christ and i t s benefits 
would not therefore r i s e very early f o r debate. But i t does not 
follow that these subjects were absent from the innermost thoughts of 
the fathers. They appear i n the l i t u r g y and are frequently touched 
upon i n sermonic contexts, though there i t was considered s u f f i c i e n t 
merely to repeat the B i b l i c a l language. I t could be that the thought 
of the church simply lagged behind i t s experience. 
However, when a l l allowances of t h i s sort have been made, there 
i s a noticeable change of mood when passing from the New Testament to 
the immediately sub-apostolic w r i t e r s . The joy of forgiveness, the 
sense of immediacy and intensely personal response to the i n i t i a t i v e 
of God i n Christ which we found i n Paul has diminished. I n place of 
thankfulness f o r the unmerited action of God we f i n d a heavy emphasis 
on man's need to repent and make himself worthy of the forgiveness 
offered; or, l a t e r , on the necessity f o r correct b e l i e f to win 
salvation. I t i s the power of Christ's example which i s set before 
men as a spur, rather than the effectiveness of his work as a cause 
of thankfulness. Instead of being part of man's response to God 
repentance and b e l i e f are presented as themselves the means of 
earning salvation. 
I l l u s t r a t i o n s of t h i s mood can be found i n 1 Clement, the 
pseudonymous homily 11 Clement, and, most easily, i n the l e t t e r s of 
Ignatius, as well as i n other writings of the period such as the 
2 
e p i s t l e of Barnabas and the epis t l e to Diognetus. Basic to t h i s 
sort of thinking i s what might be called a ' l i g h t ' doctrine of s i n . 
1. c f J.N.D. Kelly: Early Christian Creeds ch 3. esp pp 66-70. 
2. cf 1 Clement. 7. Library of Christian Classics Vol 1 p 47; 
11 Clement. 3»4. i b i d p 194; Ignatius, To the Romans, 3:2, 
4:1. i b i d p 104. 
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Man's state i s not so serious as to need external Divine intervention. 
There i s no sense of radical estrangement or r e b e l l i o n . Sin i s 
rather lack of knowledge, or at worst occasional disobedience. Man 
needs to be t o l d what to do, and, by obedience, can put himself r i g h t 
w ith God. 
Of course the et h i c a l approach i s not an ignoble one. I t could 
be. presented as deliverance from an anxious and meaningless l i f e . The 
picture of Jesus as the great example i s c e r t a i n l y one l i n e of thought 
i n the New Testament, and when he i s seen as the pattern given by God 
some element of divine i n i t i a t i v e remains. Later the concept of 
example merges int o the idea of i l l u m i n a t i o n , often associated with 
the g i f t of immortality, but by then the e a r l i e r man-centred moralism 
tends to be reduced to one strand, and that not the most important, i n 
redemption thinking. J.N.D. Kelly sums up t h i s approach, " I t must 
be admitted that, as compared with the New Testament, the Apostolic 
Fathers as a whole are not greatly pre-occupied with s i n , and that 
t h e i r writings exhibit a marked weakening of the atonement idea. 
Although s a t i s f i e d that Christ died f o r us ... they assign a r e l a t i v e l y 
minor place to the atoning value of His death. What looms much larger 
i n t h e i r imagination i s the picture of Christ as the lawgiver, the 
bestower of knowledge, immortality and fellowship with God." (Early 
Christian Doctrines p 165).^ One i s l e f t with the f e e l i n g that the 
death of Christ was rather a drastic cure f o r a minor ailment. 
The f i r s t major P a t r i s t i c w r i t e r to give anything l i k e a systematic 
treatment of atonement was Irenaeus. Against gnosticism and i t s 
contempt f o r creation he sought to establish the u n i t y of God; the 
uniqueness and effectiveness of the redemptive work of Jesus; and 
God's concern f o r creation, which leads to his r e l a t i n g redemption to 
a l l creation. 
His thought on redemption includes the need f o r teaching or 
il l u m i n a t i o n . He also has adumbrations of what might be called a 
theory of redemption by d e i f i c a t i o n - 'He became man i n order that we 
might become as God'. But he i s c h i e f l y known as a representative 
1. For similar comments cf H.R. Mackintosh: The Christian Experience 
of Forgiveness p 113; R.S. Paul : The Atonement and the 
Sacraments p 36f. 
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of what has come to "be called the 'Classic' or 'Dramatic' theory; 
that Christ won a v i c t o r y over h o s t i l e forces on man's behalf, i n t o 
which men may enter. I n se t t i n g out his argument he has two 
intertwined themes which may loosely be described as recapitulation 
and dualist exchange. 
The theme of recapitulation can be understood at two level s . 
At i t s simplest i t presents a contrast between Adam and Jesus i n 
which Jesus i s seen going over the whole course of Adam's his t o r y and 
pu t t i n g i t r i g h t by making the r i g h t decisions where Adam made the 
wrong ones. The advantage of such a theory, s e t t i n g aside the 
mythological overtones, i s that the whole l i f e of Christ i s involved 
i n his redemptive work. At every point he meets the enemies h o s t i l e 
to men and overcomes them. I n t h i s sense, though the theory i s most 
2 
f u l l y worked out i n Irenaeus, such ideas are found i n other fathers. 
But at a deeper l e v e l t h i s idea can be seen not only as a 
r e p e t i t i o n of Adam's story, but as a summing up of the purposes of 
God f o r man and the whole of creation. Creation and redemption are 
drawn together as Jesus embodies i n himself the course of human his t o r y 
purposed by God from the beginning. This introduces two important 
ideas. F i r s t that God acts i n a way that i s ' f i t t i n g ' ; as man's 
p l i g h t came from an indi v i d u a l choosing wrongly i t i s apt that his 
redemption should come from an individual choosing r i g h t l y . Secondly 
there i s here the very important idea of the s o l i d a r i t y of the race; 
as men were 'solid with Adam1, so they may be 'solid with C h r i s t 1 . 
The idea of duall'ist exchange also proceeds on the basis of what 
i s ' f i t t i n g ' f o r God. Redemption i s rescue from Satan's power. 
Satan has no real claim on men, he has usurped authority from God, 
yet i t would not be ' f i t t i n g ' f o r God to dispossess him by violence. 
Even i n dealing with Satan God must be shown to be j u s t . Thus we 
have the idea of Christ's self-donation f o r the redemption of men. 
1. cf Library of Christian Classics Vol 1 p 389f. 
2. cf H.E.W. Turner: The P a t r i s t i c Doctrine of Redemption pp 49-53* 
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This idea of payment i s variously interpreted. I s i t payment 
to the Devil, or picturesque language indicating the cost to Christ? 
Many scholars wish to r e s i s t the idea of payment to the Devil.''' But 
some idea of a price paid i s c e r t a i n l y a reasonable understanding of 
Irenaeus' words, "Redeeming us by his. blood i n accordance with h i s 
reasonable nature, he gave himself a ransom for those who had been 
led into c a p t i v i t y . " (Adversus Haereses 5:1, LCC Vol 1 p 385). 
Though t h i s i s not the most prominent idea i n Irenaeus treatment of 
the subject, the germ of l a t e r elaborations i s c e r t a i n l y present. 
On t h i s theory, the benefits of Christ's work should flow to a l l 
men regardless of t h e i r attitude, j u s t as the disadvantages of Adam's 
disobedience had done. Such u n i l a t e r a l action by God, by which men 
are saved almost i n spite of themselves, i s not an easy idea, but i t 
may be there i s a deep truth here, that the human situ a t i o n and 'the 
way things are generally 1 are different since the work of C h r i s t . We 
s h a l l return to such ideas. Elsewhere, and more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , 
2 
Irenaeus suggests men appropriate salvation through the sacraments. 
The idea of human s o l i d a r i t y , that the race i s i n some profound 
sense one entity, lends i t s e l f to what could be c a l l e d a doctrine of 
de i f i c a t i o n either p h y s i c a l l y or mystically. That which i s done i n 
humanity at one point holds good for the whole race. Such thinking 
sees the r e s u l t of Adam's disobedience as los s of immortality and the 
passing of corruption to the race. Man's need i s then more restoration 
and recovery from corruption than rescue from p e r i l or punishment. 
Perhaps the best exponent of t h i s type of thought was Athanasius. 
He can also describe man as under the control of a rebel - Satan -
whose rebel l i o n w i l l be put down by the mere appearance of the true 
king.^ Usually however he sees s i n as corruption. This corruption 
1. c f E.R. Hardy: Library of Chri s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol 1 p 351» Less 
dogmatically, H.E.W. Turner: op o i t p 54« 
2. Adv Haer 5si Library of Ch r i s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol 1 p 388. 
3. de Inc 55 Library of Chri s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol 111 p 109. 
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leads to death. The Logos, having taken humanity i n the person of 
Jesus, suffers the common l o t of man. But the indwelling Logos and 
the obedient l i f e l i v e d make the death of t h i s one body equivalent to 
the death of a l l humanity ( a hint of a price paid), and since the 
Logos i s by nature incorruptible the resurrection naturally follows. 
Such i s the r e a l i s t i c connection between the humanity assumed by the 
Logos and a l l other humanity that the incorruption and victo r y over 
death present there overflow to the r e s t of the race. Athanasius 
i l l u s t r a t e d t h i s by a parable. When a king v i s i t s a c i t y , though he 
only l i v e s i n one house, the entire c i t y i s honoured."*" Gregory of 
Nyssa has a s i m i l a r idea when he speaks of the Logos taking humanity 
2 
from 'the lump of our humanity 1. 
There i s i n Athanasius a suggestion that death (or Satan) had 
over-reached i t s e l f i n taking Jesus, an idea based on 1 Cor 2:8. 
This led to a good deal of elaboration leading to the notorious 
analogy of Gregory of Nyssa where the humanity of Jesus i s seen as 
3 
the b a i t on the hook of h i s d i v i n i t y . For t h i s type of thinking 
the benefits of Christ's work are passed on to men through the 
sacraments. 
So f a r we have considered only the Eastern Greek fathers. I n 
the West the predominant mood was l e g a l i s t i c , and Western thought was 
simpler, more objective, and has, on the whole, been more i n f l u e n t i a l 
i n English Religious thought. 
The two important names are T e r t u l l i a n and Augustine. 
T e r t u l l i a n ' s great concern was for the moral l i f e of the church. He 
accepted that each offence deserved an appropriate punishment, and 
applied t h i s way of thinking to relati o n s between God and man, teaching 
that good deeds earned merit i n the sight of God and that e v i l ones 
needed s a t i s f a c t i o n . Thus the important terms, 'merit 1 and 
'satisfa c t i o n * were introduced into Western theology. 
1. de Inc 9 Library of Chri s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol 111 p 63 
2. Address on Religious Instruction 33 Library of Chri s t i a n C l a s s i c s 
Vol 111 p 310 
3. i b i d 24 p 301* For a sympathetic modern discussion of t h i s 
analogy cf F.W. D i l l i s t o n e : The Chr i s t i a n Understanding of 
Atonement p 97f• 
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Perhaps more importantly T e r t u l l i a n introduced the idea of grace 
as a quasi-physical energy injected into the believer by sacraments. 
Baptism conveys forgiveness for o r i g i n a l s i n and s i n before baptism, 
for l a t e r sins s a t i s f a c t i o n must be made. I n a s t r i c t l y l e g a l sense 
to make s a t i s f a c t i o n i s the same as to bear punishment, but T e r t u l l i a n 
did not see i t i n t h i s sense. The s a t i s f a c t i o n s of almsgiving, 
prayer, fas t i n g , etc. were grounds on which God might annul the 
punishment due, but were not themselves the punishment. Int e r e s t i n g l y 
he does not seem to have used the term s a t i s f a c t i o n i n speaking of 
the r e l a t i o n of Christ's death to s i n . Yet he prepared the way for 
others to do so. 
Later Western fathers used T e r t u l l i a n * s terminology and developed 
more c l e a r l y the idea of substitution. S a c r i f i c i a l language i s used, 
and s a c r i f i c e i s understood as penal s a t i s f a c t i o n or substitution. 
Jesus i s seen as a s a c r i f i c i a l victim dying to meet the demands of 
divine j u s t i c e . Language used i n the East for the ' C l a s s i c 1 view 
i s here used i n a penal way. 
F i n a l l y the greatest of the Western fathers, Augustine, though 
he has other views as well, sees the death of Christ c h i e f l y as 
vicarious and substitutionary. Like T e r t u l l i a n too he sees grace as 
a divinely infused energy, infused through the sacraments, by which 
man performs good works. Together with h i s tremendous stre s s on 
the free pardon of God through C h r i s t , and an insistence that a l l good 
works come from God's grace, he wants to find a place f o r merit. 
The argument becomes c i r c u l a r , " I n the end i t i s not the sinner, 
joined by f a i t h to the saviour and reconciled to God, who i s acquitted 
at the judgement-seat; i t i s the saint who appears clothed i n h i s own 
merits, the love and good works which he owes to God's i n s p i r i n g 
grace." (C.N. Moody, cite d by H.R. Mackintosh, op c i t p 118). This 
complex of thinking dominated Western theology u n t i l the Reformation. 
Following Augustine the next r e a l l y outstanding contribution to 
the subject was Anselm's 'Cur Deus Homo'. As the idea of payment or 
punishment,(^the two were not c l e a r l y distinguished^) had become 
accepted orthodoxy, the chief problem was on the propriety of God 
making any payment to Satan. Anselm set aside any question of 
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payment to Satan, seeing man's r e l a t i o n s o l e l y towards God, and 
replaced the idea of punishment by that of s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
The "background i s feudal society. The serf who does not pay h i s 
dues to h i s lord has broken h i s contract and insulted the lord's 
dignity. E i t h e r he must make s a t i s f a c t i o n by paying what i s due, 
plus a l i t t l e extra to cover the i n s u l t , or he must be punished. I f 
he i s punished, probably by death, the lord would s t i l l not get h i s 
due or s a t i s f a c t i o n for h i s offended honour. Hence s a t i s f a c t i o n and 
punishment are mutually exclusive. 
Transferring t h i s to man's r e l a t i o n to God, s i n i s both a 
withholding of the obedience due and a s l i g h t on God's honour. Should 
any s i n f u l man henceforth l i v e a perfect l i f e t h i s would only be what 
was due i n the present, i t would not make reparation for past sins or 
offended honour. Now, i t i s a basic premise f o r Anselm that s i n 
without s a t i s f a c t i o n must be punished, i t would not be ' f i t t i n g ' for 
God simply to forgive."'" But i t i s also a fundamental axiom that man 
was made fo r blessedness, and God's purpose would have f a i l e d i f he 
2 
did not achieve i t . I t was i n order that God should escape from t h i s 
dilemma - to put i t crudely - that Jesus became man. 
I n C h rist God himself provided the f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n . His 
perfect l i f e was what he as man owed, but h i s death was more than God 
demanded since God does not ask for the death of a perfect man. 
Furthermore, as Son of God h i s death was of i n f i n i t e worth. I t 
followed that God owed him something, since an i n f i n i t e l y good l i f e 
merits an i n f i n i t e reward. Chr i s t , as God, lacked nothing, hence 
h i s reward was made available to the r e s t of mankind as an i n f i n i t e 
s a t i s f a c t i o n to be offered .to God. 
The external and a r t i f i c i a l nature of t h i s scheme i s e a s i l y 
c r i t i c i s e d . But i t does take s i n seriously and omits the idea of 
payment to Satan. I t was b a s i c a l l y t h i s scheme which, codified by 
Aquinas, governed medieval theology. Aquinas was simply more 
1. Cur Deus Homo 1:12 Library of C h r i s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol X p 120 
2. i b i d 11:1 Library of C h r i s t i a n C l a s s i c s Vol X p 146 
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concerned to i n s i s t that the benefits of Christ's work came to men 
through the sacraments. He also developed the idea of infused grace 
enabling men to earn merit i n vir t u e of which they might appear 
confidently before God. 
The one great medieval thinker who stood out against t h i s was 
Peter Abelard. For him complicated arguments about whether Christ's 
death was a ransom price, a punishment or a s a t i s f a c t i o n , simply 
missed the point. Men had disobeyed God but a l l they needed to do 
was to repent. God was w i l l i n g to forgive them and Jesus was the 
bearer and the pledge of th i s forgiveness. His patience through 
misunderstanding, persecution and suffering were both a revelation of 
God's attitude and a c a l l to men to repent. The sheer s i m p l i c i t y of 
Abelard's presentation made him a t t r a c t i v e to many at the beginning 
of t h i s century, and we s h a l l consider the representation of h i s 
thought i n the work of Hastings Rashdall. 
I t i s scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Reformation was a 
dispute about the significance of the work of C h r i s t and the means by 
which i t s benefit was appropriated. Luther and Calvin sought to 
recover the New Testament sense of immediacy and free personal 
intercourse with a forgiving and active God. Luther c r i t i c i s e d the 
Roman sacramental system and claimed that the gospel of free forgiveness, 
which he found through the scriptures, had, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, 
been trapped i n the system. Both Reformers s t r e s s the importance 
of scripture and the work of the Holy S p i r i t i n conveying grace to 
the f a i t h f u l , though they would claim not to undervalue the true 
role of sacraments. 
I f the s t r e s s on personal experience was different, i t could be 
claimed that on what might be c a l l e d the 'mechanics' of the work of 
Christ t h e i r thought was largely a continuation of what had gone 
before. Since the publication of Aulen's 'Christus Victor' i t has 
been widely argued that Luther was an exponent of the ' C l a s s i c ' 
theory of atonement. Some of h i s language supports t h i s , but h i s 
chief emphasis i s on penal substitution, C h r i s t bearing the 
punishment which was due to s i n f u l men."1. But when he uses the 
1« c f Commentary on Galatians 3sl3» 4'4» and passim. 
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metaphor of a court room, and speaks of C h r i s t making s a t i s f a c t i o n 
for the sins of men, t h i s i s not a return to Anselm's thinking. With 
Anselm the picture was of God appearing before some independent judge 
as a p l a i n t i f f against man i n a c i v i l action, with Luther the idea i s 
of God as the judge and man as the accused i n a criminal action. 
Calvin too s t r e s s e s the substitutionary element, and seems to see 
s a c r i f i c e as substitutionary suffering. He suggests that the 
B i b l i c a l language which speaks of God's wrath against s i n i s an 
accommodation to men's understanding, but i n s i s t s that i t must s t i l l 
be taken very seriously. But he s p e c i f i c a l l y guards himself against 
the idea of a loving Son placating an angry Father, he was f a r too 
good a B i b l i c a l scholar for that, "The love of God the Father precedes 
our r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n C h r i s t j or rather i t i s because he f i r s t loves, 
that he afterwards reconciles us to himself." ( I n s t 11:16:3). This 
point i s worth emphasising since i t i s an advance on many previous 
positions, and also on many l a t e r so-called C a l v i n i s t ones. 
Both Luther and Calvin also speak of the perfect l i f e of C h r i s t 
being imputed to the believer, and of the importance of Jesus as a 
teacher. I n spite of h i s s t r e s s on the cross, Calvin argues that the 
whole l i f e of C h r i s t works our atonement, and has a r i c h stream of 
'deification' thinking when he stresses the believer's incorporation 
into C h r i s t . But with both i t was the s t r e s s on immediate personal 
response which set them aside from the complicated medieval system. 
At the end of the Reformation period the main l i n e s had been set 
along which thinking on t h i s subject was to proceed u n t i l f a i r l y 
recent times. The f o s s i l i s i n g of Calvin's thought by such Puritan 
divines as John Owen and Jonathan Edwards seemed at l e a s t to make 
the whole thing c l e a r . Even the view of Grotius, that Christ's 
sufferings are not exactly equivalent to men's deserts but that they 
maintain the r e l a t i o n of God to His creatures as a j u s t 'Rector', 
moves within the same complex of ideas. I t was i n d i r e c t opposition 
to Edwards' Calvinism that McLeod Campbell attempted to draw attention 
away from (What C h r i s t does f o r us, to what he does i n us, and to use 
more personal and l e s s external categories. j\ A movement which, we 
s h a l l see, carried on into the twentieth century. 
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We have seen then that the work of C h r i s t can "be seen as 
e t h i c a l example; vicarious victory; entry of divine influence to 
reverse the corruption of the race and "bestow the g i f t of d e i f i c a t i o n ; 
s a t i s f a c t i o n ; perfect s a c r i f i c e or penal substitution. Frequently 
more than one view i s found i n the same theologian and each has a 
number of v a r i a t i o n s . 
Turning to the appropriation of Christ's work we see the power of 
moral i n s p i r a t i o n ; the illumination of divine wisdom; the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a work done for men almost i n spite of themselves of which they 
need to be told; s t r e s s on sacraments; and s t r e s s on immediate 
experience, normally associated with scripture and preaching. Often 
these variations lead to a d i v i s i o n between those theories which are 
broadly objective, s t r e s s i n g what God has done f o r men, and those 
which are broadly subjective, s t r e s s i n g what he does i n men; though 
t h i s d i v i s i o n i t s e l f i s open to c r i t i c i s m . We s h a l l keep these 
varying theories and responses i n mind as we consider f i v e 
representative English theologians of the early Twentieth century. 
However, we must note that different h i s t o r i c a l periods and 
different temperaments bring forth different types of theory. An 
age conscious of h o s t i l e forces was doubtless receptive to the ' C l a s s i c ' 
view; one conscious of decay would respond to ideas of d e i f i c a t i o n ; 
Anselm's teaching very c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s h i s feudal background; and the 
l e g a l terminology of the Reformers and t h e i r followers reflected t h e i r 
own age. Furthermore the different approaches of an Abelard or a 
Luther seem c l e a r l y to r e f l e c t the temperament and experiences of the 
men concerned as well as the problems of t h e i r age. Therefore, 
before proceeding, i t w i l l be necessary to look, very broadly, at the 
background of thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l i g i o u s thought, i n the f i r s t 
h a l f of the twentieth century. 
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I I . THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
James Denney was born i n 1856. He established h i s reputation as 
a B i b l i c a l Scholar and Theologian i n the l a s t decade of the nineteenth 
century, and became Professor of Systematic and Pastoral Theology at 
Glasgow i n 1897. Donald B a i l l i e ' s best known book 'God was i n C h r i s t ' 
was f i r s t published i n 1947• An appendix to i t was the l a s t 
writing he completed before h i s death i n 1954» Our background 
therefore covers nearly three-quarters of a century. I t was a period 
which saw great changes i n the position of Great B r i t a i n and the 
attitude of her people, not only t h e i r r e l i g i o u s attitude. 
In the closing years of V i c t o r i a ' s reign and for some time 
afterwards England was the centre of the largest and most powerful 
empire the world had known. Rich and powerful she seemed to face the 
future with confidence and a rather smug sense of security. I n spite 
of growing s o c i a l unrest and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the r i g i d c l a s s 
system, the prevailing mood was of complacency and optimism. 
The England of the nineteen f i f t i e s could i n many respects hardly 
have been more di f f e r e n t . Two world wars had shattered the complacency 
and d r a s t i c a l l y altered England's position. The empire was on the 
way to becoming a commonwealth, opportunities i n Europe seemed to have 
passed, and even her most chauvinistic leaders were obliged to admit 
that B r i t a i n was no longer a f i r s t c l a s s world power. 
There had been gains. The Welfare State was on the way to 
becoming a r e a l i t y , and great s t r i d e s had been made i n such f i e l d s as 
health and education. But i t was accompanied for many by a sense of 
sad disillusionment. The New Jerusalem did not look l i k e providing 
a sense of security among i t s inhabitants. Use of atomic power at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had produced a sense of disenchantment with 
humanity. There was an uneasy awareness that a war of unimaginable 
horror was a p o s s i b i l i t y , and, for the f i r s t time i n centuries, no 
Englishman would be i n a position to do anything at a l l about i t . 
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Some were convinced that the nation's basic need was s p i r i t u a l , 
and that the malaise could only be cured by r e l i g i o u s r e v i v a l . That 
there was at l e a s t some truth i n t h i s may be indicated by the success 
of the American evangelist Dr. B i l l y Graham who attracted thousands to 
London's Harringay arena nightly for three months i n the year of 
B a i l l i e ' s death. Certainly i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l i g i o n had l i t t l e hold 
on the l i v e s of the B r i t i s h people. Rowntree and Lavers reported 
that i n York on a Sunday i n 1948 only one c i t i z e n i n twenty one 
attended Anglican worship, whereas i n 1901 i t had been one i n seven. 
(English L i f e and Leisure c i t e d by D.L. Edwards Religion and Change 
p 94)• Though there i s reason to believe that the church's hold had 
been weakening before the turn of the century.^ Yet the period i s not 
without i n t e r e s t i n g theological work and vigorous debate. 
I t i s often f e l t that the Victorian age was one of s e t t l e d 
r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . Certainly the upper and middle classes generally 
attended church, and the lower classes outwardly accepted r e l i g i o n . 
I t was an age of missionary z e a l , and there was great i n t e r e s t i n 
theological l i t e r a t u r e . Yet L.E. E l l i o t t - B i n n s described i t as 
"... supremely an age of doubt and c o n f l i c t , and also of much 
inconsistency." He points out that, "The biographies of the l a t e r 
nineteenth century contain not a few records of prolonged, and often 
indecisive c o n f l i c t i n the minds of those who sought to reconcile 
t h e i r s p i r i t u a l needs with t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l p r i n c i p l e s . " (The 
Development of English Theology i n the Later Nineteenth Century p 7f) 
The c o n f l i c t s referred to came f i r s t from the natural sciences. 
I t was a period of great advance i n the natural sciences, so much so 
that at one point the concept of 'Science' was almost deified, and 
the pronouncements of s c i e n t i s t s were treated with the awe and 
reverence which had once been accorded to theologians. 
Geology undermined the Genesis accounts of creation. Then, more 
dramatically, biology with the theory of evolution caused consternation 
i n conservative r e l i g i o u s c i r c l e s . I t involved a denial of the 
Genesis creation narratives and, by implication, a number of related 
doctrines. The t r a d i t i o n a l conception of man as s p e c i a l l y created 
by God and endowed with capacity f o r communion with Him was replaced 
by a doctrine which traced h i s origin to the operation of natural 
and impersonal laws. With t h i s went the denial of the related 
doctrine of the f a l l which explained man's los s of communion with God. 
Hence i t was a popular gibe among the anti-orthodox that man had f a l l e n 
upwards. An almost equally serious r e s u l t was that the apologist was: 
robbed of one of h i s favourite t h e i s t i c arguments, that from design. 
Nature was depicted as a ruthless struggle for s u r v i v a l rather than as 
the vast, complex, but exceptionally well-oiled machine which C h r i s t i a n 
apologists had t r a d i t i o n a l l y claimed i t to be, an argument given 
c l a s s i c expression i n Paley's i l l u s t r a t i o n of the watch and the watch-
maker. Underlying a l l t h i s of course was the r e a l i s a t i o n that i f the 
creation narratives were f a l s e the old idea of the Bible as containing 
divine revelation i n i n f a l l i b l y true propositions must be abandoned. 
With science attacking from without, the church seemed to many to 
be i n greater danger from within. Rumours came from Germany of what 
came to be known as 'Higher C r i t i c i s m ' . Scholars inside the church 
argued that the Old Testament was not what i t seemed. I t was 
suggested that much of what had been taken as history was i n f a c t f o l k -
l o r e , the f a c t that i t was said to be f o l k - l o r e with a moral was not 
much consolation to bewildered conservatives. 
No doubt f o r many humble believers Darwin and h i s followers, 
together with the B i b l i c a l c r i t i c s , were v e r i t a b l e a n t i - c h r i s t s , and 
they were content with the t r a d i t i o n a l appeal to scripture as 'Word 
of God'. Thus when 'Essays and Reviews' (1860) shortly followed by 
Colenso's 'Introduction to the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua' (1862) 
thrust these views upon the attention of the English r e l i g i o u s public, 
there was widespread support, es p e c i a l l y among the clergy, for the 
indictment of two of the contributors tb 'Essays and Reviews' for 
heresy, and for the deposing of Colenso, Bishop of Natal, from h i s 
see. S i m i l a r l y , twenty f i v e years l a t e r , Spurgeon, the conservative 
Baptist leader, got considerable support from the rank and f i l e of h i s 
own denomination and beyond when, i n the 'Down Grade' controversy, he 
denounced as h e r e t i c a l those who accepted the c r i t i c a l conclusions 
concerning the i n s p i r a t i o n of scripture.^ But c l e a r l y such an 
attitude could not be maintained. I t was impossible for educated 
1. cf J.W. Grant: Free Churchmanship i n England 1870-1940 p 93f 
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men to adopt one attitude for t h e i r r e l i g i o n while preferring 
another for t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l l i v e s . 
I f denial of the new movements was impossible there had to be 
some concession, accommodation or thorough-going reconstruction from 
the r e l i g i o u s camp. A reconstruction came from the University of 
Oxford. The c o l l e c t i o n of essays 'Lux Mundi1 appeared i n 1889, the 
work of a group of 'High' Anglicans under the leadership of Charles 
Gore, then P r i n c i p a l of Pusey House and l a t e r Bishop of Worcester 
and Oxford. Gore claimed that he and h i s collaborators were 
" ... servants of the Catholic Cireed and Church, aiming only at 
interpreting the f a i t h we have received." Though he admitted that 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l , s o c i a l and s c i e n t i f i c changes of the age were such 
as to " ... necessitate some general restatement of i t s claim and 
meaning ..." (Lux Mundi p v i i i ) . For a book with such a modest aim 
i t s e f f e c t was phenomenal. J.K. Mozley said of i t , "Few books i n 
modern times have so c l e a r l y marked the presence of a new era and so 
deeply influenced i t s character ...11 (Some Tendencies i n B r i t i s h 
Theology p 17). 
Most i n t e r e s t at the time was roused by Gore's a r t i c l e on 'The 
Holy S p i r i t and I n s p i r a t ion' i n which he showed that he no longer 
held the inerrancy of scripture and adumbrated the Kenotic Christology 
which he put forward l a t e r i n h i s Bampton Lectures. But more 
important was the general acceptance of contemporary i n t e l l e c t u a l 
ideas and the willingness to work within them. P a r t i c u l a r l y was t h i s 
so with the idea of evolution. 
The theory of evolution made a positive as well as negative 
contribution to r e l i g i o u s thought. Beginning as a s c i e n t i f i c 
hypothesis i n the f i e l d of biology i t was extended to cover every 
part of man's being and history. Man, nature, society and r e l i g i o n 
were a l l seen as on a steady evolutionary march from worse to better. 
•Progress 1 was the watch-word of the age, with the implication that 
the present was a great improvement on the past and that f a r greater 
things l a y i n store i n the future. 
What might be c a l l e d the philosophical undergirding for t h i s type 
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of thought was found i n Hegelianism. For Hegel everything must be 
knowable and thus reducable to mind. The ultimate r e a l i t y i s pure 
thought or s p i r i t which manifests i t s e l f i n various ways, but supremely 
i n the human mind or s p i r i t , so that the a c t i v i t i e s of the human mind 
or s p i r i t are the best clue, and the only means, f o r understanding the 
ultimate r e a l i t y or world s p i r i t . H.R. Mackintosh says, "No one has 
ever been quite sure what Hegel believed about God, but we s h a l l not 
be f a r out i f we describe h i s general system as a form of pantheistic 
Monism or l o g i c a l Evolutionism." (Types of Modern Theology p 102). 
Being, l i k e thought, i s a d i a l e c t i c process which moves forward by the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of opposites. As i n thought progress i s made by the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s i n synthesis, both thesis and 
anti t h e s i s being necessary for each other and the f i n a l synthesis, so 
i n history, Hegel claimed, we can see the same thing happening. Thus 
he described history as God's r e a l i s a t i o n of himself through, or i n 
the process of, human experience. 
Hegel saw himself as a Christian apologist. "Nothing can be 
more certain than that Hegel meant to be f r i e n d l y ; indeed he appears 
to have been quite sinc e r e l y persuaded that for the f i r s t time he was 
giving the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n an opportunity to understand i t s e l f . 
Reconciliation was to be the watchword of the new era. The truth 
formulated by speculation i s a c t u a l l y none other than that preached 
by r e l i g i o n i n more c h i l d l i k e tones." ( i b i d p 106). Understanding 
of ultimate r e a l i t y as pure thought was only possible for philosophers. 
For the masses the truth would continue to be taught i n the p i c t o r i a l 
language of r e l i g i o n and grasped by the imagination, a lower f a c u l t y 
than reason. 
Such an approach had advantages. I t gave a s p i r i t u a l view of 
the world, saving man's s p i r i t u a l i n s t i n c t s from s c i e n t i f i c agnosticism 
or positivism. Stress on the clash of thesis and ant i t h e s i s showed 
that progress need not be smooth, though the notion of progress 
remained c e n t r a l . Room was found for the philosopher and the 
simple believer, and t r a d i t i o n a l language was not discarded. As 
s p i r i t u a l and material should not be r i g i d l y distinguished i t was 
congenial to those enthusiastic for s o c i a l improvement. F i n a l l y , 
not l e a s t a t t r a c t i v e i n t h i s period, i t acknowledged the dignity and 
importance of man. 
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But C h r i s t i a n i t y had to pay for i t s philosophical r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . 
No more could be heard of the uniqueness of Jesus. Hegel could 
accept incarnation, but not unique incarnation. This was not always 
r e a l i s e d i n England. For him the two natures language was a p i c t o r i a l 
expression of the f a c t that there i s no r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between God 
and man. Both need each other. Mackintosh comments "The idealism 
of Hegel being rigorously immanental, the Absolute mind i s not another 
mind, but the essence of a l l f i n i t e minds, and they are constituents 
of i t . " ( i b i d p 103). Jesus of Nazareth was one of the 'great men' 
of history who had caught a glimpse of the speculative truth which 
Hegel had now worked out, and had t r i e d to teach i t to h i s d i s c i p l e s . 
This philosophy was introduced to England by the i n f l u e n t i a l 
Oxford philosopher T.H. Green. I t s impact on theology here was by no 
means as great as i t had been i n Germany. I t has never been usual 
i n England f o r one philosophical system to completely dominate the 
theological scene. Nevertheless i t had considerable influence, and 
i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that many of the contributors to 'Lux Mundi' had 
been pupils of Green. Furthermore the s u b - t i t l e "a s e r i e s of studies 
i n the r e l i g i o n of the incarnation", showed a d i s t i n c t and no doubt 
conscious movement from the Atonement as the central i n t e r e s t i n 
theology. For those who wish to minimise the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
God and man the Incarnation i s a more convenient s t a r t i n g point. 
However t h i s should not be exaggerated. Anglican scholars with 
t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l fondness for P a t r i s t i c studies have always given 
more prominence to the Incarnation than i s common with those of a more 
Reformed t r a d i t i o n . Furthermore i t must be stressed that Gore 
p a r t i c u l a r l y could not be accused of overlooking man's need f o r 
redemption. Yat 'Lux Mundi' shows an almost indecent anxiety to 
baptise the s t r e s s on evolution and progress into the f a i t h , and to 
give an immanent rather than transcendent view of God. Aubrey Moore 
suggested that " ... i n the providence of God, the mission of modern 
science was to bring home to our unmetaphysical ways of thinking the 
great truth of the Divine immanence i n creation ... the Divine 
immanence must be f o r our age, as for the Athanasian age, the meeting 
point of the r e l i g i o u s and philosophic view of God ..." (op c i t p 100). 
J.R. Illingworth regretted that the Atonement had often been treated 
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i n i s o l a t i o n to the detriment of the doctrine of Incarnation. I n 
h i s view "The Incarnation opened heaven, for i t was the revelation of 
the Word; hut i t also reconsecrated earth, for the Word was made 
Fles h and dwelt among us. And i t i s impossible to read history 
without f e e l i n g how profoundly the r e l i g i o n of the Incarnation has 
been a r e l i g i o n of humanity." ( i b i d p 211) 
The 'Lux Mundi1 party dominated Anglican theology, and to a l e s s e r 
extent a l l English theology, for t h i r t y or more years. For Gore, 
though he worked out h i s Christology more f u l l y i n h i s Kampton 
Lectures of 1892, the movement had gone f a r enough. Gore was always 
l o y a l to the Catholic Creeds. We s h a l l note that h i s l o y a l t y earned 
him something of a reputation as a reactionary. But others wished to 
go further. A s t r e s s on incarnation accompanied by a v i r t u a l neglect 
of atonement, p a r t i c u l a r l y at a time when men's minds were somewhat 
intoxicated by ideas of progress and the excellence of humanity, can 
lead to a very one-sided presentation of the Gospel which i s i n f a c t 
no Gospel. While the best minds i n the movement did not go that f a r 
others did, chief among them R.J. Campbell. 
As minister of the C i t y Temple i n London, Campbell occupied the 
most i n f l u e n t i a l pulpit i n Congregationalism at a time when great 
influence was exerted from pulpits. In the autumn of 1906 he spoke 
to the London Board of Congregational Ministers on "The Changing 
Sanctions of Popular Theology", a paper l a t e r published i n 'The 
Chr i s t i a n World', interpreting God's dealings with men almost 
exclusively i n terms of immanence. The r e s u l t was a controversy i n 
which Campbell was charged with departing from the Evangelical f a i t h . 
Soon a f t e r i t s beginning he outlined h i s position i n a somewhat 
disputatious book 'The New Theology' (1907). Other books and 
pamphlets followed, and he organised h i s followers into the 
•Progressive League* which he soon re-organised, i n the hope of 
excluding extremists, as 'the L i b e r a l C h r i s t i a n League,* 
Campbell defined h i s position as "The attitude of those who 
believe that the fundamentals of the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h need to be 
r e a r t i c u l a t e d i n terms of the immanence of God", Apart from the 
e x p l i c i t use of 'immanence' t h i s i s not f a r from what Gore had 
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given as the aim of the 'Lux Mundi' group. Later, i n a Daily Mail 
interview, Campbell described h i s message as "the Gospel of the 
humanity of God and the d i v i n i t y of Man." ( c i t e d J.W. Grant o£ c i t 
p 135)• Prom t h i s point of view h i s t o r i c a l revelation was set aside 
and one doctrine a f t e r another was explained i n terms of evolving 
human excellence. The uniqueness of C h r i s t was a sp e c i a l object of 
attack. "Nothing", writes J.K. Mozley, "gave greater offence than 
h i s apparent r e f u s a l to allow that Jesus was divine i n any other way 
than was possible for every man." (op c i t p 35)• The Bible was 
replaced by appeal to inner witness, "Never mind what the Bible says 
about t h i s or that, i f you are i n search of truth, but t r u s t the voice 
of God within you." (attributed to Campbell by W.H.S. Aubrey, i n The 
Old F a i t h and the New Theology, c i t e d by J.W. Grant 0£ c i t p 138)• 
The movement represented by Campbell and h i s immediate followers 
did not have wide support, even i n h i s own denomination. But i t 
brought to l i g h t the dangers inherent i n the s t r e s s on immanence and 
the neglect of other aspects of the faith.'*' 
Hegel's was not the only theological influence to come from 
Germany. Against i t s a r i d i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m Albrecht R i t s c h l had 
protested i n favour of moral and personal r e l i g i o n , and probably had 
more effect on English theology. He set himself to e s t a b l i s h the 
primacy of h i s t o r i c revelation, denying man's a b i l i t y to know God 
apart from h i s i n i t i a t i v e . Thus he restored emphasis to the h i s t o r i c 
Jesus, showing that C h r i s t i a n f a i t h means personal involvement and 
commitment to him. But, on the debit side, he tended to minimise 
dogma and give impetus to subjectivism. 
The chief r e s u l t was L i b e r a l Protestantism which took up the 
c r i t i c i s m of dogma, seeing i t as the Hellenising of pure New Testament 
f a i t h , and attempted to get back behind the r e l i g i o n about Jesus, 
found i n Paul and John, to the r e l i g i o n of Jesus, which, i t was 
supposed could be found by h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m of the synoptics. 
1. I n f a i r n e s s to Campbell i t should be noted that he l a t e r made i t 
c l e a r that he had ceased to hold the doctrines of the 'New 
Theology 1 movement. He returned to the Anglican church, to 
which he had previously belonged, becoming Canon and Chancellor 
of Chichester. 
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Such a view had been propounded i n England by Hatch as early as 1888, 
but i t s r e a l apostle was Adolf von Harnack i n h i s 'History of Dogma* 
(1886-89)» and i n a course of lectures given i n B e r l i n i n 1900 and 
translated into English as 'What i s C h r i s t i a n i t y 1 i n 1901. For 
Harnack the essence of Christ's teaching was summed up i n two 
concepts the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, the r e s t 
was H e l l e n i s t i c accretion. 
C r i t i c i s m of the New Testament had not been common i n England. 
The work of the Cambridge scholars Westcott, Lightfoot and Hort had 
seemed to guard i t against the attacks which 'Higher C r i t i c i s m 1 had 
launched upon the Old. Now that changed as English scholars followed 
German ones i n i n s i s t i n g that C h r i s t i a n i t y should be based on the 
'Jesus of History' rather than the 'Apostolic C h r i s t ' . The Jesus 
they meant was the r e s u l t of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m of the Gospels. 
He tended to be a noble e t h i c a l teacher remarkably s i m i l a r , as 
Schweitzer was soon to point out, to the idea which the scholar 
conducting the enquiry held before himself. This allowed for 
considerable variety, but there was l i t t l e place for miracle or 
claims to Messiahship. I t was agreed that Jesus displayed unique 
moral perfection which was a r e f l e c t i o n of God and an a t t r a c t i o n to 
man, but t h i s f a l l s some way short of Chalcedonian Christology. 
The Roman Catholics Loisy and T y r e l l attacked t h i s view. Loisy 
argued that Jesus was an eschatological preacher, but that the kingdom 
he had foretold developed slowly i n the Catholic church. Thus he 
could be s c e p t i c a l about the gospels but reverent i n h i s approach to 
church and sacraments. However such views on scripture, though 
acceptable i n German or English u n i v e r s i t i e s , were unacceptable to 
Rome, and both Loisy and T y r e l l were excommunicated i n the e n c y c l i c a l 
'Pascendi Gregis 1 (1907) and what had come to be known as Catholic 
Modernism was condemned. 
But i n England, i n spite of protests from Gore who argued that 
subscription to the creeds demanded of an Anglican clergyman must 
involve acceptance of the Virgin B i r t h and the bodily resurrection of 
Jesus, the Modernist movement gained strength. I t was greatly 
a s s i s t e d by the emotional overtones of words such as ' l i b e r a l * and 
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•modern1 with the implication that those who opposed them were 
narrow and old-fashioned. Canon Lloyd has drawn attention to the 
pervasive influence of the 'Liberal' appeal.^ He also quotes from 
William Sanday i n a pamphlet against Gore, " I "believe that the 
cultivated modern man may enter the Church of Christ with his head 
erect - with some change of language due to differences of time, hut 
a l l of the nature of re-interpretation of old truths, and without any 
real equivocation at his heart." (The Church of England i n the 
Twentieth Century Vol 1 p 77). The cultivated modern man was the 
person to whom modernists t r i e d to appeal. He could not accept the 
supernatural, and was convinced that sin was, at most, an old-fashioned 
word for the survival of animal tendencies i n the evolving human 
species. For his benefit the Modernists seemed w i l l i n g to sacrifice 
any element of the supernatural i n Gospel or creed, but without 
conspicuous success. 
Confidence i n the Jesus of history was shaken by Schweitzer's 
'Quest for the Historical Jesus' which appeared i n English i n 1910. 
Schweitzer stressed the eschatological element i n Jesus11 teaching while 
the ethical element, which for the Modernist was the heart of the 
Gospel, was dismissed as an interim ethic. Schweitzer over-reached 
himself. He leaned heavily on certain proof-texts, notably Matt 10:23, 
and neglected other parts of the gospels. But after his book the 
Liberal Jesus was never quite the same again. 
However the most devastating blow to Modernism was the war of 
1914-18• Modern cultivated man showed just how far he had advanced 
beyond the need of supernatural redemption. Now the most optimistic 
believer i n progress and essential human goodness might have wondered 
whether more was needed than fearless Biblical criticism and 
enlightened moral optimism. Yet the movement survived the war, at 
least i n i t i a l l y , and held i t s most highly publicised and controversial 
meeting at Girton College Cambridge i n 1921. We must return to this 
meeting i n connection with Hastings Rashdall who was a prominent 
participant. Here i t i s enough to say that i t was accused of making 
modern man the arbiter of the Gospel and was generally condemned. 
1. R. Lloyd: The Church of England i n the Twentieth Century 
Vol 1 p 92ff. 
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Attempts to get a definite pronouncement against the Conference from 
the Convocation of Canterbury meeting i n 1922 were diplomatically 
resisted. Lloyd comments, "Perhaps i t was the wisest course "because 
as by instinct or inspiration the course of theology followed there-
after very different and much more suggestive paths, ..• Thereafter 
modernism in the Anglican Church might remain as an organised party, 
... but i t s contentions were seen to be side-issues and i t s 
characteristic language to be archaic jargon. The Girton Conference 
of 1921 was the last breathing of a one-time giant soon destined to 
become a l i v i n g corpse*'1 ( i b i d Vol 11 p 47). 
Ritschl not only directed attention to the historic Jesus, he 
also stressed personal commitment and experience and thus opened the 
way to subjectivism. The appeal to (Religious experience was not new. 
I t had always been for many, especially Evangelicals, the surest 
proof of their f a i t h , against which no intellectual argument could 
ultimately prevail. But i t had not previously been used as a major 
theological argument as i t now came to be used. Such arguments did 
not just appeal to dramatic conversion experiences but to 'the inner 
li g h t * and 'the d i v i n i t y i n every man'. Works by Inge, von Hugel, 
and Underhill led i n a revived interest i n mysticism. Horton Davies 
suggests that men were ti r e d of the scholars' approach to religion and 
2 
turned instead to the experts, the practitioners. But i n appealing 
to mysticism there is a danger that no distinction w i l l be made 
between Christian and non-Christian varieties. Any vague spir i t u a l 
experience is sometimes thought to be enough and the result can easily 
be Pantheism. Certainly there was some blurring of the edges, but 
neither Inge nor von Hugel were w i l l i n g to lose the transcendent God 
of the Bible i n the currently popular stress on immanence. 
These writers introduced a much needed positive note, and their 
influence on some was deep and lasting. Yet i t was hardly very wide. 
Further, appeals to experience were open to criticism from the 
growing science of psychology. Some psychologists were sympathetic 
to religion. But, as E l l i o t t Binns comments, their arguments 
" ... were often accompanied by the patronising admission that 
1. cf R.W. Dale: The Living Christ and the Four Gospels p 23 
2. Worship and Theology i n England Vol V p 
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religion might be a useful thing, even i f i t s truth was a matter of 
indifference." (op o i t p 117)• 
With the decline of Modernism after the Girton Conference a 
different type of theology took the centre of the stage, at least i n 
Anglicanism. I t s manifesto was the collection "Essays Catholic and 
Cr i t i c a l " edited by E.G. Selwyn i n 1927. I t s brightest star was 
William Temple. Broadly described as Liberal Catholicism, this school 
of thought kept the strengths of the immanentalists without losing 
confidence i n a transcendent God, In many ways i t was a return to 
the Catholicism of Gore, to whom Temple was much indebted. There 
was less uncertainty i n the face of Biblical criticism, and a renewed 
willingness to speak about the classical doctrines of sin, judgement, 
grace and redemption, though perhaps not to speak of them i n the 
classical way. There was also an influential renewal of interest i n 
the doctrine of the church, accompanying a growing concern for church 
unity. 
About Temple, A.M. Hamsey writes, "He f e l t that the philosophical 
climate of the time was friendly to a spiritual interpretation of the 
world, unfriendly to a particular revelation. I t was credible that 
God and man could be united i n the whole process of the world, scarcely 
credible that deity could do things i n particular. Against such 
assumptions Temple set himself to vindicate, i n idealism's own terms, 
the rationality of an Incarnation and a particular revelation." 
(From Gore to Temple p 148). The attempted vindication came chiefly 
i n three classic works, Mens Creatrix (1917)» Christus Veritas (1924;) 
and Nature. Man and God (l934)» These were attempts to j u s t i f y , or 
at least explain, historic Christianity i n philosophical terms, and 
were written with a confidence which, at least for the f i r s t one, was 
very rare at the time. 
But i t i s probably no insult to Temple to suggest that his work 
was the last flowering of Hegelianism i n the idealist form which i t 
had taken i n England. I t s time had pas^ >, at least temporarily. 
Having spoken of Temple's aim to relate f a i t h to contemporary 
philosophy and find i n Christ the key to the rationality and unity of 
the world, Ramsey comments "Nothing, therefore, i n his last years 
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befitted his greatness more than the humility with which he 
acknowledged that his quest had failed, and that other tasks were 
superseding i t . " (op c i t p l60). This acknowledgement came i n the 
preface to the report of the Commission on Doctrine i n the Church of 
England, a "body which was set up i n 1922, after the Girton Conference, 
hut did not report u n t i l 1939* The immediate future lay with 'neo-
orthodox1 Biblical theology whose chief exponent was Karl Barth. 
Barth had "been a Swiss pastor before the f i r s t world war, and 
has described eloquently his own "break with Liberal Protestantism 
when he found that most of his own teachers had pledged support for 
Wilhelm 11 and the war policy."1" The story of his subsequent 
development and the alternative he suggested to Liberal theology has 
often been told. Prom the angry, dialectical, style of his Romans 
in 1918, to the measured profundity of his Church Dogmatics begun i n 
1932 and not completed at his death i n 1968, he i s concerned with one 
question, "What has the church to say to modern man that modern man 
could not say to himself?" There could hardly be a more different 
starting point from the wooing of cultivated modern man which we have 
seen i n English theology, 
Barth was concerned to stress that God had acted i n the person 
and work of Jesus as this i s witnessed i n scripture. Hence the 
complement to his criticism of man-centred theology was his constant 
appeal to scripture. Not that the Bible had not previously been 
read, nobody could accuse the writers of Liberal 'Lives of Jesus' of 
that, but Barth approached i t not to dissect i t by means of the 
correct criticism, but to hear a Word of God from i t . 
In England he was often dismissed as a fundamentalist, or i t was 
patronisingly acknowledged that he had drawn attention to some 
neglected themes but i n a rather extravagant and one-sided way. He 
was not widely read. But, strangely, a similar though less dramatic 
movement was gaining strength i n England. At f i r s t i t was apparently 
quite independent of Barth, but later i t learned much from him. 
1. cf The Humanity of God p 14 
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P.T. Forsyth, Principal of Hackney Theological College from 1901 
u n t i l his death i n 1921, had already, while Liberalism was at i t s 
height sought to recall his contemporaries to a deeper more dogmatic 
theology. His writings contain many of the themes which later 
appeared i n Barth. Generally he was ignored or regarded as a 
reactionary, but towards the end of his l i f e there were signs that he 
was being taken more seriously. The Anglican J.K. Mozley sought, at 
f i r s t without much success, to draw attention to his work within the 
Church of England. More effective was the work of an Anglo-Catholic 
scholar, a contributor to Essays Catholic and C r i t i c a l . Sir Edwyn 
Hoskyns. 
Hoskyns, who taught the New Testament at Cambridge from 1919 to 
1937* set himself to remedy the sense of uncertainty produced by the 
long reign of negative New Testament criticism. Without denying the 
rights of criticism, or the gains i t had made, he concentrated on 
presenting the positive New Testament message. He spoke of Jesus as 
Himself the supernatural Gospel of God, and showed that the Liberal 
Christ was not to be found i n the New Testament. He seems to have 
begun his work independently of Barth, and Anglican scholars seem 
anxious to point out that he was not a Barthian.^" Nevertheless, i n 
1933 he translated the second edition of Barth's Romans, and clearly 
he understood and greatly admired Barth, Certainly he was instrumental 
i n preparing English theology to hear what Barth, and other Continental 
theologians had to say. 
Thus there came about a revival of what came to be called 
•Biblical Theology*, Critical work had sapped confidence i n the 
Bible, producing a vague but widely held view that i t had been 
disproved. Criticism had generally been presented, or had f i l t e r e d 
through, to the general public i n a negative and destructive way. 
For more than a generation many ministers of a l l denominations had 
unfortunately considered i t a mark of academic integrity and 
sophistication to speak of what they disbelieved about the Bible more 
than about i t s positive message. Probably they were not trained to 
do anything else. The disastrous effects of this mood are s t i l l with 
us, i n self-consciously enlightened modernity on the one hand and 
1. cf R. Lloyd op_ c i t Vol 11 p 57; A.M. Ramsey op_ c i t p 137 
-31-
r i g i d defensive literalism on the other. But between the wars there 
was some recovery. On a pastoral level the Bible Reading Fellowship 
encouraged private devotional reading. On the more academic front 
i t once more became customary to see the Bible as a whole, and the 
English tradition of Biblical Scholarship, never really dormant, 
flourished anew i n men such as Rowley, Bodd, Taylor and the Mansons, 
ably served by popularisers such as Hunter and Barclay. 
After 1945 there was greater willingness, perhaps born of despair 
of other hopes, to pay attention to Biblical theology. I t was 
assisted by an awareness of what the German church, which was i t s 
source had suffered. There was an almost romantic appeal about 'The 
German Church Struggle', and a willingness to hear the theology which 
had sustained i t . R.S. Paul comments " I f 'continental theology' 
could say a sustaining word to the Confessing Church i n Germany, or to 
the persecuted churches of Occupied Europe, then i t had something to 
say to the disillusionment of England's lost securities and to the 
aftermath of her outworn prides." (op o i t p 244) • 
At the end of our period then we find a more confident and 
dogmatic theology. But i t i s now carried on i n an increasingly more 
secular society the majority of whose members are content to leave 
the institutional church out of their lives and thinking, though many, 
i f pressed, would claim to be Christian. The period has seen the 
rise and f a l l of a proud, confident, man-centred l i b e r a l theology, 
and i t s replacement by a dogmatic theocentric neo-orthodoxy; Though 
i t i s arguable that Barth was never understood i n England, and that 
'Barthianism* had begun to wane by the end of the period. 
We noted earlier that the pictures used to present the doctrine 
of atonement and i t s appropriation vary from age to age i n accordance 
with contemporary thinking and needs. That is not to say that a l l 
pictures are:equally good, or that they a l l equally f a i t h f u l l y and 
adequately reflect the New Testament. We now turn to consider five 
representative teachers of the period to ask how they presented these 
themes, and what permanent elements of truth we can find i n their 
work. 
Chap I I I Consents Jarnes Denney:- r e l a t i o n to Lib e r a l i s m and the 
c r i t i c i s m of orthodox formulae p 32-39* 
Ideas based on NT - unity of ITT p 39f? Synoptic m a t e r i a l 
p 40-42; Acts p 42; Hebrews p 42f; Johannine material p 43-45? 
i n a l l t h i s s t r e s s on n e c e s s i t y of C h r i s t ' s death, the idea of 
su b s t i t u t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . 
Chief i n t e r e s t i n Paul. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Paul's approach 
p 45-48; key Pauline Passages 11 Corinthians 5?14-21 p 49-52; 
Galatians 3:13f P 52-54? Romans 3:21-26 p 54-56. C e n t r a l i t y 
of these passages i n h i s theology p 56f 
These ideas to be commended to the. modern mind. Features of the 
modern mind p 58f; personal and moral r e l a t i o n between God and man 
d i s t o r t e d by s i n ; involves a l l nature p 59-64? s i n death p 64f; 
inadequate views of atonement p 66f; c o s t l y nature of forgiveness 
and idea of 'penal' s u b s t i t u t i o n p 67-69; God as object of 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p 69f; s u b s t i t u t i o n not representation p 70f. 
R e l a t i o n to man. F a i t h includes regeneration and assurance 
p 71-74? Union e t h i c a l not m y s t i c a l p 74f; The Holy S p i r i t p 75? 
Sacraments and Church p 76-78; The Bible 78-80. 
Concluding c r i t i c i s m p 80-83. 
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I I I JAMES PENNEY (1856-1917) 
We have seen that the period during which Denney did his 
theological work was a period of growing liberalism. Widespread 
application of the theory of evolution encouraged optimistic ideas 
of human p e r f e c t i b i l i t y and progress. I t seemed to many that at 
least the outward l o t of man was getting better and better. The 
physical sciences promised the means to transform l i f e within a few 
generations. Meanwhile a vague but deeply f e l t sense of moral 
improvement was i n the a i r . Past ages appeared primitive and uncouth. 
They were to be outgrown sp i r i t u a l l y and intellectually, and, as this 
was done, old fashioned ideas of sin and g u i l t before God would drop 
away. 
In more obviously theological areas 'modern cultivated man' 
seemed to rule the f i e l d i n the persons of the immensely learned 
German c r i t i c a l and historical scholars. I t seemed that c r i t i c a l 
study of scripture had undermined i t s authority as the inspired word 
of God and brought the Hebrew-Christian tradition into line with 
other religions. But i t was generally held to be the best of them, 
a kind of f i n a l flowering of man's progressive awareness of God and 
his search for sp i r i t u a l truth and satisfaction. More importantly 
c r i t i c a l study seemed to have brought the figure of Jesus to l i f e i n 
a way hitherto unsuspected. No longer a dim figure i n stained glass 
windows, he stood forth i n flesh and blood. I f this meant, on the 
one hand, that the supernatural framework in which he had previously 
been presented had to go - and with i t , ultimately, his unique 
div i n i t y - this loss seemed to be more than made up by the gain i n 
his humanity. In fact comparatively few seem to have thought through 
the new approach to i t s logical conclusion. I t was sufficient that 
he could now be hailed as 'one of us', a heroic figure indeed, but a 
human and approachable one, with a message about the love of his 
equally easily approachable father. 
Adjustments had to be made to the traditional patterns of 
dogmatic theology. Dogmatism was to be thrown off, and nowhere was 
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this more apparent than i n thinking about the atonement. I t was 
quite unthinkable to continue to speak in terms of payment, or of the 
satisfaction of divine justice. The Father of Jesus could not be 
seen as a God of wrath. I f what had been called sin was s t i l l to 
have any place i n theology i t could certainly not have the importance 
i t had once had. That men do wrong, that, i n spite of their moral 
evolution, they are subject to weakness, was allowed. However what 
was required was forgiveness and renewed moral effort rather than 
costly redemption from outside. Thus any picture of atonement was to 
be i n these gentler, more human, more humane terms. Generally this 
led to a tendency to stress the l i f e of Jesus rather than his death 
and to make the incarnation the central theme of theology. 
Over half a century after his death i t has become customary to 
look back on Denney as a conservative or traditionalist out of step 
with the liberalism of his day. Together with P.T. Forsyth, he is 
seen as a champion of a rather old-fashioned orthodoxy, valiantly 
withstanding the rising tides of liberalism u n t i l the f i r s t world war 
and the work of Karl Barth should combine to turn them back, at least 
temporarily. There i s some truth i n this picture but not much, and 
i t i s doubtful whether Denney or his contemporaries would have 
recognised i t . While he saw himself as having a message to his 
generation, and considered i t a duty to point out weaknesses i n 'the 
modern mind1, he certainly did not turn his back on what was going on 
around him. Some regarded him as a dangerous l i b e r a l . 
He insisted that theological thinking should not be divorced 
from the best contemporary scientific and philosophical thinking, but 
that the theologian needed a coherent picture of the world as a whole. 
At the beginning of one of his earliest works 'Studies i n Theology1 
(1894) he argues that theology "... must contain the ideas and 
principles which enable us to look at our l i f e and our world as a 
whole, and to take them into our religion, instead of leaving them 
outside." (op o i t p i ) . Arguing against the idea that religion and 
science should each be allowed their own sphere of influence and l e f t 
there, so that they should not come into conflict, he asserts, "The 
religious man has to l i v e his religious l i f e i n nature, and to 
maintain his f a i t h i n God there; the scientific man, i f he be religious, 
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has precisely the same task; and they are bound, by the very nature 
of intelligence, to come to an understanding. ... We deceive ourselves, 
and t r y to evade the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the task which is l a i d upon us, 
when we deny the essential relation i n which theology must stand to 
a l l the contents and problems of our mind and l i f e . " ( i b i d p 3f) 
At this period he was quite violently opposed to the anti-metaphysical 
strain i n the thought of Ritschl. By the end of his l i f e he had 
adopted a much more Ritshlian position, but he never changed his mind 
about the relationship which should exist between theology and the 
best contemporary thought. 
In his attitude to scripture also he was far from being a r i g i d 
conservative. He regarded scripture as a means of grace, but this 
did not make i t immune from criticism. Rather his use of scripture 
should save the Christian from undue concern about the results of 
c r i t i c a l study. "... a Christian who knows that God does speak to 
the soul through the Scriptures ought not to speak of criticism as an 
alien or hostile power, with which he may be compelled, against his 
w i l l , to go so far, but which he must ever regard with suspicion." 
( i b i d p 213). Thus we find him outlining sympathetically the 
c r i t i c a l positions of his day, and elsewhere roundly asserting that, 
"Belief i n the inspiration of Scripture i s neither the beginning of 
the Christian l i f e nor the foundation of Christian theology;..." 
(The Atonement and the Modern Mind p 248 ) . 
Denney did not get his reputation as a champion of orthodoxy by 
ignoring or resisting the thought of his day. He differed from most 
of his contemporaries because of his starting point, and because of 
the relationship he adopted to modern thought. He was a New 
Testament scholar and an evangelist. Prom these two positions he 
stood apart from and criticised many of his contemporaries. I t was 
his contention that the starting point for Christian theology should 
be the New Testament picture of Jesus and the New Testament message 
1. 'The Atonement and the Modern Mind1 was published i n 1903? mainly 
to answer points raised by reviewers and correspondents after 
the publication of 'The Death of Christ' i n the previous year. 
A revised edition of both together was issued i n 1911* 
References are to the pagination of the 1911 edition. 
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of redemption. While this should not he presented i n a way 
deliberately and glaringly at variance with modern thought i f that 
could be avoided, i t was the New Testament pattern which was to be 
normative, not modern man's enlightened conscience or higher 
aspirations. 
Writers of Liberal 'lives' of Jesus were also keen to begin from 
a picture of Jesus. However, as we have seen, their result was 
generally a moral preacher. They sought the religion of Jesus, i n 
which he was the example of worship, rather than the religion about 
Jesus, i n which he was the object of worship. Ideas of love and 
divine fatherhood were generally presented i n ways which omitted the 
note of redemption, and Paul was accused of 'Hellenising* the Gospel. 
The result was a widespread criticism of the 'orthodox' position. 
I t was argued that the traditional stress on the death of Jesus was 
misplaced, or at least grossly one-sided. Atonement and incarnation 
were drawn together. When they were not actually made one i t was 
nevertheless insisted that more stress must be put on the l i f e of 
Jesus than had been customary. 
We shall see that Denney accepted much of this criticism. He 
agreed that many traditional formulations of an 'objective* atonement 
were too external, and that place must properly be found for the 
entire l i f e of Jesus i n the work of reconciliation. Yet he differed 
fundamentally from many of his contemporaries. For Denney Jesus was 
not simply an example, his relationship with God was unique. "He was 
not a son among others, but the Son through whom alone the Father was 
interpreted to the world." (Studies i n Theology p 3l)» Others, would 
have agreed with t h i s , but not so many would have agreed with him that 
the doctrine of atonement, the reconciliation of man to God, found 
i t s centre uniquely i n the cross. As the central point of the New 
Testament, the atonement, he claims, "... is Christianity i n brief; i t 
concentrates i n i t s e l f , as in a germ of i n f i n i t e potency, a l l that the 
wisdom, power and love of God mean i n relation to sinful men." (The 
Atonement and the Modem Mind p 243) • Thus the cross and i t s 
interpretation became the chief theme of his writing. I t was so i n 
the early work 'Studies i n Theology' (1894)• He made a detailed 
study of the New Testament teaching i n 'The Death of Christ' (1902) 
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arising from which came his study of 'The Atonement and the Modern 
Mind' (1903). Arguing directly against theological liberalism, he 
set out i n 'Jesus and the Gospel' (1908) to show by the s t r i c t use of 
c r i t i c a l methods that Jesus himself saw himself as an object of f a i t h , 
not i t s example, and saw his death as the chief purpose of his l i f e . 
Finally he summed up his views i n the posthumously published 
Cunningham Lectures 'The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation' (1917). 
Turning to his positive contribution, i t w i l l be as well to 
notice f i r s t how far he agrees with the c r i t i c s of the 'so-called' 
orthodox position, and what he does not say. I t was certainly not 
his view that the l i f e and death of Jesus could or should be radically 
divided. In fact he believed that only a definite doctrine of 
atonement kept the place of Christ i n the Gospels. Against those 
who saw incarnation, the taking of human nature by God, as i t s e l f the 
atonement, he suggests that this makes the earthly l i f e of Jesus 
unnecessary and, for that reason, must be wrong. He argues that 
Athanasius, whom he sees as the chief patristic representative of this 
tradition, does not need the l i f e of Jesus in his theology. For him 
the Logos removes or defeats corruption simply by coming i n to 
humanity. Because of the divine law that death must follow sin he 
must die, but there is no logical reason why he should not have died 
at once. In fact Athanasius has to find room for the human 
experiences though, on his premisses, he cannot say why.''" In the 
same way, he argues, those modem theologians who concentrate on the 
incarnation and see the cross as i t s result and not i t s purpose -
2 
he quotes Inge, Vestcott and Wilson as examples - do not realise 
that they are not only taking away, what they would consider undue, 
attention from Jesus' death, but also from his l i f e . Of such an 
approach he writes, " I t does not answer moral questions, especially 
those which bring the sinful man to despair; ... I t does not contain 
a gospel for lost souls, but a philosophy for speculative minds." 
(The Death of Christ p 236) 
In contrast to such views Denney wants to give f u l l weight to 
the ministry of Jesus, and the fact that i n him God entered into moral 
1. 'The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation' pp 38ff 
2. 'The Death of Christ' pp 232ff; and 'The Christian Doctrine of 
Reconciliation' pp 2/J-Off 
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and personal relations with men. Thus he is c r i t i c a l of ideas of 
merit and satisfaction whose development he traces from Tertullian 
through Anselm. He notes the movement back to personal terms i n the 
Reformers, but regrets that i n their successors there is a reversion 
to a Roman attitude i n the stress put on statements of f a i t h and 
correct formulae. Certainly i n Protestant orthodoxy he sees the 
danger of not doing justice to God's love and of making the death of 
Christ a t o t a l l y external, legal transaction. "... the idea that 
Christ was man's substitute or representative i n the work of making 
atonement had too much lost i t s connection with love; i t had become 
part of the plan of salvation, and i t s ethical character was impaired." 
(The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation p 118). Thus he welcomes 
greater stress on the love of God shown in the l i f e and work of Jesus, 
and on the subjective effects of atonement. He expounds such passages 
as Jesus meeting with the sinful woman (Luke 7s36-50), and Zacchaeus 
(Luke 19slff), stressing the reconciling effect of his attitude. 
"This is happily one of the points of the gospel story about which 
there can be no dispute. There might be a question as to whether 
Jesus spoke any given word assigned to Him, or as to the circumstances 
i n which i t was spoken, or as to i t s proper application; but i t is 
quite inconceivable that the evangelists should misrepresent so new 
and wonderful a thing as the attitude of Jesus to the s i n f u l , or the 
reconciling power which accompanied i t . " ( i b i d p 12f). 
In this mood he welcomes the work of Bushnell and MacLeod 
Campbell who i n different ways interpreted Christ's work through love, 
stressing his identification with men i n their need and despair. 
Here, he suggests, the personal element which had had a place for a 
time at the Reformation but had been unable to establish i t s e l f 
theologically comes out i n new r e l i e f . So he can write, "Of a l l 
books that have ever been written on the atonement, as God's way of 
reconciling men to Himself, Macleod Campbell's is probably that which 
is most completely inspired by the s p i r i t of the truth with which i t 
deals." (i b i d p 120). Later, i n the same vein, " A l l that is 
positive i n the doctrines of Bushnell and MacLeod Campbell, ... is to 
be welcomed without reserve. We are to think of the work of atonement 
or reconciliation as a work rising out of the situation i n which 
Christ found Himself as a member of the human race; as one with us He 
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spontaneously, under the impulse of love, makes a l l our burdens His 
own." ( i b i d p 260). Yet, when a l l this has been said, Denney is 
convinced that this stress is but a part of the Gospel, and indeed 
of i t s e l f no true Gospel at a l l . 
Protests against the r i g i d i t y of what had become the 'orthodox1 
formulae, with their division between Jesus' l i f e and death and the 
externalising of the l a t t e r , were to be welcomed. But he feared lest, 
i n reaction, the essential truth of the objective view of the 
atonement should be lost. There was a danger that stress on Jesus' 
spiritual identification with men and obedience to the Father would 
lead to a depreciation of His actual suffering and death. MacLeod 
Campbell tended to stress His ' s p i r i t of obedience' or 'the s p i r i t i n 
which he died' as having atoning value, as opposed to 'the mere 
physical suffering'; and many others took a similar l i n e . This, for 
Denney, was to introduce an ai r of unreality and was certainly not 
true to his reading of the New Testament. As he saw i t both scripture 
and common sense put the death of Christ i n the centre of the Gospel. 
"To an unsophisticated Christian, to talk of a redemption to which 
the death of Christ i s not essential is to talk about nothing at a l l . 
The simplest evangelist here w i l l always confound the subtlest 
theologian; the foolishness of God i s wiser than men", (i b i d p 269). 
The truth of the objective view had to be kept; there was an element 
of something done outside of us. 
Neither c r i t i c s or admirers have always seen the complexity and 
double-sidedness of Denney's attitude to the objective view of 
atonement, or the formulae i n which i t has traditionally been stated. 
He kept an awareness of the dangers of externality and the need for 
more ethical and personal concepts, together with a desire to keep 
the objective element. Writing about the response to 'The Death of 
Christ 1 he commented, "... few things have astonished me more than 
to be charged with teaching a 'forensic' or 'legal' or 'judicial' 
doctrine of atonement, resting, as such a doctrine must do, on a 
'forensic' or 'legal' or 'judicial' conception of man's relation to 
God." (The Atonement and the Modern Mind p 27l). Such phrases, 
uninterpreted, are not sufficiently personal. "To say that the 
relations of God and man are forensic is to say that they are regulated 
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by statute - that sin is a breach of statute - that the sinner is a 
criminal - and that God adjudicates on him by interpreting the statute 
i n i t s application to his case. Everybody knows that this is a 
travesty of the truth, and i t i s surprising that any one should be 
charged with teaching i t , or that anyone should applaud himself, as 
though he were i n the foremost f i l e s of time, for not believing i t . " 
( i b i d p 272). However, we shall see that, with proper safeguards, 
he was w i l l i n g to speak of the atonement as forensic. The cross, he 
believed, must be the centre of the Gospel as an objective act of 
God. The orthodox formulae contain a great and basic truth. I t may 
be that repetition of these formulae has become wearisome, "But i t i s 
not because the formulae are orthodox that they weary, i t is because 
they are formal; the v i t a l interest of the great realities which they 
enshrine has slipped from an unbelieving grasp, and l e f t the preacher 
with nothing to deliver but words." (The Death of Christ p 220). 
That meant they had lost contact with the New Testament, The answer 
therefore was not simply to c r i t i c i s e the formulae* but to return to 
the New Testament. 
Denney's treatment of the doctrine is based on a systematic 
study of the New Testament material i n an attempt to show the place 
which the death of Christ had there and the interpretation put upon 
i t by the Apostolic writers. The form of this study, and to a large 
extent the results, closely parallel that of Dale whose work 'The 
Atonement' (1875) was the last great apologia for the objective view. 
But Denney, writing later, has also to vindicate the unity of the New 
Testament teaching against the suggestion that there are i n fact two 
Gospels, one i n the synoptics the other i n Paul. He seeks to show 
that the death of Christ is central to a l l parts of the New Testament, 
and that the New Testament writers saw i t as the chief part of Jesus' 
work to which the atonement was to be attributed. A division between 
fact (synoptics) and interpretation (Paul), while i t may be useful 
for thought should not be pressed. "The view Christians took of the 
books they valued was instinctively dogmatic without ceasing to be 
historic a l ; or perhaps we may say, with a l i v e l y sense of their 
historical relations the Church had an instinctive feeling of the 
dogmatic import of the books i n i t s New Testament.!1: (ib i d p 6), But 
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the death of Christ i s neither simply history or dogma, nor the two 
together. For the writers of the New Testament i t was also an 
experience of God i n action, and that action had present significance. 
"The death of Christ i n the New Testament is the death of one who is 
alive for evermore. To every New Testament writer Christ is the Lord, 
the l i v i n g and exalted Lord, and i t is impossible for them to think of 
His death except as an experience the result or virtue of which is 
perpetuated i n His risen l i f e . " ( i b i d p 7)» I f these points, made in 
the introduction to his chief work on the Biblical evidence, are borne 
i n mind, the occasional sense of abstraction which made one c r i t i c 
say that he was more interested i n the death of Christ than the death 
of Christ."*" i s put into i t s proper perspective. 
Denney surveys the Biblical evidence most f u l l y i n 'The Death of 
Christ'. However the same passages are also treated i n other works, 
particularly of course i n his commentaries. He finds i n the death 
of Christ the dominant theme of the New Testament, and argues that i t 
is understood i n a substitutionary sense. He goes most readily to, 
and seems most at home i n , the writings of Paul, and certain key 
passages there. We w i l l therefore pass quickly over his comments on 
the rest of the New Testament before looking i n rather more detail at 
those key Pauline passages. 
In the synoptic Gospels the sheer space given to the Passion and 
death show i t s importance i n the eyes of the evangelists. For Jesus 
himself i t is sometimes argued that he only slowly realised that 
violent death would be part of his work. Yet against this the 
Baptism and Temptation stories, the significance of which Denney 
believes Jesus must have explained to his disciples later, indicate 
that he knew the way he should go from an early period. Submission to 
a baptism of repentance at a l l , and especially the influence on the 
narrative of the 'Servant' passages of second Isaiah, Denney takes as 
showing that "... the shadow of the world's sin lay on (his career) 
from the f i r s t . " ( i b i d p 16). 
During the ministry the 'bridegroom' saying (Mark 2:19f) shows 
1. A reviewer i n 'London Quarterly Review' CXXIX (1918) p 259f 
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he anticipated a violent death, and l a t e r he made repeated attempts 
to teach the d i s c i p l e s that he was destined to die (Mark 8:31; 9'- 31J 
10:31f). The death i s covered by a sense of necessity (<&0» 
though t h i s could mean that he saw death as the inevitable r e s u l t of 
his opponents h o s t i l i t y , the deeper reason was that he saw i t as part 
of the divine plan. The ultimate source of the necessity i s i n the 
Servant passages of second I s a i a h . His death was es s e n t i a l to h i s 
Messiahship. I t was not, as some of Denney's contemporaries would 
have argued, simply the crowning service of h i s l i f e and a possible 
way of winning to repentance some who had r e s i s t e d h i s e a r l i e r appeals. 
His death was the very soul of h i s vocation. 
Later there are two much more important references. F i r s t i s 
the 'ransom' saying of Mark 10:45t " » » o i t i s not only f a r the simplest 
and most obvious interpretation, but f a r the most profound and the 
most consonant with the New Testament as a whole, that Jesus i n t h i s 
passage conceives the l i v e s of the many as being somehow under f o r f e i t , 
and teaches that the very object with which he came into the world was 
to l a y down His own l i f e as a ransom price that those to whom these 
f o r f e i t e d l i v e s belonged might obtain them again." ( i b i d p 31)• ^he 
background of t h i s l i n e of thought i s most l i k e l y to be Psalm 49*7f 
and Job 33*23f i n both of which the idea of 'ransom' occurs as that 
at the cost of which deliverance i s assured. 
The other key synoptic passage i s i n the l a s t supper narrative 
(Mark 14:22ff and p a r a l l e l s ) . Denney p a r t i c u l a r l y draws attention 
to the reference to 'covenant blood 1. He allows that the longer 
version i n Matthew 26:28 "my blood of the - new covenant which i s shed 
for many unto remission of s i n s " may be an interpretative expansion. 
But the extra words are "... by a mind i n a position n a t u r a l l y to know 
and understand what Jesus meant." ( i b i d p 38)• For the f i r s t 
hearers t h i s would be taken as a reference to the Sinai covenant of 
Exodus 24:8 and the promise of a new covenant i n Jeremiah 31s31-34o 
I t i s too pedantic to argue that remission of sins was not i n question 
at S i n a i , "Covenant blood i s s a c r i f i c i a l blood, and we have every 
reason to believe that s a c r i f i c i a l blood u n i v e r s a l l y , ... was 
associated with propitiatory power." ( i b i d p 39)• "Hence", he says 
1. We s h a l l l a t e r consider c r i t i c i s m s of t h i s view of s a c r i f i c e . 
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i n another place, "when we take into account our Lord's conception 
of His work as a whole, and esp e c i a l l y His conception of a Son of Man 
who comes to His kingdom through a Passion interpreted i n such 
wonderful words as Mark 10:45 and Matthew 26:28, we are able to say, 
with His authority "behind us, that t h i s Passion entered into the work 
of redeeming men, of forgiving them, and of reconciling them to God." 
(The Chr i s t i a n Doctrine of Reconciliation p 141). There i s no formal 
or abstract theology here i n the synoptics, but a consciousness on 
Jesus' part of the r e a l i t i e s which present evangelical theology with 
i t s task. 
Turning to the resurrection Denney notes that the resurrection 
appearances are never simply appearances, there i s always some charge 
to the d i s c i p l e s , and t h i s i s always i n terms of baptism or the 
remission of s i n s . Thus ideas of baptism and ideas of the remission 
of sins interpenetrate each other. Since, i n h i s own teaching, the 
remission of sins has been connected with h i s death, baptism must 
also be linked with h i s death. So a l i n k i s forged between h i s 
teaching and the teaching and practice of the reBt of the New Testament. 
Similar patterns are found i n the e a r l i e s t preaching and writing. 
I n the Acts of the Apostles the death of C h r i s t i s seen as a divine 
necessity (2:23); i t i s explained by reference to the Servant (3:13; 
8*35); forgiveness i s offered on the basis of i t (2:38; 10:43); and 
both sacraments are assumed, thus keeping i t central i n church l i f e . 
I Peter has only incidental references to the death of Christ, but 
again they are i n terms of s a c r i f i c e and sin-bearing ( l : l f f ; l : 1 8 f f ; 
2:20f; JzYff), The chief aim of the references i s moral, but the 
morality i s motivated l e s s by example than by gratitude. "Whoever 
says 'He bore our s i n s ' says substitution; and to say substitution i s 
to. say something which involves an immeasurable obligation to C h r i s t , 
and has therefore i n i t an incalculable motive power." (Death of 
Ch r i s t p 71f). 
I n Hebrews the chief themes are priesthood and s a c r i f i c e . The 
i n t e r e s t of the e p i s t l e i s i n man's freedom to approach God, and the 
death of C h r i s t i s seen as establishing an eternal covenant, and 
producing s a n c t i f i e d people. But Denney i n s i s t s that i t i s not the 
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process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f which i s of f i r s t importance; that 
could "be the r e s u l t of human eff o r t or even of metaphysical influence 
from the incarnation alone. "... the immediate effect of Christ's 
death upon men i s r e l i g i o u s rather than e t h i c a l ; i n technical language 
i t a l t e r s t h e i r r e l a t i o n to God, or i s conceived as doing so, rather 
than t h e i r character. Their character, too, a l t e r s eventually, but 
i t i s on the "basis of that i n i t i a l and primary re l i g i o u s change; the 
r e l i g i o u s change i s not a r e s u l t of the moral one, nor an unreal 
abstraction from i t . " ( i b i d p 160). 
A p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s i n Hebrews i s on the' f i n a l i t y and completeness 
of Christ's work. Something i s done which never has to be done again. 
This can only be so i f a connection i s assumed between s i n and death 
so that His death i s i n place of ours. The writers "... dominant 
thought may be said to be that C h r i s t by.his death removes s i n , as an 
obstacle standing i n our path - bears i t away, so that i t blocks our 
road to God no longer - s t i l l He does not do t h i s except by dying; i n 
other words, he bears s i n away because he bears i t ; He removes the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i t from us because He takes i t upon Himself." 
( i b i d p 166). Again Denney i n s i s t s that the only suitable term here 
i s substitution. Though Christ i s c e r t a i n l y our representative and 
exemplar t h i s does not go f a r enough. " I t i s true that He i s our 
representative; but He not only acts i n our name, and i n our i n t e r e s t ; 
i n His action He does something for us which we could never have done 
fo r ourselves, ... t h i s i s the evangelical truth that i s covered by 
the word 'substitute', and which i s not covered by the word 
'representative'" ( i b i d p 171)o 
Denney takes the Johannine material together as of one school, 
though probably not the same hand. The ideas here are different but 
the c e n t r a l message i s the same. I n the Apocalypse the death of 
C h r i s t i s a demonstration of God's love which achieves something once 
for a l l - he draws attention to the a o r i s t s i n 1:5, and- 5*9* I n the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c description of Jesus as the 'Lamb* we are again i n the 
context of s a c r i f i c i a l death (5:6-14), and t h i s death has the power to 
ins p i r e and strengthen martyrs (12:11). "Hence the blood of C h r i s t 
both does something once for a l l - i n breaking the bond which s i n 
holds us by, and bringing us into such a r e l a t i o n to God that we are 
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a people of p r i e s t s - and does something progressively, i n assuring 
our gradual assimilation to Jesus C h r i s t the f a i t h f u l witness. I n 
both respects the C h r i s t i a n l i f e i s absolutely indebted to i t . " 
( i b i d p 181). 
The Gospel has a different tone. As f a r as the Prologue i s 
concerned Denney admits - r e l u c t a n t l y - that the theme i s different 
from St. Paul. The s t r e s s i s on revelation rather than redemption. 
Throughout the Gospel, with i t s s t r e s s on 'truth' and almost 
philosophical r e f l e c t i o n , there i s a contrast to the Pauline and 
synoptic s t r e s s on s i n and death. Nevertheless, when the influence 
of the Prologue i s not allowed to dominate the r e s t of the book, one 
finds many references to the death of C h r i s t . He i s the s a c r i f i c i a l 
sin-bearing lamb (l: 2 9 ) ; there are various references to him being 
raised or l i f t e d up (3*14; 7:28; 12:32); the Good Shepherd lays down 
hi s l i f e (10:11); the grain of wheat must die (l2:24ff); he lays down 
hi s l i f e f or h i s friends (l5:13» cf 17:19)» and Caiaphas prophecy that 
one must die for the people i s given s p e c i a l solemnity ( l l : 5 0 ) . 
F i n a l l y the fulness of the Passion narrative emphasises i t s importance. 
From a l l t h i s the cross can be seen as coming from the love of the 
Father (3:16), and there are frequent references to the necessity of 
Jesus' death as that which must take place. 
I John makes the relationship to s i n more e x p l i c i t , and, because 
of the nature of the work, there i s more st r e s s on the believer's 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . There are ideas of s i n as a problem to be solved, 
and of a divine law to be vindicated. I n t h i s connection we f i n d 
the WOT&CI h&oy/Of (2:2) used of Christ's work. Denney takes i t as 
propitiation, though s t r e s s i n g i t s connection with the love of God 
(Rom 3:25). 
I n t r eating the Johannine l i t e r a t u r e , though the comment f i t s 
h i s attitude over a wider sphere, Denney i s keen that the death of 
C h r i s t should not be ' s p i r i t u a l i s e d * i n a way that robs the actual 
event of r e a l i t y and importance. C h r i s t i a n i t y must be s p i r i t u a l l y 
apprehended, but there must be no depreciation of the h i s t o r i c a l . 
" C h r i s t i a n i t y i s as r e a l as the blood of C h r i s t : i t i s as r e a l as the 
(4:10; 3:l6), and finds i n i t echoes tX&0-r4f>iO\/ i n Romans. of Paul's 
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agony i n the garden and the death on the Cross. I t i s not l e s s r e a l 
than t h i s , nor more r e a l ; i t has no r e a l i t y whatever which i s 
separable from these h i s t o r i c a l things. ... I t i s when that awful 
experience of Jesus i s revealed as a propitiation for s i n s , an 
assumption of our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by One who does right by the 
eternal law which we have wronged, and does i t for us at t h i s 
tremendous cost;; i t i s then that the soul of man i s reached by the 
divine love, and through penitence and f a i t h drawn away from e v i l , and 
born again of God." ( i b i d p 202f). The reference to a broken law 
which must be vindicated i s a basic theme with Denney. 
As Denney treats i t the material surveyed above i s divided by h i s 
treatment of the Pauline l i t e r a t u r e which he deals with i n i t s 
canonical place. One cannot escape the conclusion that Denney i s 
most at home with St. Paul and reads the r e s t of the New Testament 
•from a Pauline standpoint. A most sympathetic c r i t i c , H.R. 
Mackintosh, commented of 'The Death of C h r i s t ' that i t "... hardly 
s a t i s f i e s the c a r e f u l exegete, for, to put i t broadly, i t represents 
the different apostolic writers as a l l saying exactly the same thing 
about the Cross, which i n f a c t they do not do. The l i v i n g v a r i e t y 
of interpretation i s obscured." ( P r i n c i p a l Denney as a Theologian 
ET Vol XXVIII 1917 P 491). I n f a c t Mackintosh puts i t very broadly 
indeed, for Denney does note different interpretations. However he 
tends to gloss over them rather quickly. Certainly both i n 'Studies 
i n Theology' and 'The C h r i s t i a n Doctrine of Reconciliation' he goes 
straight to St. Paul and merely notes the places i n the non-Pauline 
literature.which agree with Paul. Only when he has set himself the 
task of tracing the subject through the entire New Testament does he 
do anything l i k e j u s t i c e to the other strands of interpretation. 
Yet when the c r i t i c i s m of Paulinism has been allowed, t h i s need not be 
seen as i n any way s i n i s t e r or partisan. Paul i s the great New 
Testament preacher of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , the great evangelist. I t i s 
not unusual that Denney, overwhelmed by the same concerns, should 
turn to him. 
Perhaps i n recognition of the prime importance he was going to 
give to the Pauline contribution to the subject, Denney gives t h i s 
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section a long explanatory introduction i n which he outlines c e r t a i n 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Paul's presentation of the cross. 
F i r s t he notes the assurance with which Paul expresses himself. 
There i s a confidence i n the c e n t r a l i t y of the cross which i n 
Galatians 1:4* 8f amounts to intolerance. " I dannot," says Denney, 
agree with those who disparage t h i s , or a f f e c t to forgive i t as the 
unhappy "beginning of r e l i g i o u s intolerance. ... I f God has r e a l l y done 
something i n C h r i s t on which the salvation of the world depends, and 
i f He has made i t known, then i t i s a C h r i s t i a n duty to be intolerant 
of everything which ignores, denies, or explains i t away." (Death of 
C h r i s t p 78f). Further he argues, i t i s a sure indication.of the 
e s s e n t i a l character of Paul's teaching on the cross that he i s 
intolerant about i t . "To touch h i s teaching here i s not to do 
something which leaves h i s gospel unaffected; as he understands i t , 
i t i s to wound h i s gospel mortally." ( i b i d p 79)• 
Secondly he notes that Paul considers the preaching of the cross 
to be central to the common apostolic Gospel ( l Cor 15s3)» He i s 
passing on what he has received as b a s i c . The idea that 'Christ died 
f o r our s i n s , according to the s c r i p t u r e s ' cannot be dismissed as a 
mere Paulinism, one idea among many p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Conscious no doubt 
of the weight he r e s t s upon t h i s foundation, Denney emphasises the 
importance of the general apostolic agreement on t h i s point i n a l l h i s 
treatments of t h i s theme.''' 
Thirdly he argues that there i s no evidence of any development 
of Paul's thought i n t h i s matter. I n the so-called c a p t i v i t y 
e p i s t l e s - Colossians, Ephesians, Philippians - the gospel i s exhibited 
i n other rela t i o n s than those found i n the e p i s t l e s of the great 
missionary period - Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, -
but there was no basic change. "... the apostle had one message on 
Christ's death from f i r s t to l a s t of h i s C h r i s t i a n career. His 
gospel, and i t was the only gospel he knew, was always 'The Word of 
the Cross' ( l Cor 1:18), or 'The Word of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 1 (2 Cor 5:19). 
The application might be i n f i n i t e l y varied, ... but t h i s i s not to 
1. cf Studies i n Theology p 104; The Death of Christ p 79f; The 
C h r i s t i a n Doctrine of Reconciliation p 171» 
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say that i t was i n process of evolution i t s e l f . " ( i b i d p 83) 
Fourthly i t i s not possible to argue that as long as the f a c t of 
Christ's death i s kept the theory i s unimportant, or that any theory 
that f i t s the present need w i l l do. In t h i s way i t could be suggested 
that Paul's interpretation i s only possible for one of h i s background; 
or even that i t was deliberately invented to cover the church's 
embarrassment at the f a c t that Jesus had died a criminal's death."'" 
But Denney argues that while the d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and theory 
may be useful i n some spheres i t cannot be made here. I t i s not 
possible to preach the death of C h r i s t without some theory of i t . 
"The simplest preacher, and the most e f f e c t i v e , i s always the most 
absolutely t h e o r e t i c a l . I t i s a theory, a tremendous theory, that 
Christ's death i s a death for s i n . But unless a preacher can put 
some interpretation on the death - unless he can f i n d a meaning i n i t 
which i s f u l l of appeal - why should he speak of i t at a l l ? " ( i b i d p 86) 
The l a s t preliminary point he makes concerns the connection 
between the death and resurrection of C h r i s t . He admits that Protestant 
theology has often concentrated on the death i n i s o l a t i o n from the 
resurrection, which Paul does not do. Yet i t would be wrong, i n 
reaction against t h i s , so to s t r e s s the resurrection that the death 
and i t s importance are l o s t . Both sides must be kept. "There can 
be no salvation from s i n unless there i s a l i v i n g Saviour: t h i s 
explains the emphasis l a i d by the apostle on the resurrection. But 
the Living One can only be a Saviour because He has died: t h i s explains 
the emphasis l a i d on the cross. The C h r i s t i a n believes i n a l i v i n g 
Lord, or he could not believe at a l l ; but he believes i n a l i v i n g Lord 
who died an atoning death, for no other can hold the f a i t h of a soul 
under the doom of s i n . " ( i b i d p 87f) 
More p o s i t i v e l y , before turning to consider the e p i s t l e s , Denney 
suggests that Paul puts the death of Christ i n the context of three 
relationships. F i r s t i t i s related to the love of God. He notes 
that some dismiss Paul's doctrine of propitiation as inconsistent 
with Jesus' teaching on the love of the Father. Such a reaction, he 
1. Rashdall worked out the l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y . Denney i s not 
dealing with 'straw men'. 
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siiggests, i s too hasty. " I t may he a modern, i t i s c e r t a i n l y not a 
Pauline idea, that a death for s i n s , with a view to t h e i r forgiveness, 
i s inconsistent with God's love." ( i b i d p 89). Since Paul sees 
propitiation as the supreme demonstration of God's love i t i s at l e a s t 
possible that those who r e j e c t i t as incompatible with that love have 
midunderstood him. Later Denney deals at some length with the 
conception of the righteousness of God. 
Secondly the cross must be seen i n r e l a t i o n to the love of C h r i s t . 
Unlike some older exponents of the objective view of atonement, Denney 
stresses that C h r i s t i s the agent, not merely the instrument, of 
salvation. He redeems men by obedience to the w i l l of God i n 
f u l f i l l i n g h i s vocation as redeemer. The cross i s the price which he 
had to pay, and w i l l i n g l y paid, for us men and for our salvation. 
F i n a l l y , he suggests, one cannot understand Paul's presentation 
of the death of Christ without seeing i t i n r e l a t i o n to man's s i n and 
the wrath of God on i t . I t i s a constant theme with Denney, to which 
we s h a l l return, that Christ's death must be, and must be seen to be, 
i n r e l a t i o n to s i n . There i s for Paul, and for Denney, a necessary 
r e l a t i o n between s i n and death. This i s a d i f f i c u l t t r a i n of thought, 
and, again, i t i s one to which we must return as i t has an important 
place i n Denney's thought. Here i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to say that he 
accepts Paul's dictum that 'the wages of s i n i s death' (Rom 6:23). 
Man i s a moral being bound by a universal law to God. He i s not an 
animal or a plant, and when death comes to him i t i s not merely a 
physical end, i t i s a moral and s p i r i t u a l experience. "Death i s the 
word which sums up the whole l i a b i l i t y of man i n r e l a t i o n to s i n , and 
therefore when Christ came to give Himself for our sins He did i t by 
dying." ( i b i d p 92). 
I n 'The Death of C h r i s t 1 Denney works through the Pauline e p i s t l e s 
commenting on every verse which r e f e r s , or may r e f e r , to Christ's death 
and i t s significance for men. But there are three key passages to 
which he re f e r s on many occasions, which he discusses i n d e t a i l , and 
which c l e a r l y sum up for him the apostolic teaching on t h i s subject. 
They are 2 Corinthians 5:14-21; Galatians 3s13^5 and Romans 3s21-26. 
We s h a l l consider them i n order. 
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2 Corinthians 5:14-21. Denney describes t h i s passage as the locus 
c l a s s i c u s on the death of Christ i n Paul's writings. I n t h i s e p i s t l e 
Paul i s defending h i s apostleship and h i s conduct towards the 
Corinthians. His defence r e s t s on h i s correct understanding of the 
Gospel and h i s success i n preaching i t . I n Chapter 5 he argues that 
h i s motives have been to serve God and to benefit those who heard him. 
He gives as h i s reason, "For the love of C h r i s t constraineth us; 
because we thus judge, that one died for a l l , therefore a l l died; and 
he died f o r a l l , that they which l i v e should no longer l i v e unto 
themselves, but unto him who f o r t h e i r sakes died and rose again." 
( v l 4 f ) . Here says Denney, r e f e r r i n g back to h i s introductory points, 
we have a connection between the love of C h r i s t i n which the cross 
originated and the s i n with which i t dealt. Further we have a theory 
which connects the two. 
To a c e r t a i n extent the passage i s c l e a r . One could not deny, 
from t h i s passage, that Paul i s moved by the love of Ch r i s t , and that 
that love was shown i n C h r i s t ' s death for a l l . What i s l e s s c l e a r 
i s i n what sense he could be said to have died for a l l , and how t h i s 
could have such constraining influence on Paul and, so Paul expects, 
the Corinthians C h r i s t i a n s . I n other words, what i s the theory? 
grounds, the idea of substitution i s not i r r e s i s t i b l e . The meaning 
i s simply that there i s some benefit for a l l . However, Denney argues 
that the key to the argument i s i n the inference which Paul draws from 
the death of the one - 'therefore a l l died'. " I n one sense, i t i s 
i r r e l e v a n t and interrupts h i s argument. He puts i t into a hurried 
parenthesis, and then eagerly resumes what i t had suspended. ... Yet 
i t i s i n t h i s immediate inference - that the death of C h r i s t for a l l 
involved the death of a l l - that the missing l i n k i s found." ( i b i d p 101) 
Here i s the source of the constraint. I t l i e s i n the immensity of 
the benefit conferred, He has i n some sense died our death. Denney 
puts the point more sermonically i n the Expositors Bible. "... i f 
we a l l died, i n that C h r i s t died for us, there must be a sense i n 
which that death of His i s ours; He must be i d e n t i f i e d with us i n i t : 
I t must be noted that 'for a l l ' t ranslates VTflp ifoVTuv and 
f o r t h e i r sakes' bvifl ai/TUV and that the preposition VlTtfi t means 
on behalf of* as opposed to<s»V77 'instead of Thus, on l i n g u i s t i c 
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there, on the cross, while we stand and gaze at Him, He i s not 
simply a person doing us a service; He i s a person doing us a service 
by f i l l i n g our place and dying our death." ( l l Corinthians p 194f)» 
This i s substitutionary atonement. I t i s not possible to evade 
or d i l u t e i t by speaking of a mystical union of Christ and the 
believer. Such an argument might apply to 'crucified with C h r i s t ' 
(Gal 2:20), but there the apostle i s speaking of C h r i s t i a n experience. 
Here there i s something prior to such experience. "This clause puts 
as p l a i n l y as i t can be put the idea that His death was the death of 
a l l ; i n other words, i t was the death of a l l men which was died by 
Him." (The Death of C h r i s t p l O l f ; cf Studies i n Theology p 109). 
I f i t were not so then i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the cross could 
have the constraining power which Paul attributes to i t . 
The same point - the antecedent finished work of C h r i s t , which 
precedes a l l C h r i s t i a n experience - i s made again i n the references to 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n v 18f, "But a l l things are of God, who reconciled 
us to Himself through C h r i s t , and gave unto us the ministry of 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ; to wit, that God was i n Christ reconciling the world 
unto himself, not reckoning unto them t h e i r trespasses, and having 
committed unto us the word of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . " Denney points out 
that the English verb 'to r e c o n c i l e 1 (and the German 'Versohnen' 
which i s normally taken as i t s equivalent) has not quite the same 
meaning as the Greek k<XTa.\ikfr<r<rciV i n normal English the implication 
i s that both parties are n e c e s s a r i l y involved. So to say that God 
has reconciled man to himself implies - i n English- that man has 
entered into a state of peace with God, a reconciled relationship. 
But the Greek does not go so f a r , "The work of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , i n 
the sense of the New Testament, i s a work which i s finished, and 
which we must conceive to be finished, before the gospel i s preached." 
( i b i d p 103). I n other words, God has done something outside of us 
and without our co-operation into the benefits of which we are now 
able to enter. 
This r a i s e s the question why r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was necessary, and 
how Christ by dying our death could effect i t . I n h i s commentary 
Denney runs r h e t o r i c a l l y through the possible reasons why i t was 
-51-
necessary. Since i t i s God who does the reconciling i t may be 
assumed that the element which made i t necessary i s on man's side. 
So he l i s t s man's d i s t r u s t of God, h i s d i s l i k e , fear, antipathy, 
s p i r i t u a l alienation. A l l these contain some truth, but to put the 
need for r e c o n c i l i a t i o n here i s not to go deep enough. "The serious 
thing which makes the Gospel necessary, and the putting away of which 
constitutes the Gospel, i s God's condemnation of the world and i t s 
s i n ; i t i s God's wrath, ..." ( l l Corinthians p 212). God takes s i n 
seriously and his wrath i s h i s reaction to i t . I t i s the putting 
away of t h i s wrath which constitutes the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
The r e s u l t of God's wrath, for man, i s death. Paul has shown i n 
v 14f that Christ's death for us affected the removal of t h i s wrath. 
Now, having noted that God was 'not reckoning unto them t h e i r 
trespasses' (vl9), he gives a f u l l e r explanation of how i t was 
effected i n v 21. This, says Denney, i s Paul's own commentary and 
explanation of 'One died f or a l l ' . "Him who knew no s i n he made to 
be s i n on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God i n 
him." I t i s important to notice that God i s the subject of th i s 
sentence. I t i s not to be softened into saying 'Christ became s i n ' , 
which can then be understood i n terms of h i s w i l l i n g s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
with sinners. "... i t i s God who i s presented dealing i n an. awful 
way with the awful r e a l i t y of s i n , f or i t s removal; and the way i n 
which he removes i t i s to lay i t on His Son. That i s done, not i n 
anything el s e , but i n th i s alone, that Ch r i s t , by God's appointment, 
dies the sinner's death. The doom f a l l s upon Him, and i s exhausted 
there." (Studies i n Theology p 112) Nor has Denney much patience 
with discussions about the relevance to t h i s passage of the Old 
Testament s i n offering. "The expression for a sin-offering i s d i s t i n c t 
{jTCfi OL/J&f>Tlfr$ ) , and the parallelism with ^lk<XLO<ru\//j i n the next 
clause forbids that reference here. The sin-offering of the Old 
Testament can at most have pointed towards and dimly suggested so 
tremendous an utterance as t h i s ; and the profoundest word of the New 
Testament cannot be adequately interpreted by anything i n the Old." 
( l l Corinthians p 219). I n any case he frequently makes the point 
that long and complicated discussions on Old Testament ideas and 
customs intended to illuminate the New Testament are l i a b l e to be 
confusing as often as helpful. The question i s not what cer t a i n 
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words or phrases might have meant i n the Old Testament, but how they 
are used by New Testament w r i t e r s . I n t h i s passage "The idea 
underlying i t i s p l a i n l y that of an interchange of stat e s . " (Studies 
i n Theology p 111). 
I t may be complained that t h i s argument contains an inner 
contradiction. God, as i t were, appears on both sides of a case at 
once. Denney admits t h i s , but has no reply except that he does not 
r e a l l y regard i t as a serious c r i t i c i s m . I t i s a cool and l o g i c a l 
comment without serious e x i s t e n t i a l involvement or concern. We s h a l l 
note l a t e r that he suggests the experience of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n always 
involves a sense of tension i n which God i s both for us and against 
us. Man standing before God was faced with bearing the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and burden of s i n . "The message of the Gospel, as i t i s here 
presented, i s that Christ has borne i t for us, i f we deny that He can 
do so, i s i t not tantamount to denying the very p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
Gospel? Mysterious and awful as the thought i s , i t i s the key to the 
whole New Testament, that C h r i s t bore our s i n s . " (The Death of Christ 
p 106). 
Galatians 5:15f. This passage i s treated i n h i s three major works 
on the subject. He points out that t h i s e p i s t l e i s more exclusively 
concerned with the cross than any other New Testament document. The 
whole of the Chr i s t i a n r e l i g i o n and l i f e i s shown to consist i n an 
understanding of and response to the love exhibited in the cross. I t 
i s by tr u s t i n g i t f u l l y that man i s put right with God and any 
suggestion that i t needs supplementing from the law, or indeed any 
other source, i s to f r u s t r a t e the grace of God and treat the death of 
Ch r i s t as vain (2:2). 
Denney suggests that had Paul been w i l l i n g to appeal simply to 
h i s experience, to say that he had t r i e d to regulate h i s l i f e by law 
and found i t impossible and so had given i t up, and then had explained 
how through the constraint of God's love i n Christ he had found a more 
sa t i s f a c t o r y l i f e , then h i s gospel would have seemed more a t t r a c t i v e 
than i t does to many who have misgivings about what he a c t u a l l y did 
say. For he does not stay at the empirical l e v e l , he goes on to a 
theory. I t i s summed up i n the expression 'Christ under the law' (4*4) 
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but the f u l l meaning of the phrase i s given i n 3*13 'Christ redeemed 
us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us: for i t 
i s written, Cursed i s every one that hangeth on a tree:" 
The f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y here i s the precise meaning of the term law. 
The obvious meaning as Paul wrote was the Jewish law. But i f that 
was a l l then t h i s would be limited to an 'ad hominem* argument which 
could not be used except i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which an attempt at 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n through the observance of the Jewish law could r e a l l y 
be presented as a l i v e option. Denney i s not w i l l i n g to accept t h i s 
l i m i t a t i o n . While i n the accidental circumstances of the e p i s t l e the 
Jewish law i s prominent, he argues that the meaning i s more general, 
"... i t i s law i n the large sense of the e t h i c a l n e c e s s i t i e s which 
determine a l l the r e l a t i o n s of God and man. For law i n t h i s large 
sense Paul had the profoundest reverence. He knew that i t could 
never be treated as though i t were not, not even by God, and not even 
i n the act of forgiveness." (The Ch r i s t i a n Doctrine of Reconciliation 
P 167). 
But i f the wider meaning i s accepted i t i s s t i l l not possible to 
stop when one has said that Christ was 'under the law.', since the 
phrase i s ambiguous. As f a r as the law of God comes to man as an 
imperative t e l l i n g him what he must do to please God, then i t i s of 
course true that Ch r i s t , as t r u l y human, was 'under the law' as every 
other man i s . But t h i s would not be enough to secure man's redemptiion. 
Hence Denney goes on, "The law has not only a r e l a t i o n to man as such, 
i n which i t expresses the w i l l of God; i t has a r e l a t i o n to men as 
sinners, i n which i t expresses the condemnation of God. Now Christ i s 
our Redeemer, according to the apostle, because He was made under the 
law i n t h i s sense." (Death of C h r i s t p 112). I t i s t h i s which i s 
made pla i n i n Galatians 3!l3» 
With the wider understanding of law he r e j e c t s the argument that 
'curse' here i s to be i d e n t i f i e d with the cross on the basis of 
Deuteronomy 21:23 he that i s hanged i s accursed of God ...". I t 
seems to imply that had Jesus died i n some other way Paul would not 
have been able to use t h i s quotation, and that our condemnation would 
not have come upon him. No doubt i t was because of the c r u c i f i x i o n 
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that t h i s verse came e a s i l y to Paul's mind, but i t was Jesus' death, 
rather .than any p a r t i c u l a r form of death, that was the acceptance of 
the curse. "Death i s the curse of the law. I t i s the experience 
i n which the f i n a l repulsion of e v i l by God i s d e c i s i v e l y expressed; 
and C h r i s t died. I n His death everything was made His that s i n had 
made ours - everything i n s i n except i t s sinfulness." ( i b i d p 115)• 
The analogy of other New Testament uses of the Old Testament supports 
Denney here. While Jesus' r i d i n g into Jerusalem on an ass declares 
him to be king i n fulfilment of Zechariah 9s9» and h i s death between 
two thieves i s taken as fulfilment of 'he was numbered with the 
transgressors' i n I s a i a h 53*12, i t could not seriously be argued that 
had he not ridden the ass or been c r u c i f i e d between the thieves the 
New Testament writers could not have considered him king or to have 
died for sinners. S i m i l a r l y here the curse re f e r s to the death 
rather.than the manner of the death. 
Yet Denney i s keen to point out that Paul avoids applying to 
Christ the exact words of the text i n Deuteronomy 'accursed of God1. 
To have done so would be misleading. Jesus was not accursed of His 
Father; he was doing the Father's w i l l i n becoming accursed, taking 
the curse of death, for us. Denney did not present a picture of the 
loving Son wresting redemption from an angry or reluctant Father. He 
would have accepted Forsyth's statement of the case, that the grace of 
God provided the cross, i t was not procured by i t . 
Romans 3?21-26 This becomes the most important of Denney's three 
key passages. I t s growing importance can be traced through h i s 
writings. I n 'Studies i n Theology' (1894) i t i s dealt with i n l e s s 
than two pages. I n 'The Death of C h r i s t ' (1902) i t gets f u l l e r t r e a t -
ment i n ten sides with references to the work of other int e r p r e t e r s . 
Yet here, as i n the previous work, i t s t i l l seems to have what one 
might c a l l a subordinate role supporting the position arrived at from 
2 Corinthians 5:14-21. But by the end of h i s l i f e i n 'The C h r i s t i a n 
Doctrine of Reconciliation' (1917) p r a c t i c a l l y the whole of h i s 
treatment of the Pauline view of the subject, some t h i r t y sides, i s 
given to these verses. By then, however, he i s not simply concerned 
with the exegetical problem of bringing out what Paul said or meant, 
he i s also concerned with what might be c a l l e d - though probably not 
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by Denney - the hermeneutical problems of putting i t i n terms which 
would be acceptable, or at l e a s t understandable, to his contemporaries. 
Meanwhile he had also covered the passage i n h i s Expositors Greek 
Testament Commentary on Romans (1900). For the moment we are c h i e f l y 
interested i n h i s understanding of Paul. 
The preceding chapters of Romans have concluded a l l men under 
s i n and i n need of a righteousness which, of themselves or by way of 
the law, they are unable to obtain. Again Denney i s understanding 
law i n the wider sense indicated above. The question of the e p i s t l e 
i s then 'How can s i n f u l men be righteous before God?'. The Gospel, 
as explained i n these verses, brings Paul's answer to that question. 
A righteousness of God i s made available to the sinner by God by the 
means of setting forth His son as a propitiation. There are two 
problems, the precise meaning of Sik^Ofo^f 9to<i and of Wo-fT/jpioV-
The problem with SlkoLLOtroVrj &ioi) i s whether i t refers to God's 
character - that He i s himself righteous, h i s passive righteousness, 
or whether i t i s a more technical term f o r the Gospel - h i s action i n 
setting men r i g h t , h i s active righteousness. I think that most 
modern commentators accept that the two cannot be r i g i d l y separated, 
they are aspects of the same thing not quite different and independent 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Thus i t might seem that Denney makes rather heavy 
weather of the problem, e s p e c i a l l y i n 'The Death of C h r i s t ' ( c f pp 
120-125). But no doubt i n h i s day the other p o s s i b i l i t i e s he 
suggests were l i v e options. He suggests that some take the phrase 
to mean simply God's self-imparting goodness, while others r e f e r i t to 
h i s acting r i g h t l y i n the context of the covenant, or i n accordance 
with h i s own nature. Exponents of these views say a l o t that i s 
true, but they do not see the problem with which Denney sees Paul i s 
grappling. The problem that i f God takes s i n seriously the plight 
of men i s hopeless, they are exposed to the wrath of God; but i f God 
does not take s i n seriously and simply forgives f r e e l y , then man can 
have no confidence i n the character of God. Furthermore, such views 
have not taken seriously the significance of tXlKfTf/jP^y/. 
The solution, according to Denney, i s to understand the 
righteousness of God i n two senses coming to a climax at the end of 
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the passage with God both j u s t i n himself (Passive Righteousness), 
and the j u s t i f i e r of the ungodly (Active Righteousness). The key i s 
i n the idea of t\(k(TT^f>toV He dismisses the idea that i t could mean 
•mercy seat' as i n Exodus 25:16, as incongrous with the context and 
out of keeping with the apostle's thought. Neither does he f e e l i t 
i s necessary to make i t a neuter adjective and supply a noun, say fiUf/d. 
I t i s probably not possible to come to a conclusion on the grammatical 
question. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t to see the propitiatory ef f i c a c y of 
Christ's blood. " I t i s not necessary to assume that any p a r t i c u l a r 
s a c r i f i c e - say the sin-offering - i s i n view; ... i t i s enough to say 
that for the Apostle the ideas of blood with propitiatory v i r t u e , and 
s a c r i f i c i a l blood must have been the same, ..." (Romans p 6 l l ) . Thus 
the two aspects of God's righteousness, active and passive, are both 
kept. "There can be no gospel unless there i s such a thing as the 
righteousness of God f o r the ungodly. But j u s t as l i t t l e can there 
be any gospel unless the i n t e g r i t y of God's character be maintained." 
(The Death of C h r i s t p 119). 
This interpretation keeps both the freedom of God's action and 
the necessary connection between Christ's death and man's s i n . I n h i s 
death the divine judgement on s i n i s met. Thus the passage i s seen to 
be i n l i n e with the others we have studied. Forgiveness i s offered 
f r e e l y to men, but at great cost to God who, i n the death of h i s son, 
met the demands of the law. " I do not", wrote Denney, "know any word 
which conveys the truth of t h i s i f 'vicarious* or substitutionary* 
does not, nor do I know any interpretation of Christ's death which 
enables us to regard i t as a demonstration of love to sinners, i f t h i s 
vicarious or substitutionary character i s denied." ( i b i d p 126). 
I n these passages Denney believes he has found and set forth 
the heart of the Gospel. He knows that not a l l would agree, and that 
some would dismiss such passages rather impatiently as not central to 
the New Testament, contradictory to a simpler and purer message of 
God's free love, or r e l a t i v e to a world view or attitude to the Jewish 
law that mankind has long since outgrown. Such c r i t i c i s m s did not 
simply touch h i s B i b l i c a l exegesis, they went to the heart of h i s 
f a i t h and the truths he held most dear. Thus he responded to such 
c r i t i c i s m s with vehement eloquence. " I think i t worth while to draw 
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attention to the f a c t that a theology which treats ... (the passages 
above) ... as mere excresences on the gospel, or even on the Pauline 
gospel, i s u t t e r l y at variance with the New Testament. I t i s i n 
passages l i k e these that the Christian consciousness i n a l l ages has 
found the very core of the gospel, the inmost heart of God's 
redeeming love; they have been the refuge of despairing sinners from 
generation to generation; they are not ' f a u l t s 1 , as a geologist would 
say, i n the structure of Christian thought; they are not e r r a t i c 
boulders that have been carried over somehow from a pre-Christian -
i . e . a Jewish or pagan - condition of mind, to a Christian one; they 
are themselves the most profoundly, purely, and completely Christian 
of a l l scripture thoughts. The idea they contain i s not an i r r a t i o n a l 
or immoral something that we must eliminate by one device or another 
- by exegetical ingenuity, or philosophical i n t e r d i c t ; i t i s the 
diamond pivot of which the whole system of Christian t r u t h revolves, 
and to displace i t or tamper with i t i s to reduce the New Testament t o 
an i n t e l l e c t u a l chaos." (Studies i n Theology p 108f). 
Yet such vehemence could not take the place of argument, and 
from the publication of 'The Death of Christ' onwards his writings are 
c h i e f l y an attempt to explain, defend and commend the exegetical 
results he had stated there. 
We noticed above the complex double-sided nature of his a t t i t u d e 
to the orthodox formulae of objective atonement. Admitting the 
danger of ex t e r n a l i t y , and welcoming the greater use of human and 
personal analogies, he was equally convinced that t h i s should not lead 
to an abandoning of the objective element which he considered to be 
the main New Testament teaching. 
The lectures published as 'The Death of Christ' were intended as 
an exposition of t h i s teaching. Before t h e i r publication he wrote 
to his f r i e n d W. Robertson N i c o l l , "There i s nothing i n them but an 
exhibition of the New Testament teaching; but the c e n t r a l i t y and 
grav i t y and inevitableness and glory of i t impressed me more than ever, 
and I think i t worth i n s i s t i n g on. The epistles deduce everything 
Christian from i t , theological and e t h i c a l ; and there i s no choice 
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but to take i t or leave i t . " (Letters of Principal James Penney to 
W. Robertson N i c o l l p 24f). I n spite of the l a s t sentence he seems 
to have been genuinely surprised at the reception the book received. 
I t seems that he had, perhaps rather naively, expected the New 
Testament teaching, as he saw i t , to commend i t s e l f more easily than 
i t d i d, at least w i t h i n the church. He had paid some attention to 
opinions other than his own, and made some attempt to explain the 
Pauline ideas i n modern terms. But the correspondence which followed, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when he was congratulated or c r i t i c i s e d f o r having put 
forward 'forensic' or ' j u d i c i a l ' views, convinced him of the need to 
show much more c l e a r l y to the modern mind how those ideas were to be 
understood and the background against which they should be set. 
When he turned to the 'Modern Mind* he picked out three chief 
features which he considered had fashioned i t s outlook. The development 
of the sciences, p a r t i c u l a r l y biology, could, he thought, be a helpful 
f a c t o r f o r the evangelist or apologist i n at least one d i r e c t i o n . 
Against the sheer individualism which had been current f o r some time 
i t stressed the essential unity of mankind and the connection between 
man and the rest of nature, both of which were, f o r Denney, 
presuppositions of the Doctrine of Atonement. Less h e l p f u l l y , i n 
giving purely physical explanations of a l l phenomena, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those of conscience, science was contributing to the loss of the 
consciousness of sin and of individual moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Secondly 
he noted the prevalence of i d e a l i s t philosophy, with i t s tendency to 
stress the un i t y of God and man and accordingly reduce the uniqueness 
of Christ. As the sense of distance between man and God was l o s t , 
men no longer saw the need f o r a mediator. Not the least d i f f i c u l t y 
with idealism was the tendency to use Christian phraseology but 
without, as Denney saw i t , the f u l l Christian meaning. F i n a l l y he 
noted the current stress on h i s t o r i c a l study. Here the danger was 
to see everything as r e l a t i v e to i t s own time, and so to deny the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of any h i s t o r i c a l period or events having eternal 
significance. Even i n the church some distinguished a purely h i s t o r i c a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the death of Jesus - He was put to death by his 
enemies, from a dogmatic one - he died f o r our sins. We have seen 
Denney's c r i t i c i s m of t h i s sort of thing. For him the event needs, 
and has an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , an uninterpreted event i s not possible. 
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But he saw that the 'Modern Mind* also made legitimate demands 
on a doctrine of atonement. I t insisted that t r u t h should be 
v e r i f i e d i n experience and be e t h i c a l l y construed. His own theology 
met these demands. The evangelist i n him, never f a r below the surface, 
warmed to an appeal to experience providing i t was a deep enough 
experience and not s u p e r f i c i a l emotion. Furthermore he insisted t h a t , 
properly understood, the experience of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n led to s a n c t i f i c -
ation. But, i n contrast to some others, he insisted that t h i s meant 
dealing adequately with man's r e l a t i o n to God. Thus he can both 
c r i t i c i s e some representations of the objective view, and at the same 
time commend the moral depth and earnestness which he connected with i t . 
"Sometimes t h i s aspect of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s not adequately recognised. 
The term i s r e s t r i c t e d too narrowly to a transaction i n the sphere of 
conscience. But the end of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s to make saints, and no 
l i f e impresses us as s a i n t l y unless i t r e f l e c t s , however obscurely, 
the glory of the beatitudes. We are not r e a l l y reconciled to God 
through Jesus unless we are reconciled to t h i s as the true l i f e , and 
we are not reconciled to t h i s as the true l i f e unless we are reconciled 
to renouncing a l l the passion with which when we were ignorant of i t 
we sought the chief end of l i f e elsewhere." (The Christian Doctrine of 
Reconciliation p 12). 
This introduces us to a basic assumption of his thought. He saw 
man as a creature made f o r personal relationship with God, and seemed 
unable to consider any other p o s s i b i l i t y . Writing of the 'New 
Theology' of R.J. Campbell, which he took to be pantheist, he said, 
"Nothing ever impressed me so much, as an argument f o r theism, as the 
f i r s t verse of the 139th Psalm. A man i s incapable of judging any-
thing i f he does not f e e l that i t expresses the most re a l experience 
of which human nature i s capable. Thou hast searched me, and known me 
- and i f he does not f e e l that the thou i s j u s t as real and as personal 
as the me. Only God can prove His being and His personality and His 
character to man, and He proves a l l three, i n the f i r s t instance, by 
experiences l i k e t h i s . " (Letters of Principal James Penney to 
W. Robertson N i c o l l p 80). This i s axiomatic. He never wrote 
anything which might be considered an apologia towards atheism. A 
personal relationship with, or at least an awareness of, God he takes to 
be a f a c t of experience to anyone who has seriously considered his own 
existence. 
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The relations between God and man must also be seen as moral. 
I t i s i n t h i s sense he speaks of a necessity r e s t i n g upon G;od, and 
t h i s i s most important f o r his understanding of atonement. I n his 
dealings with men God also i s governed by law, that general law which 
Denney expounded i n his treatment of Galatians 3:13 and Romans 3:21ff. 
His concern here i s to keep the i n t e g r i t y of God, and! also to show 
that man can be confident i n his dealings with God. 
Denney's use of law, p a r t i c u l a r l y his application of i t to God, 
has been c r i t i c i s e d and perhaps misunderstood. We saw that he 
repudiates what are generally called ' l e g a l 1 or • j u d i c i a l 1 approaches 
to atonement. The relations between God and man are not regulated by 
statute as are those between a judge and a criminal. But i t i s not 
enough to replace the analogy of judge and criminal by that of parent 
and c h i i d . " I f the sinner i s not a criminal before his judge, 
neither i s he a naughty c h i l d before a parent whose own weakness or 
a f f i n i t y to e v i l introduces an incalculable element in t o his dealing 
with his child's f a u l t . ... I t ought to be apparent to everyone that 
even the r e l a t i o n of parent and c h i l d , i f i t i s to be a moral r e l a t i o n , 
must be determined i n a way which has universal and f i n a l v a l i d i t y . " 
(Atonement and the Modern Mind p 272f). To speak of relations as i n 
t h i s sense under law, and even to bring God under t h i s law, i s not 
the same thing as to say that they are legal and thus impersonal. I t 
i s rather to make them sure.. The alternative would seem to be to 
declare God to be without law, which i s presumably not seriously 
suggested. "The relations of God to man therefore are not capricious 
though they are personal: they are reflected or expressed i n a moral 
con s t i t u t i o n to which a l l personal beings are equally bound, a moral 
constitution of eternal and universal v a l i d i t y , which neither God nor 
man can ultimately t r e a t as anything else than what i t i s . " ( i b i d p 27l) 
I t i s i n t h i s context that s i n i s seen not j u s t as a breach of 
law, but as a breach of relationship. Man i s estranged from God. 
No good end i s served by speculating about how t h i s estrangement came 
1. I f Denney's careful use of 'law', and his holding together of 
•personal 1 and 'legal' analogies, i s noted, he seems to have 
anticipated and met most of the c r i t i c i s m s which D i l l i s t o n e has 
made of the use of 'legal' conceptions of atonement, cf F.V. 
D i l l i s t o n e : The Christian Understanding of Atonement p 203-215. 
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about or theorising on the 'unfalien 1 state of Adam. As a matter of 
f a c t man 'knows' himself to be i n a wrong r e l a t i o n with God and i n 
need of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The consciousness of being wrong with God 
may come to the surface of man's mind through some p a r t i c u l a r act, but 
what i s basically involved i s a condition of sinfulness or estrangement. 
Man i s conscious of a bad conscience, a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y before 
God. I t might seem that what i s needed i s repentance, but man comes 
to see that his state of s i n i s such that he cannot adequately repent. 
Thus there i s a sense of being bound i n a relationship with God; an 
awareness that the relationship i s wrong; and an i n a b i l i t y either to 
escape from the relationship or to put i t r i g h t oneself. 
Denney writes often and at length on t h i s subject. He regrets 
that the 'Modern Mind' either f a i l s to realise i t s own position or i s 
content with s u p e r f i c i a l panaceas, believing that repentance i s not 
only possible but easy. He writes, "This sense of being wrong with 
God, under His displeasure, excluded from His fellowship, a f r a i d to 
meet Him yet bound to meet Him, i s the sense of g u i l t . Conscience 
confesses i n i t i t s l i a b i l i t y to God, a l i a b i l i t y which i n the very 
nature of the case i t can do nothing to meet, and which therefore i s 
nearly akin to despair." ( i b i d p 279). Elsewhere perhaps more 
f o r c i b l y , "At a p r i m i t i v e stage of advancement, indeed, j u s t as i n 
childhood, men repent of what they have done; but at a more mature 
stage they repent of what they are. At f i r s t they f e e l that they must 
make amends; but when they come to know themselves, they f e e l that 
they must be born again." (Studies i n Theology p 85f). I t i s i n t h i s 
sense, he suggests, that we must understand the t r a d i t i o n a l language 
about man's t o t a l depravity. 
However, important though the individual relationship with God i s , 
i t i s by no means a l l . There i s a social and organic aspect of s i n 
which involves the entire race. I t t e l l s on the entire society. 
A l l men l i v e i n a society and e f f e c t that society by t h e i r actions, 
.just as they are affected by i t . This has obvious implications f o r 
the doctrine of atonement. "We become conscious that the i n d i v i d u a l 
cannot be reconciled to God except by a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n which the 
i n t e r e s t of a l l his fellows i s i d e n t i c a l with his own." (The Christian 
Doctrine of Reconciliation p 192). This puts the doctrine on a f a r 
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wider canvas, showing that i t must involve a f a r greater work than 
we might at f i r s t have imagined. 
This also raises one of the most i n t r a c t i b l e problems involved 
i n the doctrine of grace. How f a r i s the individual responsible f o r 
his sins, and how f a r can he even hope f o r redemption? The corporate 
conscience and the corporate nature of g u i l t could be used by the 
ind i v i d u a l as an excuse. He could blame his own sins upon his 
environment or heredity. At i t s extreme t h i s leads to one aspect 
of the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius. 
I n the l a s t resort, Denney suggests, one can only appeal to moral 
experience and assert that each i s r i g h t i n what he asserts but wrong 
i n what he denies. The antinomy runs as deep as our moral 
consciousness. Augustine i s r i g h t to i n s i s t that man's very nature 
needs to be renewed. We have j u s t seen that Denney i s convinced man 
cannot make amends, and that s p i r i t u a l l y sensitive and mature man 
knows that he needs r e b i r t h . Yet i t i s equally axiomatic to our 
moral consciousness that we cannot evade r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r our sins. 
Pelagius and his followers were r i g h t to oppose any view which 
encourages man, even i f only by implication, to opt out of the moral 
struggle. 
I n his e a r l i e r work he seems to f e e l f o r a solution which w i l l 
do j u s t i c e to the problem i n a f a i r l y neat and well rounded way. 
Acknowledging a debt to Dale, he wrote "The inherited bias may be 
strong, but i t i s not everything that i s i n any man's nature, and i t 
i s only when he ignores or renounces the r e l a t i o n to God, and f r e e l y 
make the e v i l inheritance his own, that he makes i t i n t o a 
condemnation, and puts i t between himself and l i f e . What we i n h e r i t , 
s t r i c t l y speaking, may be said to be our t r i a l , but not our f a t e . " 
^Studies i n Theology p 91). The need to i n s i s t that man remains 
redeemable he always kept. But, though the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
t r i a l and fat e re-appears, i n his l a s t work he seems more content 
simply to state both sides of the paradox with no attempt to resolve 
them. "Our whole nature i s involved i n s i n , but not indistinguishably 
and i r r e t r i e v a b l y involved, and we disown the sin and protest against 
i t even when we f e e l ourselves most hopelessly i t s slaves. On t h i s 
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the need and the p o s s i b i l i t y of redemption depend." (The Christian 
Doctrine of Reconciliation p 198). And l a t e r i n the same 
discussion, "We know immediately and at f i r s t hand the only things 
which are of any consequence: that sin i s rooted i n our nature so 
deeply, i s so congenital and powerful, that we cannot save ourselves; 
and on the other hand, that God has made us f o r Himself, and has 
never l e f t Himself without a witness i n our consciences, so that the 
p o s s i b i l i t y and hope of re c o n c i l i a t i o n are not precluded." ( i b i d p 200). 
This leads to the t h i r d and perhaps most d i f f i c u l t aspect of his 
thinking about s i n . From being i n d i v i d u a l i t must be extended not 
only to society but to the natural world. Belief i n God as creator 
rules out any sharp d i v i s i o n between the moral or s p i r i t u a l and the 
physical worlds. Sin affects man's r e l a t i o n to the physical world. 
Nature i s not simply a neutral stage f o r moral struggle. As part, 
with man, of God's creation i t also has been affected by si n . But i t 
i s also the organ and a l l y of God. "The universe i s a system of 
things i n which good can be planted and i n which i t w i l l bear f r u i t ; 
i t i s also a system of things i n which there i s a ceaseless and 
unrelenting reaction against e v e i l . " ( i b i d p 202) 
Denney admits t h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t conception with which to work. 
I t i s always l i k e l y to s l i p into pantheism. Yet he i n s i s t s , though 
i t may only be possible to state i t p o e t i c a l l y or imaginatively, i t 
must be stated. The d i s t i n c t i o n between moral or s p i r i t u a l on the 
one hand, and natural or physical on the other, may be useful f o r 
discussion, but i n f a c t man i s a uni t y . Sin involves the whole man 
i n whom s p i r i t and nature interpenetrate. "There i s a moral 
co n s t i t u t i o n , ... even of the physical world; and though i t i s 
impossible f o r us to work i t out i n d e t a i l , the assumption of i t i s 
the only assumption on which we can understand the l i f e of a being 
related as man i s related both to the natural and the s p i r i t u a l . " 
(Atonement and the Modern Mind p 282). He takes t h i s f o r granted, 
explaining that while he does not pretend there i s a r t i c u l a t e 
r e f l e c t i o n on i t i n the Old or New Testaments i t i s t a c i t l y assumed 
i n both. 
Thus man, out of his proper relationship with God, i s also out 
-64-
of step with the very nature of l i f e and the world i t s e l f . The 
inevitable reaction of the constitution of things against sin means 
that man not only needs to he reconciled to God but to l i f e i t s e l f . 
The chief point Denney wishes to draw from t h i s l i n e of thought i s the 
establishing of the B i b l i c a l connection between sin and death. 'The 
wages of sin i s death 1 (Rom 6:23). This i s the awful f i n a l assertion 
of the reaction of God's entire creation against s i n . 
Denney i s aware that t h i s connection would not be easy f o r the 
contemporary mind. Death i s never a popular subject. At the time 
he wrote i t was generally l e f t i n the domain-of biology. The human 
being was a complex l i v i n g machine which grew, grew old, wore out i n 
the process of time and eventually died. I n t h i s sense death i s 
merely a natural physical event. Denney did not deny t h i s physical 
explanation. Neither did he deny that many people would not, or could 
not, look beyond i t . However he pointed out that i t was a l i m i t e d 
view and ce r t a i n l y not a B i b l i c a l one. I t was true that the account 
of the o r i g i n of death i n Genesis 3 was mythological. But, he argued, 
mythology i s not nonsense, i t i s rather a profound statement of truths 
beyond normal expression. This myth enshrines the t r u t h that man i s 
not simply natural l i k e an animal or plant. He i s also a s p i r i t u a l 
being and i n f a c t , as we have seen, i t i s the d i v i s i o n of the two which 
i s unreal. Holding them together Denney argued that death was more 
than a physical event, i t was a s p i r i t u a l experience. The tendency 
to make l i g h t of death was simply not true to experience. "In the 
most happy or the most glorious conditions, the death of a s p i r i t u a l 
being has an inevitable i n d i g n i t y and humiliation i n i t ; we f e e l i t i s 
re v o l t i n g l y out of keeping i n a nature akin to God." (The Christian 
Doctrine of Reconciliation p 279). 
The horror of death i s an indication of the seriousness i n God's 
sight of the sin from which i t r e s u l t s . I n death we see what i s 
always true of sin - that i t l i e s under the wrath of God. I t i s t h i s 
wrath which man senses, though dimly, i n his sense of g u i l t before 
God, "His condemnation of s i n , His wrath r e p e l l i n g s i n , resting over 
sin , are not figments of our ignorance and fear; they are absolutely 
r e a l things, to which our conscience bears a true though awfully 
inadequate testimony." (Studies i n Theology p 94)« Denney suspected 
that many of his contemporaries were rather too easily persuaded 
that man's sense of s i n was the r e s u l t of an ignorance that was. now 
being outgrown. He wished to r e c a l l them to a more B i b l i c a l 
position. God's wrath and condemnation of the s i n f u l world, he 
suggests "... are not, whatever speculative theologians may think, 
unreal things: neither do they belong only to ancient times. They 
are the most r e a l things of which human nature has any knowledge t i l l 
i t receives the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . They are as r e a l as a bad conscience; 
as real as misery, impotence, and despair." ( l l Corinthians p 213). 
Only a shallow sophistication, or a proud confidence i n man's lack of 
need, can take these things l i g h t l y . But they are not i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
discerned. Such conceptions are only l i k e l y to have power among men 
who are genuinely concerned about t h e i r relationship to God. To such 
people, he asserts i n a s t r i k i n g metaphor 'death i s the sacrament of 
s i n * . "... the connection of sin and death i n scripture ... i s a 
profound conviction and experience of the human conscience, and a l l 
that i s of i n t e r e s t i s to show that such a conviction and experience 
can never be set aside by the protest of those who aver that they know 
nothing about i t . " (Atonement and the Modern Mind p 288). 
I t i s against t h i s background that we must set the need and work 
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . How are the severed relations between man and 
God to be.restored i n a way which does ju s t i c e to the r e a l i t y of s i n 
and to the awfulness of God's wrath? I t i s accepted that t h i s 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n comes through the work of Christ, and Denney gives an 
outline of the history of the doctrine.'''. As we have seen on several 
occasions he agrees i t had become too formal and external. 
Satisfaction had been equated with punishment; the stress had been 
exclusively on Christ's death, ignoring his l i f e ; the subjective 
response had been neglected; there was inconsistency i n that while 
God was said to forgive f r e e l y i t was also asserted that he had been 
paid; there was a false d i v i s i o n of the a t t r i b u t e s of God which 
normally led to an opposition between his j u s t i c e and mercy. Denney 
thought these objections could be overcome and that the t r a d i t i o n a l 
formulae kept important t r u t h s . Nevertheless, the objections were 
formidable. 
1. cf The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation pp 97-115* 
-66-
He notes that i n face of these objections certain inadequate 
doctrines of atonement had been suggested. Some concentrated on the 
incarnation rather than the death of Christ. We have already noted 
part of his objection to t h i s l i n e of thinking.^" I n taking attention 
from the death of Christ i t risked making his l i f e unnecessary too 
since a l l that needs to be done, the taking of humanity in t o Godhead, 
or the infusing of humanity by Godhead, has been done by his b i r t h , 
though advocates of t h i s view do not always recognise t h i s . This view 
also s h i f t s the centre of gravity of the Hew Testament. While the 
incarnation may be the thought around which everything gravitates i n 
the Nicene Creed and the church which produced i t , that i s not the 
case with the New Testament. There, as he believes he has shown, the 
cross i s central. "Not Bethlehem, but Calvary, i s the focus of 
revelation, and any construction of C h r i s t i a n i t y which ignores or 
denies t h i s d i s t o r t s C h r i s t i a n i t y by pu t t i n g i t out of focus." (The 
Death of Christ p 235f )• Furthermore to make the incarnation central 
i n t h i s way i s to replace morals by metaphysics. A man who i s 
concerned about his sins and his standing before God does not need to 
be lectured on the ontological relations of Godhead and manhood. 
Fi n a l l y , t h i s approach tends to sentimentalise C h r i s t i a n i t y as the 
Christmas celebrations i n many churches show, "... they are an appeal 
to anything and everything i n man except that to which the Gospel i s 
designed to appeal. The New Testament i s j u s t as l i t t l e sentimental 
as i t i s metaphysical: i t i s ethical not metaphysical; passionate, 
not sentimental." ( i b i d p 237)• 
Othe:is suggested that a l l that was needed was f o r God to forgive, 
to o f f e r a kind of universal amnesty. I t was frequently pointed out 
that i n the parable of the Prodigal Son there was no complicated 
'machinery' of atonement. The loving Father was waiting and ready to 
receive the repentance of the son with no q u a l i f i c a t i o n s or questions. 
This, i t was argued, was Jesus' essential message, reflected i n his 
a t t i t u d e to sinners during his ministry. From t h i s point of view the 
death of Christ was simply the inevitable r e s u l t of his courage i n 
preaching t h i s message among s i n f u l , r e l i g i o u s , men. 
I t would be hard to imagine a presentation of the atonement with 
1. cf p 36 above. 
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which Denney would have had less sympathy. Not that he saw no 
t r u t h i n i t at a l l , hut rather that i t appeared so su p e r f i c i a l and 
incomplete. One senses that he i s hardly able to understand how i t 
could seriously be put forward as an answer to the need f o r atonement. 
He points out that a theology based simply on the parable of the 
Prodigal Son would have no place f o r Jesus either, and that that 
parable i s designed simply to show the freeness of pardon from man's 
side, whereas the doctrine of atonement i s concerned with the cost to 
God and the p a r t i c u l a r way i n which he bore that cost. For Denney, 
and f o r his understanding of the New Testament, that cost was prima r i l y 
the cross. Those who spoke of God merely f o r g i v i n g had not given 
enough thought to the maintenance of God's righteousness or to the 
costliness of forgiveness as these were presented i n the New Testament." 
I n his e a r l i e r works he passes st r a i g h t from a c r i t i c i s m of these 
inadequate doctrines of atonement, as he sees them, to an objective 
view, and to support i t from the New Testament. I n his l a s t work, 
though the outcome i s the same, he approaches more gradually, taking 
account of the ministry of Jesus as well as his death and dwelling at 
some length on the concept of forgiveness. As we have seen,he notes 
that the entire l i f e of Jesus had a reconciling e f f e c t , and refers to 
the s i n f u l woman (Luke 7s36-50) and to Zacchaeus (Luke 1 9 : l f f ) . 
Such people were brought by Jesus very presence and manner to 
repentance and were forgiven. But he points out that even i n purely 
human terms a forgiveness which i s offered f r e e l y i s not without 
cost to the one who offers i t . 
He gives examples of forgiveness i n human experience, pointing 
out that the i n i t i a t i v e i n restoring a broken relationship by means of 
forgiveness l i e s with the one who was wronged. This can be seen i n 
the case of a father wronged by his son, or a wife by her husband, but 
i n neither case w i l l a mere announcement of forgiveness without cost 
to the forgive r s u f f i c e . " I t i s the p l a i n t r u t h that everyone who 
knows, even i n human relations what i t i s to forgive or to be forgiven, 
1. I n t e r e s t i n g l y Forsyth has an extended treatment of the parable 
of the 'Prodigal Son* as an answer to the problem of atonement 
which seems to owe a l o t to Denney. cf P.T. Forsyth: 'The 
Work of Christ' p 106ff. 
-68-
knows also that i t i s the most costly and tragic of a l l experiences." 
(The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation p 135). The offence which 
caused the breach i n the relationship i s not ju s t ignored, i t i s paid 
f o r . One re s u l t of such an experience i s the sense of debt on the 
part of the one forgiven. 
A l l t h i s supports the position which Denney had previously set 
out from the New Testament. God's forgiveness cannot be easier or 
cheaper than human forgiveness, rather, as the breach i s greater so 
the cost may be expected to be greater. The cost i s the death of 
Christ. Only i f his death i s seen i n t h i s way i s the r e a l i t y of 
man's sin taken with proper seriousness. "... i n perfect sinlessness 
He consents even to die, to submit to that awful experience i n which 
the f i n a l reaction of God's holiness against s i n i s expressed. Death 
was not His due: i t was something al i e n to One who did nothing amiss; 
but i t was our due, and because i t was ours He made i t His. I t was 
thus that He made Atonement. He bore our sins." (The Atonement and 
the Modern Mind p 301). 
Later he discusses the term penal su b s t i t u t i o n . He i s not 
happy with i t s l e g a l i s t i c overtones. Punishment, he considers, can 
only exist i n and f o r a bad conscience. While the innocent may 
suffer f o r , and i n the place of, the g u i l t y , he remains innocent. 
Thus he wishes to exclude the idea that "... the Son of God, with 
whom the Father was well pleased, should be regarded at the same time 
as the object of the Father's displeasure, the v i c t i m of His wrath, 
on whom the punishment of a l l the world's sin was i n f l i c t e d . " (The 
Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation p 262). We have seen that i n 
dealing with Galatians 3s13 he pointed out that Paul did not say 
that God cursed Jesus. Nevertheless, he does not.want to l e t the 
term go completely. The sufferings of Jesus involved taking seriously 
the r e a l i t y of sin and the wrath of God. The Christian conscience 
through the ages has always found there the heart of the Gospel, and 
has seen there God's treatment of sin at i t s worst, while paradoxically 
t r y i n g to preserve the innocence of Jesus and the relations of the 
T r i n i t y . I n the l a s t resort Denney can do no more than accept 
t h i s paradox. "... ean-v/.e," he asks, "say anything else than t h i s : 
that while the agony and the Passion were not penal i n the sense of 
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coming upon Jesus through a bad conscience, or making Him the 
personal object of divine wrath, they were penal i n the sense that i n 
that dark hour He had to realise to the f u l l the divine reaction 
against sin i n the race i n which He was incorporated, and that 
without doing so to the uttermost He could not have been the Redeemer 
of that race from s i n , or the Reconciler of s i n f u l men to God?" 
( i b i d p 273)• Thus i t i s that the sense of indebtedness to Christ i s 
such a major feature of New Testament C h r i s t i a n i t y , and also, Denney 
would argue, or genuine C h r i s t i a n i t y i n any subsequent age. 
That t h i s l i n e of thinking can be put, and often has been put, 
crudely and mechanistically, should not be allowed to weigh against 
i t too heavily. Here, as i n the sense of tension i n which God seems 
to be both f o r us and against us at the same time, we are dealing 
with the deepest human experiences. The experience must be held even 
i f the expression of i t lacks sophistication. I t does not follow 
that we need to speak of a d i v i s i o n between the j u s t i c e and the mercy 
of God. The opposite of j u s t i c e i s i n j u s t i c e , not mercy. God 
remains j u s t , and shows his jus t i c e c h i e f l y i n showing mercy. " I t i s 
certa i n l y part of the experience of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n that God treats us 
better than we deserve. He does not deal with us a f t e r our sins, nor 
reward us according to our i n i q u i t i e s . ... But i t i s not part of the 
experience to f e e l that there i s a c o n f l i c t between the divine 
a t t r i b u t e s of j u s t i c e and mercy, ... they are i n active and immutable 
harmony with each other, and God always - not merely i n f o r g i v i n g sins 
- acts i n unison with both." ( i b i d p 22). 
A fur t h e r unusual l i n e which Denney follows here i s t° argue that 
God i s also affected by the act of Christ. I t i s true that the New 
Testament always sees God as the subject of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , but the 
point of such language i s to stress his i n i t i a t i v e . I t i s wrong to 
suppose that he was not changed. "When we say that because God i s 
love, immutably and eternally love, therefore He does not need to be 
and cannot be reconciled, we are imputing immutability to God i n a 
sense which p r a c t i c a l l y denies that He i s the l i v i n g God. I f sin 
makes a difference to God - and that i t does i s the solemn f a c t 
which makes r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of int e r e s t to us - then God i s not 
immutable, and His love i s not immutable, i n the sense assumed." 
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( i b i d p 237)• Those who protest against any idea of God being 
reconciled to man seem to see him as an unmoving 1summum bonum'. I n 
human experience there i s a difference between the readiness to forgive 
and the actual opportunity of exercising forgiveness and moving i n t o 
a reconciled relationship. May i t not be, therefore, that there i s a 
difference to God when his forgiveness i s made actual by the work of 
Christ? 1 
As we have often noted, f o r Denney the best expression available 
f o r that work i s ' s u b s t i t u t i o n 1 . He finds the word 'representative' 
which i s often suggested as an improvement i s too open to misunder-
standing. I t has the implication that Christ i s somehow 'put forward 1 
by the human race, rather than the more B i b l i c a l conception of his 
being 'given' by God. Thus the sense of man's debt to God i s 
weakened. Though, following r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , when men are reconciled, 
i t may be said that he i s our representative. 
Not the least advantage of the idea of 'substitution' f o r Denney 
i s that i t can be preached. I t does not follow that the preacher 
w i l l always begin at the cross. Men may be attracted to Jesus i n 
many ways, but wherever i n the Gospel story one begins, one w i l l 
i n evitably be led to the cross. I t i s the one who can, and does, pay 
t h i s price that can o f f e r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to sinners, 
2 
I n t h i s vein he gives a long i l l u s t r a t i o n from Kierkegaard i n 
which man's approach to God i s traced through the stages of growth to 
maturity. The c h i l d who 'says Da to the Kaiser as he does to his 
nurse' finds nothing odd i n regarding God as his heavenly Father and 
probably has no ideas about Christ at a l l . The youth i s pleased to 
1, I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a l l the scholars covered i n t h i s work make some 
c r i t i c i s m of the doctrine of Divine i m p a s s i b i l i t y , 
2. Denney read Kierkegaard before he was generally known i n England. 
I n 1905 he asked Robertson N i c o l l whether there would be any 
int e r e s t i n a book of selections from Kierkegaard translated by 
Dr. Grieve, and commented that he had himself thought of 
tr a n s l a t i n g the study of Abraham's s a c r i f i c e from the German. 
He thinks the journal would be i n t e r e s t i n g , but adds "His more 
formal works do not seem to me l i k e l y to have any vogue i n t h i s 
country. They are as much eccentric as o r i g i n a l , and with sober 
minds a l i t t l e paradox goes a long way." (Letters of Principal 
James Denney to W, Robertson M c o l l p 55) • 
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accept Christ as f r i e n d and example but feels no greater need. But 
the mature man, with greater insight brought about by closer 
acquaintance with Christ and f u l l e r recognition of his own state, 
comes to a more e x i s t e n t i a l understanding of his need of re c o n c i l i a t i o n 
and his consequent debt to Christ, (cf Death of Christ pp 216-218) 
Once that need i s seen the idea of 'sub s t i t u t i o n 1 can be seen to 
stand i n r e l a t i o n to i t as other theories do not. He makes t h i s point 
i n an i l l u s t r a t i o n which deserves to be quoted at length. " I f I were 
s i t t i n g on the end of the pier, on a summer day, enjoying the sunshine 
and the a i r , and someone came along and jumped i n t o the water and got 
drowned 'to prove his love f o r me', I should f i n d i t quite u n i n t e l l i g -
i b l e . I might be much i n need of love, but an act i n no r a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n to any of my necessities could not prove i t . But i f I had 
f a l l e n over the pi e r and were drowning, and some one sprang into the 
water, and at the cost of making my p e r i l , or what but f o r him would 
be my f a t e , his own, saved me from death, then I should say, 'Greater 
love hath no man than t h i s . ' I should say i t i n t e l l i g i b l y , because 
there would be an i n t e l l i g i b l e r e l a t i o n between the sa c r i f i c e which 
love made and the necessity from which i t redeemed. I s i t making 
any rash assumption to say that there must be such an i n t e l l i g i b l e 
r e l a t i o n between the death of Christ - the great act i n which His love 
to sinners i s demonstrated - and the si n of the world f o r which i n His 
blood He i s the prop i t i a t i o n ? I do not think so. Nor have I yet 
seen any i n t e l l i g i b l e r e l a t i o n established between them except that 
which i s the key to the whole of New Testament teaching, and which bids 
us say, as we look at the Cross, He bore our sins, He died our death. 
I t i s so His love constrains us." ( i b i d p 127)^ 
We must now ask how Denney sees the benefits of Christ's death 
coming to man. I n fa c t he writes surprisingly l i t t l e on the 'means of 
grace 1• He seems to have considered i t to be his task to elucidate 
the meaning of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The application he seems to regard as 
1. Hastings Rashdall c r i t i c i s e d t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r f a i l i n g to do 
ju s t i c e either to the view i t attacked or the one i t defended. 
These cr i t i c i s m s w i l l be taken up i n the next chapter. 
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self-evident. Such help as he gives i s largely incidental and i s 
covered by one important rubric - nothing i n t h i s sphere i s made p l a i n 
to observers. Only those who approach the subject i n earnest, 
concerned about t h e i r soul's eternal destiny, are l i k e l y to understand. 
And such people, he implies, need no explanation. 
The task of the evangelist i s to preach Christ - a l i v i n g and 
ascended Christ, but a Christ who was c r u c i f i e d and has thus dealt 
with the sin of the world. He i s to preach 'Jesus i n His death'. 
This evangelistic message becomes effective through f a i t h . Denney i s 
keen to keep the l i v i n g moral content i n f a i t h . He strongly 
repudiates the view that Paul had two gospels, a simple j u r i d i c a l one 
and a fullerethico-mystical one. I n t h i s vein Weiss argued that 
the doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h alone i s supplemented i n Paul's 
theology by a doctrine of s p i r i t u a l regeneration through a mystical 
union with Christ established by baptism. Ritschl made a similar 
d i s t i n c t i o n , though he saw the two as p a r a l l e l rather than successive. 
Denney i s impatient with such d i s t i n c t i o n s . They do not do j u s t i c e 
to the force of Paul's thought or i t s r e l a t i o n to r e a l i t y , "... there 
i s nothing i n any Christian experience answering to t h i s dead or 
i n e r t j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h , which has no r e l a t i o n to the new l i f e , 
nor again i s there anything i n Christian experience l i k e t h i s new l i f e 
which i s added by baptism to the experience of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h , 
but does not spring out of i t . " ( i b i d p 129). Faith i s , f o r Denney, 
the t o t a l characterisation of the Christian l i f e . I t i s not a work, 
neither i s i t something which belongs merely to the beginning of the 
Christian l i f e . "Faith f i l l s the New Testament as completely as 
Christ does; i t i s the correlative of Christ wherever Christ r e a l l y 
touches the l i f e of men. ... And there i s nothing s u p e r f i c i a l i n what 
the New Testament c a l l s f a i t h , ... on the contrary, f a i t h exhausts i n 
i t s e l f the being of man i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n ; i t i s his absolute 
commital of himself f o r ever to the sin bearing love of God f o r 
salvation. I t i s not simply the act of an instant, i t i s the a t t i t u d e 
of a l i f e ; i t i s the one r i g h t thing at the moment when a man abandons 
himself to Christ, and i t i s the one thing which keeps him r i g h t with 
God f o r ever." (The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation pp 287f, 291). 
I t i s as pointless to speak of adding anything to f a i t h as i t i s to 
speak of adding anything to Christ. 
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The r e s u l t of such f a i t h i s assurance. On several occasions 
he c o n t r a s t s the Roman and Pro t e s t a n t a t t i t u d e s t o assurance. For 
Rome assurance of s a l v a t i o n seems presumptuous. The "believer must 
always he. l o o k i n g t o the q u a l i t y o f h i s moral l i f e and seeking the 
he l p of the church t o maintain h i s p o s i t i o n "before God. This, says 
Denney, i s understandable as a check against s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , b ut i t i s 
a departure from the New Testament. He quotes a t l e n g t h the 
seventh chapter of the s i x t h session of the Council of Trent on the 
subjec t of J u s t i f i c a t i o n , and comments t h a t the u n d e r l y i n g conception 
of f a i t h - acceptance of teaching - i s not the same as the New 
Testament conception of complete abandonment t o C h r i s t . This i s 
made c l e a r by the references t o the a d d i t i o n s which have t o be made 
to f a i t h . The complementary teaching on grace as something which can 
be lodged b o d i l y i n the soul has also moved from the New Testament 
conception. There we f i n d "Grace i s the a t t i t u d e of God t o man which 
i s revealed and made sure i n C h r i s t , and the only way i n which i t 
becomes e f f e c t i v e i n us f o r new l i f e i s when i t wins f o r us the 
response o f f a i t h . " And the response, "... i s not a p a r t of the 
C h r i s t i a n l i f e but the whole of i t . I t does not need t o be, and 
cannot be supplemented or eked out by ' g i f t s ' and 'graces'. A l l g i f t s 
and graces are where C h r i s t i s , and f a i t h i s the i n d i v i s i b l e acceptance 
of them a l l i n Him" ( i b i d p 301f) 
But the P r o t e s t a n t view has o f t e n been e q u a l l y a t variance w i t h 
the New Testament. I n Protestantism the attempt t o check presumption 
and safeguard m o r a l i t y has o f t e n l e d t o assurance being made dependent 
on c o r r e c t b e l i e f , o r b e l i e f of a c e r t a i n i n t e n s i t y . But a l l such 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are f o r e i g n t o the New Testament and are, i n f a c t , 
symptomatic of a d i f f e r e n t atmosphere. However important m o r a l i t y 
may be, however understandable the desire t o assure t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
i s accompanied by s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , t h i s i s not the way t o safeguard 
e i t h e r . Denney o f t e n quotes w i t h approval the remark of Chalmers 
•What could I do i f God d i d not j u s t i f y the ungodly?' The f a c t i s 
t h a t God o f f e r s assurance o f s a l v a t i o n t o sinners, and t h i s assurance 
i t s e l f i s the best guarantee o f m o r a l i t y and f u t u r e h o l i n e s s . "To 
t r y t o take some p r e l i m i n a r y s e c u r i t y f o r the sinner's f u t u r e m o r a l i t y 
b e fore you make the gospel a v a i l a b l e f o r him i s not only t o s t r i k e a t 
the r o o t o f assurance, i t i s t o pay a very poor t r i b u t e t o the power 
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of the gospel. The t r u t h i s , m o r a l i t y i s best guaranteed by C h r i s t , 
and not by any precautions we can take before C h r i s t gets a chance,..• 1 1 
( i b i d p 211f). I n f a c t the assurance o f f e r e d i n the New Testament i s 
o n l y a v a i l a b l e t o s i n n e r s , and thus could not l o g i c a l l y l e a d t o 
presumption. 
Together w i t h assurance, f a i t h i n the New Testament b r i n g s a 
sense of c o n s t r a i n t t o serve C h r i s t . I t was here t h a t Denney began 
h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 2 Corinthians 5sl4fff and i t i s t h i s c o n s t r a i n t 
which he sees as the motive and guarantee o f s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . But 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s not something separate and d i s t i n c t from f a i t h , i t i s 
r a t h e r the working out of f a i t h . I t i s what i t means t o b e l i e v e and 
to go on b e l i e v i n g . 
He i n s i s t s on the e t h i c a l nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a i t h . 
As we noted he i s n o t happy w i t h t h e o r i e s which speak o f a mystic union 
between C h r i s t and the b e l i e v e r , and which see i n Romans 6 a d i f f e r e n t 
theology from t h a t found i n Romans 5 r a t h e r than a c o n t i n u a t i o n and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . I t i s a standing c r i t i c i s m t h a t Denney was 
unable t o appreciate mysticism, but such c r i t i c i s m r a t h e r misses the 
p o i n t . Mysticism as a s p i r i t u a l exercise p r a c t i s e d by C h r i s t i a n s 
such as von Hugel does not seem to have i n t e r e s t e d him. He d i d not 
deny i t s value or c r i t i c i s e i t so much as ignore i t . I n our present 
context however, he i s concerned about the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of St. Paul, 
the question how f a r i t i s possible t o f i n d mysticism i n Paul, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t there i s something superior about, the 
r e l i g i o n which f i n d s mysticism t h e r e . W r i t i n g t o Robertson N i c o l l he 
comments, "... when a man maintains t h a t there i s something which may 
be described as a 'mystical union', which transcends a moral union, 
a l l I can say i s t h a t my mind does not f o l l o w him. I cannot conceive 
anything which transcends a moral union. ... much o f what appears ( i n 
St. Paul) t o favour the idea o f a m y s t i c a l as going beyond a moral 
union i s the language o f passion, which has a p o e t i c and emotional 
t r u t h . ... I t i s j u s t l i k e the language of passion i n which the 
sacramental bread and wine are c a l l e d the body and blood of C h r i s t . 
No other language would s a t i s f y C h r i s t i a n f e e l i n g . Yet they are not 
the body and blood of C h r i s t , and a great deal t h a t i s w r i t t e n about 
the m y s t i c a l union seems t o me as u n r e a l as t r a n s u b s t a n t i a t i o n . " 
( L e t t e r s o f P r i n c i p a l James Denney t o W« Robertson N i c o l l p 38f) 
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The e t h i c a l union o f f a i t h leads t o a death on the b e l i e v e r ' s 
p a r t t o those t h i n g s t o which C h r i s t d i e d . So Denney can w r i t e q u i t e 
sermonically o f the C h r i s t i a n ' s death t o s i n , the f l e s h , and the law -
taken as l e g a l i s m . There i s a d a i l y m o r t i f i c a t i o n i n C h r i s t i a n l i f e , 
and a c o n t i n u i n g response to the a c t of God i n C h r i s t . I f t h i s i s 
c a l l e d a dying and r i s i n g w i t h C h r i s t t h a t i s the language of passion 
not mysticism. We do not i n f a c t d i e and r i s e as he d i d . "Our dying 
w i t h Him, ... i s a present and an e t h i c a l experience; i t i s a dying t o 
s i n , a "being o r r a t h e r a becoming i n s e n s i b l e t o i t s appeals and i t s 
power; our l i v i n g w i t h Him i s a being a l i v e t o God, a new s e n s i b i l i t y 
t o His claim upon our l i f e . I n other words, our union w i t h C h r i s t 
i s not metaphysical or m y s t i c a l , but moral..." (The C h r i s t i a n Doctrine 
of R e c o n c i l i a t i o n p 304)• 
Strangely he does not speak of the work of the Holy S p i r i t 
a p p l y i n g the work of C h r i s t . When one considers t h a t he has an 
acknowledged debt t o C a l v i n , and t h a t echoes of Calvin's thought can 
sometimes be heard i n h i s work, one might expect him t o use t h i s 
t y p i c a l l y C a l v i n i s t theme. He seems i n f a c t t o be wary of references 
to the S p i r i t . He was not happy about t h e i r i n c l u s i o n i n the c a t h o l i c 
creeds. " I n s p i t e of the creeds, there i s no such expression i n the 
New Testament as b e l i e v i n g i n the Holy Ghost. The S p i r i t i s not an 
o b j e c t of f a i t h l i k e C h r i s t or God, i t i s an experience which comes t o 
people through f a i t h . " ( i b i d p 308)• The S p i r i t i s not an e x t r a t o be 
added to f a i t h . " T h e o l o g i c a l l y , the S p i r i t i s the d i v i n e c o r r e l a t i v e 
of f a i t h , and of the dying w i t h C h r i s t and l i v i n g w i t h C h r i s t , ... i t 
i s the power o f God which i s manifested i n every C h r i s t i a n experience 
whatever. I t i s not something s p e c i f i c a l l y d i v i n e which comes through 
baptism and has no r e l a t i o n t o f a i t h and j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; ..." (The 
Death of C h r i s t p 139)• I t i s d o u b t f u l how f a r these references -
e s p e c i a l l y the ' i t ' r a t h e r than 'he' - are compatible w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l 
T r i n i t a r i a n i s m , and Denney was c r i t i c i s e d on t h i s issue d u r i n g h i s 
l i f e . For our present purposes i t i s enough to see t h a t he regards 
the S p i r i t r a t h e r as the experience of f a i t h , and l i s t s the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f power, l i f e , and j o y , which should be found w i t h i t . 
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F i n a l l y we t u r n t o the sacraments and the church. There i s 
l i t t l e evidence, hut what there i s shows a change of a t t i t u d e t o the 
sacraments. C e r t a i n e a r l y comments are sometimes quoted as i f they 
give h i s f i n a l position.''" Arguing f o r the c e n t r a l i t y o f the death of 
C h r i s t i n the New Testament, he wrote "From the New Testament p o i n t of 
view, the sacraments c o n t a i n the gospel i n b r i e f ; they contain i t i n 
inseparable connection w i t h the death o f Jesus; and as long as they 
h o l d t h e i r place i n the Church the saving s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h a t death 
has a witness which i t w i l l not be easy t o d i s p u t e . " ( i b i d p 60f). 
Later i n the same work "... both of the sacraments are forms i n t o 
which we may put as much of the gospel as they w i l l c a r r y ; and St. 
Paul, f o r h i s p a r t , p r a c t i c a l l y puts the whole o f h i s gospel i n t o each." 
( i b i d p 98)• Speaking of Romans 6 he w r i t e s "When ... Paul argues 
t h a t baptism i n t o C h r i s t means baptism i n t o His death, he i s not 
s t r i k i n g out a new thought, of a somewhat venturesome o r i g i n a l i t y , t o 
ward o f f a shrewd blow suddenly aimed a t h i s gospel; he i s only b r i n g i n g 
out what was a l l along t o him the e s s e n t i a l meaning of t h i s ordinance." 
( i b i d p 97)» and he describes both sacraments as, "... ordinances w i t h 
which every C h r i s t i a n was f a m i l i a r , and w i t h o u t which a place i n the 
C h r i s t i a n community could n e i t h e r be acquired or r e t a i n e d , . . . " 
( i b i d p 98). 
This e a r l y a t t i t u d e does n o t seem to have been maintained. He 
never denies the place which the sacraments have i n the New Testament, 
but he never deals w i t h them a t l e n g t h , nor does he seem to t h i n k t h a t 
they need to f i g u r e very l a r g e l y i n C h r i s t i a n l i f e . I n h i s l a s t work 
he seems to take back what he had p r e v i o u s l y s a i d about the accepted 
connection between baptism and the death of C h r i s t . Baptism i s c l e a r l y 
symbolic of washing away o f s i n , and t h e r e f o r e , since cleansing from 
s i n i s n e c e s s a r i l y connected w i t h the death o f C h r i s t so i s baptism. 
But he i s less happy w i t h the argument o f Romans 6. Here, he says, 
Paul goes beyond the idea of washing t o the idea of a union w i t h the 
death and r e s u r r e c t i o n o f Jesus t h a t i s p r i m a r i l y e t h i c a l . He i m p l i e s 
t h a t i t would have been b e t t e r had the apostle kept the two ideas 
d i s t i n c t . F u r t h e r , he suggests, " I t i s f o r c i n g the language of verse 
6 - 'knowing t h i s , t h a t our o l d man was c r u c i f i e d w i t h Him 1 - t o argue 
1. c f J.R. Taylor: 'God loves l i k e t h a t ' p 52f, 59. 
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from i t , ... t h a t t h i s whole conception of baptism was f a m i l i a r t o 
the Romans independently o f Paul, and was i n f a c t c u r r e n t i n the Church 
and simply i n h e r i t e d by him" (The C h r i s t i a n Doctrine of R e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
p 316). While t h i s does not s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n t r a d i c t the e a r l i e r 
q u o t a t i o n i t d e f i n i t e l y seems t o be i m p l i e d i n the e a r l i e r passage 
t h a t Paul i s r e f e r r i n g t o a g e n e r a l l y accepted teaching on the 
meaning o f baptism. 
What seems t o have happened i s t h a t , between the two passages, 
Denney has become i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned about ideas o f m y s t i c a l union 
which seemed t o him t o d e t r a c t from what he took t o be the t r u e idea -
t h a t o f moral union. Romans 6 i s , o f course, a very u s e f u l passage 
f o r advocates of a m y s t i c a l union so Denney has t o i s o l a t e i t . He 
suggests, r i g h t l y i t seems, t h a t the argument of the passage i s not 
l o g i c a l l y coherent. "The death and r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t have one 
meaning i n the premisses and another i n the conclusion - one meaning 
i n Him, and another i n a p p l i c a t i o n t o us." ( i b i d p 317)• For the 
argument t o work i t would seem t h a t C h r i s t must be presumed t o be 
more h o l y a f t e r the r e s u r r e c t i o n than before i t . Paul, claims Denney, 
seems t o lose h i s way i n the argument, and breaks i t o f f w i t h the 
demand 'Reckon yourselves dead t o s i n , b ut a l i v e t o God i n C h r i s t 
Jesus'. "Apart from t h i s s e l f - r e c k o n i n g , which when r e a l i s simply 
the renewal of f a i t h ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f i t s e l f w i t h the Saviour, a l l 
t h i s about union w i t h the death and r e s u r r e c t i o n of C h r i s t i n baptism 
i s meaningless." ( i b i d p 317)• This i s an u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way f o r 
Denney t o t r e a t Paul. One cannot help t h i n k i n g he i s bound by 
opinions a r r i v e d a t elsewhere. 
The general idea of the g i f t o f the S p i r i t i n baptism he explains 
i n accordance w i t h what we have seen t o be h i s view of the S p i r i t * I n 
New Testament times baptism was a d u l t b e l i e v e r ' s baptism. As such i t 
would be a time of hi g h and serious emotion as the baptised consciously 
responded, or gave witness of t h e i r response, t o C h r i s t i n f a i t h . 
When the emotion was not present steps were taken t o remedy the defect 
(Acts 8:14ff, 19s2ff). Such experiences cannot be expected w i t h 
i n f a n t baptism, and so the t r a d i t i o n a l language connecting baptism 
and the S p i r i t i s now redundant. He concluded, "Baptism enters i n t o 
the process of s a l v a t i o n o n l y when i t coincides w i t h the act o f f a i t h 
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i n which the s o u l , under solemn and moving c o n d i t i o n s , consciously 
and i r r e v o c a b l y commits i t s e l f t o C h r i s t , i d e n t i f y i n g i t s e l f , i n 
s p i r i t u a l passion, w i t h Him who died f o r i t and rose again." ( i b i d 
P 319f) 
S i m i l a r arguments are used of the Lord's Supper. There can be no 
suggestion of grace being passed on. C h r i s t i s present i n the sense 
conveyed by the elements, as one who once gave himself f o r us and 
p e r p e t u a l l y o f f e r s h i m s e l f t o us. But he i s always so present, not 
o n l y i n the c e l e b r a t i o n o f the sacraments. They do not c o n t a i n grace, 
they are i l l u s t r a t i o n s of grace. Thus the supper i s a d e c l a r a t i o n of 
f a i t h r a t h e r than a r e c e p t i o n on our p a r t , a k i n d o f acted sermon. 
He i s s c a t h i n g l y c r i t i c a l of any l i n k i n g of C h r i s t or grace t o the 
elements. "There i s no i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning i n saying t h a t C h r i s t i s 
present i n the bread and wine, o r i n , w i t h , and under the bread and 
wine, o r , what i s the poorest o f a l l evasions of i n t e l l i g e n c e , i n 
•sacramental union' w i t h the bread and wine; the presence of C h r i s t 
n e i t h e r has nor can have any metaphysical r e l a t i o n whatever t o the 
sacramental elements. ... however the b e l i e v i n g soul may be helped i n 
i t s r e l a t i o n t o C h r i s t by r i t e s l i k e baptism and the supper, i t i s the 
negation not o n l y of C h r i s t i a n experience, but of human i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
t o say t h a t the new l i f e i s e s s e n t i a l l y or v i t a l l y r e l a t e d t o the water, 
o r t o the bread and wine." ( i b i d p 321f). A thoroughly Zwinglian 
p o s i t i o n . 
I t i s perhaps n a t u r a l from t h i s t h a t w h i l e he sees t h a t the Church 
was an i n s p i r i n g concept t o the New Testament w r i t e r s and the Reformers 
( c f Studies i n Theology p 173^)» does not have a l a r g e place i n h i s 
w r i t i n g . He was i n f a c t very a c t i v e i n e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a f f a i r s . His 
correspondence shows gr e a t i n t e r e s t and a c t i v e concern f o r what might 
be c a l l e d contemporary church p o l i t i c s . But t h e o l o g i c a l l y the 
sub j e c t i s not s e r i o u s l y r a i s e d . He speaks movingly o f C h r i s t i a n s 
b e a r i n g each others burdens, of t r a i n i n g each other i n f a i t h , and i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t the church as an i n s t i t u t i o n i s accepted. But i f we had 
o n l y h i s t h e o l o g i c a l works on which t o form a judgement i t would be 
t h a t the Church had not a very important place i n h i s thought. 
S u r p r i s i n g l y the s i t u a t i o n i s s i m i l a r w i t h regard t o s c r i p t u r e . 
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His teaching i s thoroughly b i b l i c a l , but apart from one l e c t u r e i n 
Studies i n Theology ( c f pp 202-227), he never gives a systematic 
account of what he b e l i e v e d about i t . C l e a r l y , as we have seen, he 
was n ot concerned to defend i t s supposed i n f a l l i b i l i t y . But w h i l e the 
r i g h t s of c r i t i c i s m were t o be allowed, and could b r i n g the B i b l e t o 
l i f e i n a way t h a t a f l a t orthodoxy could n o t , he also saw the danger 
of an excessive concern f o r c r i t i c i s m . Asked t o help i n producing 
some simple commentaries f o r church teachers, he wrote, " I t i s 
c e r t a i n l y a drawback t o most recent commentaries t h a t the study o f 
c r i t i c i s m has apparently b l i n d e d the commentators t o the f a c t t h a t the 
books on which they are working are b i t s o f the B i b l e - t h a t but f o r 
t h a t f a c t they would i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y never have reached us - and 
t h a t the c h i e f business of the commentator i s t o e l u c i d a t e t h e i r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e as v e h i c l e s o f r e v e l a t i o n . . . " ( L e t t e r s o f P r i n c i p a l James 
Penney t o W. Robertson N i o o l l p 171). 
The phrase 'vehicles o f r e v e l a t i o n * i s probably the key t o h i s 
understanding of s c r i p t u r e as f a r as our present i n t e r e s t i s concerned. 
The B i b l e was the means by which the Gospel was conveyed t o men. I t 
was not necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a d o c t r i n e o f i n s p i r a t i o n i n advance, o r 
worry over i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t s . The great t h i n g which was secure was 
t h a t the s c r i p t u r e s d i d b r i n g C h r i s t t o men. " I f they ( t h e Gospels) 
t r u l y represent C h r i s t t o us, so t h a t we gain the f a i t h i n Him which 
t h e i r authors had, i s not t h a t a l l we can desire?" (Studies i n Theology 
p 208). Later he put the p o i n t more s u c c i n c t l y by arguing t h a t the 
a u t h o r i t y o f s c r i p t u r e came from the t r u t h i t taught, r a t h e r than t h a t 
any p a r t i c u l a r d o c t r i n e was t r u e because i t was i n s c r i p t u r e . 
Speaking o f the t r u t h o f the Atonement found i n experience he wrote 
"We f i n d t h i s t r u t h i n the C h r i s t i a n S c r i p t u r e s undoubtedly, and 
th e r e f o r e we p r i z e them; b u t the t r u t h does not d e r i v e i t s a u t h o r i t y 
from the S c r i p t u r e s , or from those who penned them. On the c o n t r a r y , 
the s c r i p t u r e s are p r i z e d by the Church because through them the soul 
i s brought i n t o contact w i t h t h i s t r u t h . " (Atonement and the Modern 
p 248). I n other words he i s us i n g Luther's dictum o f accepting t h a t 
which ' p l i e s C h r i s t , and then using the gospel which has; come through 
s c r i p t u r e t o t e s t the s c r i p t u r e which bore i t . The argument i s 
c i r c u l a r , b u t , accepting the a u t h o r i t y of the experience, as Denney 
does, i t i s sound as f a r as i t goes. There i s a l o t of what might 
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be. considered important ' B i b l i c a l ' teaching, however, which could 
not be es t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s way and i t may be t h a t Denney has got around 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s too e a s i l y . 
I n p r a c t i c e however h i s approach i s very conservative and he 
does seem t o accept the teaching because i t i s b i b l i c a l . I t i s f o r 
t h a t reason t h a t he i s concerned t o show t h a t there are not two gospels 
but o n l y one i n the New Testament. He thus gets the a u t h o r i t y of 
Jesus, which a l l o f h i s contemporaries would accept i n some way, f o r 
the r e s t o f the New Testament. I n h i s sermons he appeals t o s c r i p t u r e 
as an accepted a u t h o r i t y , and he urges h i s students t o read the B i b l e 
i n p u b l i c i n the way t h a t h i s f r i e n d J.P. S t r u t h e r s read i t , "He never 
reads s c r i p t u r e as i f he had w r i t t e n i t : he always reads i t as i f 
l i s t e n i n g f o r a vo i c e . " ( a t t r i b u t e d t o Denney by Adam Burnet, c i t e d 
by J.R. Taylor: God loves l i k e t h a t p 140). 
Those who read expectantly w i l l be rewarded; those who read merely 
c r i t i c a l l y w i l l f i n d n o t h i n g but cause f o r c r i t i c i s m . This i s a 
f u r t h e r example of the e x i s t e n t i a l note which we have found i n Denney 
be f o r e . I t emerges i n a passionate rebuke of those who regarded 
Paul as t h i n k i n g i n out-dated P h a r i s a i c a l terms which could not be 
understood i n the t w e n t i e t h century. "To say t h a t Paul i s 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , o r t h a t he presents C h r i s t i a n i t y i n a way which does 
i t every k i n d of i n j u s t i c e and i s f i n a l l y unacceptable t o us, i s t o f l y 
i n the face of h i s t o r y and experience. There have always been people 
who found Paul i n t e l l i g i b l e and accepted the gospel as he preached i t . 
There are such people s t i l l , i f n ot i n t h e o l o g i c a l class rooms, then 
i n mission h a l l s , a t s t r e e t corners, i n l o n e l y rooms. I t i s not 
h i s t o r i c a l s cholarship t h a t i s wanted f o r the understanding o f him, 
and n e i t h e r i s i t the i n s i g h t o f genius: i t i s despair. Paul d i d not 
preach f o r scholars, nor even f o r philosophers; he preached f o r 
sinners. He had no gospel except f o r men whose mouths were stopped, 
and who were standing condemned a t the bar of God. They understood 
him, and they f i n d him eminently i n t e l l i g i b l e s t i l l . " (The C h r i s t i a n 
Doctrine o f R e c o n c i l i a t i o n p 180). 
Some c r i t i c i s m s of Denney have been made i n passing. We have 
noted the accusation t h a t he makes the e n t i r e New Testament speak i n 
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one v o i c e , t h a t o f Paul, o m i t t i n g other emphases. We have also 
seen h i s supposed i n a b i l i t y t o grasp mysticism, l e a d i n g some t o say 
t h a t he always wanted t h i n g s t o be more simple than they i n f a c t were 
or could be. We n o t i c e d too t h a t h i s view of the S p i r i t i s open t o 
c r i t i c i s m , and t h a t i t could w e l l be argued t h a t h i s conception of 
the sacraments and the place o f the church i n the C h r i s t i a n l i f e l a c k 
depth and ric h n e s s . However, i t i s n ot the purpose of t h i s study t o 
present a f u l l - s c a l e c r i t i c i s m o f the theologians mentioned. I t i s 
only concerned w i t h aspects of t h e i r work - though i t happens t h a t i n 
the case o f Denney those aspects are h i s c h i e f concern and account f o r 
p r a c t i c a l l y the whole of h i s w r i t i n g . 
I n the more l i m i t e d perspective o f t h i s study i t could be argued 
t h a t there i s one major omission from h i s thought. The theory o f 
atonement known as the 'Christus V i c t o r 1 , o r Dramatic, o r Classic view 
has achieved considerable p o p u l a r i t y i n t h i s century. I t s exponents 
c l a i m , w i t h some j u s t i c e , t h a t i t has good New Testament support, and, 
as we have seen, i t i s found i n the Fathers. I t might seem strange 
t h a t Denney does not give more weight t o i t . 
I n The Death of C h r i s t he mentions the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Paul 
thought of C h r i s t ' s r e c o n c i l i n g work as i n c l u d i n g s p i r i t u a l beings as 
w e l l as men. But h i s i s i n c l i n e d to dismiss t h i s l i n e o f t h i n k i n g as 
• q u a s i - p o e t i c a l ' , arguing t h a t i f i t was r e a l l y important i t would have 
been more f u l l y worked out i n the apostles's argument (op c i t p 141ff). 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t i c e t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i s m was made t o him 
f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of the book, f o r i n the r e v i s e d and enlarged 
e d i t i o n he w r i t e s "A f r i e n d l y c r i t i c o f t h i s book pointed out what he 
regarded as a serious omission i n i t - the want o f any reference t o 
the death o f C h r i s t as a v i c t o r y over Satan." ( i b i d p 203). Even so 
he h a r d l y deals w i t h the p o i n t s e r i o u s l y . Taking i t t o r e f e r c h i e f l y 
t o the Johannine references t o the Prince of t h i s World, he merely 
excuses h i m s e l f w i t h the se l f - d e p r e c a t o r y comment "A mind which does 
not n a t u r a l l y personalise the p r i n c i p l e of e v i l - t u r n i n g the 
p r i n c i p l e i n t o a prince - has the same embarrassment i n d e a l i n g w i t h 
these passages as w i t h the Pauline ones r e f e r r e d t o a t p 143o 
Possibly we get out too e a s i l y w i t h our a b s t r a c t nouns." ( i b i d p 203f). 
Though he goes on t o admit t h a t i n the a c t u a l c o n f l i c t w i t h e v i l i t 
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seems more n a t u r a l t o speak o f a person than a p r i n c i p l e . I t might 
he p o i n t e d out t h a t exponents of the 'Christus V i c t o r 1 theory would 
not a l l "begin w i t h the f o u r t h gospel, and would not l i m i t the v i c t o r y 
over e v i l t o Jesus' death. An a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e of t h i s view f o r 
many i s t h a t i t can take i n the e n t i r e i n c a r n a t i o n . 
More r e v e a l i n g of Denney's a t t i t u d e i s a comment to Robertson 
N i c o l l about The Atonement and the Modern Mind, which, i t i s t o be 
remembered, was meant t o answer problems which had a r i s e n from the 
e a r l i e r book. He w r i t e s "There i s n o t h i n g i n them ( t h e book was f i r s t 
i n l e c t u r e form) about 'the powers of e v i l 1 - not t h a t I do not t h i n k 
t h e r e i s anything to say, but I do not t h i n k i t i s an aspect of the 
f a c t s which the modern mind f i n d s very accessible." ( L e t t e r s of 
P r i n c i p a l James Penney t o V/. Robertson N i c o l l p 3l)# 
His l a s t book has one aspect of the theory i n a passage d e p i c t i n g 
C h r i s t ' s v i c t o r y over death and s i n , but i t remains i n embryonic form 
( o f C h r i s t i a n P o c t r i n e o f R e c o n c i l i a t i o n p 244f). The conclusion of 
t h i s passage probably explains why the theory as a whole would not 
have appealed t o him, "The world not only contains s i n i n the sense o f 
a power h o s t i l e t o C h r i s t and t o us, a power which He has vanquished 
i n bloody c o n f l i c t , and which we must vanquish i n His t r a i n ; i t 
contains our s i n . Besides i t s r e l a t i o n t o s i n a b s t r a c t l y considered, 
the work of the Reconciler must have some s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t o s i n i n 
t h i s l a t t e r aspect; i t must deal w i t h s i n not merely as a power a t 
work i n the wo r l d , but as something f o r which r e s p o n s i b i l i t y already 
l i e s upon us." ( i b i d p 250). I t may be t h a t t h i s comment exposes the 
weakness of the Christus V i c t o r theory. I t can i n s p i r e confidence i n 
C h r i s t ' s v i c t o r y over h o s t i l e powers and s i n i n general, but i t has l e s s 
to say t o the earnest i n d i v i d u a l concerned about h i s own s i n and h i s 
standing before God. As we have seen, Penney the e v a n g e l i s t , was 
more concerned w i t h a theory of the death of C h r i s t which could come 
i n t o i n t e l l i g i b l e r e l a t i o n t o s i n as i t a f f l i c t e d t h a t s o r t of 
i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s perhaps a weakness, though i n another sense h i s 
g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h , t h a t h i s theology was d i r e c t e d so single-mindedly 
i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 
He i s l e f t , then, as the great exponent o f the o b j e c t i v e view 
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of atonement understood through the category o f ' s u b s t i t u t i o n ' . As 
such h i s w r i t i n g s have provided an armoury f o r evangelical theologians 
throughout t h i s century so f a r , and h i s type o f theology has 
provided the t h e o l o g i c a l u n d e r g i r d i n g f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l type of 
evangelism. However, he d i d not convince a l l . Some who were 
impressed, o f t e n i n s p i t e of themselves, w i t h the b r i l l i a n c e of h i s 
l o g i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f other p o s i t i o n s were not s a t i s f i e d t h a t h i s 
own was immune from a t t a c k . Both the o b j e c t i v e view i n general and 
Denney's p a r t i c u l a r expression of i t were attacked by h i s contempor-
a r i e s . Rather than consider o b j e c t i o n s t o h i s p o s i t i o n here, i t 
w i l l be easier t o see them i n the work of one of those contemporaries 
Hastings Rashdall. 
Chap IV Contents Hastings R a s h d a l l : - comparison w i t h Denney p 84 
Basic p o s i t i o n and r e l a t i o n to modernism p 85-89. 
Abelard's view o f atonement alone acceptable t o modern man p 90f> 
Jesus as e t h i c a l teacher - f o r g i v e n e s s f o l l o w s repentance and obedience, 
n o t connected w i t h b e l i e f s about Jesus p 92f; Ransom and Last Supper 
sayings p 94 _98j E a r l y church overcame embarrassment o f Jesus' death 
by r e f e r e n c e t o s c r i p t u r e p 98-IOO5 I n Paul o b j e c t i v e ground o f 
atonement i s s u b s t i t u t i o n p 100-162, s u b j e c t i v e ground i s f a i t h as 
assent which must be f o l l o w e d by works o f lo v e ( i e f i d e s i n f o r m i s and 
f i d e s f o r m a t a ) p 102-105; l a t e P a uline thought moves awgy from o b j e c t i v e x± 
view p 105f. Johannine thought i s redemption through r e v e l a t i o n p 106f 
P a t r i s t i c t e a c h i n g - Greek e t h i c a l , e s p e c i a l l y i n Origen, p r e f e r r e d 
t o L a t i n l e g a l i s t i c , e s p e c i a l l y i n Augustine p 107-109. 
Medieval p e r i o d p l O J f . Luther as extreme r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f 
s u b s t i t u t i o n t h i n k i n g and j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h alone p 110-112. 
C r i t i c i s m o f s u b s t i t u t i o n a r y view p 112-116. 
A b e l a r d i a n view and i t s r e l a t i o n to men p 116-118. 
Strengths and weaknesses o f the two views so f a r discussed 
p 119-128. 
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IV. HASTINGS RASHDALL (1858-1924) 
To t u r n from Denney to Rashdall i s t o move i n t o a completely 
d i f f e r e n t atmosphere. Not only do the two have d i f f e r e n t s t a r t i n g 
p o i n t s and methods, they have a d i f f e r e n t emotional approach t o the 
sub j e c t . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e i r f i n a l p o s i t i o n s were so 
f a r apart. 
Denney we saw was a New Testament s p e c i a l i s t , almost a Pauline 
s p e c i a l i s t . He was not a philosopher and scarcely a h i s t o r i a n of 
C h r i s t i a n thought. Further there i s a great sense of emotional 
involvement i n Denney's work. At h i s most s c h o l a r l y he remains an 
evan g e l i s t concerned to preach a gospel which i s r e l a t e d to the needs 
of s i n f u l man, and which alone can save him from condemnation. His 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s the need f o r a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between God and man which has been corrupted by s i n . Thus h i s work 
has a d i s t i n c t narrowness. Nearly a l l h i s w r i t i n g i s concerned w i t h 
atonement i n one way or another. 
Rashdall could h a r d l y have been more d i f f e r e n t . He was a 
philosopher and h i s t o r i a n as w e l l as a t h e o l o g i a n , indeed perhaps he 
was a b e t t e r philosopher or h i s t o r i a n than t h e o l o g i a n . There i s a 
coolness and i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m about h i s work which i s i n marked c o n t r a s t 
to Denney's passionate involvement. He could h a r d l y be c a l l e d an 
eva n g e l i s t i n the same sense as t h a t word i s a p p l i c a b l e t o Denney, but 
he was concerned t o present the C h r i s t i a n gospel as he saw i t t o h i s 
contemporaries. However, where Denney preached to the conscience 
s t r i c k e n s i n n e r concerned about h i s standing before a h o l y God, 
Rashdall commended a su p e r i o r moral philosophy t o the c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of 'modern c u l t i v a t e d man'. Not t h a t he d i d n o t consider the 
de c i s i o n t o accept or r e j e c t i t as of g r e a t , even u l t i m a t e , importance, 
but h i s more p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t d i c t a t e d a d i f f e r e n t 
approach. His s t a r t i n g p o i n t also d i c t a t e d the p r o p o r t i o n o f h i s 
considerable output t h a t i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the subject o f t h i s 
study. While he wrote f a r more than Denney, o n l y one l a r g e book, a 
few essays and sermons, and passing references i n works on oth e r 
t o p i c s w i l l be r e l e v a n t here. 
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Hastings Rashdall spent most of h i s l i f e a t New College, Oxford, 
as a student and then as a teacher o f philosophy. Between 1885 and 
1889 he taught a t Lampeter and Durham (where he complained of the 
Canon-ridden s o c i e t y ) , before r e t u r n i n g t o Oxford, f i r s t t o H e r t f o r d 
and B a l l i o l and then, i n 1895» t o New College. There he remained, 
from 1910 combining h i s u n i v e r s i t y work w i t h a Canonry a t Hereford, 
u n t i l he was appointed Dean of C a r l i s l e i n 1917. At t h a t p o i n t he 
l e f t academic l i f e but d i d not change h i s academic i n t e r e s t s , i t might 
be argued t h a t the c l o i s t e r e d l i f e o f s c h o l a r s h i p , which he seems t o 
have enjoyed immensely, i s r e f l e c t e d i n h i s s e n s i t i v e , but s t r a n g e l y 
unworldly o r even u n r e a l i s t i c , and h i g h l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach t o 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
Like many others of h i s generation he was profoundly i n f l u e n c e d 
by the i d e a l i s t philosophy t o T.H. Green.^ But he was never an 
absolute i d e a l i s t i n the Hegelian sense. He would never agree t h a t 
a l l f i n i t e minds are i n some sense c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s o f one i n f i n i t e 
mind. C.C.J. Webb suggests t h a t the best d e s c r i p t i o n of h i s 
p o s i t i o n was 'Personal Ide a l i s m ' , and t h i n k s t h a t 'The p o s i t i v e 
c o n v i c t i o n which dominated a l l Rashdall's thought on p h i l o s o p h i c a l and 
t h e o l o g i c a l questions was t h a t of the absolute, u n q u a l i f i e d r e a l i t y o f 
i n d i v i d u a l persons, minds o r s p i r i t s . " (Rashdall as Philosopher and 
Theologian, an essay included i n Matheson op c i t pp 240-249* P 240). 
I n the f i e l d o f e t h i c s Rashdall defined h i s own p o s i t i o n as 'I d e a l 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ' . He explained t h i s as meaning t h a t a m o r a l l y mature 
man must choose the g r e a t e s t good, but t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t t o the o l d e r 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , t h i s good need not be pleasure i n any obvious sense -
good w i l l , goodness, v i r t u e , character, i s an end i n i t s e l f . "True 
moral judgement i s a judgement of value. I t i s expressed i n the 
form ' t h i s i s good', not ' t h i s i s r i g h t ' . " (Conscience and C h r i s t p 13) 
I t was i n moral consciousness t h a t he found the r e v e l a t i o n o f God. 
These two considerations - personal i n d i v i d u a l i t y and the moral 
consciousness - dominate h i s thought. He seems t o have thought t h a t 
they were s e l f - e v i d e n t , and t h a t they also dominated the thought of 
h i s contemporaries. I t seemed t o him t h a t when modern c u l t i v a t e d man 
turned from the C h r i s t i a n church i t was because o f the whole scheme 
1. c f P.E. Matheson: The L i f e of Hastings Rashdall (1928) pp 29, 39. 
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of supernaturalism i n which C h r i s t i a n theology and e t h i c s were 
presented, and ife. c laim t o he immune from s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
He t h e r e f o r e made i t h i s task t o show t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n 
d o c t r i n e s could he t r a n s l a t e d i n t o modern thought forms. 
Such a programme had obvious apologetic value a t the time. But 
f o r him i t was n o t merely an apologetic or defensive move of the 
moment d i c t a t e d by contemporary circumstances. He was convinced t h a t 
progress i n human moral consciousness, which he accepted as a f a c t , 
should be accompanied by development i n the understanding o f 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e . Jesus, he b e l i e v e d , had taught and i l l u s t r a t e d 
i n h i s l i f e c e r t a i n basic p r i n c i p l e s , but development was t o be 
expected i n the understanding and a p p l i c a t i o n of those p r i n c i p l e s . 
Furthermore i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Rashdall's f i r s t major work was 
The U n i v e r s i t i e s of Europe i n the Middle Ages (1895)» and t h a t he was 
a l i f e - l o n g student and admirer of Scholastic theology. Ideas which 
motivated t w e n t i e t h century modernism are found i n h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n 
of Thomas Acquinas, "The work which Ac^uinas d i d f o r the church of 
h i s day - the f u s i o n of the highest s p e c u l a t i v e thought of the time 
w i t h i t s profoundest s p i r i t u a l c o n v i c t i o n s , the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f the 
new t r u t h s of the present w i t h the k e r n e l o f t r u t h embodied i n the 
t r a d i t i o n a l creed - i s a task which w i l l have to be done again and 
again ... the work of Aciquinas i s b u i l t on the s o l i d f oundation upon 
which a l l such e f f o r t s must repose - the grand c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
R e l i g i o n i s r a t i o n a l and t h a t Reason i s d i v i n e , . . . " ( U n i v e r s i t i e s o f 
Europe i n the Middle Ages Vol 1 p 3^7• c i t e d Matheson op c i t p 71f)« 
I t i s easy to b e l i e v e t h a t , over twenty years l a t e r , he saw h i m s e l f 
i n the same t r a d i t i o n when he wrote, "One of the most c r y i n g needs of 
the Church a t the present moment i s a serious attempt a t r e - t h i n k i n g 
i t s t r a d i t i o n a l Theology. A l a r g e p a r t o f t h a t theology has obviously 
become more or less u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o modern man ... I t needs t o be 
re-examined, and (where necessary) reconstructed, i n the l i g h t o f 
modern philosophy, modern science, and modern c r i t i c i s m . " (The Idea 
of Atonement i n C h r i s t i a n Theology. 1919» P v i i ) . 
This was c u r r e n t l y a popular a t t i t u d e , and Rashdall's advocacy 
of i t made him the acknowledged leader of the Modernist movement i n 
the Church of England. I t i s probable t h a t he was not temperamentally 
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s u i t e d to such a r o l e , and t h a t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h a t movement 
l e d t o him being associated, i n the popular mind and i n the minds o f 
some t h e o l o g i c a l opponents, w i t h ideas t h a t were more extreme and 
unorthodox than any he h e l d h i m s e l f . Nevertheless, h i s genuine 
sympathies w i t h the Modernist movement are p l a i n . He was Vice-
President of the Churchman's Union ' f o r the advancement of l i b e r a l 
r e l i g i o u s thought' from i t s i n a u g u r a t i o n i n 1898, becoming President 
i n 1923t a ^ was a supporter of and c o n t r i b u t o r t o both the ' L i b e r a l 
Churchman' and the 'Modern Churchman' which were successively i t s 
organs. He shared the mood of crusading confidence o f the Modernists 
as they saw themselves l e a d i n g t h e i r f e l l o w churchmen from the dark 
s u p e r s t i t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l theology i n t o the pure l i g h t o f modern 
thought. 
The existence o f God, he b e l i e v e d , was a necessary p o s t u l a t e of 
the moral consciousness, and a n a t u r a l i nference from the sheer 
existence o f the m a t e r i a l world, since n o t h i n g could e x i s t except as 
the o b j e c t of some mind. Such a mind must be personal i n the same 
sense t h a t human minds are personal, though immeasurably supe r i o r t o 
them. Thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man was a personal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of w i l l s and minds. He had no understanding o f , or 
patience w i t h , appeals t o immediate r e l i g i o u s experience. God 
revealed himself i n man's moral consciousness, and men grew nearer t o 
him as they discerned and obeyed t h a t r e v e l a t i o n . I t was s e l f - e v i d e n t 
t o Rashdall t h a t i n h i s own generation the e n t i r e race had made immense 
s t r i d e s i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 
His C h r i s t o l o g y , which came to be the centre of b i t t e r d i s p u t e , 
springs from t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . He sees Jesus as a unique example 
of what man could and should be. This i s expressed i n an e a r l y 
sermon, "The h i g h e s t t h a t we know i n man i s the highest t h a t we can 
t h i n k of God. .... I n Jesus C h r i s t humanity a t t a i n e d i t s highest moral 
development, and j u s t because of t h a t p e r f e c t humanity, the conscience 
o f mankind has recognised i n him a supreme, a unique, i n a sense a 
f i n a l r e v e l a t i o n of t h a t God who a l l through the world's h i s t o r y had 
been by slow, successive stages r e v e a l i n g h i m s e l f t o the human s p i r i t . " 
( D o c trine and Development. 1894 P 80. c i t e d P.J. K i r k b y : Dean 
Hastings Rashdall Modern Churchman Vol X V I I , 1927 P 486). His 
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biographer finds his position best expressed i n three propositions 
from an a r t i c l e on Miracles and the D i v i n i t y of Christ which appeared 
i n the 'Modern Churchman1 i n 1911. F i r s t that the indwelling of God 
i n Christ must not be isolated from his indwelling i n every man. 
Secondly that i t must be recognised as a unique.or supreme example of 
th i s general indwelling. Thirdly that the 'proof of Christ's 
D i v i n i t y must be sought i n the appeal which he makes to the moral and 
relig i o u s consciousness of mankind."'' I t i s from teaching l i k e t h i s 
that J.K. Mozley can describe his Christology as "... the old Antioch-
ene position pushed very f a r . . . " (J.K. Mozley: The Heart of the 
Gospel, 1925 p 129ff). Though i n t e r e s t i n g l y Rashdall does not r e f e r 
to the Antiochene fathers apart from occasional footnotes. 
Clearly Rashdall believed that his position was thoroughly 
orthodox. Unfortunately i n his desire to stress the ro l e of 
conscience and Jesus' s i m i l a r i t y to a l l men, while at the same time not 
offending modern cult i v a t e d man, he spent a great deal of time explain-
ing what he did not believe, and what he did not think i t necessary 
f o r others to believe. Prom very early i n his career he made i t p l a i n 
that he did not consider that the subscription to the catholic creeds 
demanded of a clergyman of the Church of England committed those who 
made i t to b e l i e f i n every d e t a i l of the creeds. He believed that 
the incarnation, understood i n the way explained above, was basic to 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y , but that i t s essential t r u t h was not affected by 
scepticism about the V i r g i n B i r t h , miracles or the Resurrection. 
Indeed he informed Bishop Lightfoot of Durham of his own doubts about 
the V i r g i n B i r t h before his ordination i n 1894. Apart from that 
however, he was normally content to say that scepticism would be 
consistent with the o f f i c e of a clergyman, rather than confessing to 
any major disagreements with the creeds. 
I n stressing what might be called the essential normality of 
Jesus he cle a r l y ran counter to the stress on Jesus' eschatological 
teaching which had been made common largely by the work of Schweitzer. 
He i s at pains to set aside, or at least to tone down, that emphasis. 
"According to the ultra-Eschatological School, a l l the emphasis ( i n 
Jesus' teaching) was upon the Eschatology. I believe the exact 
opposite to be the case. I n the teaching of Jesus a l l the emphasis 
1. Matheson: op c i t p 134f. 
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was on the Ethics, and upon Religion of an intensely ethical type." 
(Conscience and Christ p 59)• While Jesus may at an early stage of 
his ministry have expected some future in-breaking of God in t o 
h i s t o r y i n a dramatic and supernatural way, he came to realise that 
the Kingdom was a close e t h i c a l and s p i r i t u a l union of man with God. 
The d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s sort of argument i s the d i f f i c u l t y of 
making any d i s t i n c t i o n between Jesus and other ethical teachers. 
Rashdall saw t h i s , but i t did not worry him. He did not himself 
deny the uniqueness of Jesus, but such a denial would not have been 
important f o r him since the important thing was the teaching, not the 
one who gave i t . " I think i t should be very d i s t i n c t l y realised 
that the t r u t h and value of the Christian Ethic does not depend on the 
f a c t of i t s having been taught by Jesus Himself. ... I f i t could be 
shown that the sayings which we have been i n the habit of regarding 
as most characteristic of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus were i n r e a l i t y none 
of His, i f i t could be shown that there never was a h i s t o r i c a l Jesus, 
or that we know nothing to speak of about His teaching, the t r u t h and 
value of the teaching a t t r i b u t e d to our Lord i n the Gospels would not 
be one whit diminished." ( i b i d p 2740« He was not himself so 
sceptical of the h i s t o r i c a l evidence, but he was quite sure that 
Jesus had never made any claim to uniqueness or D i v i n i t y . 
I t was t h i s sort of teaching which led to the great controversy 
of his career. I n 1921 the conference of the Modern Churchman's 
Union met at Girton College, Cambridge, and took as i t s theme 'Christ 
and the Creeds'. The Christ of whom they spoke was a l i b e r a l or 
humanist Christ. A l l were convinced of his humanity, and spoke of 
i t passionately. His D i v i n i t y , which they seemed genuinely to wish 
to assert, they derived from the moral excellence of the humanity. 
Rashdall's paper on 'Christ as Logos and Son of God1, does not seem 
exceptional among the others. He denied that Jesus claimed to be 
Divine, "Jesus did not claim d i v i n i t y f o r Himself ... Never i n any 
c r i t i c a l l y well-attested sayings i s there anything which suggests 
that His conscious r e l a t i o n to God was other than that of a man 
towards God - the a t t i t u d e which he wished that a l l men should adopt 
towards God." ( c i t e d R. Lloyd op c i t Vol I I p 42). As he l a t e r said 
t h i s was the sort of thing he had been teaching f o r years, and he 
-90-
considered i t quite conservative. However, the paper was widely 
reported as denying the D i v i n i t y of Christ. Perhaps hecau.se he was 
recognised as the leader of the movement, at least i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , i t 
was Rashdall who was most b i t t e r l y attacked. Chief among his 
theological c r i t i c s was Gore, an opponent since Rashdall had made his 
views on subscription known many years previously, but the press also 
took up the matter with such virulence and lack of knowledge of the 
issues involved or the actual contents of his paper that Rashdall was 
able to sue one national newspaper f o r damages. 
His biographer speaks of Rashdall*s amazement and dismay at the 
furore which his paper caused, suggesting that i t cast a shadow over 
his l a s t years and that he could r i g h t l y be b i t t e r at the treatment 
he received, p a r t i c u l a r l y from Gore.''" Roger Lloyd gives a d i f f e r e n t 
side of the picture, commenting that, "Dozens, perhaps hundreds of 
lonely parish priests were deeply disquieted and even daunted by the 
weight of i n t e l l e c t u a l authority apparently arrayed against the 
orthodox presentation of the Faith which had sustained t h e i r fathers 
and ancestors." (op c i t Vol I I p 45) • This aspect of the a f f a i r 
would apparently have been foreign to Rashdall. There i s a certain 
pathetic charm i n his naive assumption that he has said nothing at 
a l l unusual. 
But he could honestly claim that his teaching had been consistent 
throughout his long career. This i s well brought out by Kirkby who 
compares statements from sermons and academic works from d i f f e r e n t 
2 
periods of his l i f e . Following the Girton Conference he preached a 
number of sermons i n C a r l i s l e Cathedral o u t l i n i n g his position. I n 
one of them he said, " I have t r i e d - not only i n that l i t t l e paper at 
Cambridge, but i n a l l my teaching during the l a s t thirty-seven years 
of my c l e r i c a l l i f e - to help people to see some i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning 
i n these formulae, which so many repeat without meaning anything 
d e f i n i t e by them, and which so many cast away as worthless because 
they cannot f i n d a meaning f o r them." (Kirkby op c i t p 484)• We now 
turn to his attempt to f i n d i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning i n the church's 
formulae about atonement. 
1. cf Matheson op c i t pp 206ff. 
2. cf Kirkby op c i t p 484f. 
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We have found i n Rashdall two major emphases:- the primacy of 
the moral consciousness i n man as his contact with ultimate r e a l i t y , 
and the recognition of Jesus as the supreme revelation "both of God and 
of man's possible r e l a t i o n with him. I t i s to "be expected therefore 
that he w i l l understand atonement i n terms of the effect of the second 
on the f i r s t ; of the perfect revelation i n Christ winning the assent 
of the moral consciousness i n man. I n other words, atonement i s 
"brought about by a change i n man which makes him 'at one1 with God, 
rather than by some act outside of man which i n some way changes the 
way things are i n the world. The work of Christ i s to bring about 
t h i s change. 
This sort of theory i s known variously as the 1exemplarist', 
'moral influence', or 'subjective' view of atonement. I t was very 
popular i n English theology i n the early part of t h i s century, helped 
by the general revulsion from the supposed immorality and e x t e r n a l i t y 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l objective view, and by the insistence on stressing 
the love of God and using personal analogies which we found i n MacLeod 
Campbell and Bushnell. I n England Rashdall was i t s chief exponent, 
thoughv.it was put forward i n a s l i g h t l y less uncompromising form by 
R.S. Franks, f i r s t i n his h i s t o r i c a l work 'History of the Doctrine of 
the Work of Christ' (1918), and l a t e r i n 'The Atonement' (1934). 
I t received i t s classic expression, and f o r some theologians i t s 
name, from Peter Abelard (1079-1142). 
Rashdall's f i r s t public exposition of t h i s view seems to have 
been i n a University Sermon of 1897 e n t i t l e d 'Abelard's Doctrine of 
the Atonement1'*" His concluding judgement on i t was " I believe i t to 
be as noble and perspicuous a statement as can even yet be found of 
the f a i t h which i s s t i l l the l i f e of Christendom." (op c i t p 50). 
He never seems to have doubted that judgement, and his Bampton 
Lectures, delivered i n 1915 though not published u n t i l 191-99 are a 
defence and exposition of i t , though c h i e f l y i n the form of a c r i t i c i s m 
of other options. Towards the end of that book he gives what he 
takes to be the most e x p l i c i t statement of Abelard's view i n the words 
of a p u p i l , Peter Lombard, "So great a pledge of love having been 
1. cf The Expositor Series 4 f Vol V I I I pp 37-50. 
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given us, vie are "both moved and kindled to love God who did such great 
things f o r us; and by t h i s we are j u s t i f i e d , that i s , being loosed 
from our sins we are made j u s t . The death of Christ therefore 
j u s t i f i e s us, inasmuch as through i t charity i s s t i r r e d up i n our 
hearts." (The Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology p 438)• 
Rashdall believes t h i s view i s the only one that could possibly 
be held by modern man, and that i t i s true to the teaching of Jesus, 
though he knows that i t i s by no means the one most generally taken 
i n the course of Church hi s t o r y . He points out that no council of 
the Church has ever issued a d e f i n i t i o n of atonement, but knows that 
Christians have generally connected i t with certain b e l i e f s about 
Jesus 1 person, more p a r t i c u l a r l y his death as the objective ground on 
the basis of which sins are forgiven, and that the benefits of t h i s 
work have usually been considered to be found i n connection with the 
Church i t s preaching and sacraments. 
He puts forward his own views i n three steps. F i r s t he attempts 
to show that his view correctly represents the teaching of Jesus. 
Secondly he traces the h i s t o r y of the doctrine from the New Testament 
to the Reformation. This i s the bulk of the book and i n i t he t r i e s 
to show that the close connection between atonement and the death of 
Jesus was a mistake, though an understandable one, and that the 
'subjective' theory has often broken through i n some form, though apart 
from the case of Abelard i t has always been i n competition with other 
views. Thirdly he concludes his h i s t o r i c a l survey with a chapter on 
Luther at the end of which he gathers together certain e a r l i e r points, 
and certain assumptions which have become p l a i n , to make a sustained 
attack on objective views of atonement before giving a f i n a l positive 
statement of Abelard's view. For the purposes of t h i s study the long 
central section on the h i s t o r y of the doctrine i s less important. We 
w i l l r e f e r to i t b r i e f l y but concentrate on the f i r s t and l a s t parts. 
He begins with a study of the teaching of Jesus about forgiveness 
as i t i s found i n the synoptic gospels, though admitting that a 
doctrine need not be assumed to be false because i t i s not actually 
found i n Jesus' teaching. We have seen that the idea of doctrinal 
development had a secure place i n his thinking. Nevertheless, he 
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suggests, the authority claimed f o r t r a d i t i o n a l formulations w i l l he 
affected by the r e l a t i o n i n which they stand to Jesus 1 teaching, 
" S t i l l more w i l l our a t t i t u d e towards such interpretations be 
affected i f i t should be found that some of them are p o s i t i v e l y 
inconsistent with the teaching of Him whose mind they purport to 
represent." ( i b i d p 4) 
What then was Jesus' teaching? According to Rashdall, as we 
have seen, i t was s t r i c t l y e t h i c a l . Jesus deepened and s p i r i t u a l i s e d 
the ethic of Judaism. Slowly he realised that he was the Messiah, 
and i n that sense his teaching was Messianic - concerned with the 
Kingdom of God and entry to i t . But the Kingdom was a s p i r i t u a l and 
et h i c a l conception of communion with God. Those who entered i t 
had to be worthy. "The clear, unmistakable, invariable teaching of 
Jesus was that men were to be judged according to t h e i r works, 
including i n the conception of works the state of the heart and 
intentions as scrutinized by an all-seeing God. The righteous v/ere 
to be rewarded, the unrighteous were to be punished." ( i b i d p 12). 
The stress on the inner motives introduces the idea of repentance f o r 
wrong motives, and Rashdall shows the important place which appeals 
f o r repentance had i n the teaching of Jesus. There i s no inconsistency 
here as works flow from the inner state of the heart. 
Underlying a l l i s the revelation of the fatherhood of God. God, 
as a loving father, desires only what i s good f o r a l l his children. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of punishment i s not ruled out, but the purpose of 
punishment, i n f l i c t e d or threatened, i s the improvement of the sinner. 
Thus when the sinner become better punishment becomes unnecessary. 
Sometimes Rashdall seems to suggest that the improvement must be 
actual and p r a c t i c a l l y displayed i n outward actions. But usually, 
and more consistently with his stress on the motives of the heart, 
he sees forgiveness and restoration to God the father as a natural 
and inevitable r e s u l t of sincere repentance. Repentance is, a radical 
change of heart or character, a return to God. Nothing more i s 
needed than repentance, though i t s f r u i t s w i l l appear i n Christian 
l i v e s as "a test and pledge of i t s r e a l i t y ' . Thus there i s no need 
f o r f a i t h i n Jesus' person or work. 
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I n support of t h i s he draws attention to a number of parables -
the Lost Sheep, the Unmerciful Servant, the Two Sons, but most of a l l 
the Lukan parables of the Prodigal Son and the Pharisee and the 
Publican - i n a l l these, he argues, forgiveness follows immediately 
upon repentance. "There i s not the s l i g h t e s t suggestion that 
anything else but repentance i s necessary - the actual death of a 
Saviour, b e l i e f i n the atoning efficacy of that death or i n any other 
a r t i c l e of f a i t h , baptism, confession to any but God, absolution, 
reception of the holy eucharist, Church membership - not a h i n t of any 
of these. The t r u l y penitent man who confesses his sins to God 
receives instant forgiveness." ( i b i d p 26). Jesus i s presented 
prima r i l y as a prophet or teacher; indications that he demanded f a i t h 
i n himself are to be a t t r i b u t e d to l a t e r ideas which the evangelists 
have allowed to colour t h e i r presentation. And even i f these l a t e r 
ideas are allowed to stand, forgiveness i s not dependent on them, 
"... invariably i t i s obedience to the w i l l of God as declared by Him 
and His disciples which i s to be rewarded - obedience to His commands 
rather than any i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f about Him or His Messianic work." 
( i b i d p 21). 
Rashdall knows that t h i s i s at variance with much l a t e r teaching 
which concentrates on the necessity of Jesus 1 death or speaks of 
'conditions of salvation'. He presses t h i s point home, " I t i s surely 
a d i f f i c u l t thing to say - as must be done i f some l a t e r doctrine of 
the atonement i s treated as the very essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y - that 
what was taught by Christ Himself was not C h r i s t i a n i t y at a l l . " 
( i b i d p 27). But there are synoptic passages which can be appealed 
to against t h i s l i n e of thought, and v/hich can be taken to imply 
that Jesus connected salvation with his death. Rashdall speaks of 
two of them - the Ransom saying of Mark 10:45i and the sayings 
reported at the Last Supper. 
Of Mark 10:45 there are two questions - i s i t a genuine saying 
of Jesus? and, i f i t i s genuine, what was i t s o r i g i n a l meaning? 
Without committing himself he seems to i n c l i n e to the view that i t i s 
a l a t e r doctrinal addition. Since i t i s not i n Luke he argues that 
i t was not i n the copy of Mark from which Luke copied, so that i t 
must have been inserted i n a l a t e r copy of Mark and thus got into 
Matthew. He seems to sense some weakness i n t h i s argument - r i g h t l y 
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so since t h i s point has been heavily c r i t i c i s e d - and so, i n a long 
appended note he sets out his arguments i n some d e t a i l . His main 
points are that Mark, or the l a s t editor of Mark, seems to make 
additions i n l a t e r ecclesiastical language; that the passage i s out 
of context; and that i t i s the only use of Isaiah 53 i n Mark. He 
sums up, "There i s room f o r difference of opinion on the subject; but 
anyone who, i n the teeth of t h i s c o n f l i c t of Gospel texts and of 
modern au t h o r i t i e s , i s r e a l l y prepared to say that the genuineness of 
the words i s certain, and to make his whole i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jesus 
turn upon the assumption of t h e i r genuineness, must be a person who 
has l i t t l e sense of the nature of h i s t o r i c a l evidence." ( i b i d p 55) 
On the possible meaning of the words i f genuineness i s allowed, 
he argues that the idea of a suffering Messiah, that i s one whose 
suffering would be a central motif of his Messiah-ship, was too 
remote to have occurred easily to Jesus. The most natural meaning 
would be that he realised that the course of his ministry must lead 
to a clash with the authorities and possibly to execution, and that 
he meant the words l i t e r a l l y . He would die physically and thus save 
his followers from a similar fate since one death would s a t i s f y the 
auth o r i t i e s . 
Again he seems a l i t t l e embarrassed to leave the matter there. 
Thus he goes on to show that there was i n current Jewish thought the 
idea that the suffering of the righteous could benefit the g u i l t y , 
and that t h i s idea finds classic expression i n Isaiah 53• Neverthe-
less, he argues, t h i s need not refer to any unique suffering and 
death. " I t i s ce r t a i n l y possible that our Lord may have applied 
Isaiah's conception of the suffering Servant to the Messiah, and so 
to Himself; or that without any such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n He may have 
thought of His death as b e n e f i t t i n g others, not i n any unique or 
exclusive way, but j u s t as the sufferings of other righteous men had 
done and might yet do. ... But, i n whatever sense Jesus may have 
expected that the sufferings of the Messiah were to benefit others, 
the assertion that they would do so i s a long way o f f from the dogma 
that forgiveness of sins could be purchased i n t h i s way and i n no 
other." ( i b i d p 35). He concludes t h i s section by arguing that to 
make too much of Jesus * death and to in t e r p r e t i t as substitutionary 
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would be out of keeping with the rest of his teaching. He puts 
p a r t i c u l a r stress on the f a c t that Jesus l a t e r prayed that the cup 
should pass from him. I f his purpose i n coming to the world had been 
to die, and i f he himself had taught that t h i s was so, i t i s not 
reasonable, Rashdall argues, that he should now pray that t h i s 
purpose should not be f u l f i l l e d . 
The Last-Supper sayings are s i m i l a r l y c r i t i c a l l y handled. Only 
Matthew 26:28 refers to the forgiveness of sins, "... and the words 
which contain t h i s reference are precisely the words which may most 
confidently be set aside." ( i b i d p 38). This i s because Matthew i s 
dependent on Mark and the Matthean addition "unto remision of sins" 
can be taken as a gloss on Mark's " t h i s i s my blood of the covenant". 
However, the Markan words themselves are clumsy and suggest a 
conflation of two t r a d i t i o n s "my blood" and "blood of the covenant". 
Furthermore they do not seem i n keeping with the words which follow 
i n a l l the accounts, with s l i g h t variations, "... I w i l l no more 
drink of the f r u i t of the vine, u n t i l that day when I drink i t new i n 
the kingdom of God." This, together with the f a c t that the shorter 
Lukan t e x t , which Rashdall prefers, omits them, suggests - to Rashdall 
- that there was o r i g i n a l l y no reference to blood at a l l . However, 
i f the genuineness i s allowed, the covenant referred to would be that 
of Jeremiah 31s31ff where there i s no s a c r i f i c i a l idea. Even i f 
Jesus did speak "with a touch of b i t t e r irony" of his blood as r a t i f y i n g 
the covenant, i t would be i n the sense that covenant parties made a 
s a c r i f i c e of communion. 
The words over the bread " t h i s i s my body" could mean "my s e l f " , 
i n the sense that Jesus was devoting himself to t h e i r good. I t could 
even, on the analogy of references i n the Talmud, be taken to ref e r 
to his teaching. Rashdall' seems to prefer the f i r s t . "But f o r our 
Lord to say that He was giving Himself f o r His disciples involves no 
idea of atonement - s t i l l less of an atonement upon which the 
forgiveness of the sins of the whole world depended. ... our Lord w i l l 
be thinking of His death as s a c r i f i c i a l or vicarious only i n the sense 
i n which any great leader of men might regard a martyr's death as an 
act of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e on behalf of his followers. Doubtless He may 
have f e l t that the death of the Messiah had a significance which the 
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death of no other man could have, but He claims f o r i t no unique 
expiatory value." ( i b i d p 43) • The l a s t sentence introduces an 
i n t e r e s t i n g modification. Rashdall sees that the death of Christ 
has had an effect greater i n degree, though he would say not d i f f e r e n t 
i n kind, than that of any other martyr. This he traces to i t s power 
as the supreme revelation of loving service which kindles a response 
of g r a t e f u l i m i t a t i o n i n the hearts of those who see i t . 
This treatment of the synoptic material shows certain 
characteristics of Rashdall's thought. He i n s i s t s that everything 
should be brought into l i n e with the picture of Jesus as the ethical 
teacher and preacher, c a l l i n g f o r repentance and proclaiming the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of free forgiveness. I t i s i n l i n e with t h i s that he 
looks f o r a doctrine which w i l l not separate Jesus 1 death from h i s . 
l i f e and teaching. Thirdly there are several references here to 
Jesus as the supreme martyr, a metaphor to which he often returns. 
But i t i s also worth drawing attention here to a rather . 
aggravating characteristic of his s t y l e , or perhaps of his way of 
conducting an argument. He frequently introduces a topic or a section 
of his case with a f a i r l y dogmatic assertion. I n the chapter we 
have considered an assertion such as that a passage i s un l i k e l y to be 
genuine, or that a certain set of ideas could not have been i n Jesus' 
mind. But then, a f t e r developing t h i s l i n e of thought a l i t t l e , he 
returns to say, 'however, even i f that were not so ... then what 
would follow...' and gives a more q u a l i f i e d argument. This i s 
somewhat disconcerting and smacks of verbal sleight of hand. One 
feels that he r e a l l y wants to s t i c k to the opening dogmatic assertion, 
but one cannot r e a l l y c r i t i c i s e him on the basis of that assertion 
because cl e a r l y he has made q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , sometimes quite considerable 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . But, on the other hand, the adjustments which he 
allows under the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s have an a i r of u n r e a l i t y about them, 
since they are a l l under the rather grudging rubric 'even i f . . . ' 
and seem to be offerred as very much second best. 
However, i n spite of a l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , his own summing up i s 
that the study of the synoptic gospels leads to "... the conclusion 
that our Lord never taught that His death was necessary f o r the 
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forgiveness of sins, or that any condition was required f o r 
forgiveness but the supreme one of repentance and that amendment 
which i s implied i n a l l sincere repentance." ( i b i d p 45)• 
From th i s he suggests that i n going on to study the history of 
the idea of atonement two basic assumptions can be made. F i r s t 
t h a t , though development i n the understanding of the doctrine may 
occur, "... no doctrine of the atonement can be a legitimate 
development of our Lord's teaching, no doctrine of the atonement can 
be genuinely Christian, which contradicts a feature of that teaching 
so fundamental as the t r u t h that God i s a loving Father, who w i l l 
pardon sin upon the sole condition of true repentance." And secondly, 
"The only atoning influence that can be recognised i n the death of 
Christ, or i n any other aspect of His work, i s one which operates by 
actually helping to produce that repentance and moral regeneration 
upon which, and upon which alonei:, according to the Master's express 
teaching, forgiveness depends." ( i b i d p 48). 
Yet, i n spite of what seems so pl a i n to Rashdall, i t i s clear 
that the l a t e r church has taught that forgiveness, though requiring 
repentance, has been i n some way dependent on Jesus' death. Rashdall 
must therefore explain how t h i s change took place. 
I t would have been usual at the time he was w r i t i n g to have 
blamed the apostle Paul. We noted that many theologians distinguished 
between Jesus and Paul. But Rashdall does not take that l i n e . 
Referring to I Corinthians 15:3» he writes, "The b e l i e f that i n some 
sense Christ dies f o r s i n - i n order that sin might be forgiven and 
removed - was thus quite c e r t a i n l y part of what St. Paul received. 
... I t resulted from the r e f l e c t i o n of the church i n the i n t e r v a l 
which elapsed between the Crucifixion and St. Paul's conversion..." 
( i b i d p 76). Yet, he asserts, such a b e l i e f i s not present i n the 
speeches i n the Acts of the Apostles which make the resurrection 
cen t r a l , and see salvation as due to the Messiah's teaching and 
example, not his death. How then did the new b e l i e f grow up? 
He gives a number of reasons broadly due to the Jews' understanding, 
or rather from his view misunderstanding, of t h e i r h i s t o r y , r i t u a l s , 
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and c h i e f l y , scriptures. There was the idea of Yahweh's 
interventions i n history by great acts of power, leading to the idea 
of a coming great act of judgement and the establishing of his r u l e . 
There was the idea of s a c r i f i c e , which, though frequently s p i r i t u a l i s e d 
by the 'higher minds' of I s r a e l , would commonly be seen as p r o p i t i a t o r y 
and would thus provide a background against which the death of Christ 
could be interpreted. More important, and destined to be linked with 
the idea of s a c r i f i c e , was the idea of the expiatory and regenerative 
value of innocent suffering, which developed p a r t i c u l a r l y during the 
exile and reached i t s peak i n the idea of the Suffering Servant, 
representative of the ideal I s r a e l i t e or of the f a i t h f u l remnant i n 
I s r a e l . This came to be the most important force i n the change of 
understanding of the atonement, f o r the s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y of 
vicarious suffering "... easily degenerates i n t o the superstition of 
vicarious expiation, and even the more immoral notion of vicarious 
punishment." ( i b i d p 72). Rashdall points out on several occasions 
that there had been no i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Messiah and the Servant 
before the time of Jesus. Besides these Jewish sources he acknowledges 
that some would f i n d influences from Philo or the H e l l e n i s t i c mystery 
r e l i g i o n s , but he i s inclin e d to discount those. 
Of these possible sources of early Christian thinking on our 
subject Rashdall concentrates on the use made of Isaiah 53 and the 
idea of vicarious suffering. He argues f i r s t that the execution of 
Jesus as a criminal presented the Christians with a great apologetic 
problem. How could such a person be God or the Son of God? But, 
secondly, he argues that the f i r s t Christians, most of whom were Jews, 
would accept without question the divine authority of the Old 
Testament scriptures. Hence they could f i n d the answer to t h e i r 
problem by asserting that Jesus had to die i n f u l f i l m e n t of Isaiah 53* 
"The b e l i e f was accepted on authority. I t became part of the 
Christian's accepted creed that sins were forgiven through the death 
of Jesus, because God had expressly revealed that by t h i s and by no 
other means were they to be forgiven." ( i b i d p 8 l ) . Thus they 
moved "... from the idea of salvation through a Saviour who had been 
cr u c i f i e d to the idea of salvation through His c r u c i f i x i o n . . . " ( i b i d 
p 82). So the atoning efficacy of Christ's death was accepted on 
the authority of the Old Testament, especially Isaiah 53« I"t was 
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inevitable that l a t e r minds would attempt an explanation of how t h i s 
death should have th i s e f f e c t . 
I n the New Testament the classic explanation comes from St. Paul. 
Here Rashdall makes some int e r e s t i n g and somewhat confusing 
d i s t i n c t i o n s . On the surface he makes a simple d i v i s i o n between 
Paul's theory of atonement and his doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . One 
might therefore expect that the f i r s t part w i l l deal with the objective 
ground of atonement and the second with i t s subjective appropriation. 
There are indications that t h i s i s the d i v i s i o n which Rashdall intends. 
However, that apparently neat plan i s crossed by another d i v i s i o n . 
Running through a l l his treatment of Paul i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
what Paul says, the logic of his arguments, and what he might be 
in f e r r e d to believe at a deeper l e v e l . I n other words, between Paul 
the theologian and Paul the believer or simple re l i g i o u s man. This 
second d i s t i n c t i o n seems to be more important to Rashdall. 
St. Paul's objective theory of atonement, he argues, i s found 
c h i e f l y i n the epistle to the Romans. I t i s worked out to answer 
the question how could Gentiles become Christians without accepting 
the Jewish law. Paul answers i n two steps. F i r s t he shows from 
scripture and experience that neither Jews nor Gentiles can expect to 
be j u s t i f i e d by works of the law. Not only are a l l i n f a c t sinners, 
but a l l have an e v i l i n c l i n a t i o n derived from Adam. Though i t i s i n 
f a c t death rather than s i n that Paul traces from Adam, and i n f a c t the 
source of sin i s often found i n the f l e s h , the g i s t of the argument i s 
clear. A l l have sinned and are s i n f u l . Therefore man cannot hope 
f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n by works of the law. 
For Paul the objective ground i s quite c l e a r l y the death of 
Christ. This i s clear when he turns to say how, i n face of t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y , man i s i n f a c t j u s t i f i e d . There are passages which r e f e r 
salvation simply to the name of Jesus ( I Cor 6 : l l ) j others speak also 
of the Resurrection (Rom 4*25; I Cor 15sl7)» but i t i s more usual to 
refe r i t to the death of Christ (Rom 3:24ff; 5:9). "That i s the main 
thesis of.the Roman Epistle. The intimate connection between 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n and the death of Christ i s stated over and over again. 
... St. Paul does not quite say why God could not remit the penalty 
-101-
of sin without the death of His Son. But i t cannot be denied that 
those theologians who declare that t h i s would be incompatible with 
God's ju s t i c e - the j u s t i c e which requires that somehow sin should be 
punished - or with the consistency which demands the i n f l i c t i o n of 
the p a r t i c u l a r punishment which God had threatened, namely death - are 
only bringing out the l a t e n t presuppositions of Paul's thought." 
( i b i d p 91f). 
I n other words, Paul teaches substitutionary atonement. The 
idea i s anathema to Rashdall. Later we shall see the bitterness 
with which he attacks i t . I t i s a l l the more in t e r e s t i n g therefore 
to notice here how f u l l y he i n s i s t s on i t s place i n Paul's thought. 
" I t i s impossible to get r i d of t h i s idea of su b s t i t u t i o n , or vicarious 
punishment, from any f a i t h f u l representation of St. Paul's doctrine." 
that the idea of su b s t i t u t i o n i s required by the context, (e.g. Rom 8:3; 
Gal 3:13» I I Cor 5*21). "There are, indeed, only a few passages 
which necessarily suggest the idea of substituted punishment, or 
substituted s a c r i f i c e . But there they are, and St. Paul's argument 
i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e without them." ( i b i d p 94)• 
But Rashdall's own a t t i t u d e i s unchanged. While honest exegesis 
w i l l not allow us to get r i d of i t , the idea of su b s t i t u t i o n or 
expiation "... i s an idea which can be reconciled neither with the 
demands of the moral consciousness as interpreted by the modern 
i n t e l l e c t , nor with the p l a i n teaching of St. Paul's Master and ours." 
( i b i d p 98)• He notes with manifest approval that Paul does not use 
the idea of punishment, and rar e l y employs d e f i n i t e l y s a c r i f i c i a l 
language. His language i s usually j u r i d i c a l . He never sees Christ's 
death as changing God's love, but rather a l l i s due to God's love. 
I n l a t e r epistles, claims Rashdall, the appeal to human love on the 
basis of t h i s example of God's love looms larger. 
So the basic motivation of Paul's thought becomes the same as 
that previously argued f o r the rest of the early church, the acceptance 
of the authority of the Old Testament. He has.a conception of God's 
love f o r a l l , and i s driven to f i n d a theory which can accommodate that 
( i b i d p 92). Even when he demurs s l i g h t l y that Paul always uses 
'on behalf o f , and not&vZt 'instead o f , he nevertheless allows 
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love with his t y p i c a l l y Rabbinic regard f o r the authority of 
scripture. Rashdall even suggests that Paul may have striven to 
reconcile a u n i v e r s a l i s t i c conception of God with the Old Testament 
before his conversion.. The twentieth century l i b e r a l has no such 
problems. He sees that there i s a basic contradiction between the 
Old and New Testaments, but whereas Paul agonises to reconcile them, 
the l i b e r a l theologian merely subordinates the f i r s t to the second. 
In a l l t h i s Rashdall argues that Paul r e a l l y has Jesus' s p i r i t 
and ideas at heart. Passages asserting the Christian's freedom 
from the law are found side by side with those which assert the 
necessity of Jesus* death to save man from the penalty of the law. 
There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g section arguing that Paul was more influenced 
by the character, example and teaching of Jesus than i s often allowed." 
But the conclusion i s that Paul was better than his theology. Given 
his background he had to reconcile the s p i r i t and ideas of Jesus 
with the law, and t h i s could only be done by using the, basically 
immoral, idea of substitution. 
Turning to the question of the subjective appropriation of 
atonement, or j u s t i f i c a t i o n , the condition as f a r as Paul i s concerned 
i s c e r t a i n l y f a i t h . Rashdall knows t h i s . But he also knows that 
the phrase ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h * has certain connotations 
h i s t o r i c a l l y , and that i t can have a certain emotional and contro-
v e r s i a l r i n g about i t . I t i s much loved and used by exponents of a 
theology very d i f f e r e n t from Rashdall's. I t i s hard to believe 
that Rashdall does not have t h i s l a t e r h istory and b i t t e r controversy 
i n mind when he writes on Paul's doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h . 
I t i s hard too to believe that he i s not already preparing a l i t t l e 
controversial material of his own. Already he seems to have i n 
mind the attack he i s going to launch on Luther and those whom he 
associates with him. 
This seems to be the case from the beginning, with his 
d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h . " I think i t cannot be denied that St. Paul 
does habitually i d e n t i f y f a i t h with i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f . " ( i b i d 
1. The Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology pp 106-108 
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p 108). I n a footnote on t h i s he writes "Faith (iTctTTlj ) never seems 
"by St. Paul to be used i n the sense of t r u s t , except so f a r as t r u s t 
i s implied i n believing the statements or promises of another." I t 
i s t h i s idea that he develops. So he speaks of Abraham's f a i t h as 
believing "various divine communications" ( i b i d p 109), and of Paul's 
understanding of Christian f a i t h as a c o l l e c t i o n of be l i e f s about 
Jesus. Again we have the disconcerting t r a i t , already noted, of 
following a dogmatic statement with a q u a l i f i c a t i o n so great that, i f 
intended, i t throws doubt on the meaning of the f i r s t statement. 
Thus he writes here "No doubt, to the deepest religious consciousness 
of St. Paul f a i t h was much more than b e l i e f . " ( i b i d p 109), and l a t e r 
he speaks of the apostle's "... re l i g i o u s insight ... and his personal 
experience of the effects which flowed from acceptance of Christ." 
( i b i d p 121). But these qu a l i f i c a t i o n s seem to be at once withdrawn 
i n such comments as "For St. Paul i n his l o g i c a l moments f a i t h means 
b e l i e f " ( i b i d p 110), and, towards the end of t h i s section, "... his 
theory of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by b e l i e f . . . " ( i b i d p 12l). I t may be an 
unkind conclusion, but i t seems to be the case, that Rashdall i s 
aware that f a i t h i n Paul i s a complex idea which usually means more 
than, though i t includes, assent to t r u t h , and that he prefers to 
understand i t simply as i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f . 
Accepting that f a i t h leads to j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we must then ask 
whether j u s t i f i c a t i o n means, as Protestant theology asserts 'to 
declare righteous', or, as Medieval and Roman theology would a f f i r m 
'to make righteous'. As f a r as the Greek i s concerned Sik(hi-00 means 
'declare righteous'. For Paul i t s primary meaning i s a c q u i t t a l of 
those who are not yet i n fa c t righteous. "So f a r the righteousness 
which i s ascribed to them i s (to use the technical term) an 'imputed', 
i n other words an unreal righteousness." ( i b i d p 111). Perhaps 
thinking t h i s i s rather too sweeping, he adds a footnote "The word 
does not necessarily imply that what i s reckoned or imputed 
does not correspond with the actual f a c t . ... but when God i s 
represented as 'not imputing to them t h e i r trespasses, 1 i t c l e a r l y has 
the meaning of not taking account of t h e i r trespasses which r e a l l y 
have been committed. There i s , however, no trace of the character-
i s t i c Protestant notion that Christ's righteousness i s imputed to us." 
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However God does not leave men unjust. J u s t i f i c a t i o n i s 
necessarily followed by s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and the g i f t of the S p i r i t 
with adoption to Sonship by baptism. Hence there must be moral 
regeneration. "St. Paul does teach j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h without 
the works of the law, but never j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h without good 
works." ( i b i d p 114)» These good works are an essential part of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and Paul speaks of a judgement of works ( I I Cor 6:10). 
"And thus at bottom the Catholic theory of j u s t i f i c a t i o n finds more 
support i n St. Paul, and i s f a r nearer his real thought, than the 
Protestant theory i n i t s s t r i c t t r a d i t i o n a l form. I f grammatically 
and f o r the purposes of his q u a s i - j u r i d i c a l argument j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
means counting righteous, p r a c t i c a l l y i t means f o r St. Paul a making 
righteous as w e l l . J u s t i f i c a t i o n , i n the sense of present forgiveness, 
may be by f a i t h only, but not so ultimate salvation." ( i b i d p 116). 
Faith should always be accompanied by good works, and when Paul writes 
as i f f a i t h alone saves he i s assuming a f a i t h accompanied by such 
works. Yet his own l e t t e r s show that f a i t h i s not always accompanied 
by works. Hence, Rashdall concludes, what Paul means i s that i t i s 
not .just f a i t h , i n the sense of b e l i e f , that j u s t i f i e s , but a f a i t h 
that i s accompanied by a transforming and active love. The 
teaching of Romans must be interpreted by I Corinthians 15• "When 
he recognises that there i s a kind of f a i t h so strong that i t could 
remove mountains, and which i s yet worthless i n the sight of God 
because i t i s unaccompanied by charity, he i s unsaying a l l that the 
l e t t e r of the Epistle to the Romans l o g i c a l l y implies." ( i b i d p 117)• 
In other words, here as i n the teaching on atonement there i s a 
contradiction between the l o g i c a l meaning of what i s said and what 
Paul knows from his own experience. Again his argument i s based on 
the Old Testament; such passages as the Septuagint mistranslation of 
Habakkuk 2:4 "the j u s t shall l i v e by f a i t h " ; the supposed precedent 
of Abraham; and Isaiah's declaration that "whosoever believeth on Him 
sha l l not be put to shame" (isa 28:16. cf Rom 10:13). Thus he has 
attached the transforming power to f a i t h alone when i t should have 
been attached to f a i t h accompanied by love. He does make the 
connection correctly at least once when he speaks of " f a i t h working 
through love" (Gal 5*6), which Rashdall takes as the real core of 
his teaching. " Thus he concludes, "The Protestant theory of 
-105-
j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h - hardly perhaps the ultra-Protestant 
watchword • J u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h only' - has on i t s side the l e t t e r 
of St. Paul's teaching. The scholastic d i s t i n c t i o n between an 
unformed f a i t h (fides informis), mere i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f , which saves 
not, and a perfected f a i t h (fides formata) which saves because i t 
produces love, comes f a r nearer to the deepest convictions of the man 
and to the teaching of His Master." ( i b i d p 120). As f a r as l a t e r 
ages are concerned, the s p i r i t of St. Paul i s a better guide than 
his time-bound Rabbinic theology. 
General c r i t i c i s m of t h i s w i l l be made l a t e r , but i t i s worth 
noting here that Rashdall's l i m i t a t i o n of Paul's understanding of 
f a i t h to i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f - which l a t e r becomes mere i n t e l l e c t u a l 
b e l i e f - i s purely a r b i t r a r y . I t i s t h i s l i m i t a t i o n which makes 
necessary a number of l a t e r d i s t i n c t i o n s which would probably be 
unknown to the apostle, c h i e f l y that between j u s t i f i c a t i o n and 
sa n c t i f i c a t i o n . I t i s also t h i s which leads, i n Rashdall's view, to 
l o g i c a l inconsistencies. A more f l e x i b l e , or broader and more 
dynamic, understanding of f a i t h , not making such a r i g i d d i s t i n c t i o n 
between Paul's formal theology and his r e l i g i o u s experience with i t s 
outcome i n s a n c t i f i c a t i o n would have avoided unnecessary problems. 
Rashdall goes on to argue that i n l a t e r epistles, when the 
controversies which produced Galatians and Romans had receded, the 
antagonism between f a i t h and works i s less marked and the need f o r 
something more than f a i t h becomes more prominent. Philippians 
stresses the moral influence of Jesus' obedience to death, and speaks 
of the need f o r e f f o r t i n the Christian l i f e . ( P h i l 2 : l f f ; 2:12f; 
J:12). Golossians has a strong assertion of the retrospective effects 
of Christ's death (Col 2:14), but throughout the epistle there i s a 
stress on the knowledge which Christ gives (Col 3:16). Ephesians 
has an idealised picture of the church, which i n some sense completes 
Christ himself (Eph 1:23). "The whole development exhibited i n 
these epistles may be summed up by saying that the tendency i s 
towards an insistence upon Christ's work as revelation rather than as 
retrospective atonement, and upon the moral effects of the revelation 
rather than upon the j u r i d i c a l a c q u i t t a l which i t effected." ( i b i d 
p 143)• I n other words there i s a move away from the objective 
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view of atonement found i n Romans. 
For the purposes of th i s study i t i s not necessary to consider 
the rest of Rashdall's h i s t o r i c a l material i n such d e t a i l . He 
argues that i n the rest of the New Testament and the immediately 
post New Testament period a doctrine of atonement through the death 
of Christ i s accepted. But i t i s accepted on the authority of the 
Old Testament, and there i s no accepted rationale of how that death 
effected atonement. The idea of substitution i s found, but normally 
Isaiah 53» or another prophecy, i s i n the background. The charact-
e r i s t i c ideas of Romans exercised almost no influence. Any 
explanation of atonement which i s suggested i s i n terms of subjective 
e t h i c a l and s p i r i t u a l e f f e c t s . 
The chief New Testament support f o r atonement by revelation and 
enlightenment i s found i n the Johannine l i t e r a t u r e . Though the 
t r a d i t i o n a l formulae are used, and the death of Christ i s seen as 
inevitable and mysterious, the chief atonement thinking i s i n terms of 
revelation through teaching and example leading to subjective change 
and obedience. Rashdall argues that there i s no stress here on the 
saving effects of Christ's death, and p a r t i c u l a r l y draws attention to 
the absence of the vicarious element i n John 17. For the differences 
between Pauline and Johannine thought, he has a simple solution, "... 
i f we put out of sight everything i n St. Paul which finds no echo i n 
St. John, we sha l l be on the way to an appropriation of that central 
core of eternal t r u t h which underlies them both. After a l l , the 
fundamental idea both of St. John and of St. Paul i s simply that the 
death of Christ, the culminating act i n a l i f e of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , i s 
the supreme manifestation of Christ's love, and therefore of the love 
of the Father whom He reveals; and that the contemplation of that 
l i f e and death gives other men the po\tfer, as nothing else has done, 
to overcome temptation and to lead l i v e s of love l i k e His." ( i b i d 
p 184f). An important indication of Rashdall's own thinking, and a 
l i n e of argument which he presses l a t e r , comes i n his commendation of 
the f o u r t h evangelist f o r not di v i d i n g the persons of the T r i n i t y . 
" I t i s not too much to say that the worst developments of the 
atonement doctrine arose from the conception of a sharp separation 
between the three manifestations of God (not i n St. John spoken or 
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thought of as three 'Persons') which would have been impossible to 
the author of the fourt h Gospel." ( i b i d p 187). 
Throughout the f i r s t one and a ha l f centuries of the church's 
l i f e , he suggests, the tendency i s to a doctrine of salvation which i s 
r a t i o n a l , e t h i c a l and s p i r i t u a l . Christ's death was seen as somehow 
necessary, and the source of a power which was connected with r i t u a l 
acts, especially baptism which was believed to carry "... an immediate 
and plenary remission of past sins." ( i b i d p 204). But as baptism 
followed public confession of f a i t h and repentance, and was followed 
by the laying on of hands and prayer f o r the g i f t of the Holy S p i r i t , 
Rashdall can argue that the forgiveness was i n f a c t attached to the 
repentance. Thus he can praise and thoroughly approve of the early 
teachings which, "...see i n Christ's death the crowning and t y p i c a l 
act i n a l i f e devoted to the teaching, by precept and example and 
character, of s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g love, ... Would that so much could be 
said of the l a t e r theories which have i n v i t e d men to seek salvation 
by reliance upon the death of Christ and the deliberate repudiation 
of His teaching!" ( i b i d p 208). 
I t i s hardly too much to say that he regards the subsequent 
his t o r y of the doctrine as a progressive f a l l i n g away from t h i s 
o r i g i n a l p u r i t y and s i m p l i c i t y as men attempt to devise 'theories of 
atonement1. He understands the motives f o r the attempt, but regrets 
i t s e f f e c t s . Though, n a t u r a l l y , he allows that from time to time 
l i g h t shines through the gathering darkness. 
He c l e a r l y prefers the Greek t r a d i t i o n to the Latin one. On 
the whole the Greeks were more philosophical and s p i r i t u a l . Rashdall 
would say they were also more ethical. They concentrated on the 
example and teaching of Jesus and tended to view the incarnation as 
a whole. Latin theology on the other hand was inclined to be 
l e g a l i s t i c . I t tended to see atonement i n objective terms, and to 
concentrate on the death of Christ to the v i r t u a l exclusion of His 
l i f e and teaching. So Rashdall writes, " I t i s hardly possible to 
exaggerate the effects exercised on the development of theology by 
the circumstance that the Greek Fathers had been trained i n the schools 
of Greek philosophy, while the education of the Latins had been f o r 
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the most part an education i n Roman law, and, as I should be inclined 
to add, Roman rhet o r i c . " ( i b i d p 248f), and l a t e r "To turn from the 
pages of " f t e r t u l l i a n to those of the next great Christian theologian -
Origen - i s l i k e emerging from a dimly-lighted Roman catacomb int o 
the b r i l l i a n t sunshine of a southern noon." ( i b i d p 255). 
Yet he sees f a u l t s i n Greek theology. While he thoroughly 
approves of incarnation and atonement being held closely together, he 
does not l i k e the idea that the incarnation of the Logos should i t s e l f 
work atonement by somehow af f e c t i n g the whole of humanity. Such a 
metaphysical, almost physical, transmutation of humanity by which 
incorruption i s defeated he describes as pure myth. Though he admits 
that, i n the classical form i n which i t was presented by Athanasius 
i t i s the normal teaching of Greek theology u n t i l the present. He i s 
even more h o s t i l e to the idea of Christ's death as a ransom to Satan, 
especially when i t i s combined with crude ideas of deception. 
But i n the main Greek theology never loses i t s high ethical note, 
and the highest point i s found i n Origen. Rashdall t r i e s hard, though 
perhaps unsuccessfully, to excuse Origen from the charge of having 
used the ransom theory i n i t s usual way. I n him, he claims, i t was 
merely metaphorical, intended to express the great cost of redemption. 
The background was the ransom of prisoners taken i n b a t t l e , not the 
j u r i d i c a l idea that payment made i t ' f a i r ' f o r God to redeem men from 
Satan, forgive sins, or cancel the death penalty. I n any case t h i s 
could be no more than a minor blemish i n Origen's theology which 
should not be allowed to detract from his greatness, "... the general 
s p i r i t of Origen i s the s p i r i t i n which modern theology must be 
reconstructed; ... there i s l i t t l e i n his doctrine of redemption which 
may not be appropriated almost unaltered by the modern theologian. ... 
The only way i n which a bad man can j u s t l y be freed from punishment by 
a good and ju s t God i s by his being induced to repent and so to become 
actually good. J u s t i f i c a t i o n to Origen means simply the being made 
actually righteous." ( i b i d p 273)• The rest of P a t r i s t i c theology, 
at least on the atonement, i s rated higher or lower according to 
whether i t i s near Origen, and thus e t h i c a l , or fa r t h e r from him, and 
thus more objective and taking his metaphors seriously or l i t e r a l l y . 
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Latin theology i s treated f a r less sympathetically. Here 
j u r i d i c a l concepts are applied. What, i n the East, had been at least 
p a r t l y metaphorical i s taken as simple f a c t . P a r t i c u l a r l y i s t h i s 
true of the idea of ransom. Ideas which grew up i n the realm of 
ecclesiastical d i s c i p l i n e were transferred to the relations between 
God and man. "With T e r t u l l i a n begins the degradation of repentance 
int o 'penance'" ( i b i d p 254)• This l i n e of thought c r y s t a l l i s e s i n 
the idea of Christ bearing punishment i n our place to s a t i s f y the 
ju s t i c e of God. 
As chief exponent of t h i s type of thought, and most i n f l u e n t i a l 
f i g u r e i n Western theology u n t i l the Reformation, Augustine comes o f f 
rather badly at Rashdall's hands. While i t i s clear that most of his 
ideas come from Paul, he hardens them, giving the metaphors a hardness 
and l i t e r a l n e s s which they had not had before. This hardening i s 
seen i n his ideas of the P a l l , o r i g i n a l s i n , election, and grace. 
More importantly i t i s seen i n his doctrine of atonement. "... 
usually Christ's death i s treated as a penal i n f l i c t i o n endured by 
Christ instead of man; but s t i l l i t i s endured because j u s t i c e requires 
that i t should be endured." ( i b i d p 331)• The punishment was j u s t 
because Adam's sin had been inherited by his descendants. 
In discussing t h i s Rashdall brings together ideas of ransom, 
sa t i s f a c t i o n and punishment. Previously he has shown that ransom at 
least need not be treated with the others. As a matter of f a c t 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i s not necessarily the same as punishment, though i t can 
be used as i f i t were. However, Rashdall's implication i s that, at 
least f o r Augustine, they were a l l reducable to the same idea - a 
substitutionary punishment - and they were thus accepted i n orthodoxy. 
"The ransom theory was, as we have seen, questioned by a few Easterns. 
But i n the West i t s ascendancy was undisputed t i l l the t w e l f t h century. 
I t can be discovered more or less e x p l i c i t l y i n nearly every w r i t e r 
of whose works there are any considerable remains." ( i b i d p 350). 
Of the Medievals, Anselm i s treated k i n d l y . He provided an 
alternative to the idea of punishment, but he s t i l l uses basically 
the same j u r i d i c a l conceptions as Augustine. With Abelard Rashdall 
comes to his own theory, but we must reserve comment on t h i s u n t i l 
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l a t e r . I n any case i t was basically Anselm's idea of s a t i s f a c t i o n 
which was taken up by scholastic theologians to become the new 
orthodoxy. The great name here was that of Thomas Adquinas, though 
he was a great c o d i f i e r not an innovator. Broadly he accepted 
Augustine's teaching on o r i g i n a l sin and the need f o r grace. But 
grace i s available, and with i t s help men can do good works and earn 
merit. Not that any were considered r e a l l y worthy, but i t i s 
'congruous1 that good acts should be rewarded, even though i t i s only 
by the grace of God that they are performed. The performance of good 
works by a f a i t h f u l man i s the passing of his f a i t h from 'fides informis' 
- the raw material of f a i t h , to 'fides formata' - the formed f a i t h which 
leads to j u s t i f i c a t i o n because i t produces good works. 
Much i n Scholasticism can and should be c r i t i c i s e d . Rashdall 
c r i t i c i s e s the idea of sacraments as channels of grace, the idea of 
indulgences, and the treasury of merit. He refers too to the 
differences w i t h i n scholasticism. But with a l l i t s f a u l t s he sees i t 
SIS o • o 3* noble attempt to vindicate the ri g h t s of reason i n r e l i g i o n , 
to fuse into the very f a b r i c of the Church's doctrine the best elements 
of ancient thought, and above a l l , to assert that fundamental t r u t h of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y - never perhaps up to the age of the Reformation formally 
denied, but often obscured - that the only f a i t h which saves i s the 
f a i t h that produces love." ( i b i d p 392). 
At t h i s point Rashdall's h i s t o r i c a l survey i s r e a l l y over. When 
he turns to Luther he i s concerned to paint a picture of the sub-
s t i t u t i o n a r y theory of atonement against which he sets that of Abelard. 
Thus his p o r t r a i t of Luther i s l i t t l e more than a caricature. He 
wants to see the Reformation as a good thing i n that i t got r i d of 
ideas of s a t i s f a c t i o n through ecclesiastical ordinances as necessary 
additions to repentance, and reduced the power of the clergy as 
dispensers of grace. Thus i t cleared the way f o r a moral and free 
approach to God. But, "... the connexion of the Reformation and i t s 
blessings with the new doctrine of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s l i t t l e more than 
an accident of h i s t o r y , ... the r e a l work of the Reformation was almost 
independent of t h i s dogma, ( i b i d p 416). 
Luther i s notoriously easy to quote, and i t i s clear that his 
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more extreme sayings need to "be corrected, or balanced, by being 
brought in t o r e l a t i o n with the rest of his theology. He was a 
passionate man, not over concerned with a formal l o g i c a l consistency, 
and often enough careless of the offence that his words might cause. 
But perhaps his very passion gives him some advantage over his cooler 
and more l o g i c a l c r i t i c s . Rashdall himself, normally very cool, i s 
not lacking i n passion i n his treatment of Luther. There i s something 
almost hysterical about his eagerness to present the Reformer's 
position as grossly exaggerated and one-sided Augustinianism. A 
position contrary i n every way to what Rashdall takes to be sound 
Christian teaching and the enlightened deliverances of the modern mind 
and moral consciousness. I t i s worth noting that many of his 
C quotations come, though Denifle's 'Luther und Luthertum 1. from an 
A ' 
early commentary on Romans which Luther himself did not see f i t to 
publish. Closer attention to such works as 'The Freedom of the 
Christian Man1, the sermon 'On Good Works', or the treatment of the 
Ten Commandments i n the Catechisms, might have yielded a d i f f e r e n t 
picture. As i t i s , while one recognises i n Rashdall's treatment a 
good deal of Luther's teaching i t i s presented i n a very biased way 
and i t i s mixed with a l o t which, because of the way i n which i t i s 
presented, i s not Luther's teaching though his words are quoted. 
The basis of Luther's teaching on atonement, says Rashdall, i s 
subst i t u t i o n . "Indeed the idea of substitution - the idea that the 
Son was treated by the Father exactly as i f He were g u i l t y humanity -
i s now pushed f u r t h e r than i t had ever been pushed before." ( i b i d p 399) 
The benefits of t h i s work are received by f a i t h , which Rashdall takes, 
wrongly, to be mere i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f . "For him f a i t h meant mere 
i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f - that and nothing else." ( i b i d p 407). Man can 
do nothing of himself to achieve righteousness, but, by grace, the 
righteousness of Christ i s imputed to him. Imputation and assurance 
are said to be the only new doctrines to be introduced by the 
Reformation. Rashdall i s incensed by the idea of imputed righteous-
ness. He attacks Luther with copious quotations. He cannot allow 
that j u s t i f i c a t i o n should simply mean 'to declare righteous' and 
i n s i s t s on the necessity of good works. Of Luther's position he 
writes, "On such a view i t i s clear that j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes to mean 
nothing but a remission of g u i l t and the penalties of g u i l t - a 
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remission which can only "be regarded as a r b i t r a r y , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , 
and, indeed, immoral. Well may St. Thomas declare that 'remission 
of g u i l t could not be understood unless infusion of grace followed.'" 
( i b i d p 406). While i t i s admitted that Luther never actually taught 
a separation between Father and Son, or an opposition between the 
divine a t t r i b u t e s of jus t i c e and mercy, i t i s argued that so much i s 
said about the wrath of God apart from the work of Christ that such 
di s t i n c t i o n s are encouraged. 
The sum of i t i s that Luther i s accused of encouraging confidence 
i n dogmatic statements i n t e l l e c t u a l l y held, and of denigrating morality. 
"The God of Luther would have turned away sternly and coldly and 
angrily from the publican of our Lord's parable, because, though he 
repented, he came to God without the name of the Son upon his l i p s or 
the dogma of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h i n his mind." ( i b i d p 41l)« "His 
words sometimes amount to a formal contradiction of the Gospel: the 
assertion that our Lord had given a new commandment was rejected by 
Luther as Popish blasphemy. 'A new commandment I give unto you, 1 
says the Gospel. 'Christ came not to set f o r t h a new law,' says 
Luther. The difference i s irr e c o n c i l a b l e : the question whether the 
Church w i l l side with Christ or with Luther on t h i s fundamental 
question i s one of the largest of the r e l i g i o u s problems on which the 
Church of today has to make up i t s mind." ( i b i d p 412). I n a l l t h i s 
occasional references to Calvin suggest that his theology i s more or 
less subsumed under Luther's. 
Such a one-sided presentation of Luther could easily be c r i t i c i s e d . 
The quotations i n the preceding paragraph are j u s t s i l l y . Even 
Rashdall has to admit that many quite d i f f e r e n t passages from Luther 
could be quoted, and these he takes as un w i l l i n g assertions of the 
doctrine of 'fides formata'. However, to t r y to defend Luther would 
be to miss Rashdall's point. I believe, as I mentioned above, that 
t h i s picture i s a caricature. But behind i t i s the idea of 
substitutionary atonement as Rashdall understood i t and as he believed 
i t was held by people l i k e Dale and Denney. He i s not too concerned 
about Luther, i t i s t h i s view of atonement he i s attacking. 
He admits that he has been c r i t i c i s i n g the substitutionary view 
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throughout the h i s t o r i c a l section of his work. " I have assumed, 
without much formal argument, that i t i s a view which, when once i t s 
nature i s thoroughly appreciated, neither reason nor conscience can 
accept." ( i b i d p 420), Now he gives his formal c r i t i c i s m s . His 
expression of them i s sometimes time-bound, but i n essence he sets out 
the c r i t i c i s m s which have caused many, i f not most, English theologians 
i n the twentieth century to abandon the old 'orthodox position'. I t 
w i l l be as wel l , therefore, to state his arguments f a i r l y f u l l y , while 
remembering that, f o r much of the time, he has the arguments which we 
saw i n Denney i n mind. The l a s t chapter and a hal f of his book are 
a combination of these c r i t i c i s m s and a commendation of the Abelardian 
view. But we must also bear i n mind criticisms which he has made 
elsewhere. Hence what follows i s not a l l from the l a s t one and a 
ha l f chapters, and i s not i n Rashdall's order. 
His f i r s t c r i t i c i s m we have examined at some length. Substitution 
i s not taught by Jesus. He did not a t t r i b u t e unique saving power to 
his death, nor did he put i t at the centre of his teaching as some 
l a t e r theologians and theological systems have done. As f a r as Jesus 
i s concerned, men need only to repent and seek that amendment of l i f e 
which i s an i n t e g r a l part of true repentance. Their forgiveness i s 
then assured. Such teaching, though obscured by other views, remained 
dominant i n the Greek Fathers and was rediscovered by Abelard. 
Secondly, what he c a l l s the Augustinian-Lutheran view rests on 
an a t t i t u d e to scripture which i s not possible f o r modern man. I t 
involves accepting the l i t e r a l h i s t o r i c i t y of Adam, and the passing on 
of Adam's g u i l t to his successors. Further i t involves accepting the 
authority of the Old Testament, f o r i t came about because the early 
Christians, especially Paul, found i n the Old Testament scriptures 
reasons f o r the death of Christ which overcame the embarrassment which 
i t had caused f o r t h e i r teaching. The modern age, Rashdall implies, 
would not be so embarrassed by the martyr-death of a great teacher. 
More important, the modern age has not only abandoned Paul's view of 
the authority of the Old Testament, i t has also abandoned the idea of 
the authority of Paul himself on which 'orthodox' theologians based 
t h e i r acceptance of substitutionary atonement. " I t i s clear that i f 
God never threatened to punish disobedience to His commands, either by 
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f o r f e i t u r e of immortality or by everlasting torments, no scheme i s 
required f o r reconciling forgiveness with the'veracity of God. And 
i f we deny the absolute and f i n a l authority of St, Paul, we have r e a l l y 
no ground l e f t f o r believing the theory to be true." ( i b i d p 421). 
Thirdly, the substitutionary view involves an opposition between 
the wrath or j u s t i c e of the Father and the love of the Son. This, 
says Rashdall, i s contrary to the B i b l i c a l witness to a good and loving 
father eager to seek and to save a l l his children. I t i s also 
contrary to the Catholic doctrine of the T r i n i t y . The popular view 
gives the impression of the Son as a separate being who had existed 
from a l l e t e r n i t y beside the Father before he w i l l e d to come into human 
existence at the incarnation. But t h i s i s not what Catholic orthodoxy 
has understood by the 'Persons' of the T r i n i t y . Indeed, as we saw 
i n his treatment of the fourth gospel, Rashdall would prefer not to 
t a l k about 'Persons', but rather about 'manifestations' of God. Thus 
the incarnation and atonement - here he subordinates atonement to 
incarnation - must be presented as due to the loving w i l l of the 
undivided T r i n i t y . 
Fourthly, the substitutionary view implies a r e t r i b u t i v e view 
of punishment. Such a view i s based on p r i m i t i v e ideas of revenge 
and i s not now highly regarded. Punishment must be f o r the good of 
the offender, not j u s t directed to the offence which i s now past. 
This was seen by Socrates and Plato, and was accepted by such Christian 
teachers as Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Abelard. Accepting 
the Christian ethic of love, punishment can only be i n f l i c t e d i f i t 
i s l i k e l y to produce good f o r the punished. 
However Rashdall does not stop there. Even i f r e t r i b u t i v e 
punishment i s accepted - he notes J.K. Mozley as a modern theologian 
who maintains i t - the punishment must f a l l on the g u i l t y . I f i t 
f a l l s elsewhere i t i s immoral. I t i s not enough to argue that b l i n d 
j u s t i c e simply demands that punishment should f a l l somewhere. He 
refuses to allow that the use of a vaguer term, such as expiation or 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , i s any more r a t i o n a l . He allows that s a t i s f a c t i o n may 
be understood i n a sense not involving punishment, but argues that 
"... as actually employed by medieval or Reformation theology, i t 
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does at bottom involve the same fundamental immorality." ( i b i d p 423). 
I n f a c t , as we noted above, Rashdall seems to make no real d i s t i n c t i o n 
between s a t i s f a c t i o n and punishment. 
Neither can the immorality of r e t r i b u t i v e punishment be evaded 
by appealing to some metaphysical un i t y of mankind, and then arguing 
that the suffering endured by Christ was i n f a c t endured by humanity 
as a whole i n Him. "... no juggling with universals w i l l make i t 
true to say that an individual who has i n point of f a c t not been 
punished may nevertheless be deemed to have been punished." ( i b i d p 424)• 
I n any case, i f Christ i s said to be not 'a man1 but 'generic humanity' 
that i s inconsistent with asserting his r e a l manhood. I t i s a 
version of t h i s type of thinking when Dale stresses the union of the 
Christian with Christ and makes i t so close that the believer may be 
said to have died when Christ died. This confuses objective statements 
of f a c t with subjective statements of influence. I t shows i n 
Rashdall's view the common confusion between 'salvation through a 
cr u c i f i e d Saviour', and 'salvation through the c r u c i f i x i o n of the 
Saviour'. 
F i f t h l y , the substitutionary view has a false idea of f a i t h and 
the object of f a i t h . Faith, i n t h i s view, i s l i m i t e d to f a i t h i n 
Christ's death. I t leaves out of account His l i f e , teaching, example 
and resurrection. Furthermore, f a i t h i s treated as an a r b i t r a r y 
condition of salvation without regard to any moral e f f o r t on the part 
of the believer. We have seen i n his treatment of Paul, and l a t e r of 
Luther, that Rashdall i n s i s t s they both took f a i t h to be mere 
i n t e l l e c t u a l assent to propositions, and that f o r him "No value or 
efficacy whatever can be a t t r i b u t e d to the i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f when 
i t does not lead to such moral regeneration." ( i b i d p 427). I n other 
words j u s t i f y i n g f a i t h i s 'fides formata 1 not 'fides informis'. By 
taking f a i t h i n t h i s sense i t i s possible to argue, as orthodoxy 
cannot, that those who, f o r whatever reason, have not arrived at 
i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f may be j u s t i f i e d i f they show signs of moral 
regeneration and repentance, or hatred of past sins. We must, he 
argues, a f f i r m the value of b e l i e f i n Christ as the supreme revelation 
of God. "But l e t us equally avoid any mode of statement which 
suggests that those who have not heard the name of Christ, or who have, 
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from i n t e l l e c t u a l causes, been unable to accept the creed of His 
Church, are not also objects of that divine Love which received i t s 
most signal manifestation i n Him." ( i b i d p 428). 
I f then, i n view of these c r i t i c i s m s , the substitutionary view i s 
to be abandoned, what theory of atonement i s suitable f o r and acceptable 
to modern man? As Rashdall did, we have anticipated the answer on 
several occasions. The only view possible f o r modern man i s the 
subjective one found i n the Greek t r a d i t i o n and e x p l i c i t l y stated by 
Abelard. We see the f u l l revelation of the love of God i n a l i f e 
v/hich demonstrates the e t h i c a l ideal of union between the w i l l of God 
and the w i l l of man. The death of Christ i s of a piece with his l i f e 
and i s no d i f f e r e n t i n kind from any other martyr death. I t shows the 
extent to which he i s w i l l i n g to go f o r his teaching and his love f o r 
men. Both i n his teaching and i n the extent of his love he i s the 
supreme example. On man's side t h i s revelation of love inspires such 
a response that men are moved to repentance and those good works which 
follow i t . Thus t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s made not only possible but 
in e v i t a b l e . 
Rashdall has very l i t t l e to say about the means by which the 
revelation comes to men and has i t s e f f e c t . We have seen that the 
existence of a moral consciousness i n man i s a main plank i n his 
argument, indeed a s t a r t i n g point f o r his theology. Apparently he 
believes that man, endowed with such a consciousness, must desire the 
highest when he sees i t , and w i l l thus inevitably respond to the 
revelation i n Christ. He w i l l be drawn by the noble example, convinced 
by the teaching, and moved by the love shown i n the death. 
For what are t r a d i t i o n a l l y known as 'means of grace' he has scant 
respect. He never wrote on them at length though he touched on them 
i n sermons. Here, as we might expect, he t r i e d to keep as much as 
he could of the t r a d i t i o n a l language, c h i e f l y , i t seems, to avoid 
giving offence, while at the same time showing that i t could be given 
a meaning acceptable to modern cultivated man. For example the Bible 
i s not taken as i n any sense a 'given* revelation. Revelation comes 
through man's reason and moral consciousness. The Old Testament i s 
the story of an evolution of that consciousness among the Jews who 
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appear to have been the f i r s t great monotheistic people, though there 
were glimmers of monotheism elsewhere and these must also be taken 
as revelation. Jesus i s simply the high point of t h i s evolution 
which continues i n others. "The h i s t o r y of revelation i s simply the 
re l i g i o u s history of the world, as i t presents i t s e l f to the real 
believer i n a personal God, and a God revealed i n a personal Christ, 
the h i s t o r y of the world as a history of gradual and progressive s e l f -
revelation to mankind." (Christus i n Ecclesia. 1904» P 243)• 
He has no patience with sacerdotalism, or any s e t t i n g apart of a 
body of men endowed with special authority or power as dispensers of 
grace. His passages on the priesthood of the l a i t y could not offend 
the most sensitive or extreme Protestant conscience. The ordained 
ministry i s l i t t l e more than a convenience f o r the rest of the 
Christian community. They are set aside and trained f o r a special 
function, but have no peculiar r e l a t i o n to God. They are "... a 
special" order invested with the authority of the whole community, and 
set apart by them to represent them ceremonially i n worship, education-
a l l y i n teaching, and p r a c t i c a l l y i n those general social functions 
of mercy and charity, of moral elevation and enlightenment, which are 
the business of no special profession, and i n which the voluntary 
e f f o r t s of the general community require guidance and assistance." 
( i b i d p 102). 
As might be expected from t h i s view, the sacraments become 
symbols by which the influence of Christ i s portrayed and brought to 
bear on men. He w i l l not allow that they are mere symbols, since no 
symbols are mere. He points out that a l l words are symbols, but are 
nevertheless powerful. Yet the point and importance of the symbol i s 
not i n i t s e l f but i n that which i t symbolises. "Symbols, then, are 
necessary, and to Christians no symbols can take the place of those 
which have been handed down to them by t r a d i t i o n from t h e i r Founder0 
And yet the value of the symbol disappears when attention i s directed 
away from the meaning to the symbol i t s e l f ; . . . " ( i b i d p 39)• Seen 
i n t h i s way the Eucharist symbolises the teaching of Jesus, and 
baptism i n i t i a t i o n i n t o the community which accepts and l i v e s by that 
teaching. I d e a l l y baptism i s f o r adults and i s administered i n the 
name of Jesus only, but i n a Christian community - or at least a 
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community influenced by C h r i s t i a n i t y - Infant baptism i s natural as 
children come i n to the community. 
The great and most s i g n i f i c a n t means of grace f o r Rashdall i s 
the church i t s e l f . Kirkby says of him that, though he d i s l i k e d 
sacerdotalism, "... he was always a thorough ecclesiastic by i n -
s t i n c t i v e f e e l i n g . I t was the church as an h i s t o r i c and organic 
whole, with i t s ordered development of l i f e and doctrine, the instrument 
of Christ's unique revelation, to which he was so deeply attached." 
(op c i t p 486). He was active i n ecumenical work, and his biographer 
quotes a number of l e t t e r s to show that he was much loved and 
respected by the Free Church ministers of C a r l i s l e . But he was 
thoroughly convinced of the value of a state church. I t was the. 
concern to keep church and nation together, rather than any s p e c i f i c a l l y 
theological opinions, which made him such a l o y a l Anglican. He had a 
v i s i o n of the church as a community f i r e d by the example of Christ, 
teaching and serving the world, and thus winning i t s allegiance to 
the moral ideals which were uniquely revealed i n Jesus. 
In the l a s t pages of his work on atonement he suggests that the 
great d i v i d i n g l i n e between men w i l l be between those who accept and 
those who r e j e c t Christ's i d e a l . The theologians task was to put 
the old formulae, which had made t h i s p l a i n to past generations, in t o 
modern language. I n such language, "... the meaning of the Church's 
early creed, 'There i s none other name given among men by which we 
may be saved,' w i l l be something of t h i s kind: 'There i s none other 
ideal given among men by which we may be saved except the moral ideal 
which Christ taught by His words, and i l l u s t r a t e d by His l i f e and 
death of love; and there i s none other help so great i n the attainment 
of that ideal as the b e l i e f i n God as He has been supremely revealed 
i n Him who so taught and l i v e d and died•." (The Idea of Atonement i n 
Christian Theology p 463)• 
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Having seen an example of the more orthodox approach i n Denney, 
and of the Liberal one i n Rashdall, i t should be possible to draw 
attention to certain strengths and weaknesses i n the arguments. 
I t must be said i n favour of Rashdall's view that i t has the 
v i r t u e of s i m p l i c i t y . I f we assume that neither Jesus nor his church, 
at i t s best, has been pr i m a r i l y concerned with philosophers or those 
able to follow complex i n t e l l e c t u a l arguments, then t h i s i s a great 
v i r t u e indeed. Nor should such an admission be regarded as ' s e l l i n g 
the pass' or 'making the best of a bad job'. The Gospel i s to be 
preached, and i f the preacher's understanding of i t , or statement of 
i t , i s so complicated that i t cannot be understood without a higher 
education, then there i s a'prima faci e ' case that he has got i t 
wrong. The impression v/e have from the New Testament i s that men 
could at least understand what Jesus and the,apostles were saying, 
though they may not have agreed with i t . 
Further there i s considerable New Testament support f o r Rashdall's 
stress on the love of God and the place of forgiveness and repentance 
i n Jesus' teaching. While he has to omit some parts of the New 
Testament, and either amend other parts or t r e a t them i n a less than 
obvious way, the great parables showing God's concern to seek f o r Ms 
l o s t children and his readiness to welcome them back do, at least on 
the surface, lend themselves to the Abelardian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . And, 
of course, Rashdall was not alone i n beginning from t h i s stress on 
God's love and i t s obvious human analogies. There i s obviously an 
apologetic advantage here, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n an age which was keen to 
begin a l l i t s thinking from man. While Rashdall draws attention to 
the stipport his theory got from the Greek Fathers, he i s c l e a r l y not 
unaware of many modern thinkers who shared his c r i t i c a l views of the 
substitutionary theory and preferred the subjective one. 
Part of the advantage of beginning from man i s the change which 
t h i s brings about i n the idea of God. One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g 
sections of Rashdall's work i s his discussion on the p a s s i b i l i t y of 
God.1 The idea of God as a loving father who i s r e a l l y hurt, and 
1. cf The Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology pp 450-454* 
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who reall y , s u f f e r s i n the sufferings of his children has obvious 
appeal. I t compares favourably with the bloodless notion of God 
as 'pure in t e l l i g e n c e ' or 'the unmoved mover1 of A r i s t o t e l i a n thought, 
or with the severe forbidding judge that many took to be the God of 
orthodox theology. Hashdall sees that to suggest that God actually 
f e l t pain i n the sufferings of Christ would raise the ghosts of many 
ancient controversies. But he believes that to in t e r p r e t God i n the 
l i g h t of the moral consciousness means believing that pain i s possible 
f o r him. "... i f God loves mankind, He must needs sorrow over 
human sin and human pain. ... A God who could contemplate such a 
world as ours without suffering would not be a loving God, nor would 
He be i n the least l i k e Christ." ( i b i d p 452f). Such a view seems 
to favour a subjective view of atonement, not one which sees i t as 
some kind of transaction. 
This leads to the greatest advantage of the subjective view i n 
the opinion of many. I t avoids the exte r n a l i t y and supposed 
immorality of the t r a d i t i o n a l view. We have already seen Rashdall's 
crit i c i s m s of these points. 
F i n a l l y we should note that any view of atonement that i s 
genuinely Christian and i n l i n e with what we f i n d i n the New Testament 
must be, i n some sense, subjective. I f i t does not become part of 
the believer's experience and a power i n his l i f e then i t i s hard to 
see how i t could be called atonement i n a Christian sense at a l l . 
At f i r s t sight t h i s seems a strong argument i n favour of the subjective 
view, but i t can also come near to verbal juggling or deception. I t 
i s a mistake to allow one view of atonement to have a monopoly of the 
word subjective. No supporter of any other view would accept that 
his view was not intended to have some subjective power, or to get an 
int e r n a l hold on the believer. I t i s a re a l c r i t i c i s m of Rashdall's 
arguments that he implies that other views are merely external, and 
thus he gains an un f a i r emotional advantage f o r his own position. 
However there are other c r i t i c i s m s . I t i s possible to c r i t i c i s e 
Rashdall's own arguments, and, perhaps more severely, to c r i t i c i s e 
his understanding of the view which he attacks. His B i b l i c a l 
arguments are weak. As we saw he begins with the synoptic gospels 
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and only allows two places where Jesus might be thought to suggest 
that his death had atoning value - the 'Ransom' saying (Mark 10:45)» 
and the Last Supper sayings. Here one might c r i t i c i s e his arguments 
and his approach to the New Testament. By beginning with suggestions, 
i n neither case very f u l l y substantiated, that both places are t e x t u a l l y 
suspect he seems to think that he has undercut his opponents' position 
before he begins. But other New Testament scholars do not make so 
much of the textual problems, and generally f i n d more places where 
Jesus may have predicted his death as the important feature of his 
ministry. Denney, as we have seen, noted the 'Bridg'egroom1 saying 
(Mark 2:19f) and the three 'Passion Predictions' (Mark 8:31; 9:31; 
10:33f)» as passages which suggest that Jesus saw an i n e v i t a b i l i t y i n 
his death as part of his work."'' Even i f the reference of these 
passages to the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53 may seem a l i t t l e more 
doubtful now than i t once did, the element of i n e v i t a b i l i t y s t i l l 
seems to be more suitable to a reference to a divine plan than merely 
to the suggestion that he expected the enmity of his opponents to 
lead to his death. 
But, apart from looking at individual verses, one could consider 
what might be called the general presentation of Jesus i n the New 
Testament. Here Eashdall's approach to the New Testament can be 
questioned. He approaches the synoptics as i f they were attempted 
biographies w r i t t e n independently of f a i t h , then approaches each other 
strand of the New Testament as i f i t were independent. I n f a c t i t 
i s important to realise that a l l these documents were w r i t t e n w i t h i n 
the believing community. I t i s wrong to suppose that i n the synoptics 
one i s nearer to cold h i s t o r i c a l f a c t . I f then we f i n d that a l l 
strands suggest that Jesus' death was part of his Messianic vocation, 
we should ask where such a b e l i e f i s l i k e l y to have originated. 
Rashdall himself argues that a suffering Messiah and a Messianic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Isaiah 53 were not common i n Jesus' day. I t i s at 
least l i k e l y therefore that such unanimity i n p u t t i n g forward such 
s t a r t l i n g teaching i s best explained as coming from Jesus himself. 
1. There are, of course, other passages; I have only mentioned the 
ones.Denney uses. The best f u l l discussion of the synoptic 
material i s perhaps s t i l l V. Taylor: Jesus and His Sacrifice 
pp 82-200. A summary i s i n the same scholar's The Atonement 
i n New Testament Teaching pp 13-17. 
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I t i s not easy to know how one should deal with Rashdall's 
treatment of Paul. He candidly admits that substitution i s central 
to the apostle's thought, hut t h i s has l i t t l e bearing on his own ideas 
of atonement since he does not think i t necessary to accept Paul's 
authority. Again one might suggest that there i s an element of 
cheating i n Rashdall's presentation of his case. He suggests, as we 
noted, that the Augustinian-Lutheran view rests on the l i t e r a l 
h i s t o r i c i t y of the Adam story and on the plenary authority of Paul, 
then he dismisses both. I n f a c t to suggest that any part of scripture 
i s not h i s t o r i c a l i s not necessarily the same as to r e j e c t i t s 
authority. Given that Paul may have accepted Genesis as l i t e r a l 
h i s t o r y , and there i s evidence that t h i s was not always the case among 
the Rabbis, his authority i s not dependent on the h i s t o r i c i t y . As a 
matter of f a c t the New Testament shows that the apostles claimed the 
authority of i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e i r teaching, and had that claim 
accepted by the church (cf 1 Cor 2). The Gospel was preached before 
i t was w r i t t e n . The Gospels were w r i t t e n to support the preaching; 
the preaching was not meant to explain previously w r i t t e n gospels -
taken as h i s t o r i c a l records - and should not be subordinated to them. 
Thus the c e n t r a l i t y and primacy of the substitutionary view of atonement 
should not be so easily set aside. 
Two other cr i t i c i s m s could be made of Rashdall's treatment of St. 
Paul. F i r s t , i t i s by no means certain that one can separate Paul 
the re l i g i o u s man from Paul the theologian. Neither should one argue 
that since j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h only appears i n a more or less 
worked out form i n Romans and Galatians, where there i s a controversial 
or dogmatic aim, i t i s somehow unimportant when the demands of 
controversy or dogmatic d e f i n i t i o n are not present. I n f a c t one could 
turn the argument and point out that at the very place where Paul feels 
that he must state his theology with p a r t i c u l a r c l a r i t y there we have 
th i s doctrine, must i t not therefore be of paramount importance. 
But i t i s somewhat midleading, though formally true, to say that 
Romans and Galatians are d i f f e r e n t i n t h i s respe.ct. The objective 
view of the death of Christ as an atonement, on which j u s t i f i c a t i o n by 
f a i t h i s based i n Romans and Galatians, i s also c l e a r l y found i n 
I I Corinthians 5514-21; Philippians 3 *4-9; and Colossians 2:14f. 
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A more important c r i t i c i s m , which leads us "beyond his treatment 
of Paul, i s Rashdall's treatment of f a i t h as 'mere i n t e l l e c t u a l assent 1. 
I t may be that i n l a t e r Protestant formulations of the theory, perhaps 
i n some Puritan divines, there was a danger that f a i t h should be seen 
i n that way, but t h i s seems to be a complete misunderstanding of Paul 
and of Luther, I t must be said that i n neither i s f a i t h mere 
i n t e l l e c t u a l assent, and neither has i t been so i n the Reformation 
t r a d i t i o n at i t s best. They did not think of the Gospel as something 
which was presented f o r man's consideration. I t was not seen as a 
system of b e l i e f , a way of regarding the world which could be cooly 
weighed up and compared with alternatives. Neither Paul nor Luther 
was as dispassionate as that. Both could be said to have preached 
the Gospel - as they received i t - as a message to dying men. I t was 
an urgent matter which called t h e i r entire personality in t o question 
and demanded a response from t h e i r whole being, not simply t h e i r 
i n t e l l e c t . I n modern terms i t was e x i s t e n t i a l . 
When f a i t h i s seen i n t h i s way the d i s t i n c t i o n between j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
and s a n c t i f i c a t i o n f a l l s away. In any case i t could only be made f o r 
the purpose of academic discussion. As we have seen Denney refused 
to separate them. I t could be, then, that Rashdall has been too 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and has ascribed his own way of thinking to his opponents. 
The whole d i s t i n c t i o n between 'fides informis 1 and 'fides formata' 
would be foreign to the t r a d i t i o n which Rashdall i s c r i t i c i s i n g . 
They would say that the d i s t i n c t i o n implies a l i m i t e d understanding 
of f a i t h , whereas f o r them, i n Luther's words, " I t i s a l i v i n g , 
busy, active, powerful thing - f a i t h ; i t i s impossible f o r i t not 
to do us good continually. I t never asks whether good works are to 
be done; i t has done them before there i s time to ask the question, 
and i t i s always doing them." But such works, i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , 
never become the ground of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Man never reaches a 
position where he has a claim against God. 
More importantly, those of the Reformed t r a d i t i o n would argue 
that Rashdall has a l i m i t e d , indeed a s u p e r f i c i a l , understanding of 
the human predicament. This perhaps i s the chief c r i t i c i s m of 
Rashdall and the t r a d i t i o n which he represents. One feels that he 
has not yet considered how serious a thing sin i s . Certainly he has 
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not the same impression of si n and i t s r e l a t i o n to the holiness of 
God as his opponents. With them i t i s seen as a deep and radical 
breach of relationship between man and God which turns i n t o active 
r e b e l l i o n . They have a sense of the s o l i d a r i t y of the race against 
God. They are conscious of a moral disintegration which i s somehow 
wider than human but which i n human terms i s seen i n man's i n a b i l i t y 
to desire the highest when he sees i t . I t i s t h i s overwhelming 
consciousness of the holiness of God and the seriousness of sin which 
finds expression, however inadequately and with whatever mythological 
overtones, i n the idea of the F a l l and the sense of a need f o r an 
objective act outside of man, an act of God himself, to restore the 
broken relationship. 
Ideas such as t h i s are d i f f i c u l t to express and perhaps impossible 
to convey to those who seem unfamiliar with the sense of them. 
Rashdall seems to be a stranger to them. For him a l l that i s needed 
i s the r i g h t sort of teaching, repentance, and the promise that one 
w i l l be forgiven i f one's repentance i s sincere and expressed i n moral 
e f f o r t . He has the same vocabulary as his opponents, but he does 
not seem to have taken account of the costliness of forgiveness, or 
the d i f f i c u l t y amounting to im p o s s i b i l i t y of self-produced repentance, 
as they would understand these things. When he goes on to speak of 
man performing works suitable f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as i f man had wi t h i n 
himself, i n his own moral consciousness, the power not only to recognise 
his need but somehow to make up f o r i t , he i s l i v i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t 
world from that of his opponents. I t i s d i f f i c u l t also to r e s i s t 
the impression that i t i s a more s u p e r f i c i a l world, and that he has 
hardly taken his own s t a r t i n g point - i n the moral consciousness -
s u f f i c i e n t l y seriously. This point i s well made by Forsyth, 
"Conscience which, going some way, makes many heroes, going to the 
end, makes cowards of us a l l . I t ends by accusing more than 
i n s p i r i n g , and i t cannot forgive. I t repents, but the penitent 
conscience cannot forgive. The good man can never forgive himself. 
Conscience w i l l give us sound footing up to a point, t i l l i t rouse 
the sense of the holy, and then i t creates i n us the passion f o r 
forgiveness as l i f e ' s one need. But no conscience of ours can either 
forgive us or assure us of the forgiveness of God, the grace of the 
Holy." (P.T. Forsyth: The Principle of Authority p 182). I n t h i s 
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s i t u a t i o n much more i s needed than teaching and example. Indeed, 
one could argue that teaching and example would he mere cruelty i f 
there were nothing more. 
Similarly, the death of Christ as a display of love does not 
seem to bear any meaningful relationship to man's actual s i t u a t i o n as 
Rashdall's opponents saw i t . This i s the point which was made i n 
Denney's i l l u s t r a t i o n quoted above.''' I f somebody throws himself from 
a pier as a demonstration of love f o r me t h i s i s pointless and 
unhelpful unless i t bears some r e l a t i o n to my need. Rashdall takes 
2 
up t h i s point and quotes Denney's i l l u s t r a t i o n at length. He argues 
that the i l l u s t r a t i o n has missed the point of the Abelardian theory, 
and has even misrepresented the view which Denney seeks to defend. 
But t h i s confuses the issue. I t i s true that the Abelardian theory 
does not present Jesus as committing suicide, and that the sub-
s t i t u t i o n a r y theory demands more than that he should be a kind of l i f e -
saver. However Rashdall has made the mistake of c r i t i c i s i n g Denney's 
analogy rather than the point he was t r y i n g to make by i t . The point 
was that there must be a connection between the death of Christ and 
man's actual need. Thus when Rashdall changes the story and suggests 
that i t would better represent the Abelardian view i f one imagined 
Jesus approaching the person s i t t i n g on the pier and saying, 'To show 
my love f o r you, I w i l l allow myself to be thrown in t o the sea by those 
who have threatened to do so unless I abandon my work of preaching what 
I believe to be the t r u t h of God, of preparing the way of His Kingdom 
and f o r your admission thereto,' he has not met the point. Such an 
at t i t u d e - overlooking the melodramatic a i r forced upon i t by the 
i l l u s t r a t i o n - might well be i n s p i r i n g , but Denney's whole point i s 
that such i n s p i r a t i o n i s not enough. I t i s admitted that part of 
Jesus' work was teaching and revelation, but Denney, and those whom 
he represents i n Rashdall's eyes, would say that that i s not enough, 
and i f his death i s not related to man's need the lack i s not made up. 
This s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of Rashdall's was well expressed i n a review 
of his book by John Oman. "So f a r as he goes he i s wholly r i g h t , ... 
1. cf supra p 71. The Death of Christ p 127 
2. cf The Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology pp 439-445 
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But when one compares him with St. Paul, or even with Luther, one 
realises how l i t t l e he cares to l i v e i n the h a l f l i g h t s , and how a l l 
the r e a l l y creative souls have had to l i v e there a l l t h e i r time. 
His quite astonishing l u c i d i t y i s sometimes at least due to his 
natural aversion from the dim vistas of man's s p i r i t u a l horizon." 
(j.T.S. Vol XXI, 1920, p 270). I t i s i n the half l i g h t s of these 
dim vistas that the exponents of the objective view are forced to 
t h e i r apparently contradictory language. 
Strangely i t i s when his opponents have suffered from the same 
sort of aversion that Rashdall's case seems strongest. There i s 
no doubt that the orthodox position has often been stated too c l e a r l y . 
Thus i t has given the impression of an external transaction, a matter 
of the transfer of amounts i n a kind of s p i r i t u a l book-keeping. I t 
i s t h i s sort of thing that Rashdall attacks. A similar type of 
thinking i s behind his attack on the r e t r i b u t i v e view of punishment. 
Discussing t h i s theory elsewhere he c r i t i c i s e s I'.H. Bradley, who 
defended i t i n a modified form, on the grounds that he "... actually 
gives up the doctrine that the amount of punishment should correspond 
with the amount of the offence, while s t i l l maintaining that punishment 
i n general i s j u s t i f i e d only by past s i n , not by future advantage." 
(The Theory of Good and E v i l 1907 Vol 1 p 287). I n other words he 
believes that Bradley has given up the idea because he does not speak 
about amounts. I n f a c t , however, the s'efenders of substitutionary 
views of atonement have not, at t h e i r best, thought i n terms of 
amounts• 
I n a l l his cr i t i c i s m s Rashdall does not seem to have noticed 
that the best of his opponents see the problems to which he draws 
att e n t i o n , but that they also see f a r more than t h i s , and think t h a t , 
i n spite of d i f f i c u l t i e s , substitutionary language remains the best 
available. They expose themselves to c r i t i c i s m because they t r y to 
do j u s t i c e to the complexity of the issues. Thus i t i s that Rashdall 
seems able to 'score points' against Denney, and even more against 
Dale, but only because his own treatment of the s i t u a t i o n i s more 
s u p e r f i c i a l . Denney too locates the o r i g i n of atonement i n the love 
of the Father. He does not want to separate the Father and the Son, 
or speak i n terms of an opposition between the j u s t i c e and mercy of 
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God. But he does want to do ju s t i c e to the complexity of the 
problem and the depth of Christian experience. I n doing so he lays 
himself open to c r i t i c i s m , but he has at least made the attempt. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h i s respect that Rashdall prefers to d i r e c t 
his c r i t i c i s m of contemporary writers towards Dale and Denney. Both 
of these write c l e a r l y and generally unphilosophically. This i s most 
true of Dale, and he suffers most at Rashdall's hands. But even with 
Denney, though one may f e e l that Denney i s often r i g h t , one feels too 
that Rashdall can handle him i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , at least on the 
philosophical l e v e l . The exponent of the t r a d i t i o n a l position with 
whom Rashdall never comes to terms i s Forsyth. Less clear as a w r i t e r 
than Denney, Forsyth was probably a more powerful i n t e l l e c t and 
cer t a i n l y he was more able to handle philosophical questions. 
Rashdall mentions him as a defender of the substitutionary view, but 
only quotes a minor work."*" But Forsyth was a most discerning and 
devastating c r i t i c of the sort of appeal to man's best and highest 
moral aspirations which i s so well i l l u s t r a t e d by Rashdall. We may 
conclude th i s section with a long quotation which, though w r i t t e n 
years before Rashdall's work on atonement, could have been directed 
to i t . 
"Is i t not very s t r i k i n g that the deadly foes of Christ were men 
who believed passionately i n creed, conduct and charity? His slayers 
were people who believed to the death i n God and i n forgiveness, i n 
alms to the poor;,:, and i n sympathy to the sorrowful. God was t h e i r 
passion, righteousness t h e i r watchword, redemption t h e i r grand hope, 
and benevolence nothing less than a sacrament. Such was Pharisaism. 
So much i t had i n common with Christ. The deadly c o n f l i c t was not 
about monotheism, pardon, nor philanthropy. But i t was about a 
matter which has sunk with us to a mere theologoumenon outside 
•simple Bible teaching'; i t was about the terms of forgiveness. 
There l i e s the essence of Ch r i s t i a n i t y . The Pharisee said salvation 
was a . j u s t i f i c a t i o . j u s t i . his vindication. The righteous were 
forgiven t h e i r shortcomings out of regard to the matters on which 
they did not come short. Just as we say that the good side of 
1. cf The Idea of Atonement i n Christian Theology p 495f 
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human nature w i l l at l a s t submerge and j u s t i f y the rest. But Christ 
said i t was a j u s t i f i c a t i o i n j u s t i . a forgiveness unaffected by the 
good i n the sinner, and wholly due to the free grace of God, a grace 
as free, unbought, undeserved, and inexplicable as the o r i g i n a l choice 
of I s r a e l . For Christ no less than f o r Paul the whole Christian 
issue turned on t h i s grace of God to wickedness, not on mere mercy to 
f a i l u r e ; and i t was not f o r a loving God merely, but f o r a gracious 
God He died. I f we l e t that go, no gospel of love alone w i l l save 
us from Pharisaism, which w i l l come by the way of Catholicism and i t s 
semi-Pelagian humanism. And to l e t i t go theologically i s nothing 
to l e t t i n g i t go p r a c t i c a l l y as so much of our usage i s . A study of 
Pharisaism on i t s best side greatly clears the r e a l Christian issue. 
And we have abundant documents f o r i t i n much current r e l i g i o n which 
denounces Pharisaism with freedom and e f f e c t . " (L.Q.R. Vol CVT, Oct. 
1906 p 200. A footnote to an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d The Church's One 
Foundation). 
Chap V Contents John Oman:- D i f f i c u l t i e s of s t y l e , method and 
s t a r t i n g point p 129-135. 
His World View - natural and supernatural; knowledge of a 
supernatural realm p 135-138; Ways of knowing p 139f > the Supernatural 
and God p 140-142; C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o n s p 142f; Prophetic 
r e l i g i o n and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p 144-146. 
Question of Grace p I46f; Moral personality and r e l i g i o n , leading 
to c r i t i c i s m of mechanistic world view p I48-I52. 
Grace as succour and support - problem of ' c r i s i s ' conversion 
p 152-154; Persuasive and f a t h e r l y grace p 154f> Blessedness p 156f; 
Revelation - person and work of Jesus p 157-163; Penitence and 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n p 163-165. 
Means of grace - Church p 166-169; Sacraments p I69f; Bible p 170f. 
Cri t i c i s m s - of s t a r t i n g point and world view p 171f, and 
re v e l a t i o n p I73-I765 s i n p 176f; other positions p 177ff. 
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V. JOHN OMAN (1860-1959) 
With Oman we come to the most d i f f i c u l t , though perhaps the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l , of the theologians included i n t h i s study. Reading 
Oman i s d i f f i c u l t i n two ways. The most important i s the nature of 
his thought and i t s method, quite d i f f e r e n t from either Lenney or 
Rashdall. The second i s the style of his w r i t i n g . Style here does 
not mean simply such things as choice of words or sentence construction, 
though "both of these were, to put the matter most kindly, d i s t i n c t i v e . 
We also have to deal with a very discursive manner of pursuing an 
argument. This i s probably characteristic of his method of thought, 
so the two problems are necessarily interwoven. 
To comment on the second d i f f i c u l t y f i r s t , i t i s noticeable that 
most readers of Oman, friends and c r i t i c s a l i k e , draw attention to the 
d i f f i c u l t y of his s t y l e . Though i t i s often implied that the style 
covers, and i s p a r t l y excused by, profundity of thought. Thus, on 
the issue of a second ed i t i o n of 'Grace and Personality* (1917; 2nd 
Edition 1919; 5^d Edition 1925)» J«K. Mozley wrote, "... despite^many 
v i v i d phrases which i t contains i t i s not an easy book to read; i t 
demands continuous attention and not only steady but luminous thinking; 
... I f such a book succeeds i t can only be because i t deserves to 
succeed." (J.T.S. Vol. XXI p 349)• Years l a t e r , of Oman's work as a 
whole, Mozley wrote, "Easy he i s not; nor i s he always l u c i d ; but he 
i s always going down to the roots of the matter, and he i s the enemy 
a outrance of anything that seems to him unreal." (Some Tendencies I n 
B r i t i s h Theology 1951 p l 6 l ) . Of 'The Natural and the Supernatural' 
(1931)i W.R. Matthews wrote, " I t cannot be said that the book i s easy 
to read. I t must be studied and not skimmed, but the argument i s 
constantly relieved; by flashes of epigram,..." (C.Q..R. Vol 114 p 31l). 
A.D. Lindsay regretted that "Some of what Professor Oman has wr i t t e n 
i n the past has been so d i f f i c u l t to read that i t has ba f f l e d when 
i t should have illuminated,..." (J.T.S. Vol XXXIII p 388), though he 
f e l t that 'The Natural and the Supernatural' was very d i f f e r e n t . A 
pu p i l and admirer H.H. Farmer comments "His d i c t i o n i s sometimes 
obscure to the point almost of exasperation; t h i s i s p a r t l y due no 
doubt to the depth and o r i g i n a l i t y of his thought ... but i t may be 
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p a r t l y due also to some f a i l u r e i n imaginative sympathy with the mind 
of the reader. He has a way of omitting what were no doubt to him, 
with his grasp of the subject, obvious steps i n the argument, leaving 
the reader to supply them as best he can. He seldom precisely defines 
his terms, but rather leaves t h e i r import to be discovered from the 
use he makes of them, which i s sometimes not very easy to do." 
(Theologians of Our Time; John Oman. E.T. Vol LXXIV p 134). Parmer 
suggests heCmay^have benefitted from the semantic d i s c i p l i n e applied 
by l i n g u i s t i c philosophers. F i n a l l y , another student, F.G. Healey, 
i n a not o v e r - c r i t i c a l account of Oman's theology, i s obliged to admit, 
" I t i s true that, as with other o r i g i n a l thinkers, one has to get 
acclimatised to Oman's s t y l e . ... He used abstract nouns perhaps more 
than was necessary, and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of them sometimes wearies 
or baffles the reader. I n the use of ' i t ' , Oman was not always 
s t r i c t l y grammatical. He discriminated between words commonly used 
interchangeably ( f o r example, 'morals' and 'ethics'; 'origin.-. 1 and 
'beginning'; 'looking' and 'seeing') but sometimes forgot to use them 
i n the exact way he had proposed." (Religion and Reality: The Theology 
of John Oman. 1965 P 3)» Later, on 'Grace and Personality 1. the 
work which should most obviously bear on our subject, Healey comments, 
"The book was worked over several times i n order to meet c r i t i c i s m s , 
including the charge of obscurity. One r e s u l t i s a repetitiousness 
which does not always make the argument easier to follow. Another i s 
that q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , i n the form of subordinate clauses, have on 
occasion been added to sentences at such length as to s t r a i n attention 
overmuch." ( i b i d p 46). 
I n Oman's defence one might point out that he often has parables 
and i l l u s t r a t i o n s which enliven his work. The f a c t that these occur 
with greater frequency i n l a t e r works suggests that he was sensitive 
to the c r i t i c i s m s made of his s t y l e . I t i s also worth noting how 
frequently comments on style pass over into comments on content, or 
manner of thought, or both. Towards the end of the l a s t chapter we 
pointed out that there are ideas and lines of thought which cannot be 
expressed simply without d i s t o r t i o n . These are the thoughts with 
which Oman wrestles. He made t h i s point himself i n the preface to 
the t h i r d e d ition of 'Grace and Personality' (1925). Having remarked 
that he has t r i e d to make the argument plainer, he goes on, "Yet I am 
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under no i l l u s i o n i n thinking that the work i s , much more than "before, 
i n the realm of l i g h t l i t e r a t u r e , which he who runs may read. Of that, 
apart from my own l i m i t a t i o n s , a subject which has occupied the mind 
of many thinkers, throughout many centuries, does not admit: nor i s 
i t possible to spend a l i f e t i m e largely i n t h e i r company without some 
e v i l communication from t h e i r abstruseness." (op c i t p x ) . 
But style i s not the whole of the problem. Oman's work 
proceeded on the basis of a certain world-view, indeed i t could be 
said that his theology was never more than an elaboration of that world 
view. The view i t s e l f , b r i e f l y the affirmation of a supernatural 
realm which i s not d i s t i n c t from the natural but must be found i n and 
through the natural, i s perhaps not so much odd as d i f f i c u l t to state 
with any c l a r i t y . What i s involved i s a t o t a l a t t i t u d e , and Oman 
considered his task to be the a r t i c u l a t i o n and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of that 
a t t i t u d e . Further, i t had to be affirmed against an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
background which was not p a r t i c u l a r l y congenial to i t . I n that he 
takes that uncongenial background very seriously, seeking to meet i t s 
genuine objections to t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n i t y as well as t r y i n g to 
show i t s weaknesses and l i m i t a t i o n s , he i s perhaps nearer to Denney and 
Rashdall than i s at f i r s t apparent. Though his own position i s ? 
quite d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r s . 
Oman was born i n the Orkneys. Occasional passages i n his work 
show the influence of a childhood spent i n a home of simple, though 
stem, Galv i n i s t i c p i e t y , and a l i f e l i v e d i n close contact with the 
sea and land. After attending Edinburgh University and spending 
several semesters i n German u n i v e r s i t i e s , he was ordained into the 
Presbyterian ministry. From 1889 to 1907 he was minister of the 
Presbyterian church i n Alnwick i n Northumberland. I n 1907 he was 
called to the Chair of Systematic Theology and Apologetics at 
Westminster College Cambridge. He remained at Westminster, becoming 
Principal i n 1922, u n t i l his retirement i n 1935* 
Thus he l i v e d and wrote throughout the period of Liberalism and 
on into the neo-orthodox r e v i v a l . I n the preface to his l a s t book 
'Honest Religion', published posthumously i n 1941» he speaks of 
l i v i n g through the r i s e and f a l l offour 'Schools' of Gospel c r i t i c i s m . 
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Strangely he mentions no comparable movements i n dogmatic theology. 
He knew the influences which led to Liberalism, but he witnessed also 
the tragedies of the 1914-18 war which marked the end of i t s optimistic 
utopianism. Hence he can write sympathetically, even w i s t f u l l y , of 
the f u l l churches and honest kindly l i b e r a l i s m of the l a t e Victorian 
and Edwardian ages, while r e a l i s i n g the weaknesses of the underlying 
theology."'' 
He argued i n several books that the chief breach i n Christian 
thought came not at the Reformation but with eighteenth century 
rationalism. The Reformation had divided the church, but i t was s t i l l 
possible to speak of authorities which demanded obedience, whether i t 
was the Church or the Bible. Rationalism rejected a l l 'external 
author i t a t i v e i n f a l l i b i l i t i e s ' , asserting the importance of ind i v i d u a l 
freedom of judgement and exalting the place of reason. This i n turn 
led to a mechanistic view of the universe as obeying certain inexorable 
laws. With the addition of evolutionary ideas of progress, and the 
undermining of the Bible by h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m the old religious 
order, even of post-Reformation Christians, had passed. 
Oman wrote of a l l t h i s as early as his 'Vision and Authority' 
(1902), and set out the course of the change i n great d e t a i l i n his 
Kerr Lectures 'The Problem of Faith and Freedom' (l9.06). The movement 
was quite i r r e v e r s i b l e , and i n any case did not appear to him as an 
unmitigated disaster. He was not anxious to re-establish the old 
form of t r u s t i n the Bible, or to re-establish the church as an external 
authority. The Rationalist s p i r i t had made advances and, as f a r as 
i t went, i t was true. But i t was not the whole t r u t h . I t s a i r of 
superiority i n assuming i t could replace a l l that was true i n past 
ideas by i t s own unaided i n t e l l e c t was i t s great weakness. I t s 
strength was i t s stress on the freedom of individual judgement and 
the assertion that nothing was true f o r any man unless he saw i t and 
accepted i t as true f o r himself. 
The stress on.man's freedom and personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - with 
the sense both of a b i l i t y to respond, and l i a b i l i t y to judgement i f 
1. cf Honest Religion chap 1. 
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he f a i l e d to respond - i s characteristic of a l l Oman's w r i t i n g . I n 
his f i r s t major independent work he wrote "The supreme task i s to 
establish freedom upon that impelling necessity which a man's own 
s p i r i t u a l v i s i o n can alone impose." (Vision and Authority p 22). And 
i n his l a s t work we f i n d the same theme, "In r e l i g i o n we must be as 
bold, as free, as honest, as prepared to face a l l r e a l i t i e s as i n 
science or philosophy. Slavery to t r a d i t i o n , fear of inquiry, 
submission to i n s t i t u t i o n s are not r e l i g i o n but the want of i t , not 
f a i t h but unbelief. The difference i s only i n the sphere i n which 
honesty i s exercised, r e l i g i o n being the sphere i n which we are ever 
reaching out beyond what eye has seen." (Honest Religion p 51). 
I n t h i s a t t i t u d e Oman was a Liberal. Pacing the challenge of an 
unbelieving science and philosophy he did not, l i k e Denney, appeal 
back to the Bible, nor, l i k e Rashdall, take his bearings from modern 
cultivated man. But he sought to press through the easy li b e r a l i s m 
of many others and correct i t s stress on immanence by a recovery of 
transcendence. Horton Davies says of him, "Oman never ceased to be a 
l i b e r a l i n theology, but he v/as a chastened l i b e r a l who considered i t 
to be his task to rescue the older and discarded theological terms 
and to f i l l them with contemporary relevance." (op o i t p 158). He did 
t h i s not by c r i t i c i s i n g piece-meal but by bringing forward a complete 
world view. 
He remarked himself, and the comment has been elaborated by 
Farmer,^ that he had i n a sense worked backwards i n his theological 
w r i t i n g . From the beginning he accepted that there was an unseen 
supernatural realm or aspect of the world, and that men may encounter 
i t by a r i g h t working, thinking and seeking i n the natural realm. 
This assumption l i e s behind his e a r l i e r works but i s not worked out i n 
f u l l u n t i l 'The Natural and the Supernatural' i n 1931* We must t r y 
to set out t h i s view, but should notice f i r s t certain obvious objections 
to t h i s whole method of approach. 
There i s the suspicion that t a l k of a supernatural realm 
encountered through the natural i s a relapse into subjectivism. With 
t h i s goes the fear that i t does not do ju s t i c e to the Divine i n i t i a t i v e . 
The concept of Divine i n i t i a t i v e came to the fore again i n theology 
1. cf op c i t p 133 
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through the work of Barth and his followers. I t i s reasonable to 
suppose that Oman was aware of t h i s school of thought though he does 
not, as f a r as I know, refe r to i t . I n English theology t h i s approach 
was represented, as we have seen, by Denney, and, more f o r c i b l y , by 
Forsyth. Such people stress the importance of beginning from grace 
rather than nature, from what makes us Christian rather than from what 
makes us r e l i g i o u s . 
Oman seems to reverse t h i s order. He i s much more inclined to 
speak of r e l i g i o n than of C h r i s t i a n i t y , though he ce r t a i n l y did not 
think the two are always the same. I n the preface to the second 
edition of 'Grace and Personality 1 he gives as the presupposition of 
the enquiry, "... that, i n Religion, as i n a l l other subjects, t r u t h 
can only rest securely on the witness of the r e a l i t y to i t s e l f , and 
that, i n r e l i g i o n , more than i n any other subject, i t must be a witness 
to ourselves." (op c i t p v i i i ) . Later, i n the body of the book, he 
comes to deal with the r e l a t i o n between human autonomy and divine grace 
and asks, "How sh a l l we ask? Is i t to be i n the old way of arguing 
down from the throne of God, of propounding what seems to us f i t t i n g 
i n the r e l a t i o n of an I n f i n i t e Being to His f i n i t e creature, or i s i t 
to be upward from the actual position we occupy here below?" • His 
answer i s , "Only i f we can see grace as i t works on earth and under-
stand i t as i t affects our own experience, can we possibly hope to 
have either clearness or certainty." (op c i t p 40). 
On the surface then i t seems he i s open to the charge of 
subjectivism and neglecting the divine i n i t i a t i v e . Oman himself does 
not consider these points, but his pupils have pointed out that i f 
the supernatural realm i s there, outside of us, i t cannot then be 
merely an inner subjective state of mind. Further he does speak of 
God seeking men through, or i n , the supernatural environment. I t 
could be argued that he clearl y respects the Divine i n i t i a t i v e by 
beginning his discussion of grace from what God has already done i n 
man."'' Farmer i n s i s t s that, though B i b l i c a l quotations are rare, 
"His was a B i b l i c a l theology, though not i n the narrow and exclusive 
sense i n which that term i s today sometimes used." (op c i t p 134)• 
1. cf Healey op c i t p 67f• 
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A more important variant of the same question concerns the place 
of the person and work of Christ i n the r e l a t i o n between the natural 
and the supernatural. Whereas i n Denney and Rashdall Christ i s very 
much at the centre of the stage, though i n d i f f e r e n t ways, he i s not 
obviously so i n Oman. Of course, mere space, the number of words or 
pages used, i s no guide to the importance of any theme i n a man's 
work. Yet the s h i f t of emphasis i s very noticeable, and one could 
get the impression that Oman i s not dealing with the same problems as 
the other writers mentioned. 
I t could be replied that Oman did not pose the questions i n the 
usual way and so did not present the answers i n the usual way. He 
might have suggested that his contemporaries were not r a i s i n g the 
questions of the person and work of Christ i n the t r a d i t i o n a l forms. 
For most of his work he seems to assume the work of Christ and i t s 
summation i n the cross. I n other words he i s w r i t i n g from w i t h i n the 
church and i s more concerned with issues which arise i n Christian thought 
and experience a f t e r the work of Christ has been acknowledged and i t s 
benefits received. Then 'The Natural, and the Supernatural', which 
more than any other major work might be seen as directed to the honest 
enquirer outside the church, i s more a work of philosophy of r e l i g i o n 
than of systematic theology. I f t h i s sort of argument i s allowed, at 
least p r o v i s i o n a l l y , his work can be more sympathetically interpreted. 
Yet t h i s has a r i n g of special pleading. The objections raised always 
hang over his work and we must return to them l a t e r . 
What then was his world view, and how does he arrive at i t and 
defend i t ? His arguments were f i r s t set out i n an a r t i c l e 'The Sphere 
of Religion' contributed to a symposium 'Science Religion and Reality' 
(1925), but were more f u l l y explicated i n 'The Natural and the 
Supernatural', of which the e a r l i e r essay v i r t u a l l y forms the f i r s t 
section. Therefore we can l i m i t our attention to the l a t e r work. 
B r i e f l y i t i s a philosophy of r e l i g i o n i n four parts. The f i r s t 
argues that r e l i g i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l i g i o u s experience, i s not to 
be explained away but i s i n f a c t a response to the Supernatural realm 
which i s there, open to a l l , and, to some extent, experienced by a l l . 
Secondly he argues against the 'Naturalism' and 'Rationalism' of his 
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day. He complains that i t has omitted the supernatural realm from 
i t s thinking by f a i l i n g to recognise any genuine knowledge apart from 
the abstractions of s c i e n t i f i c explanation. I n the t h i r d section, 
s t i l l arguing with his contemporaries, he c r i t i c i s e s the mechanistic 
world view which sees only cause and e f f e c t , and omits not only ideas 
of freedom but a good deal of the richness of s p i r i t u a l l i f e . I n the 
l a s t section, assuming that he has established the existence of the 
supernatural realm, he c l a s s i f i e s r e l i g i o n s according to how they 
handle the relationship between the natural and the supernatural. 
While i t w i l l not be necessary to follow the d e t a i l of his arguments, 
where he has many digressions and i s occasionally time-bound, t h i s 
world view i s so very important f o r his understanding of the r e l a t i o n 
of God and man and the concept of grace that we must pick out i t s 
main points. 
The f i r s t concern i s to establish that re l i g i o u s experience 
witnesses to the existence of something r e a l , that there i s a super-
natural with which man comes i n to contact. After considering some 
attempts so to explain r e l i g i o n as to explain i t away, he turns to an 
important analysis of re l i g i o u s experience, that i s of our knowledge 
of the religious or supernatural environment. " I f " , he writes, 
" r e l i g i o n i s an actual experience of an actual environment, we can only 
hope f o r an answer as to what that environment i s by asking with a l l 
our knowledge and capacity how i t environs us." (The Natural and the 
Supernatural p 57)• This environment, he claims, i s known basically 
i n the same way as any other. Ve know any environment from i t s 
witness to i t s e l f i n a f o u r f o l d way. F i r s t from the character of the 
f e e l i n g i t creates; secondly the unique value or worth i t has f o r us; 
t h i r d l y , and inseparably from i t s value, the sense of i t s o b j e c t i v i t y ; 
f o u r t h l y there i s the necessity to think the experience i n r e l a t i o n to 
the rest of our experience and the rest of our experience i n r e l a t i o n 
to i t . Of course, such a d i v i s i o n i s only f o r convenience of 
discussion. I n experience the four aspects are united. He now goes 
on to discuss them as they apply to re l i g i o u s experience. 
The f i r s t he c a l l s the 'Holy*. This i s at once reminiscent of 
Rudolph Otto and his stress on the numinous as an overpowering sense of 
awe or dread - the 'mysterium tremendum et fascinans 1. Oman was 
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aware of Otto's work. He has a short appendix on i t i n 'The Natural 
and the Supernatural'"^ and he wrote an a r t i c l e review on the English 
2 
Translation of Otto's Book 'The Idea of the Holy'. But he i s 
c r i t i c a l of Otto's argument that the sense of 'awe', the awareness of 
some 'other', i s the one essential of r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g . For Oman 
th i s does not go f a r enough. He refers to i t as 'the awesome h o l y 1 , 
or the 'undifferentiated h o l y 1 , i t i s mere f e e l i n g without et h i c a l 
content. I t i s not that which he has i n mind when speaking of genuine 
re l i g i o u s experience. That f e e l i n g must be combined with, and 
interpreted by, the second aspect of the experience, i t s valuation as 
of worth f o r us. This he c a l l s the 'Sacred'. 
In judging something to be sacred we are recognising i t as of 
imcomparable worth. I f we ask how th i s p a r t i c u l a r valuation compares 
with pleasure, or ease, or prosperity, i t has ceased to be r e a l l y 
sacred f o r us. As with 'Holy' the valuation of the 'Sacred* can be 
embodied i n low forms, such as i d o l s , sacred groves, trees or other 
symbols of r e l i g i o n . This Oman takes as a characteristic of p r i m i t i v e 
r e l i g i o n . I t i s a tendency to 'fixed ideas'. I n other words man 
tends to l i m i t , or locate, the source of his experience of the sacred 
i n the place where the experience took place, or i n an object i n 
connection with which i t took place. I t i s a mark of rel i g i o u s 
development that the experience, and the sense of value which came 
with i t , can be detached from any material location or vehicle. Thus 
i t becomes a 'free idea'. 
These two aspects of the experience - the sense of the 'Holy', 
and the valuation of 'Sacred' - depend upon the t h i r d , the sense of 
o b j e c t i v i t y . This he c a l l s the 'Supernatural'. As the sense of 
the 'Holy' needs the valuation of 'Sacred' before i t becomes, i n his 
view, a genuine r e l i g i o u s experience, so both point to and depend upon 
the existence of a rea l supernatural order which evokes them. The 
sphere of r e l i g i o n i s neither the f e e l i n g , nor the value, but the 
environment known by means of them. "... i n the end the v a l i d i t y of 
r e l i g i o n depends neither upon the f e e l i n g of holiness nor upon the 
judgement of sacredness, but upon the r e a l i t y to which these belong 
1. cf op c i t p 471ff 
2. cf J.T.S. Vol XXV pp 275-286. 
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- the existence of the Supernatural, ... As here used, the Super-
natural means the world which manifests more than natural values, 
the world which has values which s t i r the sense of the holy and demand 
to he esteemed as sacred." ( i b i d p 7l)« The Supernatural cannot be 
simply distinguished from the Natural, they are interwoven. The 
Supernatural comes to us through and with the Natural. 
F i n a l l y t h i s experience must be thought together with the rest 
of man's experience, and the rest of experience with i t . This i s the 
task of 'Theology'. As we have seen he insisted that Theology should 
begin from man's experience. I t proceeds on the assumption that the 
Supernatural i s r e a l and, since we have as much r i g h t to believe that 
man's mind i s i n the image of the Supernatural, as to believe that i t 
i s i n the realm of the Natural, i t assumes that r i g h t thinking and 
s i n c e r i t y i n searching f o r the t r u t h w i l l be rewarded. The reference 
to 'sincerity' here i s important. Oman sees more i n the mind than 
mere r a t i o n a l i t y . The approach to Theology, he frequently i n s i s t s , 
must be made 'honestly*. By that he seems to imply a willingness, 
and an a b i l i t y , to respond to the higher aspirations of beauty, t r u t h 
and goodness which are valued as sacred. 
I n such an analysis of re l i g i o u s experience, and i n the quest f o r 
t r u t h to which i t leads, Rationalism i s not so much by-passed or 
overturned as superseded. By laying down i t s methods of inquiry 
beforehand Rationalism ruled out the Supernatural, because the Super-
natural could not be f i t t e d i n to i t s l i m i t a t i o n of a l l things to the 
measure of what i t considered s c i e n t i f i c method. However, to be t r u l y 
s c i e n t i f i c , every f i e l d of enquiry must be allowed i t s own methods, 
and t h i s rule applies to enquiry into the Supernatural realm. "But 
i t i s evident that the witness of a sphere which i s mainly concerned 
with what ought to be cannot be the same as that of a sphere which i s 
wholly concerned with what i s . ... I f t h i s i s a higher r e a l i t y , 
which i s seeking to reveal i t s e l f through our whole experience i n t h i s 
present world, i t requires us to reach out a f t e r our farthest v i s i o n 
and follow even the dimly discerned beckoning of i t s requirements, 
as they speak to us of what i s beyond demonstration and only 
discerned i n moments of deeper insight and higher concentration." 
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I f then r e l i g i o u s experience leads us to posit the r e a l i t y of 
the Supernatural realm, and, at the same time urges us to seek to 
1 think i t 1 , we might ask how can we know about t h i s realm? At t h i s 
point one might expect the introduction of the ideas of revelation 
and the work of Christ. We get neither i n the usual way. I n a sense 
he does go on to speak of revelation but i t i s not yet connected with 
Jesus. What we have i s rather a religious epistemology. As Farmer 
has w r i t t e n "Oman's whole argument ce r t a i n l y assumes, as a l l his 
writings do, that there i s i n his reader some di r e c t sense, or at 
least the capacity f o r i t , of the supernatural environment;..." (op c i t 
p 133)• He now articulates the capacity f o r knowledge of the 
Supernatural. 
He speaks of four types of knowing and i l l u s t r a t e s them with a 
parable. While walking i n a dreamy mood along a country road we may 
have a quite v i v i d sense of a l l that i s about us without concentrating 
on anything i n p a r t i c u l a r . This he c a l l s awareness. We may then 
become conscious of one pa r t i c u l a r object, say a man r i d i n g a bicycle, 
and concentrate our attention upon that. This he ca l l s apprehension. 
I f we have never previously seen a man r i d i n g a bicycle we ask what i t 
i s and a f t e r a time realise that i t i s a means of locomotion. This 
he c a l l s comprehension. F i n a l l y we ask how i t i s that the bicycle 
remains upright and i s propelled along, and f i n d the answer by applying 
the appropriate s c i e n t i f i c and mechanical rules. This he c a l l s 
explanation, ( i b i d p 120ff). 
I n these four types of knowing there i s a gradual narrowing of 
the scope of perception. The s c i e n t i s t i s concerned only with the 
l a s t two, comprehension and explanation. These have obvious value 
f o r helping man to u t i l i s e his natural environment, but the s c i e n t i s t 
i s inclined to go on to say that these two alone are real knowledge. 
This, thinks Oman, i s a mistake. I n f a c t the f i r s t two types, 
awareness and apprehension, give a d i f f e r e n t sort of perception, and 
i t i s clear that Oman considers that i t i s , i n some senses at least, 
superior. I t i s not l i m i t e d by theories, i t i s rather the 
perception of the poet or the c h i l d . 
He speaks of comprehension and explanation as blunting the 
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immediacy of perception, and cu t t i n g the perceiver o f f from his 
environment. The poet and c h i l d are not so cut o f f . I n them we 
f i n d apprehension i n a general f i e l d of awareness. Thus they are i n 
the real world of real experience; the thinker i s i n a less real world 
of explanation. He i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point at considerable length 
from Shakespeare, Wordsworth, and his own experience as a c h i l d . His 
point i s that the poet or c h i l d i s the supreme seer f o r whom "... the 
context of perception i s unity of f e e l i n g , touching a unit y of the 
world on one side and a unit y of the mind on the other, with an 
absolute sense of value, at least akin to what we have called the 
•undifferentiate holy'." ( i b i d p 139) • I t i s t h i s r e l a t i v e l y 
unsophisticated perceiving, pursued with s e n s i t i v i t y and s i n c e r i t y , 
which leads to apprehension of the Supernatural realm. 
He follows t h i s with a discussion on the entire theory of 
knowledge i n which he compares and contrasts Kant and Hegel. For our 
present purpose i t i s s u f f i c i e n t merely to note his conclusion, that 
knowledge can only be rea l knowledge f o r the individual insofar as i t 
has a meaning f o r him (Kant); and that t h i s meaning can only be 'r i g h t 
meaning' insofar as i t i s the 'real' meaning of a r e a l i t y external to 
the knowing ind i v i d u a l (Hegel). 
We now have the existence of the Supernatural realm posited by 
experience and known by apprehension. The question now arises of 
the r e l a t i o n between t h i s Supernatural and man. For Oman th i s i s , 
i n e f f e c t , the question of grace, and much which i s found i n the t h i r d 
section of 'The Natural and the Supernatural 1 under the general heading 
'Necessity and Freedom' i s found also i n 'Grace and Personality', so 
that we can consider i t l a t e r when we concentrate more p a r t i c u l a r l y on 
the doctrine of grace. However, there i s one important step i n the 
argument which must be mentioned here. That i s the r e l a t i o n between 
the Supernatural realm and God. 
Confusion arises p a r t l y because Oman wants to face i n two 
directions at once, or rather to use two languages and take part i n 
two conversations. As a l i b e r a l , profoundly influenced by the appeal 
f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l openness and free use of reason, he writes as a 
philosopher of r e l i g i o n . I n the context of t h i s conversation he 
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argu.es f o r the existence of the Supernatural as a realm, one i n which 
good and sincere men may and should move. However he i s also a 
Christian and a minister. I n the context of t h i s conversation he i s 
concerned to have dealings with God as a person, and further as a 
loving Father. No doubt t h i s conception of God would have been i n 
his mind throughout 'The Natural and the Supernatural 1. After a l l , 
divine Fatherliness had been a constant theme i n his e a r l i e r works, 
what i s not at a l l clear i s how he brings these two ideas, or the 
language of these two conversations, together. 
The f a c t i s that i n the t h i r d section of the book the phrase 
'The Deity' i s introduced, almost, i t seems, as a synonym f o r 'The 
Supernatural', and that at the end of that section he speaks of 'God' 
arguing that God must be seen as a person. There are two important 
passages where t h i s movement of thought seems to take place. I n the 
f i r s t he i s speaking of the need to assert a jus t order of the universe 
i f one sees the Supernatural i n terms of the supremacy of the moral 
order. He agrees with Kant that the question of the moral order of 
the universe i s the question of God. But i f , with Kant, one asserts 
j u s t i c e as i n some sense part of r e a l i t y , there i s a danger that God 
w i l l become merely the administrator of laws and, l i k e a human judge, 
w i l l Himself be bound by them. Oman c r i t i c i s e s t h i s as too impersonal. 
"Laws are laws as they are impersonal, and a judge administers them as 
he i s an incarnation of them i n an in d i v i d u a l and not a person. The 
idea of God as a person may be inadequate at best, ... But the least 
adequate form of i t i s that he i s one i n d i v i d u a l , standing over against 
each of us as other individuals;..." ( i b i d p 335)• I n other words 
God must be a person, but more personal than a judge. There i s also 
a d i s t i n c t i o n here between a person and an i n d i v i d u a l . 
The other important passage deals with the p o s s i b i l i t y of sin and 
forgiveness. Sin, he argues here, i s not merely a transgression of 
a law, but i s i n s i n c e r i t y i n our dealings with the 'higher environment'. 
I t i s thus a personal matter. This i s followed, though the connection 
i s not made e x p l i c i t , by the passage, "One other experience, i f i t be 
r e a l , would enable us with s t i l l greater fullness and concreteness of 
meaning to speak of God as a person. This i s forgiveness. I n a l l 
higher r e l i g i o n s the question which has given both poignancy and 
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tenderness to the idea of God, i s whether to the sinner there i s 
restoration and peace." ( i b i d p 342). 
Now i n a l l t h i s Oman moves from speaking of the Supernatural as 
a realm which i s responsive to persons, to speaking of a God who i s 
not j u s t an i n d i v i d u a l , one who i s there, standing over against man, 
but i s one with whom intimate personal relations are possible. We 
know from other works that his key analogy i s that of Fatherhood. The 
question i s , does he merely equate God and the Supernatural realm? 
From 'The Natural and the Supernatural 1 taken alone i t would be possible 
to argue that he does. Healey, however, suggests that 'Supernatural' 
and 'God' are not synonymous. The Supernatural i s rather a realm 
or order of r e a l i t y which i s personal i n qualit y but not a person. 
God i s a person who has dealings with men i n the Supernatural realm. 
But the Supernatural i s God's realm. "The d i s t i n c t i o n having been 
made, one must go on to add immediately that God and the Supernatural 
cannot be separated any more than say a king and his kingly r u l e or a 
father and his active fatherliness." (op c i t p 111). 
Confusion on t h i s point runs throughout Oman's work. I t i s 
part of the c r i t i c i s m made above that he gives i n s u f f i c i e n t weight to 
the Divine i n i t i a t i v e . Perhaps such confusion must always be attached 
to a theology which begins from man on his re l i g i o u s side rather than 
from a more positive stress on revelation. I t appears i n a number 
of modern theologians who appear to have been influenced by Oman, or 
who take a similar l i n e , and we must take up t h i s c r i t i c i s m l a t e r . 
The survey of the basic world view presented i n 'The Natural and 
the Supernatural' can conclude with some comments on the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of r e l i g i o n s i n the fourth section of the book. This leads n a t u r a l l y 
to his ideas of grace. For Oman the whole point of r e l i g i o n i s the 
attempt to establish a proper relationship between the Natural and the 
Supernatural. This i s true to some extent of even the most p r i m i t i v e 
r e l i g i o n . Hence he argues that they cannot be c l a s s i f i e d by r a t i o n a l 
or moral c r i t e r i a but rather by t h e i r ideas of redemption. 'Redemption' 
here i s rather an odd word since i t normally carries the idea of 
being redeemed from something, hence we might think he expected 
r e l i g i o n to redeem man from the natural to the supernatural. But, 
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as we have seen, that i s not his idea of the r e l a t i o n between the 
two. What he means i s the establishing of a relationship, hence he 
writes, "... a l l r e l i g i o n s are religions of redemption. And what 
distinguishes most of a l l i s the kind of redemption they o f f e r , which 
i s , i n other words, t h e i r conception of the r e l a t i o n of the Natural 
and the Supernatural." (The Natural and the Supernatural p 3^3) • A 
better word would be ' r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 1 , understood as the establishing 
of such a relationship between the two as to enable man to l i v e i n 
the Natural i n such a way as to discover the Supernatural. Different 
r e l i g i o n s , or reli g i o u s a t t i t u d e s , o f f e r d i f f e r e n t approaches* 
"When the Supernatural i s submerged i n the Natural, we have i d o l a t r y ; 
when the Natural i s submerged i n the Supernatural, we have pantheism; 
when they are set sharply apart, we have deism; when they are related 
by some kind of moral v i c t o r y , we have at least some kind of theism." 
( i b i d p 366). 
On t h i s basis he distinguishes f i v e types of r e l i g i o n . Animism 
finds the abiding or eternal i n a vague potency i n the natural. 
This group includes the p r i m i t i v e r e l i g i o n s . Polytheisms manage 
the natural by assuming various supernatural forces i n some way akin 
to man. Pantheisms proceed on d i f f e r e n t ideas of unity. He 
distinguishes two broad types. Cosmic Pantheism accepts the wholeness 
of the Natural as being the Supernatural. Acosmic Pantheism sees 
the natural as i l l u s o r y and seeks to be l o s t i n the Supernatural. Of 
such, he thinks, are, i n the l a s t analysis, a l l types of mysticism. 
Dualisms divide the Natural in t o the sacred and the secular, and the 
Supernatural in t o forces of good and e v i l . This leads to legalism 
either of a ceremonial or an eth i c a l type. F i n a l l y Prophetic 
Monotheism finds r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to the Natural by f a i t h i n One Personal 
Supernatural who gives i t meaning. This' category includes Judaism, 
on i t s prophetic side, and C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
Crossing t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n he speaks of two major contrasting 
trends found at various stages of reli g i o u s development. One tends 
to pantheism; i t i s found i n p r i m i t i v e and mystical re l i g i o n s and 
sees the Natural as i l l u s o r y , v e i l i n g God. For t h i s trend r e l i g i o n 
i s redemption from the Natural. The other i s found i n the Poly-
t h e i s t i c , Legal and Prophetic types of r e l i g i o n . For t h i s trend 
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redemption i s found i n and through the Natural, i t has a more 
hopeful and optimistic approach to the Natural world. 
I t i s not necessary f o r our purpose to examine Oman's f u l l 
treatment of r e l i g i o n s , but merely to note that C h r i s t i a n i t y i s seen 
as a Prophetic, e t h i c a l , and essentially non-mystical r e l i g i o n . On 
th i s he waxes eloquent. While a l l re l i g i o n s have some concern f o r 
reconciling the Natural, and with i t man, with the Supernatural, and 
so a l l are i n some sense redemptive, Prophetic r e l i g i o n i s more 
comprehensive and more profound i n i t s treatment of the whole of the 
Natural order and the l o t of man. Only the Prophets "... i n face of 
the same calamities as struck others with abject t e r r o r , show a 
rec o n c i l i a t i o n to God i n a l l His appointments i n the Natural ... which 
made re c o n c i l i a t i o n a l l r e l i g i o n and not merely part of i t . As t h i s 
l e f t outside of God's rule no sphere which does not manifest His 
wisdom, righteousness and love, i t i s also alone true monotheism, 
which i s not a mere affirming that God i s one, but i s the assurance 
that the world i s a l l God's by re c o n c i l i a t i o n to His meaning I n i t 
and His purpose beyond i t . " ( i b i d p 44^f). This prophetic r e l i g i o n 
i s found i n i t s p u r i t y only i n the Hebrew prophets and i n Jesus. I t 
i s necessarily the experience of the i n d i v i d u a l . When an attempt i s 
made to make i t the r e l i g i o n of a group - nation or church - i t i s 
l i a b l e to lapse i n t o some form of legalism. 
Such r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s not a theory only but a positive a t t i t u d e 
towards l i f e i n the Natural as manifesting the Supernatural worth and 
purpose. The achievement of the Hebrew prophets was not simply to 
arri v e at the conclusion 'God i s One'. "They were monotheists i n 
the only effective sense of being enabled to face the darkest i l l s of 
l i f e i n the assurance that God's meaning i s i n a l l and his purpose 
over a l l . What determines t h e i r f a i t h i s not a theory of the Super-
natural, but an a t t i t u d e towards the Natural, as a sphere i n which a 
vi c t o r y of deeper meaning than the v i s i b l e and of more abiding purpose 
than the f l e e t i n g can be won." ( i b i d p 448). However, they saw also 
that i f man used the Natural to fu r t h e r his own pride and ambition 
t h i s would lead to calamity f o r him. Yet even that calamity was part 
of God's purpose and ultimately f o r man's good. As God's whole 
purpose f o r man i s f o r his highest good, diversion from that purpose 
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i s e v i l , and the calamity which follows i t could, i d e a l l y , b r i n g 
man back to the purpose. 
The development of the prophetic movement sees a growing stress 
on individual insight and personal r e l i g i o n . This was not the 
aggrandisement of personal opinion. Neither was i t that warmth of 
personal devotion which i n some strains of piety can lead to a s e l f i s h 
enjoyment of the individual's own relationship with God. The two 
words most characteristic of Oman's treatment are 'freedom' and 
'insight*. He opposes these to a l l r eligions of reliance on external 
authority or outward conformity on the one hand, or of s e l f i s h 
s a t i s f a c t i o n on the other. Thus he finds the peak of the movement, 
i n the Old Testament, i n Jeremiah's conception of a rule of God which 
the believer knows by his own insight. "This kingdom of freedom 
which, by personal in s i g h t and consecration, emancipates from a l l 
slavery to custom and l u s t of pleasure or gain, and so from a l l f i n a l 
t r u s t i n material safeguards, p o l i t i c a l or e c c l e s i a s t i c a l , we can see, 
looking back from Jeremiah, was the hope of a l l the prophets." 
( i b i d p 454). 
Yet the prophets were not f o o l i s h l y optimistic about human nature 
and i t s p e r f e c t i b i l i t y . They saw cl e a r l y the corruption of the 
human heart. This they explained as due to i t s being self-enclosed 
and thus unable to see the purpose of God. Hence they sought to 
onen men's hearts to God, but not by force, only by appeal and 
persuasion. 
The prophetic movement reaches i t s peak i n Jesus. I t was shown 
i n His l i f e as one who saw and accepted God's purpose i n the world f o r 
himself, and who accepted God's valuation of others so that none were 
beyond his love or his purpose. I t was to his own understanding of 
the Fatherhood of God that Jesus i n v i t e d his followers. However, he 
did not appeal to authority, neither did he^Inany way seek to force 
men's opinions. He respected t h e i r freedom, but sought to appeal 
to experience and by example to c a l l them to a greater freedom which 
would come by knowing themselves to be the children of God and f i n d i n g 
his purpose i n t h e i r l i v e s . Such an appeal, and a response to i t 
which i s not disappointed but feels i t has met with success, i s only 
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possible because i t put men i n contact with the Supernatural as i t 
r e a l l y i s and t o t a l l y respects t h e i r freedom. "... with Jesus the 
only creed i s a prayer, the only casuistry the s p i r i t of love, the 
only organisation the willingness to be f i r s t i n service and l a s t i n 
honour, the only form of worship worship i n s p i r i t and i n t r u t h . I f 
Jesus i s i n any sense a f i n a l authority i n r e l i g i o n , i t i s because he 
spoke e n t i r e l y from t h i s witness of the r e a l i t y , and not by any 
authority apart from i t . " ( i b i d p 468). When t h i s appeal to man's 
personal insight was replaced by an appeal to the Gospels as an 
external authority the nature of Ch r i s t i a n i t y was changed. 
I n the l a s t few pages of 'The Natural and the Supernatural 1 
Oman uses ideas of grace which he had previously set out i n 'Grace 
and Personality'. But, on his own admission, the world view of the 
l a t e r book had already been basic to his thinking. Thus as we turn 
to look more closely at what he says about grace i t i s important to 
notice again that we w i l l not f i n d the same sort of treatment we found 
i n the other writers considered. We can not, therefore, put the 
questions outlined i n the introduction to t h i s study - at least, not 
i n the same way, Parmer comments of 'Grace and Personality' that i t 
"... i s not only great and profound theology; i t i s also a great 
re l i g i o u s book, i f one may make such a d i s t i n c t i o n ; ..." (op c i t p 134)• 
Perhaps the d i s t i n c t i o n should not be too absolute. But i t may well 
be that we w i l l understand 'Grace and Personality' better, and get 
more l i g h t from i t , i f we approach i t as a classic of reli g i o u s and 
devotional thinking w r i t t e n from w i t h i n the church - almost as a 
personal confession of f a i t h and experience - rather than as a work 
of systematic or dogmatic theology or apologetics. 
Oman saw the question of grace as the question of the entire 
r e l a t i o n between God and man. He i s drawn to i t both as a believer 
and as a philosopher. I n the background of his own thinking l i e 
the disputes between Augustine and Pelagius, and the post-Reformation 
controversies over predestination, election, o r i g i n a l sin and the 
freedom of the w i l l . He i s d i s s a t i s f i e d with the normal approaches 
to these questions, which he considers to be too mechanistic and 
impersonal. His own treatment uses ideas of personality and personal 
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relationship as guiding themes. 
He f i r s t wrote on the subject i n a series of a r t i c l e s e n t i t l e d 
'Personality and Grace' i n the 'Expositor' beginning i n 1911. These 
a r t i c l e s were the basis of the book 'Grace and Personality' published 
i n 1917• I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that such a volume should have been 
produced by a Liberal theologian during a war which tested many people's 
confidence i n grace, and f o r many others brought the end of whatever 
confidence they may have had i n Liberal theology. As f a r as Oman 
was concerned there was no suggestion of producing 'tracts f o r the 
times', but rather of o f f e r i n g r e f l e c t i o n s which had stood the test of 
the times. More important s t i l l he f e l t that his method of approaching 
the problem stood the te s t i n a way that the other methods - of 
t r a d i t i o n a l orthodoxy, rationalism, or genial libe r a l i s m - would not 
have done. I n the preface to the f i r s t e d i tion he wrote that the 
a r t i c l e s "... were already the outcome of many years of study and 
r e f l e c t i o n : and, i f I have any confidence i n o f f e r i n g the r e s u l t of 
renewed thought on the subject, i t i s that the main contention seems 
to have stood the test (of the war) i n a way impossible, not only f o r 
a merely sentimental f a i t h i n a beneficient Deity, but also f o r any 
doctrine that s t a r t s from the Absolute, whether as the absolute 
process of Reason or as the absolute Divine Sovereignty." (Grace and 
Personality p v i ) . Thus though he does not enter into any formal 
argument with e a r l i e r positions there i s , especially i n the f i r s t 
section of the book, a good deal of implied c r i t i c i s m of them. I 
sha l l attempt to outline his argument f a i r l y f u l l y , making some 
cri t i c i s m s as the argument proceeds, and conclude with some cri t i c i s m s 
a r i s i n g from those questions which are normally raised i n treatments 
of the doctrine of grace but which do not loom large i n Oman. 
Tra d i t i o n a l l y discussions of grace have begun from the idea of 
God as omnipotent omniscient power. That being the case i t has been 
natural to expect that God would provide i n f a l l i b l e authorities and 
work his w i l l by i r r e s i s t i b l e might. I n other words we expect God to 
act as we would act i f we were God. The idea of grace involved here 
Oman refers to as 'Omnipotence directed i n a stra i g h t l i n e by Omni-
science", However experience, either of the unsatisfactory nature of 
the world, or of our own moral l i v e s , indicates that God does not work 
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i n that way. Reflection also leads us to question whether such means 
of action would be i n keeping with divine fatherhood, or with any 
personal re l a t i o n s . Recent teaching had raised the question of 
personality, and Oman spent some time analysing the moral person and 
showing the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n holding together what he took to 
be the t r a d i t i o n a l idea of grace, that i s as i r r e s i s t i b l e force, and 
an understanding of moral personality. 
e 
He takes as his s t a r t i n g point the assertion of the indpendence A 
A. 
of the moral person "... we f i n d that the v i t a l and distinguishing 
characteristic of a moral person i s what philosophers have called 
autonomy. When that i s l o s t , man i s no longer a person, but i s a 
mere animate creature. This independence i s the singular, the unique 
qua l i t y of a person, and i n any relations between persons where, on 
either side, t h i s i s ignored, the r e l a t i o n becomes less than personal." 
( i b i d p 42). 
He elaborates t h i s i n three assertions. F i r s t a moral person 
i s necessarily self-determined. I t i s true that men often act from 
physical compulsion, or from unrecognised psychological motivation, 
but such actions cannot be considered moral. I f we were not free to 
make decisions f o r ourselves we would not be conscious of ourselves. 
I t i s t h i s freedom which i s basic to our sense of re s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
act i n certain s i t u a t i o n s , and our sense of remorse i f we have acted 
badly. Neither may we evade the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by speaking of our 
character. Here he distinguishes character from disposition. Our 
disposition i s i n some sense 'given', but we are responsible f o r what 
we make of i t , that i s our character. We form our character by our 
choices. In f a c t we i n s t i n c t i v e l y do not allow appeals to character 
to condone wrong actions, we hold people responsible f o r t h e i r 
characters."'" 
Secondly, a moral person i s self-determined according to his own 
se l f - d i r e c t i o n . The morally r i g h t decision must be inwardly 
accepted, not simply obeyed as a decision from outside ourselves. 
1. I t w i l l be recalled that Denney makes a sim i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n i n 
terms of t r i a l and fa t e when w r i t i n g about Augustine and Pelagius. 
supra p 62f. cp 'Studies i n Theology' p 915 'The Christian 
Doctrine of Reconciliation p 197ff. 
-149-
We may look f o r guidance, or speak of educating the conscience, "but 
i n the l a s t analysis nothing i s morally binding upon us which our own 
conscience does not acknowledge. Further, the acceptance of any 
action as morally obligatory implies that i t i s withi n our power, 
"the only v i t a l question regarding self-determination concerns our 
freedom to follow t h i s s e l f - d i r e c t i o n - to do, of our own purpose, 
what we know, of our own ins i g h t , we ought. ... The sense of being 
wi t h i n our duty i s , at the same moment, the sense of being w i t h i n our 
power; f o r what we cannot do no 'ought1 can impose upon us." ( i b i d 
P 53f). 
F i n a l l y , t h i s self-determination by s e l f - d i r e c t i o n i s possible 
because i t s sphere i s our own self-consciousness. By t h i s he means 
more than simply that we are conscious of ourselves. The point i s 
that there are many events and situations which may affect us but 
which always remain external to us, or even unknown by us. But u n t i l 
we are personally conscious of them they are beyond our moral judge-
ment. The world i n which we act morally must be admitted to our 
self-consciousness. "... the world which i s our re a l moral sphere 
i s ours only as we in t e r p r e t i t , are interested i n i t , judge i t , use 
i t . " ( i b i d p 56). For a l l the actions which we take, determined and 
directed by ourselves and within the sphere of our own s e l f -
consciousness, we are t o t a l l y responsible. 
I f grace has to do with such personalities then the t r a d i t i o n a l 
idea of 'Omnipotence directed i n a straight l i n e by Omniscience' w i l l 
not do, says Oman. Grace as i r r e s i s t i b l e force would overcome our 
personality and reduce man to the status of a thing. He would not 
then be a moral personality and God would not only not have dealt 
with him personally, but would not be able to do so. 
Yet Oman sees that behind the theories of i r r e s i s t i b l e grace and 
ideas of predestination i s a profound rel i g i o u s experience. His 
f i r s t academic work, Avhich he did while a minister at Alnwick, had 
been to translate and ed i t Schleiermacher 1s 'Speeches on Religion to 
i t s cultured despisers'. He had learned from Schleiermacher, and 
from the Calvinist t r a d i t i o n of his own church, that i n some sense 
man i s completely dependent on God. Furthermore he realised that, 
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paradoxically moral independence and religious dependence were 
both characteristic of Calvinist piety at i t s best. 
He has thus arrived at an apparent impasse. Morality demands 
that man should be independent so that he can decide; r e l i g i o n 
demands absolute dependence on God. Compromises do not work since 
they damage one side or the other. I f man i s buttressed by- r e l i g i o n 
he does not appear to make independent moral choices, and i f he i s to 
be accepted by God f o r his good works he i s not r e l i g i o u s l y dependent. 
However, experience demands that the two should not be permanently 
separated since, strangely, they seem to need each other. Religion 
ceases to be s p i r i t u a l i f the elements of moral personality which we 
have noted are removed. "Faith i s not s p i r i t u a l unless won by our 
own insight into t r u t h , received by the consent of our own w i l l s , and 
applied to the government of our own l i v e s . And, without goodness 
shining i n i t s own l i g h t , every standard by which we could judge a 
doctrine of God i s l o s t , and f a i t h becomes mere submission to 
ar b i t r a r y greatness." ( i b i d p 6 l ) . On the other hand morality l e f t 
alone tends to lose the sense of 'ought 1, or to bring i t down to what 
i s manageable, i t "... does not go much beyond decency and f a i r - p l a y , 
and leaves out of sight the deepest of a l l moral requirements, which 
i s not to act conscientiously, but to seek an ever more penetrating 
conscientiousness." ( i b i d p 63). Yet, to re f e r to experience again, 
i t i s a f a c t that i n actual l i f e there does not only not seem to be a 
clash between moral independence and religious dependence, but the 
two cohere and somehow support each other. 
Of course Oman i s not the f i r s t to arrive at t h i s impasse. His 
approach to understanding the two apparently irreconcilable sides of 
the experience together i s through his world view. The moral person 
making moral decisions i s alv/ays conscious of l i v i n g i n a world which 
somehow supports or responds to those decisions, i n the long run i f 
not i n the short. I n 'Grace and Personality' he seems to assume t h i s 
l i n e of thought rather than argue i t . The conviction 'we can because 
we ought' demands a certain type of world, a moral onei I t i s based, 
he argues, on a confidence essentially r e l i g i o u s . Moral choice and 
action cannot be an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c thing, i t demands a moral world. 
Moral choice i s not a statement of preference, but a desire to follow, 
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to f i t i n with, what i s somehow true of r e a l i t y . I n that case i t 
i s wrong to separate morality from r e l i g i o n since "both are true about 
the world. "Seeing we need a moral world to act i n , moral t r u t h to 
walk by and a moral fellowship i n which to serve, to divide moral 
independence from re l i g i o u s dependence i s merely to dissect l i v i n g 
r e a l i t y i n order to make explanation easy. As the l i v i n g u n i t y i s 
thereby turned into separate dead mechanisms, the explanation i s as 
misleading as i t i s f a c i l e . " ( i b i d p 64). Clearly t h i s i s to assume 
the ' s p i r i t u a l ' world view v/hich we have seen i n 'The Natural and the 
Supernatural'. I t also overlooks the f a c t that many of his 
contemporaries would have accepted the mechanistic description of the 
world v/hich he hints at so disparagingly i n order to dismiss i t . 
Later he had to consider that view more seriously so we must digress 
to look at that consideration. 
I t occupies the t h i r d section of 'The Natural and the Supernatural' 
under the heading 'Necessity and Freedom*. He refers to two 
cosmologies, both of which seem necessary. I t seems necessary to 
believe that man i s free to act, and that action brings certain awards; 
and i t also seems necessary to believe that the world i s based on 
certain impersonal laws of cause and e f f e c t . I n the l i g h t of these 
c o n f l i c t i n g ideas he discusses the theory of evolution. 
For our purposes i t i s not necessary to consider his arguments 
i n d e t a i l but merely to note his conclusion, that evolution i s by 
reaching forward to a f u l l e r meaning. The stress here i s on the idea 
of meaning. This i s not the same as an argument from design i n which, 
to put i t crudely, God may be supposed to have created the world on 
the basis of a blue-print the outlines of which we can discover. I t 
is rather the assertion that the environment of the world i s such 
that i t responds to the individual's quest f o r meaning and value, 
because i t i s much an environment that the value i s waiting to be 
discovered. A purely n a t u r a l i s t i c account of evolution demands such 
a view, according to Oman, though i t does not admit that i t makes the 
demand. "... nothing makes a purely n a t u r a l i s t i c account of 
evolution plausible save the ease with which t h i s environment, i n 
which a l l true values, natural and supernatural, are already e f f e c t -
i v e l y present, i s assumed, not because the theory i s e n t i t l e d to the 
-152-
assumption, but because i t cannot emancipate i t s e l f from the 
assumption on which a l l l i f e proceeds." (The Natural and the Super-
natural p 278). 
The same assumption about the Supernatural as i n some way under-
girding and interpenetrating the Natural i s involved i n the assertion 
of s p i r i t u a l freedom and advance. The only freedom worth having i s 
the freedom f o r r i g h t thinking and r i g h t acting, and such freedom i s 
"... to know a r e a l i t y which so witnesses i n i t s own r i g h t that no 
other witness has any r i g h t before i t . " ( i b i d p 31l)« Later he 
argues that as man adopts higher ideals the universe i s seen to be 
r e l i a b l e , and responsive to those ideals. The environment i s found 
amenable to ideals of t r u t h , beauty and goodness, which i n turn are 
found to be appropriate f o r d i r e c t i o n of human conduct i n the world. 
What ought to be i s seen as i n some sense more real than what i s , 
because i t i s i n some sense 'read o f f from a truer r e a l i t y . "... 
t h i s presupposes more than that the Supernatural i s r e a l . The 
problem i t presents i s that the Supernatural must also be the r e a l i t y 
of the Natural." ( i b i d p 331)• What we c a l l s p i r i t u a l advancement 
i s progress into the apprehension and use of the Supernatural. Thus 
he comes back by a long and detailed philosophical discussion to the 
point which we have seen him make 'r e l i g i o u s l y ' i n 'Grace and 
Personality'. 
I f t h i s world view i s accepted, together with the idea of moral 
personality previously outlined, the idea of grace must be re-cast. 
I t cannot be 'Omnipotence directed i n a stra i g h t l i n e by Omniscience', 
neither i s itsjworking l i k e l y to be di r e c t at a l l , i f by that any sort 
of overwhelming force or influence i s intended. For Oman, Grace i s 
the succouring and supporting of our moral independence, coupled with 
the i n d i r e c t persuasion by which we are led to see the Supernatural i n 
the Natural, and to meet i t i n a l l our dealings with our fellow men. 
I t might seem an objection to t h i s understanding of grace that 
i n a l l generations there have been 'crisis-conversions'. Men and 
women have been turned i n an instant from darkness to l i g h t . There 
are stock examples - Paul, Augustine, Wesley - but hosts of less 
famous Christians have witnessed to the same experience. 
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One senses that Oman i s uneasy i n dealing with t h i s experience. 
He i s aware that such conversions occur, and i s too honest to 
overlook them completely. Yet i t seems that the s p i r i t u a l Hone' of 
the c r i s i s conversion, the religious atmosphere i n which such phenomena 
may be accepted, or even expected, i s foreign to him. He inhabits 
a more urbane, sophisticated and scholarly cautious world. One 
could not imagine him, l i k e Denney, asserting that Paul might be more 
t r u l y understood i n mission h a l l s or street corner meetings than i n 
theological lecture rooms, or seriously bringing forward the views 
and experiences of a lay evangelist among the f i s h e r f o l k of Aberdeen 
i n support of a theological argument. Yet the great teachers of 
grace have always been at least sympathetic to th i s atmosphere. Oman 
looks at the testimony meeting from the vantage point of the lecture 
room. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid the impression that he also assumes 
a certain superiority i n his a t t i t u d e to i t , and that t h i s assumption 
i s based not only on ignorance of certain elements of Christian 
experience, but also on a defective view of s i n . This i s a c r i t i c i s m 
to which we sh a l l return. 
Though he notes the occurrence of crisis-conversions he w i l l not 
allow either that they are as sudden as they sometimes seem, or that 
they are outside the moral description of grace which he has given. 
He uses the example of physical i l l n e s s and claims that we do not 
suggest a cure i s sudden because the r e s u l t appears suddenly i n the 
patient's leaving bed. Just as hidden recuperative powers may have 
been at work f o r some time i n that case, so, i n the case of s p i r i t u a l 
changes there may have been a long period of preparation. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y he returns to the idea of 'dis p o s i t i o n 1 . The 
implication i s that certain people have dispositions which respond 
i n t h i s way. But, of i t s e l f , disposition i s neutral i n a moral sense, 
i t i s only as i t i s used that i t becomes of moral worth. This i s a 
var i a t i o n of William James argument that the 'twice-born' Christian 
i s merely of a d i f f e r e n t psychological type. 
He i s also c r i t i c a l of those who seem to r e l y on c r i s i s -
conversions i n such a way that they themselves remain passive. As 
though, to put i t simply, God i s l e f t to do the work while the man 
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opts out of the moral struggle. He complains that, "Persons who 
r e l y on t h i s passive type of regeneration are often wanting i n kind 
and patient relations to t h e i r fellows and even f a l l at times in t o 
u t t e r uncharitableness." (Grace and Personality p 76). Such people 
can f e e l themselves to he objects of God's special attention while 
they are i n f a c t c u t t i n g themselves o f f from God's action by thinking 
themselves above i t as i t comes to them i n normal l i f e . True 
conversion, on the other hand, i s an awakening of our true r e l a t i o n to 
God and man. Hence i t must involve personal i n s i g h t . I t i s due 
"... not to mystical transformation of the soul, but to the hearing 
ear and the understanding heart perceiving a new meaning i n things, 
which changes f o r us our whole world." ( i b i d p 79)• 
Doubtless the points he makes about crisis-conversions are true 
and h e l p f u l , but one s t i l l feels that he has not adequately come to 
terms with a well authenticated s p i r i t u a l experience which one might 
expect to have a more central role i n a treatment of grace. By 
pointing to possible explanations and aberrations he has avoided 
having to discuss the real thing. 
For Oman then Grace i s divine persuasion. Whatever may be said 
of supposed omissions i n his work i t must be acknowledged that t h i s 
point he sees well and i l l u s t r a t e s eloquently. I t i s , he notes, 
t y p i c a l of God's dealings with his world not to force anything. Man 
uses di r e c t methods, God has more patience. "What a l l l i f e does say 
to us i s that God does not conduct His r i v e r s , l i k e arrows, to the 
sea. The r u l e r and compass are only f o r f i n i t e mortals who labour, 
by taking thought, to overcome t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s , and are not f o r the 
I n f i n i t e mind. The expedition demanded by man's small power and 
short day produces the canal, but nature, with a beneficient and 
picturesque circumambulancy, the work of a more spacious and less 
p r e c i p i t a t e mind, produces the r i v e r . Why should we assume that, i n 
a l l the rest of His ways, He rejoices i n the r i v e r , but, i n r e l i g i o n , 
can use no adequate method save the canal?" ( i b i d p 15) 
Even more t e l l i n g i s his use of the analogy of fatherhood, to 
which he constantly returns i n a l l parts of his work. The fatherhood 
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of God, as i l l u s t r a t e d by the l i f e of Jesus i s not r e s t r i c t e d to the 
religious sphere or to any pa r t i c u l a r channels. Accordingly our 
concept of grace should be such that we can expect to f i n d i t i n a l l 
of l i f e . The important point i s the r i g h t r e l a t i o n to God. "Thus 
the d a i l y drudgery might crown us with the d i g n i t y of f a i t h f u l , s e l f -
f o r g e t t i n g , humble service, while our most overwhelming mystical 
experience might turn i n t o s p i r i t u a l pride and uncharitableness." 
( i b i d p 86). I f the relationship i s wrong, "... i f we measure the 
world by a d i f f e r e n t good and pursue ends i n i t God has not blessed, 
what we work i n i t i s e v i l and what we hope from i t disappoints." 
( i b i d p 83). The r i g h t relationship depends on our f r e e l y accepting, 
by our own moral i n s i g h t , God's w i l l as the ultimate meaning of l i f e . 
This must be something we aim at, or rather something that we are 
persuaded to accept as our aim, not something from which we s t a r t . 
However, once we accept the aim, we f i n d God to be a loving father who, 
l i k e a good human father, guides his children and gives to them, not 
i n such a way as to override t h e i r own moral e f f o r t or to make i t 
useless, but i n such a way as to encourage and support i t . Put l i k e 
that, i n terms of a gracious personal relationship working by 
persuasion rather than force, the t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s between the 
grace of God and the w i l l of man may be seen to disappear. 
In a l l t h i s i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that his s t a r t i n g point 
obliges Oman to accept a l i m i t a t i o n of God. Not that God i s l i m i t e d 
i n himself, but that he has accepted l i m i t a t i o n s i n his dealings with 
men. Such l i m i t a t i o n s are i m p l i c i t i n personal relations between 
moral beings. 
Oman has now, i n the f i r s t t h i r d of 'Grace and Personality 1. said 
a l l that he has to say about what grace i s , and even, i n embryonic form, 
about i t s implications. The view i s not developed, i n the sense of 
anything being added to i t or the meaning being refined. However, he 
goes on, i n some of his most i l l u m i n a t i n g and, from a 'religious' point 
of view, most helpful w r i t i n g , to speak of the manifestation of grace 
and the way of i t s working. These chapters are very uneven i n 
qu a l i t y . His method i s to take a theme, a B i b l i c a l or theological 
term v/hich has had some place i n the history of the doctrine of grace, 
and show how i t can be interpreted with his view of grace. The 
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unevenness arises p a r t l y from the f a c t that some chapters are more or 
less devotional meditations while others are theological essays, and 
p a r t l y from the f a c t that i t i s not always easy to see any connection 
between the chapters. Sometimes two or three are connected, but 
others seem to stand alone. Thus i t i s not easy to see the develop-
ment of an argument. Like the r i v e r he admires he i s inclined to 
meander. 
He begins the section on the mode of the manifestation of grace 
with a very i n t e r e s t i n g meditation on the Beatitudes, i n s i s t i n g that 
"... they are not negative moral imperatives to be obeyed by resolution 
and e f f o r t , but are a religious programme of how we can have absolute 
moral independence i n the world by discovering how u t t e r l y God i s to 
be depended upon." ( i b i d p 94)• The basis of them a l l , and the basis 
of the l i f e of blessedness, i s poverty of s p i r i t seen not as stoic 
resignation or mere fatalism but as "... acceptance of the duty God 
demands and acquiescence i n the d i s c i p l i n e He appoints, not as sub-
mission to the inevitable, but as the discovery that our blessedness 
is i n God's purpose i n the world and beyond i t . " ( i b i d p 98). Once 
again we have the insistence on a world view accepted by our own 
i n s i g h t . 
This r e p e t i t i o n of the position we have already discussed i s 
repeated i n treatments of Redemption and Reconciliation. Thus he 
writes, "This question concerns nothing less than the nature of the 
world. I s i t a world such as Jesus conceived i t , where, i f we seek 
f i r s t the Kingdom of God and i t s righteousness, a l l the rest i s secure; 
or i s i t such a world as Huxley propounded, where morality i s a night-
mare accident, to be maintained, at most f o r a l i t t l e space and f o r a 
l i t t l e time, against a natural order which can be e f f e c t i v e l y used 
only by the cunning of the ape and the f e r o c i t y of the tiger?" ( i b i d 
p 115). And the enmity with God which precedes r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s 
seen as enmity with r e a l i t y , "... r e a l i t y i s not one thing and God 
another; and i f we are at enmity with God, we are at enmity with 
r e a l i t y , past and present, as well as to come. To be at enmity 
against God i s neither more nor less than to be i n b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y 
to r e a l i t y , with the sense that i t i s a l l against us." ( i b i d p 123). 
Against t h i s background r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s acceptance of l i f e with i t s 
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duties and disappointments as the d i s c i p l i n e v/hich God appoints. 
Such acceptance i s not mere f a t a l i s t i c resignation, but present active 
fellowship with God. "This i s the true b e l i e f i n Providence, ... 
the l a s t and highest v i c t o r y of a f a i t h which has won a vision of a 
true and abiding good, which i s not of the world, even while a l l things 
i n the world become a new creation to forward i t . " ( i b i d p 127). 
Faith, f o r Oman i s our recognition of t h i s personal nature of 
the world, or rather of God's personal dealings with us through the 
world. I t i s not something we can force from ourselves, or work up 
within ourselves. Basically i t i s not a subjective emotion. I t i s 
rather a response to the love of God expressed i n the world. "Faith 
affirms that the actual order of the world, upon which a l l our 
blessedness u t t e r l y depends, i s of the nature of the wise and holy 
goodness we name love. Being an assertion about r e a l i t y , about what 
i s the ultimate word of power, as well as the ultimate word of 
fellowship, i t must either be true or the vastest and most misleading 
delusion." ( i b i d p 237). Thus f a i t h i s a response to an i n i t i a t i v e 
of God. I t can even be called a g i f t of God since he gives i t , 
"... by the whole witness of l i f e , interpreted by the whole of 
revelation, which, f o r the Christian, means, i n p a r t i c u l a r , l i f e as 
interpreted by Jesus Christ." ( i b i d p 140). The sin of unbelief i s 
to be insincere i n our approach to l i f e and thus to 'ward o f f t h i s 
i n s i g h t . 
The l a s t quotation introduces ideas of revelation and the person 
of Jesus. I t comes as something of a surprise to realise that, apart 
from references to the end of b e l i e f i n an i n f a l l i b l e scripture and 
some i l l u s t r a t i o n s from the teaching of Jesus, we are nearly h a l f way 
through the book before these questions arise. This i s perhaps best 
taken as confirmation of the suggestion that Oman i s w r i t i n g w i t h i n 
the church and, perhaps unconsciously, assuming a good deal i n his 
readers. I t i s also worth noting that he had w r i t t e n on the question 
of revelation i n 'Vision and Authority' (1902). The chapters of 
'Grace and Personality' which deal with Christ, Revelation and the 
Church seem to be largely adapted from the e a r l i e r book. 
I t i s , as we have seen, basic to Oman's position that God reveals 
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himself i n a l l h i s t o r y and through a l l l i f e to those who are sincere. 
Yet as personal revelation takes place most na t u r a l l y through persons 
by whose experience, and t h e i r understanding of i t , true understanding 
of God's grace as personal relationship i s given. "... we see that 
the l i v i n g experience of those who, by special faithfulness i n high 
endeavour and large c o n f l i c t , have understood God's purpose i n the 
world, may be a f a r Diviner vehicle than a mere animated pen, and that, 
as i t interprets i t s own experience d i r e c t to ours, i t has a security 
which no evidence f o r past i n f a l l i b i l i t y can ever.-enjoy." ( i b i d p 146). 
This view c l e a r l y leaves out any idea of propositional revelation, or, 
f o r that matter, any idea of revelation as giving information. 
Revelation i s the showing f o r t h or commending to our personal i n s i g h t , 
of God's gracious dealing with us i n a l l things. As such i t i s always 
available. "What we understand as, i n a special sense, revelation 
i s not some extra manifestation to make up f o r God's defects, but a 
dealing with the alienation which can see no gracious r e l a t i o n of God 
to us i n any manifestation." ( i b i d p 164). 
Man's understanding of God's gracious relationship has come 
slowly. I t i s open to any man who i s sincere, but there has been a 
special succession of men whose insight has been deeper, or surer, 
than that of others, and, i n t h i s as other f i e l d s , progress i s made 
by bu i l d i n g on the work of those who have gone before. The special 
succession are the prophets whose words, directed to men's hearts 
rather than t h e i r i n t e l l e c t s , have attempted to bring, and have 
brought, others to t h i s personal in s i g h t . I n the Hebrew-Christian 
t r a d i t i o n these men have established one l i n e of advance that i s 
supreme. I t i s i n t h i s sense, apparently, that Oman understands 
h i s t o r i c a l revelation, though he prefers to speak of h i s t o r i c a l 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The word of the prophet not only inspires, but 
reconciles us to God's purpose i n the world. 
I t i s i n the succession of prophets that he places Jesus. I n 
Jesus above a l l others we f i n d an appeal to man's insight and a 
refusal to r e l y on external authority. He takes up the work of the 
prophets, but does not externalise them as auth o r i t i e s . "His appeal 
was never i n the l a s t resort to Scripture but to the hearts of l i v i n g 
men, and the true use of the Scripture was only to aid Him i n t h i s 
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f i n a l appeal." (Vision and Authority p 103). However, Jesus was 
more than a prophet i n that he exemplified his teaching i n his l i f e . 
"Alone among men His practice was adequate to His precept, so that no 
d i s t i n c t i o n need he drawn between what He said and what He did, so 
that His teaching only expounds His l i f e and His l i f e only enforces 
His teaching." ( i b i d p 104). 
Clearly t h i s i s an important point i n Oman's theology. What 
does he teach about the person and work of Christ? Unfortunately i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to discover how, apart from i n degree, Jesus d i f f e r s from 
the prophets. But t h i s i s not to say that Oman did not intend there 
to be a difference. There i s a poetic r i n g about his descriptions 
of Jesus' teaching and l i f e , and we are t o l d that, "To His followers 
He seemed able to l i f t up man to heaven, because He has brought down 
God to earth; to be the way to the Father, because His t r u t h was the 
fulness of the Father's purpose and His l i f e the source of every l i f e 
that f u l f i l s i t . " ( i b i d p 105). There are many eloquent passages 
such as th i s i n Oman, but i t i s not clear whether, or i n what sense, 
he believes that the f i r s t followers of Jesus were r i g h t i n believing 
what they did about him. With his background we might expect Oman to 
suggest that the twentieth century cannot believe i n the same way, and 
that some re- i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s necessary. But he never makes his 
position r e a l l y clear. 
I t seems that Jesus does something which no other could do. 
Sometimes i t appears that t h i s i s no more than to give a demonstration 
of a f u l l y reconciled l i f e . The consummation of grace as a revelation 
of a personal relationship would na t u r a l l y be fellowship with God, 
which, at i t s f u l l e s t or most perfect, we do not reach. Thus, "To 
be of significance f o r t h i s fellowship, Christ must manifest our 
perfect r e l a t i o n to the Father of our s p i r i t s by blessedness i n the 
t r i a l s , i n j u s t i c e s and c o n f l i c t s of l i f e , so as to manifest them a l l 
as of God, and show us how, amid the actual conditions of our l i f e , 
i n t e l l e c t u a l as well as physical, we remain i n the Kingdom of God, 
which i s perfect blessedness i n perfect righteousness." (Grace and 
Personality p 152). That i s , God meets us i n One who f u l l y l i v e s 
our l i f e , and suffers a l l that we suffer. 
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This appears to be a purely exemplary view of Christ and his 
work. But l a t e r , speaking of the Communion of Saints, Oman argues 
that i t i s a wrong understanding of membership of that communion to 
think of i t as i m i t a t i n g Christ's example. Im i t a t i o n i s too external. 
I f we imitate we are not acting from our own in s i g h t . "No im i t a t i v e 
l i f e i s inspired, and no inspired l i f e i s i m i t a t i v e : and the mere 
im i t a t i o n of Christ i s so f a r from being an exception that i t i s beset 
by special l i m i t a t i o n s . " ( i b i d p 259)o There are too, differences 
between Jesus' s i t u a t i o n and ours and his vocation and ours. Thus 
imi t a t i o n i s impracticable and theologically wrong. We have not to 
ask 'What would Jesus do?1 on the b i g occasions of l i f e , but rather to 
have the mind of Christ on matters so small that we would not think 
of asking that question. " F i n a l l y , t h i s external use of Christ's 
example does not help us to overcome our worst moral f a i l u r e . The 
supreme moral defect i s not the lack of a good conscience, but the 
l i m i t a t i o n of our i n s i g h t , especially i n t o the claims of our own -
vocation, which makes i t so extremely easy to have a good conscience." 
( i b i d p 260). 
So Christ does more than demonstrate, somehow he overcomes the 
l i m i t a t i o n s which prevent our proper i n s i g h t . This seems to indicate 
some action on his part from which we benefit. But t h i s raises the 
spectre that God may override man's freedom, that man may be forced by 
omnipotence rather than persuaded to see the t r u t h by his own in s i g h t . 
Oman was haunted by t h i s dilemma from the f i r s t , "... how d i f f i c u l t 
must i t be f o r Omnipotence to aid man without overwhelming him. ... 
To aid man were easy, but to aid man so as not to destroy his freedom, 
but to perfect i t , i s a task requiring a l l the manifold wisdom of 
God. ... f o r the greater the preponderance of the w i l l that aids, the 
more destructive i t must be f o r the w i l l that i s aided." (Vision and 
Authority p 115). The res u l t i s that, though he seems to want to 
speak of an action which i s more than revelation, he never r e a l l y 
seems to get beyond revelation. Thus he speaks of Christ as the 
ultimate revelation "... not i n the sense of being a substitute f o r 
our own insight or of exhausting the whole meaning of experience, but 
as the i n s p i r a t i o n of our insight and the pioneer of our experience." 
(Grace and Personality p 166). There follows a c r i t i c i s m of the 
idea of propositional revelation and a body of i n f a l l i b l e revealed 
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t r u t h . Thus we f i n d that the discussion has moved from what would 
normally be called the idea of redemption to what would normally be 
called the idea of revelation. The fact that what Oman has to say 
on the second point i s more generally acceptable, and that he says i t 
eloquently, di s t r a c t s from the fact that a s h i f t has been made, and 
also from the f a c t that he has s t i l l not advanced from the idea of 
the work of Christ as revelation to seeing i t as an action. This i s 
confirmed l a t e r when the cross i s seen as the manifestation of the 
love of God as the ultimate r e a l i t y of the world and characteristic 
of his family. I n the cross, says Oman, "... we see the gracious 
r e l a t i o n of our Father towards us, because there, as nowhere else, i s 
the u t t e r service of our brethren, unconditioned by our merit, shown 
to be the essential s p i r i t of His family. The true meaning and power 
of the Cross we discover only as we have t h i s s p i r i t , ..." ( i b i d 
P 215f). 
The substitutionary view has been hel p f u l to many, he suggests, 
only because something of the truer view has broken through. What i t 
has kept i s the idea that i n the cross God shares our sorrows as a 
father enters i n to the l o t of his children. "The Father must say 
by His whole bearing towards us, My son, l e t us share the sorrow and 
l i v e down the shame together. And that i s the meaning of the Cross, 
I t works peace, not as an isolated event i n the h i s t o r y of the world, 
but because i t i s the supreme manifestation of a redeeming love which 
works every day and i n every event of every day," ( i b i d p 217), But 
there i s no cojercion. The son who wants to go away, or who does not 
want to allow t h i s sharing of his sorrow and shame, i s allowed to go 
his own way u n t i l he comes to himself. To come to himself i s to 
realise what has always been p o t e n t i a l l y true, 
Healey, having spoken of the recognition of God's personal 
relationship to us, and his trustworthiness as we meet him i n the 
normal events of every day, speaks of t h i s as a 'work-a-day' f a i t h . 
To the problem of how Jesus i s related to t h i s , Healey's answer i s , 
"To believe i n Jesus Christ i s to make discovery f o r ourselves that 
he i s the supreme helper of our work-a-day f a i t h i n God," (op c i t p 51) 
He offers no c r i t i c i s m of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christ. I t seems 
to me that he has correctly interpreted Oman's position, but also 
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that he has shown the almost banal weakness of i t . Can i t r e a l l y be 
that 'Supreme helper of our .work-a-day f a i t h i n the God behind the 
natural world' i s r e a l l y what Christians have meant by t h e i r f a i t h i n 
Christ and long discussions on atonement? Oman argues that to reach 
the personal insight which he refers to as re c o n c i l i a t i o n i t i s not 
necessary to hold any p a r t i c u l a r views about the person of Christ. 
Indeed he suggests that when f a i t h i n Christ, i n the sense of believing 
things about him, i s introduced as an addition to f a i t h i n God a 
change has taken place i n the o r i g i n a l Gospel. The Christian i s then 
conceived not as one who has found the Father and his r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
i n Christ, but as one who holds certain opinions. Wot only i s t h i s 
not what r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s about but i t evades the demand to see the 
Father by personal i n s i g h t . I t can be made more impersonal by a 
doctrine of the Holy S p i r i t as impersonal power, or by a doctrine of 
the sacraments as injections of grace. 
Thus, though Oman seemed to want to speak of a positive action 
i n Christ i t i s not clear that he has done so. We noted e a r l i e r that 
he c r i t i c i s e d Rashdall f o r an aversion to the 'half l i g h t s ' and the 
'dim vistas of man's s p i r i t u a l horizon'. Yet, at the end of the day, 
he does not himself seem to have produced anything more than an 
Abelardian view of atonement. I t i s a richer representation than 
Rashdall's, and cer t a i n l y Oman i s w i l l i n g to go into the 'half l i g h t s ' . 
He writes with great sympathy and understanding of personal r e l i g i o n . 
His c r i t i c i s m s of pu t t i n g theories i n place of personal i n s i g h t , or of 
rel y i n g on impersonal doctrines of the S p i r i t or of sacraments, are 
v a l i d . But he has only pointed to possible dangers. I t does not 
follow that every view of the work of the S p i r i t or of sacraments i s 
open to his c r i t i c i s m . And he has r e a l l y slipped around the question 
of whether some more d e f i n i t e understanding of Christ's person and 
more objective view of his work i s not necessary. 
I n making t h i s digression on the person and work of Christ we 
have covered a l o t of ground which comes l a t e r i n Oman's own treatment. 
The l a s t section of 'Grace and Personality', e n t i t l e d 'The Way of i t s 
Working,1 deals with themes which have usually been t y p i c a l of more 
'orthodox' views. Thus his work here i s defensive, though the 
defence often involves implied attacks on other positions. 
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God's grace, his personal succour of moral personality, i s 
available to those who w i l l take i t . Yet i s i s not forced upon any, 
ju s t a,s a wise father does not force even the best g i f t s on his 
children. I n the same way, j u s t as children may set t h e i r w i l l s 
against the w i l l s of t h e i r parents, i t i s open to man to contradict 
and oppose God. The man who does so oppose God i s self-deluded. 
This i s the hypocrisy that, f o r Oman, i s the essence of sin. I t i s 
a refusal to accept God's proffered grace. Indeed i t can go fu r t h e r 
and take credit f o r g i f t s or privileges which God has given. Oman's 
ty p i c a l description of t h i s state i s dishonesty or i n s i n c e r i t y , since 
i t i s a refusal to see things as they r e a l l y are. 
Against t h i s he places penitence. Seen i n t h i s way penitence i s 
not simply a f i r s t step i n the Christian l i f e but a constant a t t i t u d e 
of moral s i n c e r i t y . I t i s not a subjective f e e l i n g which can be 
worked up, or a mood of intense self-deprecation, but rather a true 
estimate of ourselves. "Not ca r e f u l l y manufactured self-depreciation, 
but s i n c e r i t y with ourselves i n the l i g h t of r e a l i t y , i s the condition 
of true penitence. ... To repent, therefore, i s nothing else than to 
see ourselves as we are i n the real moral world, apart from the 
hypocrisy which refracts our v i s i o n ... Without such repentance f a i t h 
cannot give blessedness i n face of a l l r e a l i t y , seeing that moral 
r e a l i t y , which i s the most important of a l l kinds of r e a l i t y , i s both 
perverted and evaded." ( i b i d pp 195f 199)• Such repentance i s not a 
pre-requisite of f a i t h , i t i s i n f a c t not possible apart from the 
re a l i s a t i o n of a gracious personal relationship with God. Hence 
repentance and f a i t h must go together. Yet i t does not seem natural 
to man to take t h i s a t t i t u d e , where then does repentance arise? Here 
Oman introduces the revelation i n Christ which we have already discussed. 
I t i s i n the presence of Christ that we see our f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and glimpse our f u l l p o s s i b i l i t y . "Nothing i n hi s t o r y i s more 
certain and nothing i n experience more impressive than His influence 
i n enabling men to estimate themselves with true humility, not by 
making them resolve to be penitent and abased, but by set t i n g before 
them the great s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t i e s , which at once expose hypocrisies 
and give hope i n t r u t h . " ( i b i d p 200f). 
What then i s man's position i n face of such r e a l i t i e s ? At f i r s t 
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sight i t does not seem hopeful. Paradoxically the nearer a man 
comes to u t t e r moral s i n c e r i t y the more i s he l i k e l y to revert to 
hypocrisy to avoid r e a l l y facing up to his moral f a i l u r e . Thus he 
i s caught i n a vicious c i r c l e . Sin i s hypocrisy, but any chink i n the 
armour of man's hypocrisy, any 'moment' of deeper i n s i g h t , not only 
leads to a greater awareness of hypocrisy but provokes more. The 
only alternative would appear to be black despair. 
On legal terms there i s no escape from t h i s s i t u a t i o n . I t i s a 
legal f i c t i o n either to assume that we can have present j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
before God on the basis of future merit, or that the merit of another 
can i n some way be transferred to our account. Such ideas, says Oman, 
are mere moral juggling. Pardon must come by a means which avoids 
such juggling and which enables us to see ourselves as we r e a l l y are, 
including the imputing to ourselves of our own moral f a i l u r e s . The 
solution i s that pardon comes through the i n d i r e c t means of personal 
re l a t i o n s , as i n a family. Grace i s wholly concerned with moral 
goodness, but i t does not depend on how good we are. "Grace sets 
r i g h t our legal r e l a t i o n to God, but only by making i t cease to be 
leg a l . I t may not ignore any part of the moral s i t u a t i o n , but i t s 
essential q u a l i t y i s shown i n not t r e a t i n g i t l e g a l l y . " ( i b i d p 210f). 
This i s the form which forgiveness takes i n a family or between 
friends. Offences are not condoned or overlooked, but relationships 
are restored i n spite of them. 
This i s Oman's version of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h . Faith i s a 
discernment of God's, mind, the insight i n t o the nature of things which 
sees God's gracious a t t i t u d e to a l l his children. I t i s not acceptance 
of creeds, a germ of grace as power which can be expected to germinate 
into action l a t e r , or an e f f o r t on man's part. I t i s rather the 
acceptance of the witness of r e a l i t y to i t s e l f . "We have forgiveness 
and a l l i t s f r u i t s because by f a i t h v/e enter the world of a gracious 
God, out of which the old hard legal requirements, with the old hard 
boundaries of our personality and the old self-regarding claim of 
r i g h t s , have disappeared, a world which i s the household of our 
Father where order and power and ultimate r e a l i t y are of love and not 
of law." ( i b i d p 213). Though i n a l o g i c a l sense repentance precedes 
f a i t h , i t i s only when t h i s relationship of t r u s t i s enjoyed that 
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penitence i s possible. Paul asks f o r repentance f i r s t when speaking 
to outsiders, w i t h i n the community he speaks of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by 
f a i t h . 
However when sin i s pardoned the consequences of sin remain to 
be faced. Oman makes no attempt to avoid t h i s . He has already 
argued that j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s not the condoning of s i n , i t i s to be 
expected therefore that the sinner should bear the consequences of 
sin . God does not remove tha t , neither must men attempt to evade 
i t . Again the appeal i s to an in d i r e c t working of grace. "Grace 
deals with a l l the consequences of s i n , i n ourselves and i n the 
world, i n the present and i n the future, but only by f i r s t enabling 
us to accept them", ( i b i d p 225)-. We have noted before that Oman 
admits the p o s s i b i l i t y of men t r y i n g to work against God, against the 
s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y of the world. Such a course brings calamity 
because there i s a clash with God's purpose. But a way of 
rec o n c i l i a t i o n i s open by accepting the consequences of sin as God's 
fa t h e r l y d i s c i p l i n e , his treatment of sons. Further, since the 
relationship i s a family one, we must also accept, and help to bear, 
the consequences of the sin of others. 
By accepting the whole of l i f e i n t h i s way i t a l l becomes 
sacramental, pointing to God's w i l l . Our highest good, then, i s to 
seek and to know, by our own ins i g h t , the w i l l of God as i t meets us 
through a l l l i f e . This i s not with a self-centred or negative view 
of establishing any l e g a l i s t i c claim against Him. Once the r i g h t 
relationship with God i s found and accepted we have no need to worry 
about our own status or moral progress. Rather we seek the w i l l of 
God as children, i d e a l l y , seek the w i l l of t h e i r father, knowing 
that i t i s f o r our good. Thus i t i s possible to speak both of a 
righteousness we achieve, and of a righteousness which God gives, 
"... because we are dealing with a righteousness which every duty 
God requires and every d i s c i p l i n e He appoints are designed to forward, 
so that our whole l i f e , ... i s one, i n f i n i t e l y varied, uninterrupted 
means of grace." ( i b i d p 240). 
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Oman's basic idea of grace as persuasion must af f e c t his 
treatment of what are usually called 'means of grace 1. They do not 
have value i n themselves but only as helping towards a deeper 
personal insight and r i g h t discernment of r e a l i t y . Thus instead of 
asking, 'how are the benefits of Christ conveyed to men and women of 
l a t e r ages?', one must ask, from Oman's point of view, 'what are the 
means by which men are persuaded or assured of the gracious f a t h e r l y 
concern of God f o r them?'. 
For Oman the chief means of grace was the Church as the Communion 
of Saints. I n spite of his constant insistence on the need f o r 
ind i v i d u a l discernment he was f a r from being an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n the 
normally accepted sense of the word. To recognise God as father 
was to enter a family, and that meant both to benefit from and to 
contribute to other members of the family. This would mean at least 
paying some attention to those who have passed t h i s way before, and 
who have grasped, or glimpsed, something of s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y . I n 
his f i r s t major work he expressed t h i s point. "We must a l l b u i l d 
on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, on the foundation of 
those who have observed the Divine c a l l and recognised the Divine 
teaching. To be f a i t h f u l to our own s p i r i t u a l i n s i g h t , i t must be 
our constant endeavour to be f a i t h f u l to our s p i r i t u a l ancestry." 
(Vision and Authority p 90), And i n his l a s t work he speaks of the 
value of forms, or a certain f o r m a l i t y , f o r the r i g h t development 
of the s p i r i t u a l l i f e . "... so long as we are i n the body, we 
cannot be independent of forms and organisations and ceremonies, and 
customs i n respect of them. Even our Lord went to the synagogue on 
the Sabbath as His custom was. ... unfortunately customs and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s by themselves are apt to f a i l j u s t when most needed, yet, 
i f not by themselves but sought f o r purposes beyond themselves, they 
may be our required succour: and honesty with our l i m i t a t i o n s should 
compel us to admit the need." (Honest Religion p 170f). Nevertheless, 
he can be very c r i t i c a l of certain aspects of the church, or churches, 
when he goes on to consider t h e i r function. 
Our idea of the church, he argues, arises from our conception 
of grace. But, strangely, very d i f f e r e n t types of church can be 
based on p r a c t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l ideas of grace. Thus he thinks i t 
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i s possible to c r i t i c i s e both extreme Catholicism and extreme 
Evangelicalism at the same time, as both see grace as omnipotent 
power. For t h i s reason both f a i l i n what he considers to be the main 
function of the church, that i s to encourage men towards independent 
personal insight i n t o the meaning of God's grace and experience of 
his personal concern. 
He gives four points shared by these two wings of the church 
which he considers to be marks of a false church. Or, at lea s t , 
marks of a church which has a false doctrine of grace. F i r s t , they 
both l i m i t membership by imposing conditions from w i t h i n the church -
either acceptance of a certain t r a d i t i o n or submission to a certain 
type of experience. That i s to l i m i t the church to those to whom, 
or upon whom, God may be supposed to have acted, rather than making 
the only l i m i t the insight of the outsider. Secondly, both are 
i n d i f f e r e n t to the moral independence of members. They both t r y 
"... to persuade by impression, rather than to rest a l l t h e i r hopes 
on impressing by persuasion." (Grace and Personality p 172). This, 
i n c i d e n t a l l y , i s a favourite contrast of Oman's. The impression i s 
made either by r i t u a l i s m or revivalism. Thirdly, since neither allows 
anything to man's decision they are unable to account f o r a divided 
church or an unconverted world respectively. F i n a l l y , both tend to 
take men out of the world rather than helping them to f i n d God i n 
the world. Apart from the peculiar experiences which they o f f e r as 
reception of a r b i t r a r y grace, both make the rest of experience 
ir r e l e v a n t to piety. 
Against these he sets four marks of a church which sees grace as 
the r e l a t i o n of a personal God to independent moral personalities. 
F i r s t , such a fellowship has no l i m i t a t i o n on membership. I t includes 
a l l those who know t h e i r dependence on a gracious God and work i t out 
through t h e i r relations to t h e i r fellows. He assumes that such 
people w i l l gather together. Secondly, there i s no l i m i t to the 
means of grace. Everything which helps man to see and i n t e r p r e t God's 
gracious personal r e l a t i o n can be accepted as a means of grace. Thus 
the means of grace could, i n theory, be as wide as a man's experience 
of the world. Thirdly, following the l a s t point, there can be no 
di v i s i o n between sacred and secular. F i n a l l y , the true church i s 
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related to the rule of God not by outward t r a d i t i o n and r i t e s , as 
Catholicism, or "by inner f e e l i n g , as Evangelicalism, but by moral 
relationship which accepts man's independence but finds blessedness, 
i n the way we have seen, i n r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and dependence. Not that 
we are free, but that we are being freed. 
Because we cannot claim perfection, and because i t i s natural 
that we should work through organisations, we should not be surprised 
to f i n d d i f f e r e n t churches. However t h i s should not be a cause f o r 
great concern. " I f the Church i s f i r s t of a l l the order of freedom, 
i t i s exposed to the hazards of d i v i s i o n as no other order; and, as 
C h r i s t i a n i t y was i t s e l f a schism from Judaism, there must be occasions 
when, with a l l c harity, l o y a l t y to the order f o r which the Church 
stands may both j u s t i f y and require separation." (Honest Religion 
p 173)• Such divisions, he seems to imply, may simply be a 
r e f l e c t i o n of psychological types, but they impose upon a l l Christians 
a test of charity. Whilst outward union i s c e r t a i n l y desirable, i t 
i s more important that Christians should shew sympathy and understanding 
fo r the insight and independence of others. 
With such views i t i s not surprising that he opposes any view 
of the church as a mystical body. He has been severely c r i t i c i s e d 
f o r his a t t i t u d e to mysticism, hence i t w i l l be as well to note 
c a r e f u l l y what he meant by i t . I n 'Grace and Personality' he wrote, 
"Mysticism i s here used ... of impersonal absorption i n the Divine 
and not i n the sense of the mysterious depths of l i f e which are 
inseparable from everything t r u l y personal." (op c i t p 263). Later, 
when he knew that he had been c r i t i c i s e d , he t r i e d i n 'The Natural and 
The Supernatural', to make i t clear that i n opposing mysticism he 
did not wish to rule out any deep religious experience.''" The 
mysticism he opposed undervalued the Natural which, we have seen, 
Oman valued highly. "The essential marks of t h i s mysticism are, 
f i r s t , i t s a t t i t u d e to the Natural, as i n no form a manifestation of 
the Supernatural, ... and second, i t s a t t i t u d e towards the empirical 
1. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that i n the t h i r d e d ition of Grace and 
Personality (1925) he re-arranged and extended the chapter on 
1 The Communion of Saints', presumably to make his position 
clearer. cf Third edition p 254-268, and Fontana ed i t i o n 
p 210-218. Strangely the Fontana ed i t i o n i s a r e p r i n t of the 
Second edition of 1919. 
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personality as the source of the unreal." (op c i t p 41l)» His 
language i s often complicated and confusing so that perhaps he has 
no cause f o r complaint when he i s misunderstood. Nevertheless, 
Healey i s probably correct i n suggesting that, on t h i s point, his 
c r i t i c s have probably not paid enough attention to Oman's careful 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . ^ 
When used of the church he regards the idea of the mystical 
body as a survival of t r i b a l ideas. I t thus lacks the ethical note. 
The mystical idea, he suggests, sees Jesus as the One who conquered 
i n our place. Salvation i s attached to his person rather than his 
teaching and example, and his person becomes the vehicle of mysterious 
forces which do not work e t h i c a l l y . I n contrast to such ideas "The 
essence of the gospel appeal i s humble, patient, suffering love, 
among us as one that serveth and not as one that s i t t e t h at meat: and 
with such as appeal a mystical communication of s p i r i t u a l force i s i n 
no way concerned ..." (Grace and Personality p 265). Rather the 
point i s to inspire i n us a deeper devotion to the ideals that, 
accepting them by our own insight, we may a t t a i n our own moral v i c t o r y . 
His view of sacraments w i l l have become tolerably p l a i n by now. 
Insofar as they were interpreted as vehicles of grace as 'Omnipotence 
directed i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e by Omniscience1 they did not, indeed 
could not, serve the conception of grace as gracious personal 
relationship. I f they were aids to t h i s , as he considered, correct 
view of grace then he welcomed them. However he did not l i k e to 
l i m i t the means of grace. As we have seen, he considered that, 
r i g h t l y understood, a l l l i f e was sacramental. 
Yet he realised that there were certain special, or more l i m i t e d , 
means of grace. He never denied them. I n f a c t he insisted that 
they should not be denied. But one senses an almost grudging 
recognition of them. When he mentions them i t i s usually to draw 
attention to the dangers inherent i n a false understanding of them. 
"Prayer, Word and Sacrament are s t i l l the means of grace, yet only 
as they are means of manifesting the t r u t h to every man's conscience, 
1. cf Healey op c i t p 168 n8. 
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and not merely as they are devices or vehicles or impressive doings. 
Except as means of persuading they cannot help to manifest God's 
gracious personal r e l a t i o n to His children, f o r as devices to wring 
blessings out of God or as vehicles to convey something into man, 
however individual they may be, they would not, i n any s t r i c t sense, 
be personal." ( i b i d p 176). And l a t e r , "They are special means only 
f o r enlightening us regarding the true means of grace, which i s l i f e , 
and f o r enabling us to make a diviner use of l i f e i n humbler service. 
The public use of such means of i n t e r p r e t i n g and r i g h t l y using l i f e , 
above a l l , may not be neglected, because no one can understand God's 
meaning i n l i f e i n i s o l a t i o n , but only i n the fellowship of the saints: 
yet no use of them i s i n i t s e l f r e l i g i o n , however v i t a l l y necessary 
f o r r e l i g i o n t h e i r r i g h t use may be." ( i b i d p 241). On a s l i g h t l y 
more positive note he stressed that the sacraments use materials of 
every day l i f e and thus shew a l l l i f e as i n some way manifesting God. 
Thus, "They presuppose that there i s more i n nature than an appeal to 
the senses, and more i n every g i f t of good than to eat of the loaves 
and be f i l l e d , ..." ( i b i d p 177). 
I f , as I have suggested, t h i s i s a l l somewhat grudgingly 
admitted, we should note again that he did value the sacraments. On 
the subject of Christian u n i t y , he wrote i n his l a s t book, "Yet the 
best means of a l l f o r unity of fellowship i s not available. Of a l l 
the ways of showing how the love of the Father i n the l i f e without 
and the Fellowship of the S p i r i t within i s one i n the grace of Christ 
the greatest i s the sacrament i n which the symbols used sanctify the 
whole material l i f e and make i t .transparently radiant with the 
s p i r i t u a l . " (Honest Religion p 176). While his understanding of 
other people's sacramental theology might have been lacking, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the more catholic wing of the church, i t would 
not be true to say that he had no theology of the sacraments at a l l . 
F i n a l l y we turn to his a t t i t u d e to the Bible. Once more most 
of what needs to be said has been covered i n passing. The idea of 
propositional revelation, or an i n f a l l i b l e verbal authority i n 
scripture, he saw as well past. The Bible was f o r him the record 
of the Prophetic t r a d i t i o n i n r e l i g i o n leading to i t s climax i n Jesus. 
In i t we see God's personal giving and man's receiving, a l l i n an 
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evolutionary framevrork. For ourselves the Bible i s a means of grace 
i n that i t prompts or inspires i n us the personal insight which we 
see i n the prophets. 
There i s a peculiarly 'dated' a i r about Oman's treatment of the 
Bible. Even i n 1939 he shows no awareness of the so-called B i b l i c a l 
r e v i v a l associated with Barth, or of the work i n t h i s country of Sir 
Edwyn Hoskyns. The idea of revelatory events does not occur. His 
chief concern i s with the c r i t i c a l approach to scripture which both 
excited and disturbed the Liberalism of his youth. I n t h i s issue he 
i s with the c r i t i c s i n p r i n c i p l e , though he thinks they are sometimes 
too enthusiastic and too r a d i c a l . Yet even when he writes of these 
topics one feels that his heart i s not i n i t . For him the great 
point i s always man's independent personal i n s i g h t , and scripture's 
value i s only as an aid to t h i s . Such he believes was the a t t i t u d e 
of the Apostle Paul to the Old Testament. Of him he writes, "... the 
question, often asked today, of what i s v a l i d i n Scripture i f so much 
is called i n question, has from him the answer that a l l of i t i s 
p r o f i t a b l e f o r him who discerns t r u t h because he loves God with a l l 
his mind, who knows r i g h t because he loves God with a l l his strength, 
and who gives a due value to others because he loves God with a l l his 
heart." ( i b i d p 87). Thus the Bible i s seen f a r more as an i n s p i r i n g 
book than as an inspired one. I t i s not seen as a record of the 
mighty acts of God, much less as i n some sense an authoritative 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of them which somehow conveys t h e i r grace. The l a s t 
quotation owes f a r more to Oman's Liberal theological background than 
to the apostle Paul. 
During t h i s account of Oman's thought a number of cri t i c i s m s 
have been mentioned or implied. I t should now be possible to draw 
them together. 
As frequently noted there i s no denying the great profundity of 
Oman's thought on a reli g i o u s l e v e l . Especially i s t h i s true of 
'Grace and Personality'. As a Christian, w r i t i n g from with i n the 
church, and considering from a position of f a i t h the mysteries of 
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divine providence, he has a great deal that i s p r o f i t a b l e to say. 
Thus he i s very h e l p f u l i n his c r i t i c i s m of 'straight l i n e * theories 
of grace, the idea of 'Omnipotence directed i n a straight l i n e by 
Omniscience1. Wo doubt he i s r i g h t to see the dangers of such ideas 
becoming impersonal and mechanical. 
Conversely there i s much to be said f o r his use of the concepts 
of moral personality and personal relations generally, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
f o r his stress on the key New Testament analogy of divine fatherhood. 
His use of the idea of 'persuasion', with i t s connotations of personal 
relationships, as a key concept, set against the background of a 
moral universe, or at least a universe responsive to moral meaning, 
i s very h e l p f u l . There can be no doubt of the importance of men 
being brought to see f o r themselves by t h e i r own insight rather than 
being forced. I n t h i s way he i s able to move some way towards 
harmonising human freedom and divine control. Following from t h i s 
he has some most impressive passages on the p o s s i b i l i t y of meeting 
God's w i l l , and either submitting to i s or refusing i t , i n normal 
d a i l y l i f e . This l i n e of thought, which owes a good deal to Kant, 
i s at least a part of normal Christian experience. I n an area where 
much i s i n t u i t e d , and where throughout Christian history language and 
thought have lagged behind experience, Oman has shown ways of 
expressing the experience. Furthermore i t could be said to be i n 
l i n e with a B i b l i c a l view of creation. 
I f there i s an a i r of uncertainty about such expressions of 
commendation of Oman's work, i t arises from the f a c t that there seem 
to be such gaps and inadequacies i n what he has said that one cannot 
always be sure of what he has assumed as common ground between 
himself and the reader. Even i n 'The Natural and the Supernatural 1, 
which, as we have seen, Oman himself saw as basic to his work, he 
seems to be w r i t i n g from a position which he himself has come to on 
other grounds. I t does not appear that he reached his b e l i e f i n God 
through the sort of world view which he argues f o r there. A great 
deal, both of the language and the matter, appears much richer than 
his arguments alone seem to warrant, and i t may be that he takes 
over much more from revelation than he admits. Probably such 
borrowing from revelation, or using what was t r a d i t i o n a l i n the church, 
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was much more common among Liberals than they admitted, or, perhaps, 
realised. 
More h o s t i l e c r i t i c i s m s of Oman can be grouped broadly under 
two heads, which are not mutually exclusive. F i r s t , there seem to 
be weaknesses i n his presentation of his case and i t s substance. 
Though i t may be better to speak i n terms of weakness than of wrong 
teaching. Secondly, there sometimes seems to be a lack of under-
standing of other positions. He c r i t i c i s e s positions which few, i f 
any, theologians would wish to defend. He thus gives the impression 
of strengthening his own case by argument when he i s not i n f a c t 
doing so. 
I have implied throughout that one could consider the greatest 
weakness i n his position to be i t s s t a r t i n g point. Oman begins from 
a world view i n which the apprehension of the supernatural i s a 
•given'. He then, rather too easily, makes tv/o very important 
assumptions - f i r s t that t h i s Supernatural i s personal, and secondly 
that i t can be equated with the God of the B i b l i c a l t r a d i t i o n . 
Students and admirers such as Farmer and Healey o f f e r some defence. 
But i t r e a l l y amounts to saying that he i s more B i b l i c a l than he 
seems and that he has assumed the B i b l i c a l data. This i s probably 
true. However, i f accepted, i t indicates that his r e a l s t a r t i n g 
point i s not, as he seems to suggest, a certain world view open to 
a l l . From t h i s i t would be argued that he has a much better s t a r t i n g 
point. But, paradoxically, Oman does not want that. He wants some 
more common and, i n his view, less a r b i t r a r y ground which can 
presumably be shared by the non-believer. 
There seem to be two dangers involved i n beginning from a world 
view. I t could lead simply to ' r e l i g i o n ' i n a vague and general 
sense. Using the words of Forsyth i t would be beginning from what 
makes us rel i g i o u s rather than from what makes us Christian. Forsyth 
also speaks of the 'lower end' of r e l i g i o n , "... the attenuated 
r e l i g i o n where a l l men are reli g i o u s and susceptible to some form of 
the s p i r i t u a l i n proportion to i t s lack of moral demand." (The 
Principle of Authority p l 6 l ) . There i s always the danger i n Oman's 
sort of approach of a vague r e l i g i o s i t y , of o f f e r i n g a mildly 
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' s p i r i t u a l ' atmosphere f o r what i s "basically a man-centred ethic 
which owes more to Kant than to the New Testament. That t h i s ethic 
i s admirable i n i t s e l f makes i t more d i f f i c u l t to c r i t i c i s e t h i s 
position, but i t does not make i t more Christian. 
A number of modern theologians who o f f e r apologetics beginning 
from the philosophy of re l i g i o n s rather than revelation seem to lay 
themselves open to t h i s charge. An appeal i s made to a 'numinous' 
or 'religious' experience, i n Oman's case the experience of the 
Supernatural, which, i t i s argued, can be recognised by a l l men of 
s e n s i t i v i t y and good w i l l . This i s then described i n Christian 
language and taken to be an experience of grace."'" Indeed, one needs 
to be very careful, taking the word grace i n a broad sense, about 
arguing that i t i s not an experience of grace. Yet i s cannot be 
denied that many non-believers can recognise and describe t h i s 
experience without f e e l i n g obliged to give a Christian, or even a 
re l i g i o u s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . More argument i s needed from the 
Christian side, and probably more acknowledgement of how much i s 
being assumed from revelation. Writing from an avowedly Christian 
p o s i t i o n , with many overtones of New Testament and Christian language, 
Oman gives the impression that no other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
experience i s possible. 
The second danger here i s that t h i s sort of argument only appeals 
to a certain psychological type. I f , as I have suggested, we cannot 
even with that type claim to be putting forward anything d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
Christian, the s i t u a t i o n f o r a Christian apologist i s even worse with 
those who claim not to recognise the experience mentioned. To any 
who resolutely refuse to look beyond what they consider to be hard 
objective fact i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what t h i s approach can say. 
Oman would presumably have to accuse such people of 'i n s i n c e r i t y ' . 
He assumes that his readers w i l l not only experience moral demand and 
attempt to act morally, but that they w i l l also stop to analyse t h e i r 
experience and behaviour. Such people may well be expected to have 
some sympathy with his language and the sort of ideas that he 
1. I have i n mind here such men as H.H. Parmer, John B a i l l i e , 
H.D. Lewis, and John Hick. This c r i t i c i s m , or description of 
a current approach, w i l l be taken up i n the conclusion to 
thi s study. 
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propounds. But they need not have. Much less can he expect any 
sort of hearing from those many people who act empirically, though 
morally, without indulging i n any sort of. deep analysis. what i s 
needed i s some stress on divine i n i t i a t i v e . 
This sort of stress i s normally found with a d i f f e r e n t 
understanding of revelation, speaking i n terms of objective acts of 
revelation, and with a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the person and 
work of Jesus. Something has already been said of Oman's treatment 
of these subjects. A l l that needs to be said here i s that, as with 
Rashdall, while a l l that he says i s true i t i s only part of the t r u t h . 
The New Testament does not present Jesus as c h i e f l y a teacher, or 
one who called upon his followers to accept a new ideal or to meet 
the Supernatural through the Natural. Doubtless there i s some trace 
of both of these elements, and i t would be wrong to make the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between his person and work on the one hand, and his teaching and 
example on the other, too absolutely. Yet, given that Oman suggests 
the d i s t i n c t i o n by his own comparison of stressing either orthodox 
b e l i e f s or personally accepted ideals, i t must be said that the New 
Testament stress i s the opposite to Oman's. The New Testament 
indicates that Jesus called f o r allegiance to his person and drew 
attention to a rad i c a l discontinuity between even a good, r e l i g i o u s , 
work-a-day f a i t h and l i f e and such allegiance. Certainly as f a r as 
the apostles are concerned the death of Christ has a more central 
place and objective importance than Oman i s incline d to give i t . 
Even Farmer allows that Oman's doctrine of re c o n c i l i a t i o n 
"... makes l i t t l e room f o r what Aulem has called the classic view of 
Atonement, anything corresponding to the New Testament thought of a 
cosmic v i c t o r y over e v i l won by the Redeemer through His Cross and 
Resurrection." (op c i t p 134)• I n f a c t i : t must be admitted that his 
work i s very weak i n B i b l i c a l exegesis. Healey, having given about 
one page to Oman's treatment of the three t i t l e s 'Christ', 'Lord', 
and 'Son', adds i n a note, "Oman examines such controversial 
passages as Romans Chap 3» vv 21-26; Colossians Chap 1, w 16-17; the 
prologue to St. John; and parts of Hebrews. There seems no need to 
ref e r to t h i s , however, i n the t e x t . " (op c i t p 169 n6). This sounds 
very impressive. The t r u t h i s however, that Oman's treatment of 
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the passages concerned i s scarcely longer than Healey's, and Healey 
has given the 'meat1 of i t . I t would, of course, he possible to 
present the B i b l i c a l meaning without much reference to the t e x t . 
And, as I have mentioned before, i t i s not possible to measure the 
importance of a theme i n a man's thought by counting the number of 
words or pages he devotes to i t . Nevertheless, Oman's somewhat 
cavalier dismissal of subs t i t u t i o n , and indeed the whole long h i s t o r y 
of debate over Jesus' person and work, suggests that he has not 
entered very f u l l y i n t o ideas which have been central i n the discussion 
of the subject. Neither can i t be said that he has demythologised 
or interpreted these ideas and the B i b l i c a l passages on which they 
r e s t . He has largely ignored them i n order to press on with his own 
view of persuasive grace. This view does not need to be grounded i n 
the cross, or indeed i n the incarnation and ministry of Jesus, as the 
t r a d i t i o n a l view does. 
Closely linked with t h i s i s the weakness of his teaching on s i n . 
While there i s no doubt that ideas of i n s i n c e r i t y and hypocrisy, 
which he mentions, are part of the New Testament teaching on s i n , they 
are not a l l of i t . He writes "... sin i s a wider conception than 
transgression, embracing a l l lack of earnestness and s i n c e r i t y i n 
seeking to know God's purpose as well as i n f u l f i l l i n g what we do 
know." ( i b i d p 113). Yet i t i s questionable whether, i n the way he 
treats i t , i t does not become a lesser conception than transgression. 
Wider perhaps, but not p a r t i c u l a r l y deep. 
The New Testament, and Christian thought and experience 
generally, sees a good deal more than i n s i n c e r i t y involved i n s i n . 
There are ideas of re b e l l i o n and positive culpable e v i l , f o r the 
discussion and treatment of which legal ideas have seemed apt. The 
weakness of Oman's treatment i s that he does not even show how ideas 
of forensic atonement, even granting that they may be excessively 
external, ever managed even to seem to be adequate. The whole idea 
of judgement tends to be played down. His comment quoted above, 
"Grace sets r i g h t our legal r e l a t i o n to God, but only by making i t 
cease to be l e g a l . I t may not ignore any part of the moral 
s i t u a t i o n , but i t s essential q u a l i t y i s shown i n not t r e a t i n g i t 
l e g a l l y . " (Grace and Personality p 210f), has a l i m i t e d understanding 
1. cf Honest Religion pp 97-102j 104f 
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of the way i n which legal ideas may be applied. While the excessively 
external idea of adding up good and bad deeds on the basis of which an 
account i s rendered and paid by Jesus may be too r i g i d l y l e g a l i s t i c , 
the forensic language used i n thinking about the atonement has kept 
the New Testament emphasis that God does r i g h t and i s righteous. 
The nearest Oman gets to doing j u s t i c e to t h i s sort of thinking i s i n 
his insistence that the consequences of sin must be faced. There i s 
t r u t h i n t h i s . But i t might be that some d i s t i n c t i o n could be made 
between consequences i n the form of res u l t s , which i s Oman's idea, 
and the conception of dealing with s i n i n i t s aspect of r e b e l l i o n . 
The f i r s t , to a large extent, man has to bear himself. The second 
perhaps he could not, and the whole Gospel i s that, by God's grace, 
he need not. 
The idea of something that man can not do introduces a furt h e r 
aspect of s i n . There i s a sense of sin as bondage and corruption, 
the idea expressed i n Romans 757-25.• I t i s not enough that man 
knows what he ought to do, or even that he wants to do i t . Oman's 
whole position of course i s that, i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , man i s helped i n 
his struggle by grace as succour and support. While t h i s i s no doubt 
part of the idea of grace, Paul seems to think less of support than 
of release. This i s only p a r t l y covered by Oman's idea that the 
Christian man's moral e f f o r t i s d i f f e r e n t l y motivated. I t may be 
pa r t l y a matter of 'tone 1, but c e r t a i n l y the 'tone' of Paul i s 
d i f f e r e n t from that of Oman. I t i s the sense of release from bondage 
as a g i f t , something that could not be achieved by the i n d i v i d u a l , 
even with help, that often l i e s at the heart of ' c r i s i s ' conversions. 
Oman's uneasiness about t h i s aspect of the work of grace i s a severe 
weakness i n his position. While he provides some excellent material 
f o r the Christian pastor, he has nothing to o f f e r the evangelist. 
F i n a l l y we must note his apparent lack of understanding of other 
positions. As well as his somewhat easy dismissal of Protestant 
orthodoxy and mysticism, already noted, he has an unsympathetic 
approach to the 'catholic' wing of the church. He shows here the 
weakness of his strengths. His great strength was his stress on 
the moral personality. We noted that those who are unhappy about 
his c r i t i c i s m of mysticism need to pay attention to his careful 
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def i n i t i o n s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Thus he writes, "The sense of 
touching through experience the deeper things which give experience 
meaning, may be called mystical, and then mysticism i s j u s t another 
name f o r r e l i g i o n . " ( i b i d p 263). I t was not t h i s which he 
c r i t i c i s e d but the absorption of the moral s e l f into the divine. 
Nevertheless there seem to be areas of Christian experience to 
which i s i s temperamentally h o s t i l e . As he fears stress on the 
experience of conversion may lose the conscious moral aspects of 
experience, so he reacts against the catholic approach to sacraments. 
Indeed, as we have seen, he puts the two wings of the church together. 
The f a c t that he could do so may indicate some s u p e r f i c i a l i t y i n his 
approach to both. I n pressing his own view he tended to put 
together a l l those which seemed d i f f e r e n t from i t , or lacking from 
i t s point of view. He was unwillin g to leave anything unexplained, or 
to allow that anything might need to be explained on non-moral grounds. 
He suspected the non-moral of being sub-personal and immoral. Thus 
Mozley, reviewing 'Grace and Personality* allows that when orthodox 
b e l i e f or mysticism approaching absorption displace man's moral 
response to Christ, or the Christian's service to his fellow men, then 
the response of the believer i s on the wrong l i n e s . But he argues 
"... the sense of mystical union with Christ's person does not 
necessarily, and has not normally, resulted i n His person becoming 
'a mysterious vehicle of forces' which operate overwhelmingly and 
omnipotently." And he adds, very discerningly, "As to orthodox 
b e l i e f , the Scriptures and Sacraments, i t should be remembered that 
these do not simply exist to be understood by s p i r i t u a l i n s i g h t , but 
as means to produce i t . I f t r u t h and r e a l i t y belong to them at a l l , 
they belong to them i n t h e i r own r i g h t and p r i o r to t h e i r use..." 
(J.T.S. Vol XXI p 35if). 
Mozley was a very discerning c r i t i c . Much more than most men 
he was able to enter sympathetically into the minds of others and 
see the positive value of opinions which he himself did not hold, 
without abandoning his own position. He had great respect f o r Oman. 
We may therefore conclude our treatment of Oman with some words 
which Mozley wrote elsewhere i n c r i t i c i s m of his weakness and 
acknowledgement of his strength. "Dr Oman seems to me to be too 
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much outside the p a r t i c u l a r and characteristic f i e l d of sacramental 
praxis and theology which we associate with Catholicism to be f i r s t 
a satisfactory i n t e r p r e t e r and then an adequate c r i t i c . There i s 
not enough sympathetic penetration, at least at t h i s point; and 
mental, and even s p i r i t u a l power, r i c h l y as his book i s endowed with 
both, do not make up f o r that lack. He sees negatives i n the 
position of others which they would deny, or of which they would 
give a d i f f e r e n t description. The positive i n his own position 
which he knows at f i r s t hand i s of very high re l i g i o u s value." 
(Essays Catholic and C r i t i c a l . 3^<i Edition 1931 > p 245)* One might 
add that, strangely, Oman also seemed out of contact with the real 
world of Reformed theology and piety. His was a genuinely Liberal 
theology. 
Chap VI Contents Oliver Quick:- two main influences on his thought 
p 180-184; r e l a t i o n to contemporary thought p I84-I89. 
Atonement i n whole purpose of God p 190f; E v i l as background to 
atonement p 193-196; Man and Sin p I 9 6 - I 9 8 ; Theories of atonement 
- prophetic and p r i e s t l y t r a d i t i o n s , d i s t i n c t i o n between v i t i u m and 
reatus p 198f> C r i t i e i s m of j u r i d i c a l view p 200-204; S a c r i f i c i a l 
view p 204-207; Eschatological s e t t i n g p 207-210. 
Sacraments. Lack of h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n g p 210; Symbols and 
instruments p 210f; Jesus as the supreme sacrament p 212; Sacraments 
as representative, e l i c i t i n g not i n s e r t i n g p 212f; Baptism p 213fj 
Eucharist - questions of s a c r i f i c e p 817f, and presence p 218-220; 
Church and question of v a l i d i t y of orders p 220-223; 
C r i t i c i s m . Completeness and eschatological framework p 223; 
Use of B i b l i c a l categories p 224; The system and a t t i t u d e to h i s t o r y 
p 224ff. 
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VI. OLIVER QUICK (1885-1944) 
Oliver Chase Quick v/as a younger contemporary of Oman, but his 
work shows a d i s t i n c t change i n method and mood. I n Quick the move 
away from an easy, op t i m i s t i c , Liberalism, already apparent i n the 
older man, i s much more marked. Yet some of the chief character-
i s t i c s of Liberalism, he would doubtless say the best of i t , remain. 
Hence he i s not an easy theologian to l a b e l . 
He i s perhaps best seen as a t r a n s i t i o n a l f i g u r e . He was 
aware that the more philosophical or i n t e l l e c t u a l approach to 
C h r i s t i a n i t y through some form of idealism had l o s t the popularity 
and prestige which i t had once enjoyed. That i s was open to severe 
c r i t i c i s m , and that i t had led to a d i s t o r t i o n of the Christian 
Gospel, he well knew. Indeed, as we s h a l l see, he i s frequently 
c r i t i c a l of i t himself. But he i s not w i l l i n g to j e t t i s o n the 
entire method because some of i t s results have been bad, or because 
i t has been wrongly used. He i s also aware that a new orthodoxy i s 
r i s i n g , the so-called B i b l i c a l Theology associated with Karl Barth 
and represented i n England c h i e f l y by Hoskyns. Again his approach 
i s equivocal. His own writings contain f a r more straight B i b l i c a l 
work than we found i n Oman, and there i s f a r more orthodox insistence 
on the uniqueness and significance of Christ. But he finds t h i s 
approach l i m i t i n g . He does not seem at home i n detailed exegesis 
of scripture, and prefers to press on to a more philosophical 
presentation of the meaning and outworking of Christian f a i t h . 
Thus he appears to represent something of a watershed, at least 
as f a r as B r i t i s h theology i s concerned. Old ways were passing 
away, new ones were not yet established. This, as we have noted, 
was indicated c l e a r l y by Temple i n his preface to the report of the 
Commission on Doctrine i n the Church of England, published i n 1939* 
I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n Quick set himself to expound the f a i t h to his own 
generation with the tools at his disposal. That he should do so 
with such confidence i n such an i n t e l l e c t u a l climate i s perhaps his 
chief claim to greatness. J.K. Mozley said of him, "He v/as not 
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grandly impressive a f t e r the manner of von Hugel and Forsyth, and 
he had not accumulated those vast stores of knowledge which we 
associate with such of his contemporaries as H.R. Mackintosh and 
N.P. Williams. But as an expounder of the essentials of Christian 
orthodoxy he was second to none. Orthodoxy, r i g h t thinking about 
God's revealing and redeeming a c t i v i t y i n Christ, was f o r him both 
the end i n which the i n t e l l e c t could f i n d s a t i s f a c t i o n and the 
starting-point from which i t could advance to a discernment of the 
meaning and purpose of a l l that i s . " (Oliver Quick as a Theologian, 
i n Theology Vol XLVIII p 36). I t i s possible to distinguish two 
chief influences on his exposition. The f i r s t i s the Anglican 
t r a d i t i o n of thought and sacramental worship i n which he was rooted, 
the second i s the philosophical cast of his mind. 
His roots i n Anglicanism went deep, he was a devout churchman 
a l l his l i f e and a member of the Archbishop's Commission on Doctrine. 
Born i n a vicarage, he read classics and theology at Oxford before 
his ordination i n 1911. There followed curacies at Beckenham and 
Wolverhampton; a period as vice-Principal of the Leeds Clergy School 
under B.K. Cunningham, which came to an' end with the outbreak of war 
i n 1914J a short period as curate to H.R.L. Sheppard a t St. Martin 
i n the f i e l d s ; nearly two years as domestic chaplain to Archbishop 
Randall Davidson; a short time, again as assistant to Cunningham, 
organising s p i r i t u a l refresher courses f o r Army Chaplains i n Prance; 
and, a f t e r the war, appointment as Vicar of Kenley i n Surrey. Prom 
1920 u n t i l his death he occupied various canonries: at Newcastle 
(1920-23), C a r l i s l e (1923-30), St. Paul's (1930-34); Durham (1934-39), 
and Christ Church, Oxford (1939-43)• His time and thought were 
increasingly absorbed with academic theology, and the l a s t two 
appointments were both Canon Professorships. 
He claimed allegiance to no p a r t i c u l a r party i n the church, but 
could perhaps best be described as a Liberal Catholic. His theology 
shows the t y p i c a l Anglican appeal to scripture, t r a d i t i o n and reason, 
and his sense of the r e a l i t y of the church's fellowship and i t s 
sacramental worship infused a l l his thought. The importance of 
t h i s f o r his understanding of the work of Christ, as well as i n the 
more obvious realm of sacramental theology, w i l l emerge l a t e r . 
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Like his Anglicanism his philosophical background shows i t s e l f 
both i n mood and i n method. While he was keen to i n s i s t on the 
uniqueness of Christ, and would not allow the h i s t o r i c incarnation 
to be l o s t or absorbed i n a vague doctrine of divine immanence 
undergirded by I d e a l i s t philosophy, he nevertheless wanted to have 
a t o t a l , r a t i o n a l , world view i n which a l l thought and experience 
could be harmonised. Appeals to the 'givenness' of h i s t o r i c 
revelation could never, f o r him, be an excuse f o r avoiding the need 
f o r such a view. I n the introduction to his Riddell Memorial 
Lectures, 'Philosophy and the Cross* (l95l)» he makes the point that 
contemporary theology concentrated on religious experience or the 
basic ideas of the Bible and h i s t o r i c C h r i s t i a n i t y . He saw the 
value of t h i s concentration, i n spite of the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
specialisation. But he explained that his own intention, though 
unfashionable, was to regard the Cross, "... not as the great 
mvsterium C h r i s t i i n which the religious consciousness may f i n d the 
f u l f i l m e n t of i t s adoration and self-abasement, nor as a theological 
doctrine which 'rationalises* the reli g i o u s experience of Christendom, 
but rather as an abstract general law of thought and l i f e , which 
shows i t s authority and significance outside the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
religious elements i n our nature and beyond the h i s t o r i c a l revelation 
enshrined i n the Bible and Church." (op c i t p 3f). Needless to say, 
he devoted his attention elsewhere to the narrower f i e l d of 
revelation, but t h i s longing f o r the broader view was always present. 
Somewhat paradoxically his manner of approaching i t i s by 
analysis, and sometimes almost minute analysis. He i s wont to take 
certain theological or philosophical words or phrases which seem 
simil a r , or are i n f a c t closely related, and spend considerable time 
and e f f o r t i n distinguishing them and c l a r i f y i n g t h e i r meaning. 
This can be seen i n his treatment of the meaning and use of 
1 2 universals, the d i s t i n c t i o n he draws between 'cause' and 'reason 1, 3 
and his discussion of ' f a i t h ' , 'assent', ' v i s i o n 1 , and 'reason', 
I n a very similar vein, but on a larger or more discursive scale, 
1. cf 'Liberalism. Modernism and Tradition' pp 114ff 
2. c f 'The Ground of Faith and the Chaos of Thought' pp 9ff; and 
'The Gospel of Divine Action' pp l 6 f f . 
3. c f 'The Doctrines of the Creed' pp I f f 
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he tends to take certain d i s t i n c t theological or philosophical 
movements or ways of thought, analyse them, and then seek to draw 
them together into a synthesis."'" The chief example of t h i s t r a i t 
i s the d i s t i n c t i o n which appears i n many of his hooks "between signs 
and instruments, or revelation as showing meaning or ef f e c t i n g some 
purpose. This i s such a prominent d i s t i n c t i o n , and so important i n 
his thought, that we shall see i t often. Of t h i s whole method of 
analysis and synthesis he writes, "Hegel has made i t a familar 
thought i n philosophy that human progress must always consist f i r s t 
i n taking to pieces some single experience or aspect of experience, 
and then i n p u t t i n g the pieces together again i n t o a uni t y which the 
previous d i v i s i o n has enriched. We advance, as i t were, from 
unison, through discord, to harmony; from i d e n t i t y , through 
difference, to the organic u n i t y i n which differences are held 
together and reconciled." (The Christian Sacraments p 230). 
These two major influences emerge as both strengths and weak-
nesses i n his t o t a l position. The background of the catholic church 
at worship gives an a i r of depth and completeness to his theology. 
A l l doctrines are brought under an over-arching scheme of God's 
purpose that man should approach him i n worship, and the whole i s 
set against the background of God's plan f o r the entire universe 
only to be completed i n heaven. There i s thus a reverent and rounded 
a i r to Quick's theology. The disadvantage i s that he i s not 
temperamentally at home with more Protestant or Reformed theology. 
His description of Protestant elements i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , or of the 
Protestant approach to sacraments, would not be recognised by many 
of those whom he i s attempting to describe. 
Similarly, while his method of analysis i s often h e l p f u l , and 
cer t a i n l y adds c l a r i t y to his presentation of his own position, i t 
sometimes appears too precise and occasionally unsympathetic. He 
leaves too few loose ends. Having decided on certain divisions and 
labels he forces his material to f i t them. Thus he i n s i s t s , f o r 
instance, that Protestants must hold the views that he thinks would 
1. cf the discussion of the 'Liberal Protestant' and 'Catholic 
Modernist' movements i n 'Liberalism. Modernism and Tradition' 
chaps 1 and 11; or the whole of 'Catholic and Protestant 
Elements i n C h r i s t i a n i t y ' 
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be l o g i c a l i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n ; and when he has distinguished to his 
own s a t i s f a c t i o n the symbolic and instrumental approaches to the 
sacraments, and indeed to the entire Christian l i f e , he i n s i s t s on 
t e l l i n g those who f a l l i n t o one camp or the other what they mean by 
t h e i r approach. One sometimes feels i t would have been more h e l p f u l , 
though less neat, i f he had l e t them t e l l him. 
For the purpose of t h i s study his most important writings are 
'The Christian Sacraments' (1927), the relevant sections of 'Doctrines 
of the Creed' (1958)» and the posthumously published lectures on 
the atonement 'The Gospel of the Hew World' (1944). However, his 
a t t i t u d e to current re l i g i o u s thought, and his own general position 
i s best found i n a number of other works, mainly e a r l i e r , and mainly 
i n the form of lectures. I t w i l l therefore be he l p f u l i f we f i r s t 
attempt a b r i e f summary of those e a r l i e r works. 
His e a r l i e r work was mainly concerned with contrasting 
movements wi t h i n the church, and we f i n d t h i s t y p i c a l method of 
analysing, weighing strengths and weaknesses, and attempting a 
synthesis. He i s always keen to give c r e d i t f o r the real value of 
movements with which he i s not personally deeply sympathetic. After 
reading a few chapters one recognises his technique and comes to 
suspect that the p a r t i c u l a r position under discussion at the moment 
i s being set up f o r the k i l l , and that many, though not a l l , of the 
kind things being said about i t w i l l be cancelled out or seriously 
undermined i n a few concluding pages of c r i t i c i s m . Nevertheless 
his accounts of the various positions i n vogue during the early 
years of t h i s century appear discriminating and f a i r . 
He makes a contrast between Liberal Protestantism on the one 
hand, and Catholic Modernism, or Evolutionary Idealism, on the other. 
The f i r s t desires to exalt facts and return to the simple 'Jesus of 
History', while the second i s ready to l e t facts go and f i n d the 
essential t r u t h of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the ideas i n development. Neither, 
he suggests, can f i n d a satisfactory Christology, nor are any of 
them true to the entire New Testament witness. 
Liberal Protestantism, p a r t i c u l a r l y as represented by R i t s c h l , 
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i s impatient of metaphysics and bases i t s e l f e n t i r e l y on the 
humanity of Jesus, arguing that the effe c t of the humanity gives i t 
the value of Godhead f o r us. This, Quick suggests, i s an 
a t t r a c t i v e programme but ultimately unsuccessful, leading to a type 
of 1Jesusolatry 1. " I t i s always easy, and i t i s often popular i n 
modern as i t was i n ancient times, to substitute a man d e i f i e d or 
treated as God f o r God made man i n Christ, though what could be 
f u r t h e r from the mind of Jesus i t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine. ... 
Ritschl's main idea, that of deriving the Deity of our Lord from the 
goodness and value i n experience of his h i s t o r i c manhood, has had a 
long t r i a l , and may now f a i r l y be said to have been found wanting." 
(Liberalism. Modernism and Tradition pp 17, 19)• I n any case we do 
not get the impression from the New Testament that the f i r s t 
Christians spent much time looking backwards to Jesus as he had been. 
They preferred to look upwards to the Jesus they now knew, or 
onwards to His return i n glory.''' 
Ideas of development are no more successful. I n the form of 
Catholic Modernism as represented by Loisy and T y r e l l , where the 
development of doctrines i n the church i s seen as the essence of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , the theory needs the Pope to give i t r e a l i t y . Lacking 
some authoritative voice i t i s unable to discern which developments 
are r i g h t and which, i f any, are wrong. The Pope, however, had 
disowned i t , largely because of i t s apparent extremism i n Mew 
Testament scholarship, so that i t was l e f t floundering. 
Development presented i n a more philosophical guise as 
Evolutionary Idealism, as represented by Green and Caird, where the 
essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s seen as the idea of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between 
human and divine through a general p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , runs 
out i n t o no more than an i d e a l i s t i c view of man from which God i s 
l o s t . I n t h i s l i n e of thought Jesus i s not isolated at a l l , so that 
there i s no c r i t e r i o n f o r judging the presence of God i n man. God 
becomes merely an immanent p r i n c i p l e and there i s nothing outside 
the evolutionary process. "Modern i d e a l i s t s . . . treat a l l outward 
things and happenings as symbols, more or less, of a universal. 
1. cf 'Catholic and Protestant Elements i n C h r i s t i a n i t y ' p 18f 
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S p i r i t u a l Being, Who i s so u t t e r l y de-localised as to "be at once 
everywhere and no where. He cannot ever be said to act here or there 
j u s t because He i s and acts everywhere at once. Everything means 
God, suggests God, refers to God, has i t s end and explanation i n God, 
but nothing _is God. So God comes to be conceived i n the end almost 
as nothing more than a universal meaning, explanation or id e a l . " 
( i b i d p 47). 
I t i s worth s e t t i n g out Quick's views on these movements, f o r 
underlying then he sees two contrasts to which he often returns; that 
between Hebraic and H e l l e n i s t i c thinking, and that between an 
instrumental and a symbolic understanding, of revelation and the 
world. His own view i s that neither should be stressed to the 
exclusion of the other. But t h i s does not mean that they are of 
equal value, or that he presents a Hellenised view of C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
The c e n t r a l i t y of Jesus and the primacy of the Hebraic approach are 
c l e a r l y affirmed. "The r e l i g i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l Incarnation must 
always admit some sort of f i n a l appeal to the h i s t o r i c a l l i f e which 
was i t s o r i g i n . " (Catholic and Protestant Elements i n C h r i s t i a n i t y 
p 20). Elsewhere he c r i t i c i s e d the Chalcedonian formula because, 
"... one feels that ... although f a t a l heresies have been rejected 
and p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a r e a l l y Christian doctrine of the Incarnation 
l e f t open, the saving act of God i n the manhood of Jesus i s the one 
thing l e f t unrepresented and unconveyed i n the theological statement." 
(The Gospel of Divine Action p 93) • Yet t h i s should not be taken 
to mean that the fathers had been quite wrong to use H e l l e n i s t i c 
terms and thought forms, or that Christian theology should relapse 
i n t o a positivism of revelation or give way to i r r a t i o n a l i t y . 
I t i s on t h i s account that l a t e r he was so c r i t i c a l of 
Barthianism. He admits that he had not studied Barth's works i n 
the o r i g i n a l German and that Barth himself was i n the process of 
systematising his theology. (This was i n 1931)• What Quick 
c r i t i c i s e s i s what was commonly presented i n England as Barthianism. 
His c r i t i c i s m i s that with i t s assertion that God cannot be known 
by human reason but only from his own, u t t e r l y miraculous, breaking 
i n from outside i n the person of Jesus, t h i s movement t r i e s to be 
more B i b l i c a l than the Bible i t s e l f . Mozley suggests that Quick's 
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judgement might have been d i f f e r e n t had he read the f i r s t volume of 
Barth's Church Dogmatics which was not available i n English when he 
was w r i t i n g his most c r i t i c a l comments on Barthianism.''' But t h i s 
i s perhaps u n l i k e l y , f o r as Mozley also says, " I suppose that Barth 
and Quick were as f a r removed from one another as i t i s possible f o r 
Christian theologians to be, while remaining eminenti sensu Christian 
theologians." (op c i t p 9), The t r u t h seems to be that Quick was 
opposed to t h i s entire mode of thought, For him i t showed the wrong 
sort of Christocentricism. I n his view "The Christological problem 
can only be solved by a doctrine which enables us to think of the 
l i f e of Jesus as God's act only because i t i s characteristic of God 
always and thus t r u l y symbolic of His whole purpose i n the world, and 
again to think of i t as the supreme symbol both of God's nature and 
man's perfection only because here uniquely i s the act of God," (The 
Gospel of Divine Action p 110). Further, f o r Quick, t h i s character 
and purpose of God i n the world, though uniquely revealed i n Christ, 
must be r a t i o n a l . 
Thus we f i n d him analysing the reasons and causes of unbelief 
and the arguments f o r b e l i e f i n the modern world. The points which 
he makes are of unequal value, but that he should engage i n t h i s 
sort of debate i s important i n showing the cast of his mind and the 
importance which he attached to r a t i o n a l i t y . He i s c r i t i c a l of the 
view that modern physical science had ruled out both the need and 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphysics. He i s pleased that some leading 
s c i e n t i f i c thinkers are once more introducing God in t o t h e i r 
reasoning. Therefore he i s w i l l i n g to spend a good deal of time on 
the thought of such men as whitehead and Jeans, pointing out that 
they have revived purely r a t i o n a l cosmological arguments. I t i s 
not that he i s too impressed by the conclusions at which they a r r i v e . 
"... I do not think that they, or any other purely cosmological 
argument, can bring much sa t i s f a c t i o n to Christian f a i t h . For, 
apart from other considerations, a God whose existence i s postulated 
1. Quick's most c r i t i c a l surveys are i n 'The Ground of Faith and 
the Chaos of Thought' (l93l) pp 96-107; and 'The Gospel of 
Divine Action' (1933) pp 103-109. The f i r s t volume of Barth's 
Church Dogmatics was published i n 1932, E.T. 'The Doctrine of 
The Word of God' (1936), From Quick's l a t e r writings i t does 
not appear that he changed his a t t i t u d e on Barth. 
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solely i n order to solve a cosmological problem, i s f a r too l i k e an 
i d o l called i n t o being to obviate the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the cosmologist." 
However, such arguments have what might be called a certain negative 
apologetic value, "... the thought of such men as Jeans and Whitehead, 
as well as of Eddington and others, renders the utmost service to 
f a i t h i n showing that modern science has renounced metaphysical 
dogmatism and i s prepared to leave open a f i e l d f o r s p i r i t u a l 
philosophy. For that reason, i f f o r no other, Christians would owe 
them t h e i r deepest gratitude." (The Ground of Faith and the Chaos of 
Thought p 86). 
On a more positive note i s his use of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
cause and reason. External r e a l i t y , he claims, shows both the order 
of cause and e f f e c t , and also the order of reason or purpose. He 
i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s by thinking of a man l i g h t i n g a pipe. "A whole 
series of movements and events takes place. Pipe, tobacco and match-
box are successively produced from the man's pockets. A match i s 
taken out, and struck, and the flame applied to the tobacco." (The 
Gospel of Divine Action p 17)• These various events and movements 
can be seen as l i n k s i n a chain, each one caused by one before i t 
and e f f e c t i n g one a f t e r i t - the order of cause and e f f e c t . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y the whole series can be regarded under the single 
heading of i t s purpose ' l i g h t i n g the pipe' - the order of reason or 
purpose. 
Transferring t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n to the world of external r e a l i t y 
i t can be argued that Physical science seeks to understand the world 
i n terms of cause and ef f e c t , and proceeds by analysis. Metaphysics 
seeks to see the whole, concerning i t s e l f with the over a l l 
significance or i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and proceeds by synthesis. 
However, the two orders are i n f a c t realised together. Hence, 
Quick argues, "... I think we must ult i m a t e l y accept the conclusion 
that even the simplest f a c t of perception i s only possible because 
running a l l through r e a l i t y there i s a s i g n i f i e d order of reason as 
well as an e f f i c i e n t order of cause." ( i b i d p 28). Referring to 
Berkeley he suggests that a l l our perception of the world indicates 
that "... some mind and a c t i v i t y not our own i s revealing i t s e l f to 
us through the physical nature which ul t i m a t e l y i s i t s own symbol 
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and instrument." ( i b i d p 30). Similar appeals to our perception of 
r a t i o n a l i t y and purpose pervading the universe are scattered 
throughout his w r i t i n g s . He refers to t h i s purpose as God. 
I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t that i n pursuing t h i s argument he 
refers, f o r the only time as f a r as I am aware, to the work of Oman 
i n 'The Natural and the Supernatural1."'" Like Oman, having 
established a 'super-Natural* sphere he at once assumes that he can 
speak of God. The t r u t h , however, i s that he has simply assumed a 
good deal more from revelation than he has allowed i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
argument. Here, of course, he i s better placed than Oman since he 
does i n other places pay much more attention to revelation as God's 
d e f i n i t e action i n History. 
One step more i s needed to complete the outline of his basic 
position. I t i s not enough simply to contrast 'cause' and 'reason', 
physical science and metaphysics, and to point out that the second 
member of each pai r must also be taken in t o account i n a t o t a l world 
view. Acceptance of God leads to a tel e o l o g i c a l view of the world, 
a purpose i n v/hich the whole created order w i l l have a part or f i n d 
a f u l f i l m e n t . This i s absolutely fundamental f o r Quick. He 
expresses i t several times i n such affirmations as "The purpose of 
God from which the whole world of our present experience takes i t s 
o r i g i n , and i n which i t finds i t s end and explanation, i s the purpose 
that love eternal should f u l f i l i t s e l f and triumph through the free 
self-surrender of f i n i t e s p i r i t s which have caught the f i r e of i t s 
i n s p i r a t i o n from on high." (The Gospel of Divine Action p 112). The 
new thing which came into the world with the Christian Church, and 
which cannot ult i m a t e l y be included under Hebraic or H e l l e n i s t i c 
thinking, i s that a community of people knew t h i s i n s p i r a t i o n , and 
knew themselves to be caught up i n t h i s purpose. I t i s w i t h i n the 
context of t h i s over-arching purpose that the work of atonement and 
the doctrine of the sacraments have t h e i r place. 
1. cf 'The Gospel of Divine Action' p 29n 
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With his s t a r t i n g point - a purpose of God which i s , i n p r i n c i p l e 
at least, open to r a t i o n a l perception and intended to lead to a 
f u l f i l m e n t i n which the whole of creation and world h i s t o r y finds 
i t s meaning i n God - i t i s natural that he should begin his treatment 
of atonement by considering i t s necessity. That i s , given that 
t h i s grand purpose has somehow been marred and that salvation i s 
needed, what i s i t that has disrupted God's purpose, and from what 
does man need to be saved? But though he begins with these problems 
he i s keen to assert that the doctrine must always be set against 
the background of the wider purpose of God. The cross i s not j u s t 
an answer to problems. I t does more than deal with man's past or 
present sins. Atonement sets man back i n the o r i g i n a l purpose of 
God which also concerns his ultimate destiny. 
Pursuing t h i s point i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t way he contrasts 
the Johannine and Pauline approaches to the subject. The Johannine 
view, he suggests, begins with the person of Jesus as the s e l f -
revelation of God. Thus the incarnation becomes the s t a r t i n g point 
of theology. We know God's nature and our own relationship to Him 
by f a i t h , but the future we leave i n His hands - ' I t does not yet 
appear what we s h a l l be'. The Pauline view, on the other hand, 
concentrates on the act of God i n Christ as redemption from s i n . 
Thus the atonement becomes central, an act of God which finds i t s 
focus i n the cross but reaches i t s goal i n the fut u r e . Exposition 
of t h i s act must therefore lead into consideration of the 'last things'. 
Of these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s Quick takes the Pauline. Commenting on 
the l o g i c a l connection between atonement and eschatology he writes 
"For myself I cannot but f e e l that Christian theology has on the 
whole f a i l e d to do j u s t i c e to t h i s l o g i c a l connexion, and that some 
classical treatises on the doctrine of atonement are gravely 
incomplete, because they do not face the eschatological issues which 
are raised by the very nature of the doctrine i t s e l f . " (Doctrines of 
the Creed p 190). Hence he considers together the e v i l from which 
man i s delivered, the means of deliverance, and i t s f i n a l purpose. 
I t i s perhaps worth digressing at t h i s point to note that t h i s 
discussion and i t s resolution i n favour of the Pauline view give an 
i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o Quick's mind and method. One gets the 
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impression, c e r t a i n l y i n the e a r l i e r works, that he equates the 
Johannine approach with the H e l l e n i s t i c , r a t i o n a l approach, and the 
Pauline one with the Hebraic, B i b l i c a l p osition. I t also seems that 
his own t r a i n i n g and natural i n c l i n a t i o n would lead him to embrace 
the f i r s t . Yet he chooses the second. There seems frequently to 
be a c o n f l i c t between the di r e c t i o n i n which he would l i k e to go and 
the one i n which he knows he must go. At the same time i t seems to 
be, at least p a r t l y , a problem which he has created f o r himself by 
his a n a l y t i c a l method. The d i s t i n c t i o n between the two approaches 
may not be so great as he has indicated. His desire f o r c l a r i t y 
leads him to make the d i s t i n c t i o n , and though he sometimes says that 
i t i s only a rough generalisation, he tends to observe i t rather 
r i g i d l y himself. I think he quite often makes problems f o r himself 
i n t h i s way, and his desire f o r c l a r i t y sometimes lays him open to 
the charge of misrepresentation. 
To return to the main theme of the argument we must ask how God's 
purpose went awry, and from what i t i s that man needs to be delivered? 
This i s the problem of e v i l . The r e a l i t y of e v i l as the background 
to atonement, and a consideration of the nature of e v i l i s found i n 
a l l Quick's treatment of the subject. The indications are that i t 
came to occupy an ever larger place i n his thought. I n the chapter 
on atonement i n 'The Christian Sacraments' i t i s mentioned as a 
problem. Clearly God's purpose i n the world does not always triumph, 
indeed i t i s often rejected. This r e j e c t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r l y 
seen i n the experience of Christ himself, but "... that r e j e c t i o n 
does not look l i k e a mere isolated accident i n the scheme of things: 
i t i s a l l of a piece with a certain fundamental negation of goodness, 
which i n some sense belongs to the whole texture of l i f e i n space 
and time." (op o i t p 78). Later, i n 'Doctrines of the Creed' we 
have a f u l l e r analysis of possible explanations of the nature of e v i l 
seen as that from which man needs salvation. F i n a l l y the subject 
gets what might be called a more positive treatment, where both i t s 
nature and o r i g i n are considered, i n the rather d i f f i c u l t opening 
chapter of 'The Gospel of the Mew World'. The l a t t e r treatment, 
which Quick may well have revised or developed had he l i v e d , combines 
a consideration of some i n f l u e n t i a l h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary 
views with what must be taken as his own position. 
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Por C h r i s t i a n i t y , he argues, the essence of e v i l i s sin or moral 
wrong, and i t s chief characteristic i s that i t i s destructive. I t 
i s not to be l i m i t e d to pain or suffering i n themselves. I t i s not 
the fact of suffering but i t s meaninglessness, the element of 
opposition, or at least incoherence, i n a moral world, which offends 
us. Were i t simply the physical suffering we could presumably 
argue that certain events only seem e v i l because we f e e l them to be 
pai n f u l . I n that case we could deal with them simply by refusing 
to take them seriously. "Cease to f e e l them, and a l l w i l l be well 
indeed. Why make such a fuss over a c h i l d mangled i n a street-
accident or born with a hopeless and incurable disease? Enjoy a l l 
you can, cease to heed the r e s t ; you w i l l have solved the problem of 
e v i l once f o r a l l , and f i n d the world an admirable place." But i n 
f a c t , " I t i s not sheer pain which distresses us most, but the 
meaning of moral e v i l which we read into i t . " (Doctrines of the 
Creed p 199f). 
Neither must we dismiss e v i l as mere i l l u s i o n or confuse the 
problem of e v i l with the problem of creation. Some i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t 
approaches from Plato to Hegel conclude that e v i l i s mere error or 
defect i n knowledge. This i s to inver t the Christian order. I t 
i s not so much that ignorance i s e v i l as that s i n blinds the i n t e l l e c t . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , various forms of monism begin from the problems of 
imperfection, f i n i t u d e and temporality i n creation, asking how these 
things can be i f the creative power i s good. There i s a problem 
here, Quick allows, and he believes i t can be met with a characteristic 
stress on God's s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n . But t h i s i s not the same as the 
problem of e v i l . What these approaches lack i s an appreciation of 
the destructive agency of e v i l . There i s an element of wilfulness 
and destructiveness i n i t which i s not adequately covered by ideas of 
l i m i t a t i o n or p r i v a t i o n , useful though such ideas may be as f a r as 
they go. E v i l i s the exercise of w i l l i n opposition, and f o r the 
Christian what i t opposes i s both the purpose and the love of God. 
Hence i t i s impossible to resolve the problem of e v i l without both 
redirection of w i l l and forgiveness of s i n . 
But we s t i l l have the problem of how to account f o r the 
existence of t h i s perversion. Quick suggests, "The Christian 
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answer l i e s deep i n the mystery of f i n i t e freedom. F i n i t e freedom 
i n i t s e l f i s good, hut i t involves the p o s s i b i l i t y of e v i l . This 
p o s s i b i l i t y simply as such i s also good. What actualises e v i l and 
therefore may be said to be the cause of a l l r e a l e v i l i s the act of 
a f i n i t e w i l l i n exercising i t s freedom wrongly, i . e . , so as to 
disobey God." (The Gospel of the Hew World p 26). He i s not unaware 
that t h i s l i n e of thought raises other problems, not least concerning 
cruelty i n sub-human nature. One could meet t h i s point p a r t i a l l y 
by arguing that the concept of cruelty i s a moral one and should not 
be a t t r i b u t e d t o , f o r instance, predatory animals. Yet t h i s has an 
a i r of verbal juggling about i t since the charge of c r u e l t y i s then 
simply moved back to the power which made the animal's nature what 
i t i s . The only satisfactory answer, though Quick presents i t very 
h e s i t a n t l y and t e n t a t i v e l y , i s the supposition of a f a l l e n s p i r i t 
or s p i r i t s . This keeps the cause of e v i l i n the act of a free w i l l 
outside God, a w i l l which i s allowed i t s r e a l , though r e l a t i v e , 
independence by the voluntary s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n of God. 
At t h i s point Quick introduces a l i n e of thought which seems to 
have been i n his mind at least from "The Christian Sacraments', but 
without very much development. Indeed perhaps i t could not be 
cl e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d . I t i s the question of how f a r God may be 
believed to have deliberately subjected his o r i g i n a l creation to 
sorrow, pain and death, since he knew that sin would come int o the 
world and that redemption would be wrought through sorrow pain and 
death? Jesus used sorrow and disaster, and even the s i n and 
disobedience of men, i n his work of redemption - could he have done 
his work i n a world where they did not exist? Si m i l a r l y , i f 
Christians are those who are being brought back i n t o God's purpose 
by s a c r i f i c e , as we s h a l l see Quick argues l a t e r , then the world 
very much as i t i s now with i t s opportunities f o r suffering and 
sorrow seems essential. Sin and suffering are taken and used as 
stepping stones f o r progress, without them perhaps progress would not 
be possible. Furthermore t h i s l i n e of argument need not be l i m i t e d 
to men, the evolution of sub-human creation seems to be a story of 
advance through s a c r i f i c e and loss. 
This i s a d i f f i c u l t l i n e of thought. Even i n attempting to 
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state i t there i s always a suspicion of looking back and being wise 
a f t e r the event, of t r y i n g to make the best of a bad job, or simply 
of being sermonic and rather over-pious. Quick, I think, doe's not 
completely avoid these p i t f a l l s , but at the same time i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to avoid the impression that he i s on to something. 
Sometimes he i s scarcely more than sermonic. "After a l l the 
blackest crimes of s;eccles';iastical hypocrisy and selfishness, of 
o f f i c i a l cowardice and callousness, of mob-raadness and legalised 
b r u t a l i t y , now take t h e i r place i n the story which makes what i s f o r 
Christians the h o l i e s t and most blessed commemmoration of a l l time. 
Even representations of common dice and instruments of to r t u r e have 
found t h e i r way i n t o Christian sanctuaries; and confronted by such 
paradoxes, the mind begins dimly to divine the method of a power 
which can r e a l l y take away the sins of the world." (The Christian 
Sacraments p 83f). This l i n e of thought can be transposed to the 
experience of the Christian d i s c i p l e . "Perhaps the most deeply 
Christian hope of our souls i s that i n heaven we may be able to say 
of a l l the e v i l i n the world what we have already begun to say about 
the crimes of those who were responsible f o r our Lord's death, namely, 
that , e v i l as they are, we could not now w i l l them to have been 
otherwise, since even they have been made to bear t h e i r part i n the 
triumph of God." ( i b i d p 93)• Later he uses t h i s type of argument 
as part of a theodicy. While God's ways with men may not be easy 
to explain or defend on the grounds of s t r i c t j u s t i c e , i t i s the very 
e v i l s i n t h i s world which made possible the redemption i n Christ and 
which provide what might be called the raw materials f o r Christian 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n redemption. "And therefore i t 
i s rio/t unreasonable to suppose that a world-order, i n which pain and 
death ax-3 universal, and are more acutely f e l t i n proportion as true 
progress i s made, may be the order f i t t e d to be that through which 
love wins i t s universal v i c t o r y , and from which i t rises again i n 
glory. Thus, while the world-order which we know with a l l i t s 
miseries can never be made to s a t i s f y mere j u s t i c e , the greater 
paradox may s t i l l be true, that through the atonement i t may be found 
i n the end to have proceeded from God's love." (Doctrines of the 
Creed p 212). 
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I n his l a s t work the argument i s repeated. "An order of 
nature i n which l i f e has constantly to he taken and l o s t i n order that 
evolutionary progress may be made seems somehow to point forward to a 
universal salvation wrought through s a c r i f i c e ; and i t i s very 
d i f f i c u l t to a t t r i b u t e the whole p r i n c i p l e of t h i s evolutionary 
progress to s i n . " (The Gospel of the Mew World p 29). But i n t h i s 
l a s t work an objection i s noted and he appears s l i g h t l y to withdraw. 
The objection i s that t h i s l i n e of thought seems to deny that pain 
and death are i n themselves e v i l . While pain may not always be so, 
i t often i s , and the Bible speaks of death as the f i n a l enemy, the 
consequence and penalty of s i n . However, Quick notes that 'death 1 
i s an ambiguous term. " I t may denote a merely physical and natural 
f a c t , of which the value i s r e l a t i v e ; i t may denote that f i n a l 
destruction of l i f e which the physical f a c t i s taken to symbolise -
and that undoubtedly i s e v i l . " ( i b i d p 30)« F i n a l l y he gives up the 
discussion, noting that we cannot f i n a l l y answer the question of the 
relationship of sin and death but must simply accept death as part 
of t h i s present world-order marred by s i n . 
While t h i s conclusion i s no doubt true, i t comes as rather a 
disappointing anti-climax to his discussion. The treatment of death 
seems i n the end to lack the depth and B i b l i c a l understanding which 
Denney brought to the same subject. I t i s perhaps better to say with 
Denney that while death to unfalien man may not have been such an e v i l , 
the death of f a l l e n man 'per se' i s , at least f o r the Bible. The 
death of a Christian man must presumably be understood as the death of 
one who i s i n the process of being conformed to the image of God i n 
Christ, and i s thus nearer to the death of unfallen man. Quick could 
presumably have allowed such a d i s t i n c t i o n and may have wanted to add, 
as Denney would not have done, some qu a l i f i c a t i o n s on the process of 
being conformed to the image. Death which comes as a release from 
great physical suffering and i s thus regarded as merciful, and 
therefore, on Quick's terms, as of r e l a t i v e l y high value, may indeed 
be a t t r i b u t e d to the mercy of God without denying i t s own inherent 
e v i l . The value i s r e l a t i v e to the other e v i l s of suffering which 
went before i t , yet, to the f a l l e n man, i t remains i t s e l f an e v i l . 
I t i s probable that Quick draws back from such speculations because 
they so easily pass int o judgements on the f i n a l destiny of the man 
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concerned. However there seems no reason why they should inevitably 
do so. I n any case the interest of the e a r l i e r part of t h i s discussion 
regarding the appropriateness of such a world-order as we know to the 
redemption wrought i n i t remains. 
I t i s against the background of e v i l as destructive opposition 
to the loving purpose of God, brought about by the free act of the 
f i n i t e and created w i l l using i t s freedom to disobey God, that we must 
set the doctrine of atonement. I n t h i s background man, the immedia,te 
object of atonement, i s distinguished from the rest of creation by 
the image of God. Quick looks very b r i e f l y at Ireaneus' d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the image of God which f a l l e n man retains i n some form, and 
the likeness which he loses; and also at Brunner's c r i t i c i s m of a l l 
attempts to distinguish between what was l o s t at the f a l l and what 
remains. His own approach i s s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from both and seems 
(pace Mozley op c i t p 3l) to be less obviously s c r i p t u r a l . 
The Bible seems to distinguish three sta,ges i n which man might 
be said to possess the image i n d i f f e r e n t ways, or even to be related 
to d i f f e r e n t images. There i s the image of God i n unfalien man as i t 
existed i n Adam; the image which remains i n f a l l e n man by v i r t u e of 
his having been created by God; and the image of God i n Christ to which 
Christian man i s being conformed. Quick, however, seems to work with 
two s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t stages - the image which existed i n unfallen 
man, and seems i n some distorted but real sense to remain; and the 
image which was held before unfallen man as a goal. This second form 
of the image i s s t i l l held before f a l l e n man as a goal i n that i t i s 
the condition f o r which man was created, his f i n a l condition when he 
has acknowledged God's purpose and surrendered himself to i t . For 
unfallen man i t would have required obedience to reach t h i s goal, f o r 
f a l l e n man i t i s now more d i f f i c u l t than ever to obtain. The 
substance of the image i n both cases i s freedom to choose i n r e l a t i v e 
independence. Quick speaks of two freedoms, "...to each condition 
corresponds i t s characteristic freedom. To the f i r s t the freedom of 
responsible choice, ownership, government. To the second the u t t e r l y 
unburdened and glorious l i b e r t y of the children of God, where man i s 
f i n a l l y at home i n his heavenly Father's house." ( i b i d p 38)• The 
present state of man, therefore, i s due to misuse of freedom i n the 
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f i r s t condition. 
The r e l a t i v e independence of man i s due to God's voluntary s e l f -
l i m i t a t i o n "by which he allows his creatures to w i l l and achieve ends 
of which he himself i s not the e f f i c i e n t cause. Man may therefore 
use his r e l a t i v e freedom to r e s i s t God. That i s s i n , the assertion 
of man's independent lordship and his refusal to obey. However, i n 
spite of that , there remains that i n man which knows, or i n t u i t s , that 
his real good and ultimate end i s i n submission to God. His choice 
not so to submit has given sin a foothold i n man and has marred his 
nature. He s t i l l has the capacity to be a c h i l d of God but has l o s t 
the power. "Not that there i s no good l e f t i n him, or that the divine 
likeness has been l o s t . But now man's goodness i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
a t t a i n salvation without a fresh and special intervention of divine 
grace." ( i b i d p 39). Henceforth man i s dogged by c o n f l i c t i n g moods 
of self-assertion and fear. This i s transmitted to each succeeding 
generation, though, " I t should be noticed that i n so f a r as man's 
o r i g i n a l God-likeness has been marred i n those to whom 'o r i g i n a l ' s i n 
i s transmitted, t h e i r personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r acting s i n f u l l y i s 
diminished." ( i b i d p 43)• I t i s probable that even unfalien man 
would have needed t r a i n i n g and d i s c i p l i n e to achieve God's intended 
purpose f o r him, though he would na t u r a l l y have chosen the higher good. 
Fallen man needs more than t r a i n i n g , exhortation or moral example, he 
needs a power from outside himself which nevertheless becomes i n some 
sense his own. How man reached his present state of 'fallen-ness' i t 
i s not possible to say, but i t may be that we are obliged to speak i n 
terms of an h i s t o r i c a l f a l l of the race, though such language remains 
speculative and mythical. 
The power which man needs to bring him back into God's good 
purpose comes from the atoning work of Christ. I t consists not only 
of his death on the cross but also of his resurrection and present 
lordship. The whole work of Christ has a double-sided significance, 
involving both something done f o r man which he could never have done 
f o r himself, and a continuing process in t o which he i s taken up. We 
noted Quick's opinion that many classical treatments of the doctrine 
are defective because they concentrate exclusively on the death of 
Christ. I t i s also an error, i n his view, to concentrate simply on 
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what i s done f o r man. He i s looking f o r a theory which does j u s t i c e 
to the eschatological element and allows f o r what i s done i n man, or 
f o r man's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
His analysis of the d i f f e r e n t theories of atonement i n 'Doctrines 
of the Creed', and his sketch of the h i s t o r y of the doctrine i n 'The 
Gospel of the New W o r l d w h i l e both i n t e r e s t i n g are not very d i f f e r e n t 
from those found elsewhere. We w i l l t r e a t them b r i e f l y except where 
his special emphases are found. 
From the Old Testament he noted two approaches, the prophetic and 
the p r i e s t l y . The prophets, he acknowledges, reach greater s p i r i t u a l 
heights and were not subject to the temptations of immorality, 
formalism and superstition which are always l i k e l y to beset p r i e s t l y 
r e l i g i o n . Yet the prophetic teaching had two major weaknesses. F i r s t 
the prophets had no real doctrine of grace. They put before the 
people the w i l l of God; they show c l e a r l y the essentially moral nature 
of s i n ; and then they demand that t h e i r hearers should repent and 
conform to God's w i l l . But i n a l l t h i s they o f f e r no help i n bringing 
t h i s moral transformation about. They were Augustinian i n t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e to God's power, but Pelagian i n t h e i r assumption that a l l 
could repent at w i l l . Thus, secondly, they do not seem to recognise 
how deep-seated s i n i s , both i n man and the world, or how impossible i t 
i s f o r man to free himself from i t unaided. Occasional indications 
that they do see deeper and look f o r a future action of God to change 
men's hearts (Jer 31:31ff; Ezek l l : 1 9 f f ) serve only to make plainer 
the normal d r i f t of t h e i r teaching. 
P r i e s t l y r e l i g i o n , on the other hand, sees that sin i s more 
deeply ingrained and cannot be dealt with by exhortation. I t can 
also allow f o r two d i s t i n c t i o n s which were l a t e r to be made, and to 
become very important, i n Western Catholicism. The f i r s t i s that 
between material s i n - every s i n f u l act; and formal sin - a s i n f u l act 
which i s due to the conscious personal choice of the agent. The 
second i s that between the 'vitium' of sin - the e v i l e n t a i l from the 
environment and from past s i n f u l acts which renders the agent unable 
to choose d i f f e r e n t l y ; and the 'reatus' of s i n - that sinfulness of 
which the agent i s personally g u i l t y . Broadiy speaking the prophets 
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saw a l l s i n as formal and involving 1reatus', and took l i t t l e account 
of material sin and the 'vitium' which t a i n t s l i f e l i k e a disease. 
But P r i e s t l y r e l i g i o n did see the r e a l i t y of material sin and the 
'vitium', and i t provided, i n the s a c r i f i c i a l cultus, some treatment 
f o r i t . "...the p r i e s t l y r e l i g i o n ... treats sin less as a matter 
of personal choice and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y than as a t a i n t or defilement 
with which the sinner i s , as i t were, infected. The t a i n t of sin 
ine v i t a b l y cuts a man o f f from God's favour; but sa c r i f i c e has been 
appointed by God's own merciful ordinance f o r the removal of the t a i n t 
and the restoration of the sinner." (Doctrines of the Creed p 218). 
Furthermore, the p r i e s t l y approach was more humane i n that i t put 
means of atonement w i t h i n the reach of the normal man i n a way that 
the prophets did not. 
In the Few Testament i t i s clear that atonement i s seen as a 
present f a c t through the work of Christ. The question then i s , how 
is that work to be understood? Quick suggests that there are three 
general characteristics of New Testament teaching on the subject which 
must be maintained i n any theory of atonement. F i r s t , "The atoning 
death of Christ i s regarded as inseparable from his risen l i f e ; and 
i t s e f f e c t i n the indi v i d u a l Christian i s inseparable from the g i f t 
of a new l i f e to him." (The Gospel of the New World p 52). I t i s 
in t e r e s t i n g to note that Quick's c r i t i c i s m of the j u r i d i c a l or 
substitutionary view i s that i t overlooks Christ's risen l i f e , whereas 
most other c r i t i c s complain that i t neglects his earthly l i f e . 
Secondly, "... the new l i f e i n i t i a t e s a transformation of man's whole 
being and not merely of that part of i t which i n modern language we 
should c a l l s p i r i t u a l . " ( i b i d p 57)• Thus the new l i f e i s not a 
matter of ' s p i r i t u a l ' experience i n the sense of enjoying inward or 
non-bodily sensations. I t i s rather the whole of man's l i f e quickened 
by the risen humanity of Christ operating through the g i f t of the 
Holy S p i r i t and characterised by 'agape'. F i n a l l y , "Although the 
transformation ... has already begun i n Christians, i t i s s t i l l 
incomplete, and must remain incomplete as long as t h i s world lasts and 
the Christian continues to exist i n i t . " ( i b i d p 6 l ) . Thus eschatology 
i s part of the doctrine of atonement. 
Turning to the usual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 'theories of the 
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a.tonement' he notes four - subjective, classic, j u r i d i c a l and 
s a c r i f i c i a l - though allowing that elements from d i f f e r e n t theories 
are l i k e l y to overlap. On the subjective view he quotes Abelard and 
Rashdall with some approval but points out, again, that more i s needed 
than revelation and example. He i s also rather dismissive i n his 
treatment of the classic approach. Talk of overcoming e v i l powers 
appears objective but i t i s not easy to see how i t i s applied. I f 
the power of sin i s personified and the cross i s seen as v i c t o r y over 
i t then one has the problem of explaining the continuing power of s i n . 
I f , on the other hand, t h i s theory i s simply drawing attention to the 
vi c t o r y of perfect holiness i n the person of Christ, then i t becomes 
another version of the subjective view. The only way to make i t 
objective i s by bringing i n ideas of a ransom paid to Satan, or the 
deception of Satan as by a baited hook, but such approaches are not 
morally acceptable. 
We have thus to choose between the j u r i d i c a l view, i n which 
Christ suffers vicariously, paying a penalty as man's substitute, or 
the s a c r i f i c i a l view. Quick acknowledges the place occupied by the 
j u r i d i c a l view i n the h i s t o r y of the doctrine. But he i s not happy 
with i t . He traces i t s growing prominence to the decline of the 
eschatological note of the New Testament, the sense of new l i f e and 
vic t o r y given to the f a i t h f u l i n the Christian community, together with 
the l e g a l i s t i c tone of Western thought, especially i n the Medieval 
period. The r e s u l t of these two influences i s a growing individualism. 
"Time i s thought of less as the process of events whereby God i s 
bringing t h i s world to an end i n order to establish the glorious and 
perfect universe of the world to come; i t i s thought of more as the 
process by which each individual soul reaches i t s eternal destiny i n 
heaven or h e l l . " ( i b i d p 72). This change of outlook i s accompanied 
by a concern f o r merit i n the confidence of which man can face the 
coming judgement. 
Individualism and legalism are seen as the bases of the j u r i d i c a l 
view. Anselm gave i t i t s classical Medieval expression, seeing Jesus 
as o f f e r i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n and thus clearing man's past account. The 
Reformers kept the legal framework but whereas Anselm and the middle 
ages generally think i n terms of c i v i l law they think i n terms of 
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criminal law. Instead of seeing God as a p l a i n t i f f demanding his 
legal 'satisfaction' i n court, God i s now seen as a judge and man as 
the criminal i n the dock. For the second way of thinking Jesus pays 
a f i n e or bears a penalty. 
Quick has several cr i t i c i s m s of t h i s entire way of thought. The 
chief one, to which we have now referred several times, i s that the 
New Testament sense of the Christian becoming part of a community, and, 
with the community, being involved i n a process which i s moving towards 
future f u l f i l m e n t , i s l o s t . Merit can only deal with the past. I f 
a transfer were possible i t would only a v a i l f o r sins which w i l l have 
been committed. There i s no o f f e r of help f o r l i f e . S i milarly a 
punishment borne can be understood as dealing with past sins, wiping 
the slate clean as i t were, but not as giving power to overcome e v i l 
i n the future. Luther, he agrees, does have the idea of the defeat of 
tyrants. "But he did not, l i k e St, Paul, emphasise the close connection 
between the new l i f e imparted through the atonement and the resurrection 
l i f e of the world to come. ... On the whole then i t cannot be said 
that the effect of the Reformation was to restore the gospel of the 
atonement as i t appears i n the New Testament." ( i b i d p 81f). One 
might argue that Quick's statement of the case i s hardly f a i r either 
to Anselm or to Luther, both of whom did attempt to provide f o r the 
future, however the c r i t i c i s m of the j u r i d i c a l view i s weighty. 
Apart from i t s i n a b i l i t y to f i t i n which t h i s broader view of 
God's purpose, the j u r i d i c a l view i s open to other objections. As 
we have noted before i t puts too much weight on the manhood of Christ. 
He i s almost seen as wresting something from God. The whole idea of 
the work of atonement proceeding from God's love tends to be obscured. 
Furthermore the idea of 'penal' substitution cannot be accepted i f 
'Substitution' i s s t r i c t l y understood. I t i s not possible to consider 
that Christ's sufferings were the same as sinners would have had to 
endure, or the unrepentant w i l l yet endure. Of what could such 
sufferings consist? Again, one f o r whom a substitute acts i s affected 
only negatively, he i s relieved of something but otherwise goes on as 
before. I t i s hard to believe that any Christian has every r e a l l y 
believed t h i s . " I n so f a r as there was any rea l s u b s t i t u t i o n , the 
purpose of the c r u c i f i x i o n must have been that the sinner might be 
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unaffected by the cross, except i n so f a r as he would be released 
from enduring the penalty f o r s i n . But no Christian can seriously 
a f f i r m that the cross had any such purpose." (Doctrines of the Creed 
p 229). I n f a c t there was an effe c t of the cross f o r the Christian 
i n the new l i f e of fellowship with God. 
He i s obliged to admit that the New Testament does sometimes 
seem to speak of Christ as the sin-bearer enduring a penalty. Here 
we come to the crux of the argument as f a r as he i s concerned. These 
passages were wrongly given a legal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and were allowed, 
as i t were, to dictate the meaning of other passages which should have 
been understood i n a s a c r i f i c i a l sense. The great mistake has been 
to merge the j u r i d i c a l and s a c r i f i c i a l views, and to understand the 
purpose of s a c r i f i c e as penal substitution. When Paul uses 
s a c r i f i c i a l language he should not be understood j u r i d i c a l l y . 
Conversely, "... whenever he or any other New Testament w r i t e r 
suggests that Christ bore our sins or the penalty f o r them, the implied 
thought about the atonement i s j u r i d i c a l , and i s r e a l l y i r r e l e v a n t 
to the religious ideas which underlay the sin-offerings of the 
Pentateuch." ( i b i d p 227). I n f a c t , as we sh a l l see him argue l a t e r , 
the s a c r i f i c i a l animals did not bear the penalty of s i n . The New 
Testament apparently connects s a c r i f i c e and penal substitution on the 
basis of Isaiah 53» But i n that passage the connection i s obscure 
since s a c r i f i c e i s not c l e a r l y i n mind u n t i l v 10. I n f a c t , he 
argues, the two ideas are only d e f i n i t e l y joined together i n one New 
Testament passage, and that an allusion to Isaiah 53sl2 i n Hebrews 
9:28, "... an epi s t l e which no where else speaks of Christ as s i n -
bearer but confines i t s e l f to s a c r i f i c i a l language." (The Gospel of 
the New World p 100). 
What then can we make of those hints of a j u r i d i c a l view and of 
penal substitution which are found i n the New Testament? I n 'Doctrines 
of the Creed' he i s content to say that we must not i n t e r p r e t the 
idea of Christ suffering instead of us with any l o g i c a l exactness. 
He i s to be taken as our representative not our substitute, and t h i s 
l i n e of thought i s best subsumed under the s a c r i f i c i a l view. He 
suffers vicariously and thus allows the moral demand of j u s t i c e , and 
also moves the sinner to repentance. What he suffered was on our 
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behalf, but the repentant sinner must s t i l l suffer f o r himself, 
though "What he has to suffer henceforth i s transformed from mere 
punishment int o a d i s c i p l i n e gladly accepted because by i t he i s made 
one with Christ." (op c i t p 230). Though Quick has to allow that 
such a presentation of the j u r i d i c a l theory i s incomplete since i t 
remains 'subjective' working by the influence which the cross exerts 
on men rather than by any objective action. 
Later, i n 'The Gospel of the New World', without materially 
changing his position, he suggests that one can ref e r to Christ's 
death as penal, but not as substitutionary. The Old Testament, he 
suggests, speaks of the holy death of a s a c r i f i c i a l v i c t i m and the 
unholy and penal death of a criminal. S i n f u l man has become incapable 
of the f i r s t and i s doomed to the second. Jesus by becoming man and 
dying as a man transformed the common and unholy death of s i n f u l man 
into the holy death of s a c r i f i c e . 
Thus, as we shall see, Quick allows a l o t which would normally 
be considered under the j u r i d i c a l view to be included under the 
s a c r i f i c i a l one. This i s probably quite r i g h t , but i t i l l u s t r a t e s 
again the confusion he gets himself in t o by over-subtle analysis 
r i g i d l y adhered t o . I n his discussion of the j u r i d i c a l view on i t s 
own, before he has moved on to the s a c r i f i c i a l one, he shows himself 
at h i s most a n a l y t i c a l and, I think, most annoying. While he admits 
on several occasions that Paul probably did not make neat d i s t i n c t i o n s , 
he i n s i s t s on making and fo r c i n g them. This we read, "But, i f he... 
(Paul)...had been pressed on the point, he would not, I think, have 
hesitated to declare that i t i s God's love which i n Christ has provided 
a way of deliverance from his own wrath. He would c e r t a i n l y have 
agreed that we must i n t e r p r e t a l l j u r i d i c a l language about the atone-
ment i n the l i g h t of the p r i n c i p l e that both the cross and i t s effects 
are the work of God's own love." ( i b i d p 227). And l a t e r , regarding 
the j u r i d i c a l and s a c r i f i c i a l views, "... i t i s probable that St. 
Paul never made any clear d i s t i n c t i o n i n his own mind between the two." 
( i b i d p 229). We also f i n d i n t h i s discussion his habit of not 
being content to argue that a certain position i s wrong, but, 
patronisingly, going on to explain what i t s exponents r e a l l y meant by 
i t . I n t h i s vein he w i l l not allow other, perhaps l i v e l i e r , 
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understandings of the theories he dismisses, largely apparently 
because they are ruled out by the analysis which he has imposed. 
The chief c r i t i c i s m of Quick here must be that i t i s not enough 
simply to f i n d out what j u r i d i c a l or s a c r i f i c i a l terminology should 
mean i n some ideal theological world. The important thing i s how 
these ideas were used. And i n use, even i n the Bible, there was 
probably a good deal of confusion and overlapping of ideas. 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y he acknowledges t h i s as he goes on to set out the 
s a c r i f i c i a l theory. 
Here, f o r Quick, i s the true basis f o r understanding the atonement. 
I t i s , he argues, the only theory found i n the New Testament, I t can 
draw within i t s e l f the important elements of t r u t h found i n the other 
theories without t h e i r admixture of error, and, f o r him the most 
important point, i t enables the expression of the eschatological note 
found i n the New Testament, the idea of the redeemed community bound 
f o r heaven. Thus he writes, " I venture to suggest that what theology 
needs i s a careful rethinking and restatement of a theory of the 
atonement which i s fundamentally s a c r i f i c i a l rather than j u r i d i c a l -
a theory which finds i t s s t a r t i n g point i n the only theory of the 
atonement which the New Testament presents, v i z . that of Hebrews." 
(The Gospel of the New World p 94) • I t i s somewhat strange that he 
nowhere refers to another notable attempt to use the theology of 
s a c r i f i c e f o r both atonement and sacraments which i s found i n the work 
of P.C.N. Hicks. But Hicks' book 'The Fulness of S a c r i f i c e 1 (1930), 
i s included i n the Bibliography of 'Doctrines of the Creed' and he 
seems to assume many of the conclusions of Hicks' B i b l i c a l work on 
the meaning of s a c r i f i c e . 
What then does he see as the essence of the theory of Hebrews 9? 
"The real i n t e n t i o n of the old sacrifices f o r s i n was that the blood 
of an unblemished v i c t i m , representing a stainless l i f e offered to 
God i n death, might be applied so as to remove defilements caused by 
si n , i n order that man might draw near to God i n worship, and 
communion between man and God be established." (Doctrines of the 
Creed p 233). 
His doctrine of man, outlined above, was that man was created 
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i n God's image i n order to f i n d f u l f i l m e n t i n o f f e r i n g himself 
t o t a l l y to God. Even apart from sin t h i s seems to demand something 
analagous to death. Following the intrusion of sin i t becomes 
impossible f o r man to make t h i s s e l f - o f f e r i n g , both because his 
ingrained pride rebelled against i t , and also because the effec t of 
sin was to render man's l i f e unworthy of being so offered. Henceforth 
man's death could not be a pure o f f e r i n g but i s instead the penal 
death of a criminal. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the s a c r i f i c i a l cultus was 
provided by God as a means of dealing with s i n by removing i t s d e f i l e -
ment and making atonement possible. The blameless l i f e of the animal 
v i c t i m represented what man knew he should o f f e r but could not, and 
the blood of the v i c t i m , representing i t s pure l i f e , was applied to 
man to expiate his s i n . 
Yet the offerings of the cultus were i n s u f f i c i e n t . God asked 
of man a voluntary o f f e r i n g of a pure l i f e , and such an o f f e r i n g had 
to be complete. The s a c r i f i c i a l animals were pure, but t h e i r p u r i t y 
was, as i t were, accidental. They had not had to overcome temptation 
i n moral struggle such as man knew. And they were not voluntary. 
Nevertheless, inadequate as they were, they were the best that man 
could do i n his present s i n f u l state. Even i f a man offered his own 
l i f e that would not s a t i s f y the condition of p u r i t y , and because of 
his sin his death would have a penal qu a l i t y . Jesus, however, i s 
able to o f f e r a sinless l i f e v o l u n t a r i l y . "The new revelation i n 
Jesus Christ i s t h i s . The perfect s a c r i f i c e must be a perfectly 
sinless p r i e s t - v i c t i m self-offered i n a voluntary death, as Hebrews 
so c a r e f u l l y argues. But - here i s the new thing - t h i s perfect 
s a c r i f i c e can only be achieved by the divine l i f e which i n Jesus has 
shown i t s e l f w i l l i n g to share the u t t e r l y unholy death of the criminal 
which i s the penalty f o r sin . Thus the u t t e r l y unholy and common 
death which i s the due fate of a l l men, i s i t s e l f by Christ's love 
transformed i n his own case into the e n t i r e l y holy death of perfect 
s a c r i f i c e . " (The Gospel of the New World p 101). He thus draws 
together the ideas of penal and s a c r i f i c i a l death. 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the atonement has not been as i n f l u e n t i a l 
i n the h i s t o r y of Christian thought as i t has deserved to be f o r two 
main reasons. F i r s t there has been the misunderstanding of the 
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meaning of s a c r i f i c e . When the church was no longer f a m i l i a r with 
s a c r i f i c e i t mistakenly supposed that the offerers g u i l t was trans-
ferred to the v i c t i m which then, as a substitute, bore the punishment 
due i n order that God might be p r o p i t i a t e d . "... whereas the t r u t h 
was that the v i c t i m could only be sacrificed or offered to God because 
i t was thought not to be contaminated with the offerer's sins, and 
that i n the ceremonies of atonement the use of blood s i g n i f i e d the 
expiation or washing away or 'Covering' of sin by a sinless l i f e which 
i n dying had been offered to and accepted by God, This, quite c l e a r l y , 
i s the thought of Hebrews." ( i b i d p 101). Thus one must not think i n 
terms of p r o p i t i a t i o n - that i s that the s a c r i f i c e was directed 
towards God to cause him to change his a t t i t u d e towards the sinner 
from one of wrath to one of mercy, but of expiation - that i s the 
s a c r i f i c e was directed towards the defilement of sin to remove i t and 
make communion with God a p o s s i b i l i t y . Here Quick i s dependent on 
the work of C.H. Dodd on the meaning of tXo^ff'^'Cff'&A^' 
Secondly, t h i s approach has been neglected because of the austere 
nature of the thought of the e p i s t l e to the Hebrews i n which i t i s 
found. I n another context Quick describes Hebrews as the most 
reli g i o u s book i n the New Testament. He explains his use of the word 
'religious' thus, "Hebrews i s marked out among a l l the books of the 
Bible by the i n t e r e s t which i t shows i n man's approach to God, whereas 
elsewhere the main emphasis i s l a i d upon God's approach to men." 
(Doctrines of the Creed p 113n). We do not f i n d i n Hebrews a great 
stress on love, either of the Father or of the Son. Thus the theory 
of Hebrews remains narrowly s a c r i f i c i a l . I t does not keep the t r u t h 
of the j u r i d i c a l view that Christ i n dying did also, i n love, bear 
the penalty of s i n . The Church, r i g h t l y Quick implies, noted t h i s 
lack, and preferred to look f o r i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of atonement to 
the words of Paul or John where the element of divine love i s more 
prominent. Thus i n using the s a c r i f i c i a l theory from Hebrews t h i s 
connection of Christ's s e l f - s a c r i f i c e with the love of God has to be 
supplied. But t h i s does not require a major operation or detract 
from the advantages of t h i s approach. 
1. cf Dodd Romans pp 54ff; and J.T.S. Vol XXXII pp 352-360. 
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With t h i s modification we see that i n t h i s theory manhood i s 
able to do i n Jesus what i t was o r i g i n a l l y intended to do, s a c r i f i c e 
i t s e l f e n t i r e l y to God and receive from him i n the resurrection the 
more glorious l i f e which was always God's int e n t i o n f o r man. This 
new, risen and g l o r i f i e d humanity, which i s an a c t u a l i t y only i n Jesus, 
is imparted to his followers who thereby partake of the world to come 
and receive power to complete t h e i r own s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . For i t i s 
important to see that the new l i f e they are given involves them i n a 
willingness to share the common l o t of sinners, as he did, up to a 
common death. The blood of Christ, therefore, i s seen as both 
expiating s i n and releasing the power of a new l i f e of perfect 
obedience. This l i f e means i n the Christian, as i t meant i n his l o r d , 
a l i f e of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e to God and his purpose. 
A great advantage of t h i s view i s that i t keeps, as no other can, 
the advantages of other theories. "Sin indeed, being e v i l , cannot 
be offered to God; but the penalty f o r s i n , when v o l u n t a r i l y accepted 
by the sinless out of love f o r the sinner, may be; f o r t h i s acceptance 
changes the very act of undergoing the penalty in t o the holy s e l f -
s a c r i f i c e which God's love accepts as such. ... (thus)... we can fuse 
the s a c r i f i c i a l and j u r i d i c a l and Abelardian interpretations ... into 
a single theory, and we can include and reconcile together the language 
of a l l three." (The Gospel of the New World p 104f). Thus i t seems 
that Christ i n dying bears the penalty of s i n as a man, as a l l men 
must i n death, but he does not bear i t instead of others. By o f f e r i n g 
his penal death as a s a c r i f i c e and shedding his blood he makes 
available, through his blood, a means of cleansing f o r others as the 
s a c r i f i c i a l animals had. Equally important, the shed blood represents 
the l i f e of the v i c t i m now made available to others. The blood i n 
t h i s vievr of s a c r i f i c e i s taken to mean the l i f e released and offered, 
rather than the death of the v i c t i m . Though cl e a r l y i t i s a l i f e 
offered through death. 
I f Quick's statement of the s a c r i f i c i a l view i s accepted the way 
i s open f o r manhood to return to the purpose of God from which i t had 
f a l l e n . As he began his thinking on the subject from the doctrine of 
man, he i s obliged to conclude with a consideration of eschatology. 
Can any more be said of the conclusion of God's purpose both with man 
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and with the rest of creation? 
Here again he distinguishes the Hebraic view, which sees God as 
bringing about his purpose through h i s t o r i c a l events, from the Platonic 
or H e l l e n i s t i c one, which does not think of a goal of history but 
conceives of God as perfect r e a l i t y outside of and veiled by creation 
and experience. Though there are traces of Platonism i n Hebrews and 
John, and c e r t a i n l y i t became very i n f l u e n t i a l i n Christian thinking at 
a very early point, i t i s clear that the New Testament keeps a basically 
Hebraic approach and we must think of God's purpose being worked out i n 
a temporal sequence leading to judgement. However, the idea of 
judgement must be kept subordinate to that of purpose. Similarly, 
though i t i s t r a d i t i o n a l to speak of 'last things', the idea of ' l a s t ' 
here must also be understood i n the context of purpose. That i s , i t 
must be seen as that which completes the purpose and gives meaning to 
the r e s t . But the previous parts also have t h e i r important place. 
The f i n i s h i n g touches of a work of a r t are the l a s t parts which give 
meaning to the whole, but the entire work depends also on the previous 
touches to make i t s point. 
For individuals the end of God's purpose i s t o t a l s e l f - s a c r i f i c e 
to him. I n the physical world that i s impossible apart from death. 
Death thus becomes sacramental of the completed s a c r i f i c e . Choices 
made before death decide man's f i n a l destiny, but his progress may 
not be complete at death. The Christian speaks of t h i s f i n a l destiny 
as a resurrection. Quick traces the h i s t o r y of the idea of resurrection 
and i s keen to distinguish i t from immortality seen as mere prolongation 
of l i f e , or from nature myths. I t means f o r him true l i f e restored 
by God through s a c r i f i c e . "The f i n a l winning of l i f e , .which issues 
from the f i n a l giving up, constitutes and reconstitutes i n glory the 
eternal wholeness of the self and personality. This i s the essential 
meaning of resurrection f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . ... And the f i n a l issue 
of death, which resurrection symbolises, i s a supra-temporal 
reconstitution of the whole se l f f i n a l l y surrendered to God - a 
condition i n which the whole temporal h i s t o r y of the se l f i s included 
as somehow present." ( i b i d p 113). 
Hov/ever God's purpose i s not only f o r individuals, and need not 
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be only f o r the human race. God, a f t e r a l l , created an entire 
universe and may he presumed to have some purpose f o r a l l of i t . 
Prom his e a r l i e s t writings Quick keeps the idea of God being present 
t o , or i n s p i r i n g , the whole of creation. The uniqueness of his 
presence i n Christ does not rule out the r e a l i t y of his presence i n 
the rest of creation. I t i s p l a i n from the t i t l e of his l a s t work 
that Quick wishes to speak of the proleptic inauguration of a renewed 
world order. Unfortunately t h i s i s never worked out. Perhaps i t i s 
a l i n e of thought which cannot be adequately stated but simply i n t u i t e d 
or conveyed by h i n t s . 
Quick gives hints on two levels. He speaks r e g r e t f u l l y of the 
church's disengagement from public l i f e at the time of the Reformation. 
Luther, he argues, stressed personal piety and other-worldliness, and, 
though Calvin t r i e d to subordinate the state to the church, from the 
Reformation onwards r e l i g i o n became simply one aspect of man's l i f e 
among others. Quick regrets t h i s and urges the church to seek to 
penetrate a l l areas of l i f e and to seek to make a l l l i f e holy and 
worthy of God. I n a f a l l e n world, however, t h i s could never be 
t o t a l l y successful, thus his second set of hi n t s . The church must 
o f f e r i t s e l f to God, and the individual Christian must o f f e r himself, 
as Christ did, on the world's behalf. I n doing t h i s "... the Christian 
may believe that i n and through Christ's s e l f - s a c r i f i c e the s e l f -
s a c r i f i c e of other men f o r t h e i r fellows has atoning value f o r the 
f i n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the world to God." ( i b i d p 114). I n support 
of t h i s he suggests that when Jesus c a l l s upon his followers to be the 
s a l t of the earth, s a l t i s used as a symbol f o r s a c r i f i c e . By t h e i r 
s a c r i f i c e Christians are to consecrate a l l creation as an o f f e r i n g 
to God. 
This could be said to lead to universalism. Quick points out 
i n several places that universalism has good B i b l i c a l support, i t i s 
not based on humanitarian principles alone. I t might also be argued 
that i t i s the ultimate assertion of God's sovereignty that his purpose 
should f i n a l l y and f u l l y triumph. But the Bible provides stronger 
support f o r the an t i - u n i v e r s a l i s t position, though not f o r a doctrine 
of eternal punishment. I t seems therefore that God, having given 
man freedom, demands a w i l l i n g personal response. A negative response 
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must therefore be a p o s s i b i l i t y . While a Christian might hope f o r 
universal salvation to be true, he cannot advance i t as a theological 
doctrine. 
Man's response to the work of atonement - both his reception of 
what has been done f o r him and his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o f f e r i n g of 
Christ, that i s his own s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , leads to a consideration of 
the church and sacraments. Of 'The Christian Sacraments', Mozley 
suggests that here, "Quick may be said to have reached the height of 
his powers. I t i s the most important contribution to sacramental 
theology which has come from the Church of England during the present 
century..." (op c i t p 7). Horton Davies describes i t as "The 
century's classic philosophical and theological study of the theme..." 
(op c i t p 310). Yet i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to notice that Quick pays no 
attention to the h i s t o r i c a l origins of either the church or the 
sacraments. Even i n 'Liberalism Modernism and Tradition', and 
'Catholic and Protestant Elements i n C h r i s t i a n i t y ' , where he contrasts 
t r a d i t i o n s which appeal to his t o r y with those which concentrate on 
evolution and development, he does not deal with how or why the church 
actually came into being and the sacraments were i n s t i t u t e d . The 
great work 'The Christian Sacraments' i s confessedly a philosophical 
treatment. He p r a c t i c a l l y refuses to consider what happened i n the 
Upper Room at Jesus' l a s t supper with his disciples, suggesting, 
rather dismissively, "Narrow pedantry and unimaginative l i t e r a l i s m i n 
exegesis have ever been chief obstacles to the understanding of the 
mind of Jesus. I t i s only when we consider what He has been and i s 
i n the h i s t o r y of human l i f e and thought, that we can hope i n some 
degree to enter into His mind, and so to give a true exposition of 
His meaning and intent i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r words and acts." (op c i t p 188). 
This seems to overlook completely the p o s s i b i l i t y of a more responsible 
and imaginative exegesis. So we have a treatment of church and 
sacraments i n which both are accepted as 'given', they are simply there, 
parts of the Christian l i f e . Indeed he i s nearly h a l f way through 
the book before we have a d e f i n i t i o n of a sacrament. 
Basic to his whole treatment i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between- a 
symbolic and an instrumental approach. Given that outward r e a l i t i e s 
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are related to inwa,rd r e a l i t i e s , the r e l a t i o n can he either symbolic 
i n that i t symbolises, s i g n i f i e s or expresses a t r u t h by conveying 
suggestions through the emotions or i n t e l l e c t , (Quick seems to use 
'symbolise 1, ' s i g n i f y 1 , or 'express' v i r t u a l l y interchangeably); or 
i t can be instrumental i n that outward r e a l i t y i s a t o o l which effects 
some purpose. "Instrumentality i s the r e l a t i o n of a thing to that 
which i s effected by i t ; significance the r e l a t i o n of a thing to that 
which i s suggested by i t . Instrumentality i s the special property 
of acts, extended to cover that with which the action i s performed. 
Significance i s the special property of language, extended to cover 
a l l that i s used as expressive." ( i b i d p 12). 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s an abstraction, probably no individual would 
hold completely to one side of i t and t o t a l l y exclude the other. 
Yet, as an abstraction, i t usefully indicates d i f f e r e n t s p i r i t u a l 
approaches. The symbolic approach tends to see the whole world as 
symbolic or sacramental of the presence of God within or behind i t . 
I t s characteristic mood i s contemplation. The instrumental approach 
tends to dualism, seeing God as d i s t i n c t from the world but intervening 
i n certain specific acts or r i t e s . Here the characteristic mood 
would be an ethical response or p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
Unfortunately, though he says that the d i s t i n c t i o n must not be 
forced, Quick himself seems to force i t too f a r . He wants to argue 
that the t y p i c a l Catholic approach to sacraments i s instrumental, 
stressing what i s actually done by them; while the t y p i c a l Protestant 
approach i s symbolic, making them a kind of acted parable or sermon 
explaining what i s i n any case the t r u t h . As a rough generalisation 
on. one point t h i s might do. But i f i t i s carried too f a r i t can be 
confusing or even f a l s e . For instance i t i s generally the Protestant 
who i s most inclined to stress the importance of specific h i s t o r i c a l 
acts of revelation, while the Catholic i s most inclined to see the 
incarnation as expressing what i s always true of God's a t t i t u d e to the 
world. This also i s a generalisation, but i t i s generally true. 
Thus Catholic or Protestant can appear on either side of the d i s t i n c t i o n , 
making the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f less clear, and perhaps less useful than 
Quick appears to think. I n f a c t he goes on to argue that both 
emphases are given t h e i r proper weight i n his own 'catholic' approach. 
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This may be time, but he does not help his case by f o r c i n g an a n t i -
thesis apparently i n order to make the subsequent synthesis appear 
more impressive. 
Having made the d i s t i n c t i o n Quick moves on to consider the l i f e 
of Christ as the central and supreme sacrament. I n him we see both 
the symbolic and the instrumental aspects. For C h r i s t i a n i t y the 
incarnation i s unique, i t must not be taken simply as support f o r a 
vague idea of divine immanence, "... to i n t e r p r e t the l i f e of Jesus as 
the supreme sacrament i s to show that i n t h i s outward, h i s t o r i c a l l i f e 
l i v e d i n space and time there i s both uniquely expressed and uniquely 
operative the highest purpose of goodness which a l l l i f e and nature 
are destined to f u l f i l . " ( i b i d p 57)o The symbolic aspect i s shown 
i n Jesus' l i f e which, Quick argues, embodies the values of beauty, 
goodness and t r u t h , the threefold d i v i s i o n of abolute goodness. The 
instrumental aspect i s shown i n the work of atonement. Here the 
p r i n c i p l e of redemption through loss, which Quick traces i n other spheres, 
i s uniquely operative. For though both incarnation and death are 
described as unique, they are not a l i e n " to the rest of experience. 
Quick accepts that both the values which he finds summed up i n Jesus, 
and the view of atonement as advance through loss, may be known to us 
through God's general concern f o r his creation; his 'inspiration* which 
may be seen i n a l l genuine goodness; and his purpose which must he held 
as permeating and undergirding the whole of creation. "... the 
affirmation that Jesus Christ i s the Incarnate Son i s based upon the 
acknowledgement that His l i f e uniquely represents to us the divine 
purpose operative i n the whole world of our experience." ( i b i d p 102). 
Accepting Christ's l i f e as the supreme sacrament, and the unique-
ness of his l i f e and work as expressive of general principles available 
to us elsewhere i n our experience, a sacrament i n the more generally 
accepted sense of the term could be an extension both of the incarnation 
and of the atonement. I n f a c t anything which helps us to see God's 
purpose f o r the world and to co-operate with i t may be called a 
sacrament. I n practice however we tend to l i m i t our use of the word 
i n at least two ways. F i r s t , a sacrament i s a representative member 
of a class, or a part of a whole. This idea of representation i s 
very important f o r Quick, and he gives various i l l u s t r a t i o n s of i t . 
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Thus Sunday i s i n t h i s sense a representative day, a church i s a 
representative place. The idea i s that the member chosen should 
represent the ideal relationship of the whole class to God, and be a 
means of establishing that relationship. Certain days and places are 
declared holy, and thus separated from other days and places, i n order 
to indicate that a l l times and a l l places are i d e a l l y holy, but also, 
by t h e i r use, to make that ideal e f f e c t i v e . Thus, i n the supreme 
example, Jesus' manhood i s separated from other manhood to represent 
what manhood i d e a l l y i s and to enable others to reach the id e a l . 
Secondly, the use of the word i s normally l i m i t e d to certain 
r i t u a l acts. A f u l l e r d e f i n i t i o n should be, "... a r i t u a l act, using 
a certain form and matter, which both represents some universal r e l a t i o n 
of human l i f e to God through Christ, and also, i n thus representing 
a l l l i f e , makes l i f e worthy to be thus represented." Understood l i k e 
t h i s , "... a l l sacraments are t r u l y extensions, interpretations, 
applications, of the l i f e of Jesus Christ i n Whom the meaning of a l l 
i s summed up, and from Whom they derive t h e i r effective power." 
( i b i d pp 108, 110). 
I t i s an aberration to t r e a t the sacraments magically as the only 
means whereby that p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to God can be made r e a l . The 
safeguard against t h i s i s to stress t h e i r representative character. 
They do not in s e r t something from outside, but e l i c i t something which 
i s i n any case true. "The action of a sacrament therefore must be 
always siich as to e l i c i t from man what he has i t i n him to be. And 
because man can only become i n fulness of growth that same thing which 
i n germ he already i s , the sacraments do t h e i r work of e l i c i t i n g p a r t l y 
by representing to man his ideal r e l a t i o n to God as a universal t r u t h 
already realised, which he only needs f a i t h to apprehend." ( i b i d p 115)• 
However, they do not simply represent r e a l i t i e s , they actualise them. 
They are effectual means i n the process by which the r e a l i t i e s come 
about. Thus the symbolic and instrumental aspects are both kept, 
though now one and now the other may be dominant. 
Of the individual sacraments, he gives a largely symbolic i n t e r -
pretation of baptism and a more instrumental one of the eucharist. 
His treatment of baptism i s rather b r i e f . He implies that when i t 
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was applied only to adults the instrumental aspect would have been 
more prominent, "but, accepting that i t i s now largely applied to 
infants that i s no longer the case. An example of his accepting the 
sacraments as they now are i n the church rather than considering t h e i r 
o r i g i n and histo r y . 
Baptism now i s the sacrament of divine fatherhood. Ideas of 
ablution and resurrection are involved, but these are best seen as 
f u l f i l m e n t of what i s means to be a c h i l d of God. I t i s not asserted 
that God i s ' w i l y - n i l y ' the father of a l l men. Quick prefers the 
metaphor of kingship f o r God's r e l a t i o n to a l l man, but fatherhood may 
be said to be his purpose. Looked at from the other point of view, 
a l l are subject to God whether they w i l l i t or not, yet they are also 
p o t e n t i a l l y his children. Baptism symbolises the t r a n s i t i o n from the 
f i r s t relationship to the second. I t does not establish a privileged 
position since, i n l i n e with his ideas of representation, the separate-
ness of the c h i l d of God i s measured by his capacity to represent 
what i s p o t e n t i a l l y true of a l l men. 
Quick's aversion f o r the instrumental i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of baptism 
i s based on his uneasiness about the doctrine of o r i g i n a l s i n and the 
complicated arguments about the effect of baptism upon i t . I t i s 
simply not true to experience, he argues, that baptism removes o r i g i n a l 
s i n . Presumably he means there i s no necessary observable moral 
difference between the baptised and non-baptised. Therefore i t i s 
easier to speak of baptism as symbolising more than i t effects, 
symbolising the beginning of a process which continues throughout l i f e . 
This brings i t i n l i n e with the moral teaching of the epistles where 
Christians are t o l d that they are now risen with Christ, but are also 
given p r a c t i c a l moral advice. 
However he seems reluctant to abandon instrumentality completely, 
and f i n a l l y settles f o r a l i m i t e d instrumental element i n the bringing 
of the c h i l d into the Christian community. Thus, having stressed the 
symbolism, he writes, "Nevertheless Baptism i s i t s e l f a c r i t i c a l and 
decisive moment i n the process of which i t i s the symbol. I t marks 
and characterises the soul as God's c h i l d and member of his family, so 
that a l l i t s subsequent growth i n God's gxace i s but an e l i c i t i n g or 
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bringing to l i g h t of what i t s baptism implied." ( i b i d p 179)• He 
never, as f a r as 1 am aware, says what these marks and characteristics 
of the soul are. Presumably they should distinguish the baptised 
from the unbaptised or, since the sacrament i s not the only means 
whereby the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to God i s made r e a l , the Christian from 
the non-Christian. He sees that i n the New Testament period such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n seemed possible, indeed expected. The g i f t s of the s p i r i t 
seem more sudden i n t h e i r appearance, as they often s t i l l are i n 
missionary situations. However, the change i n the church's s i t u a t i o n 
must be accompanied by a change of emphasis i n i t s theology, hence 
the chief stress now must be on the symbolic aspect. 
One has the impression that he was anxious to deal with baptism 
as b r i e f l y as could decently be managed before moving on to the 
eucharist. Here he writes at much greater length and v/ith more 
apparent f e e l i n g . As with baptism there i s a symbolic aspect here. 
The acts of o f f e r i n g and communion are symbolical. But whereas 
baptism i s concerned with something once symbolised and then worked 
out, the eucharist i s "... the constantly repeated act from which the 
soul draws i t s s p i r i t u a l food." ( i b i d p 186). As such i t must do 
something now i n the present f o r the believer. Thus symbolism i s not 
enough. At times he writes as i f symbolism can pass into instrument-
alism.by being raised to a higher power, "The symbolisation of a past 
f a c t , i f i t be t r u l y expressive, must always i n some sense bridge the 
gulf of time, make the past present, and actually convey the r e a l i t y 
of that which i t commemorates. And we may well believe that i n the 
Eucharistic action, proceeding from the l i v i n g Christ Who was dead, 
t h i s power of the expressive symbol i s raised to i t s highest point." 
( i b i d p 203). More usually he simply joins the two ideas, " I n the 
Eucharist, therefore, symbolic meaning and actual effe c t are more and 
more joined and fused together without any predominance of one or 
subordination of the others. I n i t , therefore, there must be a real 
presence of the Lord d i f f e r e n t from that which i s found i n any other 
sacrament." ( i b i d p 187)o 
We noted that he does not spend much time on questions of his t o r y . 
As f a r as he i s concerned the question i s not so much whether our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sacrament i s precisely what Jesus meant at the 
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Last Supper, but whether i t i s consonant with his whole l i f e and work. 
With a l l men what i s consciously i n the f i e l d of attention at any one 
time i s not the whole of the man's attention. Thus our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Jesus' words and actions may be richer and, i n a sense, truer than 
even he intended at the time. "... i f we thus f i n d i n them a meaning 
which goes beyond what many conceive to have been the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
our Lord's conscious knowledge before His Crucifixion, we can s t i l l 
maintain that t h i s meaning nevertheless was i n a true sense i n the 
Lord's mind, and that one great purpose of the sending of the Holy 
S p i r i t was to enable us to exhibit ever fr e s h l y the riches of meaning 
which were l a t e n t i n what our Lord said and did upon earth." ( i b i d p 19l) 
This seems a c r u c i a l step i n Quick's argument, v i r t u a l l y c u t t i n g him 
a d r i f t from the p o s s i b i l i t y of c r i t i c i s m based on h i s t o r i c a l study 
and exegesis of the New Testament. The central point must always be 
that true communion i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Jesus' s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . This 
can be accepted not simply because he intended i t at the time but 
because i t f i t s i n with his entire purpose. Questions concerning the 
r e l a t i o n of Jesus' person to the elements, or the r e l a t i o n of the 
entire sacrament to the s a c r i f i c e at Calvary cannot be answered by 
reference to His words alone, "...the truest doctrine must always be 
that which enables f a i t h f u l Christians to hold most surely that i n 
the Eucharist, as i n a r i t e symbolising the deepest meaning of a l l 
Christian l i v i n g , they are made partakers of the l i f e offered f o r them 
on Calvary, i n order that i n the end t h e i r communion with that l i f e 
may be f u l f i l l e d i n the open and glorious v i s i o n of t h e i r Saviour 
before the throne of God." ( i b i d p 194). 
Underlying t h i s apparent indifference to hi s t o r y appears to be 
the recognition of two major differences between the Last Supper and 
the Christian sacrament which are themselves h i s t o r i c a l . I n the 
f i r s t place Christians do not now have Christ physically with them as 
the f i r s t disciples did. Second, and much more important, i s the 
re s u l t of t h i s . At the Last Supper the chief idea i n Jesus' mind 
appears to be that of the Messianic Banquet to which he c a l l s his 
disciples. This was i n essence a s p i r i t u a l communion realised through 
bearing the cross. But when achieved i t would be a communion with 
him who was then physically on his way to his own cross. But now the 
si t u a t i o n must be d i f f e r e n t . Christians now are assisted i n t h e i r 
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cross-bearing by partaking of his l i f e which has already conquered. 
What s t i l l lay i n the future f o r Jesus at the Last Supper - his death 
and resurrection - has now happened and must be reckoned with. 
Subsequent observances of the r i t e cannot be the same as the Last 
Supper, but must take account of the Christian's present opportunity 
of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n Christ's work, and partaking of his l i f e , as he 
offers his s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . 
Quick now turns to consider what he takes to be the two major 
problems of eucharistic theology, the ideas of sa c r i f i c e and presence. 
We have seen his ideas on s a c r i f i c e . Man's chief end i s a voluntary 
s e l f - s a c r i f i c e to God. I n so f a r as anything other than himself i s 
offered the in t e n t i o n i s not that the v i c t i m should bear the punish-
ment due to the offerer's sin as his substitute, but rather that i t 
should be a token of his willingness to o f f e r himself, or that the 
p u r i t y of the o f f e r i n g may somehow be communicated to him. I n the 
case of the eucharist then, the purpose must be that the l i f e of 
Christ who died f o r us may be communicated to us, i n order that we 
may o f f e r ourselves with him. God asks f o r the s e l f - s a c r i f i c e of 
each i n d i v i d u a l , but f o r s i n f u l man that i s only possible as he i s 
united with Christ's s a c r i f i c e ; and the s a c r i f i c e which man makes 
i s made, as i t were, by Christ wit h i n him. 
Christ's s a c r i f i c e i s eternal. That i s , i t i s not l i m i t e d to 
his death on Calvary. While f o r man death i s an essential part of 
his s a c r i f i c e that need not be so i f we are thinking of Christ's 
heavenly s e l f - o f f e r i n g . Calvary shows what that eternal s e l f -
o f f e r i n g must mean i n earthly terms. "The Eucharist then i s t r u l y 
a s a c r i f i c e . For i t i s the perpetual externalisation i n human r i t u a l 
of the s e l f - o f f e r i n g of Christ, which was once f o r a l l i n f a c t 
externalised on Calvary, but i s ever real i n the inward and heavenly 
sphere." ( i b i d p 198). However, i t i s clear that, speaking s t r i c t l y 
h i s t o r i c a l l y , Christ's human death i s past. We can only remember 
i t . Yet men cannot complete t h e i r s a c r i f i c e apart from being 
incorporated i n t o his l i f e , and having that l i f e communicated to them. 
And that l i f e includes his human death. "Thus i t i s f i t t i n g and 
necessary that part of the Eucharistic action should be held to 
represent the dying of the Lord on earth; f o r although, when we speak 
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s t r i c t l y i n terms of space and time, that which takes place i n the 
Eucharist i s only a memorial i n r e l a t i o n to the death of Christ, i t s 
purpose i s to renew i n us now by means of His l i f e the' s p i r i t and 
power i n which He died." ( i b i d p 200). 
Quick does not, however, want to go beyond representation to the 
post-Tridentine idea of a real immolation of Christ, though without an 
actual death, i n the Eucharist. He accepts the underlying idea that 
no earthly o f f e r i n g can enter heaven without some radical change, but 
considers the point i s adequately covered by the idea of expressive 
representation. His chief objection to t r a d i t i o n a l Roman teaching 
on the Mass, as d i s t i n c t from the more careful statements of Thomas 
Acquinas, i s that i t overstresses the vicarious element of the work 
of Christ u n t i l i t becomes substitutionary. 
Turning to the nature of Christ's presence i n the eucharist he 
runs through the four t r a d i t i o n a l approaches. Transubstantiation 
and consubstantiation both relate the presence to the consecration 
and f i n d i t i n some connection with the elements; receptionism affirms 
the presence i n the heart of the f a i t h f u l worshipper; and vi r t u a l i s m , 
mediating between the two, finds the presence i n the use of the 
elements i n a certain action. He points out that i n the twentieth 
century i t i s no longer possible to think of material objects as 
having a substantial r e a l i t y d i s t i n c t from t h e i r accidents, or to think 
of the body of Christ actually situated i n heaven, so that he cannot 
be both there and i n the elements. As we have noted several times 
Quick i s not keen to l i m i t God's presence at a l l . As f a r as he i s 
concerned "... whatever i s the organ of Christ's a c t i v i t y i s , so f a r , 
His body." ( i b i d p 208f). I n view of these considerations the 
t r a d i t i o n a l arguments about the mode of Christ's presence have l o s t a 
good deal of t h e i r point. 
His own position i s very close to v i r t u a l i s m . I n t e r e s t i n g l y he 
spends some time c r i t i c i s i n g the restatement of t h i s position made 
by W. Spens i n 'Essays Catholic and C r i t i c a l ' . Spens uses the analogy 
of coinage. Coins are given a value by the decision of the sovereign. 
That value i s not dependent on the i n t r i n s i c worth of the metal of 
which the coins are made. I t depends rather on the decision of the 
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sovereign and i s manifested i n the usage of the coins. Transferring 
t h i s to the eucharist Spens argued that the eucharistic elements are 
given t h e i r value by God and that t h i s does not change t h e i r natural 
properties, but i t changes t h e i r value i n use. 
Quick c r i t i c i s e s Spens1 argument, not so much because i t i s wrong, 
but because i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t . The r e a l i t y of Christ's presence i s 
not given proper weight. In his own terms t h i s remains a symbolic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , not paying s u f f i c i e n t attention to the instrumental 
aspect. I t remains to some extent dependent on our accepting the 
meaning given to the symbols. I n response to i t Quick gives his most 
e x p l i c i t affirmation of the instrumental view. "From the beginning 
a sacrament i s i n p r i n c i p l e something more than a sign of any kind, 
more even than an effectual sign, i f by that term we denote something 
which can only be effectual as a sign, or which i s wholly dependent 
upon i t s significance f o r i t s e f f e c t . A sacrament i s actually an 
instrument whereby God's power operates upon us, not solely through 
the medium of a meaning apprehended by our minds." ( i b i d p 219). 
Thus he moves on to his own view. 
He wants to assert the r e a l i t y of Christ's presence i n the 
elements i n a way which w i l l not deny his presence elsewhere, nor 
depend on the a t t i t u d e or s p i r i t u a l state of the recipient. He thinks 
he can do t h i s by holding the doctrine of Christ's presence i n the 
closest possible connexion with the doctrine of his s e l f - o f f e r i n g 
which we have j u s t outlined. As we saw that s e l f - o f f e r i n g proceeds 
continually and men are summoned to participate i n i t . The Eucharist 
i s , as i t were, the manward point of an action by which Christ reaches 
out to men and, through the church and p a r t i c u l a r l y the eucharist, 
seeks to incorporate them i n his own eternal s e l f - o f f e r i n g . Quick 
outlines t h i s view i n a key passage which I sh a l l quote at length. 
"The Eucharist i s the s e l f - o f f e r i n g of Christ as externalised 
i n human r i t u a l , so that human l i v e s may be incorporated into i t s 
l i v i n g r e a l i t y through communion with Him Who offers and i s offered. 
The action of every Eucharist begins i n the inward and eternal sphere 
where Christ i s seated at the r i g h t hand of God. Christ's action 
then reaches i t s f i r s t stage of externalisation i n His body the Church, 
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which at a given place and time i n the person of i t s p r i e s t solemnly 
offers the bread and wine i n memorial of His passion. The action 
i s thus fu r t h e r externalised and extended into the consecrated bread 
and wine themselves as representing the offered body of Christ's 
manhood. From t h i s furthest or lowest point of externalisation the 
action of the l i v i n g Christ returns back and upwards int o the members 
of His Body the Church as they receive Him i n communion. I n them i t 
brings f o r t h the s p i r i t u a l f r u i t s of t h e i r own s e l f - o f f e r i n g which 
raises them towards heaven i n Christ's power. So the Eucharistic 
action returns i n the end to heaven which was i t s source. Thus 
interpreted, i t consists of a double movement, f i r s t downward and 
outward, then upward and inward. Thus i t re-embodies i n r i t u a l and 
f u l f i l s through the l i f e of the Church that which was f i r s t and 
pe r f e c t l y embodied i n f a c t through the h i s t o r i c a l l i f e of Jesus Christ. 
At every point of the Eucharistic action the whole Christ i s present 
i n that through which He acts; and that through which He acts i s at 
every point His Body as the instrument and expression of His w i l l . " 
( i b i d p 223f). 
I t follows from t h i s that Christ i s r e a l l y present i n the 
elements. Quick accepts t h i s but claims that the presence i s only 
affirmed i n the context of the entire action. Christ i s not localised 
i n the elements as he i s i n the doctrine of Transubstantiation. 
Rather he i s i d e n t i f i e d with them i n so f a r as they are the matter of 
the action i n which he externalises his s e l f - o f f e r i n g to the father, 
and imparts the power of his sacrificed l i f e to men. Behind t h i s 
l i e s Quick's stress on God's continued immanence i n , or i n s p i r a t i o n of, 
a l l creation. The eucharist thus becomes a unique i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
the idea of representation which f o r him underlies a l l sacraments. 
The divine immanence i s focussed there. 
The long quotation above shows the importance of the church i n 
Quick's thinking. I t i s not something he argues about, i t i s simply 
asserted. The church l i n k s the two ideas of the unique incarnation 
of the Logos i n Jesus and what might be called i t s more diffuse 
incarnation, which i s adumbrated though not yet perfec t l y realised, 
i n the whole created universe. The church i s the extension both of 
the incarnation and the atonement. As a human society i t must both 
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permeate the whole of humanity, and o f f e r i t s e l f to God on behalf of 
humanity. 
His discussion of the church i s perhaps the least h e l p f u l and 
most 'dated' aspect of Quick's work. Both i n "The Christian Sacraments' 
and 'Doctrines of the Creed' the discussion turns upon the question 
of the v a l i d i t y of orders and thus, i n his view, the efficacy of 
sacraments. I t i s thus largely a 'Catholic' discussion and has a view 
to prospects of re-union as they appeared at the time. His under-
standing of more 'Reformed' attitudes i s , to say the least, l i m i t e d . 
Nevertheless, w i t h i n i t s l i m i t s i t i s an important section of his 
work, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r i t s bearing on sacraments. 
He traces divisions within the church to d i f f e r e n t ideas of the 
v a l i d i t y of a sacrament which appeared early i n the church's h i s t o r y . 
For the Catholic there are two s t a r t i n g points. There i s the Gyprianic 
view, that a sacrament obtains i t s v a l i d i t y from the church i n which i t 
i s performed; outside t h i s one church a l l sacraments being i n v a l i d . 
On the other hand there i s the Augustinian view that the sacrament gets 
i t s v a l i d i t y from the 'intention' of the one who performs i t , and the 
use of the correct form and matter. Thus a sacrament i s v a l i d i f the 
one performing i t intends to 'do what the church does'. The essentially 
'Catholic' nature of Quick's thinking appears here almost by accident. 
Though Augustine, i f pressed, would allow lay baptism, he expected 
sacraments to be performed by one who at least claimed 'orders'. He 
was i n f a c t involved i n a controversy on the question of 'orders'. 
Quick assumes that t h i s i s the r e a l crux of the problem when he goes 
on to suggest that Anglo-Catholics are forced by circumstances i n t o 
an Augustinian position of claiming that v a l i d sacraments make a v a l i d 
church. The point i s that these sacraments are made v a l i d by the 
f a c t that they are performed by one who i s v a l i d l y ordained. This i s 
cl e a r l y the point at issue when he says that Anglo-Catholics accept 
that Free-Churchmen are able to baptise, and that baptised Free-
Churchmen are members of the church, but f o r them "... those sacraments 
which require a v a l i d l y ordained minister f o r t h e i r v a l i d i t y are lacking 
i n the Free Churches; and therefore, i f the Free Churches are to be 
recognised as parts of the ' v i s i b l e ' Church and so to enter into 
communion with the Church of England, the f i r s t necessity i s that t h e i r 
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Orders should be validated through the h i s t o r i c episcopacy." ( i b i d 
p 138)• However, Free-churchmen, as he notes, do not work with the 
concept of ' v a l i d i t y ' as d i s t i n c t from s p i r i t u a l efficacy. Given 
that t h e i r sacraments are s p i r i t u a l l y e f f e c t i v e , which few Anglo-
Catholics, I think, would deny, they f a i l to see how or why t h e i r 
orders should be called into question. 
I n his own discussion of the problem Quick does not look beyond 
the question of 'orders'. He suggests that two elements need to be 
considered, a s p i r i t u a l power bestowed by God, and authority or 
authorisation from the church. Clearly one may exist without the 
other. A false stress on the Augustinian approach has led to 
confusion and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 'hole i n corner' ordinations by 
bishops apparently cut o f f from the church. This misconceives or 
under-values the aspect of authorisation, and he i s quite clear that i t 
would be wrong to value a priesthood arrived at i n t h i s way above the 
solemn authorisation of a minister by, say, one of the h i s t o r i c 
Calvinist assemblies which does not have the h i s t o r i c episcopate. 
He suggests that a possible solution would be to regard a l l churches 
as i n some sense i n schism, and thus a l l ministries as i n some sense 
defective. Hence he looks forward to some mutual recognition and 
re-authorisation, a path which has i n f a c t been followed. 
I t i s an in t e r e s t i n g discussion, and he i s keen to be f a i r to 
those who take a d i f f e r e n t point of view from his own over t h i s issue. 
However he seems quite unable to take seriously the f a c t that some 
would not want even to begin t h i s sort of discussion since the whole 
question would be meaningless to them. He knows, of course, of the 
existence of such people. He t r i e s to enclose them i n his own 
categories by suggesting that they regard the church as a 'natural 
sacrament', or he speaks of t h e i r ' s p i r i t u a l ' view of the church and 
ministry, - apparently using the word s p i r i t u a l i n a way which leaves 
out order. One cannot help thinking that some acquaintance with the 
fou r t h book of Calvin's I n s t i t u t e s would have given a d i f f e r e n t 
tone to these comments. 
Strangely he has no reference to the work of atonement being 
passed on through scripture or preaching, and seems temperamentally 
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averse to any treatment of the conversion experience, though many 
passages i n his work show great re l i g i o u s f e e l i n g . I t i s as i f the 
very depth of his appreciation of the church at worship i n the 
eucharist has prevented him from taking the work of evangelism with 
the same seriousness. Though he quite frequently speaks of the need 
f o r the church to he involved with the world, he does not analyse 
what he means by t h i s or suggest how i t might be done. 
Ve should now be able to gather together the main strengths and 
weaknesses of his position, which have already been mentioned. 
The great step forward i n Quick's theology, i t s most important 
characteristic, i s i t s sense of completeness. Whereas some thinkers, 
Denney i s perhaps a notable example, give the impression of great 
strength through the persistent advocacy of one key idea, he offers 
a wider view. There seems to be a greater e f f o r t at consistency over 
the whole f i e l d of theology, as i s perhaps to be expected from one 
who expounds the creed. I n t h i s sense i t i s possible to speak of 
him as a visionary theologian, glimpsing a r a t i o n a l wholeness i n God's 
purposes with his creation. This v i s i o n i s based, as we have seen, 
on the twin p i l l a r s of the Christian community at worship, and the 
underlying idea of the purpose of God which i s to be worked out through 
the universe and not simply with individuals. He wrote at a time 
when the doctrine of the church was moving towards the centre of 
theological study, at least i n England. He also wrote from a back-
ground to which such a theme was congenial and to which thinking about 
the church meant thinking about sacramental worship. The stress on 
wholeness and purpose was not so common, coming presumably from 
e a r l i e r Hegelianism, and i t i s the blend of the two which i s remarkable. 
As f a r as the doctrine of atonement i s concerned i t i s a step 
forward that he should have set i t i n an eschatological framework. 
I t i s thus not presented merely as a kind of juggling with s i n . I t 
i s also a very good point that he should not l i m i t his thinking to 
what God has done f o r us i n an objective vray, but should go on to 
speak of the work of Christ i n us. This can at times add a dimension 
of religious warmth to his w r i t i n g . Perhaps more important i s the 
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f a c t that he makes more use of B i b l i c a l thinking and B i b l i c a l 
categories than many of his contemporaries. Though he sometimes 
seems to f e e l an almost prophetic compulsion to speak\against a 
narrow Biblicism and what he takes to be 1Barthianism 1, he also seems 
to take account of the current r e v i v a l of B i b l i c a l study. This i s 
seen most cl e a r l y i n his use of the l a t e s t B i b l i c a l thinking on the 
meaning of s a c r i f i c e . I t i s also apparent i n his appreciation of the 
eschatological motif i n Pauline thinking, i n his refusal to a f f i r m a 
uni v e r s a l i s t position though i t would f i t more neatly in t o his system, 
and i n his use of the d i s t i n c t i o n between Hebrais' and Hel l e n i s t i c 
thinking. 
Yet t h i s also i l l u s t r a t e s what may be his chief weakness. One 
must always speak of Quick using B i b l i c a l categories. He brings them 
i n to his system rather than being ruled by them. I t seems that the 
ra t i o n a l system must have p r i o r i t y and other things f i t i n t o i t . 
That i s not to say that he has simply devised a system without 
reference to the Bible, or that the B i b l i c a l categories are necessarily 
abused. The relationship between the philosopher and the theologian 
i n Quick i s much more complex than that. There has doubtless been 
considerable adaption on both sides, but i t i s generally the 
philosopher who ca l l s the tune. 
The most obvious i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s i s i n his fondness f o r 
analysis. We have noted on several occasions how his over subtle 
analysis has led him to force d i s t i n c t i o n s , which may well have been 
useful i n themselves, to a point where he i s forced to make an unreal 
choice. I t i s true that he normally moves on to a synthesis, but one 
wonders whether the elements which he i s put t i n g i n t o the synthesis 
are r e a l l y the ones with which he began, or whether they have suffered 
a change during the preceding analysis. 
Underlying t h i s i s what might be considered to be a false 
a t t i t u d e to histo r y . This seems an odd c r i t i c i s m when one recalls 
that he i n s i s t s on the uniqueness of the incarnation; that he agrees 
with the Liberal Protestants against the Modernists that C h r i s t i a n i t y 
must always be subject to an appeal to i t s h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s ; and 
that he always stresses the dominance of the Hebraic over the 
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H e l l e n i s t i c approach. Yet the c r i t i c i s m must stand since Quick seems 
to have reduced history i t s e l f to a philosophical theme. Appeal to 
hi s t o r y has become one strand i n his system. Actual h i s t o r y , u n t i d i l y 
made up of single events which neither f u l l y support nor completely 
contradict each other; patchy and f u l l of oddities, i s a d i f f e r e n t 
matter. Making t h i s point about 'The Christian Sacraments', Sir 
Edwyn Hoskyns wrote, "Taken as a whole Canon Quick has given us a very 
delicate interweaving of thought and expression, but i t suffers from an 
almost complete lack of a r e a l sense f o r h i s t o r y . The materials 
which meet us both i n the N.T. and i n the world of re l i g i o u s experience 
are rougher and more awkward than Canon Quick's philosophy allows, and 
he d e f i n i t e l y obscures t h i s roughness. He works with symbols which 
are almost mathematical i n t h e i r symmetry, and his conclusions are so 
neat that the reader i s hardly conscious of the drastic simplifications 
which t h i s neatness involves." (J.T.S. Vol XXX p 88). 
There are two great examples of what Hoskyns means i n the outline 
of Quick's work which we have given. The one to which Hoskyns draws 
attention i s the refusal to consider the h i s t o r i c a l incidents i n the 
Upper Room at the Last Supper. As we saw Quick prefers to go on to 
speak of the continuing re l i g i o u s significance of the eucharist. No 
doubt t h i s significance i s also of importance, but there i s a danger of 
sub s t i t u t i n g r e l i g i o u s assertions f o r theological arguments. That i s 
as true of high flown philosophical rhetoric about the eucharist, as of 
simple evangelistic piety where i t i s perhaps more easily recognisable. 
Quick seems to f a l l i n t o t h i s error i n his exposition of the eucharist. 
I n his c r i t i c i s m of the various t r a d i t i o n a l approaches he makes quite 
a l o t of the argument that since we can no longer regard the body of 
Christ as occupying space i n heaven a l o t of discussions which once 
seemed meaningful must now be abandoned. Yet his own statement of 
the case i s s o l i d l y based on the notion of heaven and movements from 
and to i t . I t may be that such metaphorical language i s inevitable. 
However i t might have been made clear that t h i s highly complex t a l k of 
externalising what i s always true of God, t h i s intersecting of eternal 
and temporal spheres which i t involves, and t h i s speculation regarding 
the eternal relationships of the persons of the T r i n i t y , can only be 
the language of devotion. I t should not replace, or take precedence 
over, the attempt to examine the h i s t o r i c a l material and to determine 
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as f a r as possible from that what happened and what was intended. 
Secondly, on the question of atonement, Quick has been highly 
selective i n his use of B i b l i c a l material. His view of s a c r i f i c e i s 
not unquestioned. But i t i s possible to accept what he writes on 
the s a c r i f i c i a l view and s t i l l to ask what he makes of the other 
material. He speaks of including the language of the other views i n 
his statement of the s a c r i f i c i a l theory, but that i s hardly enough. 
As he has shown himself the language he incorporates i s from l a t e r 
formulations of the theories. The f a c t remains that Paul does use 
substitutionary language and ideas, and that that view has more 
support i n the New Testament generally than the s a c r i f i c i a l one, 
ce r t a i n l y i n the form i n which Quick has given i t . Furthermore the 
u n i t i n g of the two views i n a predominantly substitutionary way i s found 
i n the New Testament (cp I Peter l : 1 9 f f ) . I t i s not enought simply to 
note these other lines and then leave them while pursuing more 
a t t r a c t i v e or congenial ones. I t may be that i t would be better to 
give up the neatness of the system. Similarly he i s selective i n his 
treatment of s i n . I t i s true that, as he explains i t , the p r i e s t l y 
approach seems able to deal with the idea of the t a i n t of s i n which 
the prophetic t r a d i t i o n cannot handle so w e l l . But there i s also the 
question of actual sins. Having drawn attention to the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between vitium and reatus Quick tends to concentrate exclusively on the 
former. Actual deliberate sinning and the g u i l t i t brings i s much 
less prominent i n his work. 
At base of course he may be showing the characteristics of the 
Catholic as opposed to the Reformed approach. Certainly he seems 
temperamentally unable to come to terms with a more Reformed, 
Calvinist, position. This i s shown i n his few, and rather casual, 
references to conversion. We do not f i n d i n Quick the Reformed 
f e e l i n g f o r the awful personal holiness of God and the sense of being 
i n d i v i d u a l l y set against him. Personality, l i k e h i s t o ry, has become 
a philosophical concept, part of a system. His conception of God 
seems to f a l l short of the majesty and lonely granduer t y p i c a l of the 
Reformed t r a d i t i o n . Thus f o r the individual there i s at best the 
prospect of being reconciled to the over-riding purpose, but never the 
glad release of the lonely sinner who knows that his own g u i l t has 
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been removed and that he personally can come to God as a c h i l d to 
i t s father. 
Such cr i t i c i s m s should not detract from the real value of 
Quick's work, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the service he rendered to modern 
thinking on the doctrine of atonement by re-introducing the 
eschatological element. Writing of medieval theology he noted that 
i t "... lacked ... the notion of the Church with a l l i t s members as 
a whole community l i v i n g i n the world yet not of i t . ... not only the 
society which suffers with the Crucified but also the Society which 
i n i t s own l i f e anticipates the new heaven and the new earth of the 
world to come." (The Gospel of the Few World p 78)• I n so f a r as 
he reminded the church of his own day of such themes, and called 
attention i n thinking about the atonement away from a false 
individualism, then his work has great value. 
Chap V I I Contents D.M. B a i l l i e : - A mediating f i g u r e p 228f; 
accepts Oman's description of grace p 229. 
Faith e x i s t s - i t cannot he explained away, has objective 
element p 230-233; moral conviction as 'germ' of f a i t h p 233-237; 
need to go beyond morality p 237f5 place of Jesus as great believer 
and supreme example p 2 38-241; Believer and h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m 
p 241-243; the 'Jesus of History' movement p 243-245. 
His Christology. need f o r moral categories p 245-247; The 
paradox of grace and i t s weaknesses p 247-254; 
Atonement. more needed than r e v e l a t i o n p 255f; Forgiveness 
and i t s cost i n death of Christ, traced to love of God and expressed 
s a c r i f i c i a l terms p 255 -259? H i s t o r i c a l and eternal p 259^5 only 
s a c r i f i c i a l model used p 260f. 
Sacraments. use of material f o r s p i r i t u a l p 261; l i n k s with 
the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus 262ff; Baptism 264f; Eucharist 266f. 
Other means of grace and concluding comments p 269f 
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V I I DONALD BAILLIE (1887-1954) 
Passing from the work of Quick to that of his close contemporary 
D.M. B a i l l i e one almost enters another world theologically. Many of 
the same themes are s t i l l present, indeed i n the treatment of the 
eucharist there i s a marked s i m i l a r i t y and B a i l l i e refers to Quick 
with appreciation, but over a l l . there i s a difference of mood. Not 
only does B a i l l i e w rite from a d i f f e r e n t ecclesiastical and theological 
background, but he i s subject to d i f f e r e n t influences and faced with 
d i f f e r e n t problems. This i s at least p a r t l y due to his apparently 
greater openness to continental theology which i s barely mentioned by 
Quick. The r e s u l t i s that whereas Quick would be described as a 
t r a n s i t i o n a l f i g u r e , affirming orthodoxy i n a period of change, B a i l l i e 
appears as a mediating f i g u r e , holding together the best of d i f f e r e n t 
positions separated both by time and theological conviction. I n his 
writings we f i n d reflected most of the best theological thought of 
the century up to his death. 
I n view of his wide influence and the frequency with which he 
i s quoted his actual l i t e r a r y output was remarkably small. This i s 
largely due to the f a c t that he served f o r sixteen years i n three 
parishes before entering academic l i f e as Professor of Systematic 
Theology at the University of St. Andrewi'.s i n 1934« Then, during 
the twenty years which he held that chair, a good deal of his time 
and energy was given to the ecumenical movement. I t may be too that 
he was not keen to hurry i n to p r i n t . There appear to have been a 
number of series of lectures and other writings worthy of publication 
which were not published or were published posthumously. During his 
l i f e time he only published two major works: his Kerr Lectures 'Faith 
i n God, and i t s Christian Consummation' (1927)» which was an essay 
i n the philosophy of r e l i g i o n , and his important work on the 
incarnation and atonement 'God was i n Christ' (1948), as well as a few 
a r t i c l e s and reviews. An appendix to 'God was i n Christ' was the 
l a s t thing he wrote before his death i n 1954. After his death a 
series of lectures given i n 1952, together with some other papers, 
were published as 'The Theology of the Sacraments' (1957), and there 
were a number of books of sermons and occasional addresses. 
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His early work develops from Liberal Protestantism and the 
influence of that t r a d i t i o n i s always with him. The appeal to the 
example of the 'Jesus of History 1 and to the re l i g i o u s a p r i o r i i n 
every man i s p a r t i c u l a r l y marked i n 'Faith i n God*, and i s never 
r e a l l y dropped. By the time of 'God was i n Christ' he has been 
influenced by the r i s e of neo-orthodoxy with i t s stress on the 'Word 
of God1 addressing man i n an 'I-Thou' encounter of judgement and grace. 
Now there i s a f a r greater stress on the uniqueness of Jesus and the 
importance of his \rork. Yet there i s no u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of 
the new modes of thinking. He remains appreciative of the 'Jesus of 
History* school of thought, and stresses the value of objective 
h i s t o r i c a l revelation. Thus he mediates between the early Liberalism 
and neo-orthodoxy, and also between those who wish to stress the 
subjective and those who wish to stress the objective aspects of f a i t h . 
His work shows a development of mind rather than any radical change, 
and he perhaps becomes a good example of what Stephen Neil was to 
describe as a 'post-Barthian Liberal'. 
I t could be argued that the whole of his work i s concerned with 
the subject of grace, though i n the f i r s t book the word i s not often 
used. Nevertheless he i s concerned throughout with the r e l a t i o n 
between God and man. I t i s i n introducing his work on sacraments 
that he gives his d e f i n i t i o n , "To the New Testament witness, and 
above a l l to St. Paul, grace was simply the free f o r g i v i n g love and 
mercy of God." He regrets that f o r long periods i n church h i s t o r y 
t h i s conception was replaced by a quasi-material one, and i s pleased 
that "... i n the twentieth century there has been a notable development 
of the conception of grace as what Oman called 'a gracious personal 
relationship', to be thought of on the analogy of the influence of a 
father upon his c h i l d . " (The Theology of the Sacraments p 52). 
We may give at once a broad outline of the presence of t h i s 
influence i n his thought, noting that i t i s very similar to what we 
have already seen i n Oman. He sees i t as present, or recognised, i n 
di f f e r e n t ways or i n varying degrees throughout God's creation. The 
degree, or v a r i a t i o n , depends on the 'person-ness' of that i n which 
i t i s present, and according to the r e c e p t i v i t y or resistance of 
s i n f u l man. The fi g u r e of concentric c i r c l e s may make t h i s clearer. 
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On the outer c i r c l e he cl e a r l y takes account of something which may 
"be called grace throughout the material creation. He does not dwell 
on t h i s idea, but he can l a t e r speak of a sacramental universe. 
Moving inwards, he argues that a l l men have some experience of the 
approach of God towards them - c h i e f l y i n t h e i r sense of moral 
conviction. I t i s the part of the theologian and the church to bring 
men to see t h i s f o r themselves. Further inwards i s the c i r c l e of 
believers who accept and co-operate with the grace of God and l i v e i n 
dependence on i t so that i t matures in t o f u l l Christian f a i t h . We 
sha l l see that as his thought developed he saw complications i n t h i s 
movement from morality to f a i t h which do not appear to have concerned 
him too greatly i n his e a r l i e r work. F i n a l l y , at the centre of the 
c i r c l e s , i s the person of Jesus i n whom the t o t a l v i c t o r y of the grace 
of God i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y expressed i n terms of the hypostatic union. 
Again as his thought develops there i s a move from stressing Jesus 
example and s i m i l a r i t y to men to stressing his uniqueness. 
Starting from the human side he begins from the f a c t that f a i t h 
exists. There i s a t r a d i t i o n of f a i t h , the concept of "... a mental 
a t t i t u d e , a peculiar kind of knowledge or conviction or apprehension 
or resolution, which brings us int o touch with t r u t h and with Deity, 
and which i s at the very heart of r e l i g i o n . " (Faith i n God p 37)• 
I n considering various approaches to t h i s f a c t of f a i t h B a i l l i e i s 
concerned to establish three things: that t h i s conviction of f a i t h 
cannot be so explained that i t i s explained away, that i t i s seminally 
present i n a l l men, and, most important, that there i s i n i t an 
objective element which i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y described as the approach of 
God. I t would not be enough to establish any one of these elements 
the three are interwoven. 
Faith cannot be reduced to custom or reason, though both custom 
and reason have t h e i r part i n the growth of mature f a i t h . He 
i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s by a parable of a simple uneducated charwoman who 
works i n the house of a learned philosopher. Both have f a i t h . I t 
could be argued that the woman's f a i t h i s the r e s u l t of suggestion 
and the customs of her group, while that of the philosopher i s based 
on reason and l o g i c a l argument. Such an approach, B a i l l i e suggests, 
i s inadequate. I t overlooks both the p r i o r element of personal 
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i n s i g h t , and the confidence with which the believer l i v e s on the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of f a i t h . 
As he speaks of the charwoman i t i s easy to believe that he i s 
c a l l i n g upon years of pastoral experience and observation of f i r m and 
simple piety. Acceptance of the ideas and customs of her group 
would not explain how such a woman could maintain her f a i t h i n face of 
d i f f i c u l t y . S t i l l less does i t account f o r the f a c t that her f a i t h 
supports and sustains her when much i n her environment may be h o s t i l e . 
"Such a woman has not accepted the t r a d i t i o n b l i n d l y , by mere force 
of her environment. She has appropriated i t , she has made i t her 
own, by some inner argument i n her heart which has gone to meet i t ; 
u n t i l she has come to possess a f a i t h superior to her environment, 
capable of u p l i f t i n g by i t s influence the rel i g i o u s l i v e s of her 
neighbours, and of withstanding the contradictions of her l o t . " ( i b i d 
p 89). And such inner apprehension i s , i n part, the grasping of 
something objective outside the i n d i v i d u a l . 
I n the case of the philosopher reason may help him to understand 
his f a i t h , but reason i n the sense of l o g i c a l argument i s not the 
ground of his f a i t h . B a i l l i e points out with copious quotations 
that a l l schools of Ch r i s t i a n i t y have agreed that l o g i c a l argument 
cannot 'prove' f a i t h , though some have allowed that general truths 
such as the existence of God can be so proved. For his own part 
B a i l l i e i s happy to accept the f a c t that t h e i s t i c or i d e a l i s t i c 
conclusions are not the r e s u l t of r a t i o n a l 'proof but are rather 
based on p r i o r conviction - that i s , on f a i t h . The philosopher, l i k e 
the charwoman, begins with some 'germ of f a i t h 1 . Of course i t does 
not follow that f a i t h i s i r r a t i o n a l . B a i l l i e prefers L.P. Jacks' 
description of f a i t h as 'reason grown courageous'. 
A more common explanation of the basis of f a i t h was re l i g i o u s 
experience. An appeal to re l i g i o u s experience was a feature of some 
strands of Liberal Protestantism. The Barthian school protested 
strongly that Christian f a i t h i s not j u s t religious experience. And 
yet i n the way i n which some more extreme exponents of 'Barthianism 1 
also opposed f a i t h to r a t i o n a l knowledge, i t could be argued that t h i s 
school of thought was i n f a c t appealing to a unique type of reli g i o u s 
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experience. B a i l l i e had considerable sympathy with the approach 
through experience. He sees that i t has a warmth and a possible 
richness which i s preferable to a cool i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t approach, and 
he f e l t that Brunner and Barth"*" had over-reacted against i t . Yet 
he saw that there were dangers. Experience can be set against reason, 
thus making f a i t h appear i r r a t i o n a l ; or i t can be made so uniquely 
personal that i t i s divorced from the rest of l i f e and so cannot be 
used i n an argument; or i t can deliver f a i t h i n t o the hands of the 
psychologists, there to be discredited as the r e s u l t of projection 
or wish-fulfilment. 
For B a i l l i e the r i g h t appeal to experience, which avoided these 
dangers, was to hold experience and f a i t h together as i n some sense 
one. Thus he d i f f e r e d from Schleiermacher's approach, as i t was 
currently understood, of arguing that the experience came f i r s t and 
that f a i t h i s a r a t i o n a l i s i n g of i t . Such an approach could lead to 
what he considered to be a false comparison between science and 
theology. As the s c i e n t i s t begins with experience, through his 
experiments, and then states theories, so, i t was argued, the 
theologian begins with religious experience and then states f a i t h . 
Such a view implies that religious experience i s simply f e e l i n g 
without any cognitive element, thus almost any be l i e f s could be 
deduced from i t . Against t h i s B a i l l i e asserts that b e l i e f s are 
i m p l i c i t i n the experience i f i t i s a genuine religious experience, 
an experience of God, and such be l i e f s are about objective r e a l i t i e s 
not feelings or moods. "Religious doctrines are not primarily about 
states of the human mind, but about objective divine r e a l i t i e s , God 
and His ways and His works." ( i b i d p 114)« 
Put t h i s way experience i s a v i t a l part of f a i t h and there i s 
no religious f a i t h apart from experience. Just as i t i s wrong to 
speak of the experience coming f i r s t and the b e l i e f being b u i l t upon, 
or abstracted from, i t , so i t i s wrong to reverse the order and argue 
that a b e l i e f can be held i n t e l l e c t u a l l y f i r s t and that experience 
can add something to i t . Without some experience there i s no re a l 
f a i t h , "... when a man without any l i v i n g experience of r e l i g i o n 
1 I t i s noticeable that B a i l l i e always puts the names i n t h i s 
order, and though he refers to the 'Barthian' school quotations 
are usually from Brunner. 
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assents ' i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 1 , as he thinks, to the truths of r e l i g i o n , 
i t i s not r e a l l y the truths of r e l i g i o n that he has assented t o , but 
certain metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical statements." ( i b i d p 118). 
Religious truths can only be apprehended by experience. Dogmas 
merely symbolise them. The dogmas must be personally appropriated 
and l i v e d through i n experience. Thus reli g i o u s experience i s not 
so much a basis f o r f a i t h as the f a i t h i t s e l f . 
This discussion of re l i g i o u s experience i s important f o r B a i l l i e , 
both i n what he denies and i n what he asserts. He i s not happy about 
the existence of some undifferentiated experience of the numinous as a 
prelude to f a i t h . He brings out strongly, what had been i m p l i c i t 
before, that f a i t h must include a pognitive element. On a similar 
l i n e he denies that the experience i s simply subjective. Faith i s 
concerned with objective r e a l i t i e s i m p l i c i t i n the experience, not 
simply with r e l i g i o u s states of mind. The experience i s an 
experience of something which 'comes' to us from outside and i s 
personally appropriated. I n view of the looseness with which the 
phrase 'religious experience 1 can be used, he understood the reaction 
against i t . Yet he does not want to see i t as a t o t a l l y unique 
experience. He wants to be able to appeal to a more general 
experience, hence a stress on uniqueness at t h i s point - so that the 
experience of the believer appears t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that of one 
who does not, or does not yet, believe,' - would not be welcome. 
The general and fundamental experience to which he appeals i s the 
experience of moral conviction. Here we approach the heart of his 
theology. I t i s i n the experience of morality that we f i n d the basis 
of f a i t h j and thi s i s so f o r the agnostic as much as f o r the avowedly 
reli g i o u s man. He l a t e r saw serious complications i n the move from 
morality to f a i t h , nevertheless he does not seem to have withdrawn 
from the fundamental position adopted i n 'Faith i n God1. 
The argument that there i s an intimate connection between morality 
and r e l i g i o n has often been advanced. P a r t i c u l a r l y has i t been used 
i n the counselling of those who have some doubts about t h e i r f a i t h . 
From the memoir of his brother which John B a i l l i e published with 'The 
Theology of the Sacraments', i t appears that Donald B a i l l i e also came 
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to i t i n t h i s way. John B a i l l i e explains that his "brother passed 
through a period of intense i n t e l l e c t u a l distress during which he 
was uncertain about the most fundamental aspects of C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
He goes on, "He was fond of t e s t i f y i n g afterwards to the great help 
he received i n t h i s matter from that greatest of nineteenth-century 
preachers, who several generations before had passed through so similar 
an experience, Robertson of Brighton, and especially from his sermon 
on 'Obedience the Organ of S p i r i t u a l Knowledge' ..." (op c i t p 2 0 f ) . 
Donald B a i l l i e himself refers to Robertson at length. He i s 
quoted as one among a considerable number of believers at the end of 
the nineteenth-century and beginning of the twentieth who, when t h e i r 
f a i t h was threatened by rationalism, found bed-rock i n moral conscious-
ness. When no i n t e l l e c t u a l argument seemed to be of use i t remained 
true that men knew a sense of moral obligation, and that i n doing 
what they saw to be l a i d upon them they both s t i l l e d t h e i r doubts f o r 
a while and found themselves led back to f a i t h . " I t was a case of 
f a i t h being driven back by i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s upon i t s own l a s t 
defences, and thus discovering what these defences actually are - the 
cert a i n t i e s of the moral consciousness. These a man could not doubt, 
i n actual l i f e ; and these, taken seriously and f a i t h f u l l y , carried 
with them a rel i g i o u s f a i t h i n goodness at the heart of the universe." 
(Faith i n God p 168). For B a i l l i e such an experience, and such an 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t , are t h e o r e t i c a l l y open to a l l , even the doubter, 
"... i n actual l i f e and practice every doubter worth considering knows 
that i n some quite inescapable sense the noble i s better than the base 
and has an absolute claim upon him." ( i b i d p l 6 0 ) . This inescapable 
knowledge he sees as a germ of f a i t h which exists i n everyone. This 
idea was elaborated i n John B a i l l i e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s 
denied with the 'top of the head' and affirmed by the 'bottom of the 
heart'. 
This argument i s not as simple as i t at f i r s t seems. The very 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a rel i g i o u s a p r i o r i i n man was currently being severely 
c r i t i c i s e d , as was any idea of God being postulated as the conclusion 
of an argument. B a i l l i e knew of such cr i t i c i s m s and largely accepted 
them. But he thought his own position was immune from such attack. 
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Behind an argument connecting morality and r e l i g i o n i s the• 
philosophy of Kant. B a i l l i e acknowledged a debt to Kant, but d i f f e r e d 
from him. Kant saw that God i s not simply deduced on cause and 
effect lines from the existence of conscience to God who implanted i t . 
But s t i l l i n Kant God i s a postulate, he i s not actually met i n moral 
demand. For himself, B a i l l i e sees that conscience i s p a r t l y the 
r e s u l t of evolution and environment, and i t s development can be traced 
psychologically. Neither i s God brought i n as a kind of guarantor 
that obedience to the categorical imperative of morality v / i l l 
u l t i mately be conjoined with happiness. His basic point i s that we 
are not here dealing with a two-step argument - f i r s t morality then 
God - but that, properly understood, moral experience i s i n some sense 
already an experience of God. 
This i s an important point i n his argument. I n our experience 
of moral demand we have not simply a clue to the way things are, but 
a d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n of the objective r e a l i t y of the \tforld. We are 
i n contact with something outside ourselves which i s undeniable. 
He makes the point i n various ways. "Religious f a i t h i s essentially 
the conviction that our highest values must and do count i n the whole 
scheme of things, that they are not simply our l i t t l e dream, but 
reveal the very meaning and purpose of the universe, that love i s at 
the heart of a l l t h i n g s j . . . " ( i b i d p 175)• A l i t t l e l a t e r , " I s i t 
too paradoxical i n the modern world to say that f a i t h i n God i s a 
very part of our moral consciousness, without which the l a t t e r becomes 
meaningless? ... The conviction ' I ought to do t h i s 1 , i f i t means 
anything at a l l , t e l l s me something, not simply about myself or about 
the action indicated, but about the very meaning of the universe." 
( i b i d p 182) 
C r i t i c s of t h i s sort of approach might say that i t reduces 
r e l i g i o n to 'mere morality'. But B a i l l i e would not accept that 
there i s anything 'mere' about morality. I n i t s proper place, at 
the centre of r e l i g i o n , i t i s of v i t a l importance. He also argues 
that his use of the word 'moral* should not be l i m i t e d to e t h i c a l 
ideas of the good i n r e l a t i o n to conduct. I t must also include man's 
response to beauty and t r u t h . Though i t must be admitted that his 
arguments are normally from the realm of conduct, and that he refers 
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rather s l i g h t i n g l y to "beauty and t r u t h as 'provincial moralities', 
he c l e a r l y wants to include under moral conviction a l l response to 
absolute values. 
This response, as we have noted, he sees as a 'germ of f a i t h ' 
and he asserts that such a germ i s present i n the moral honesty of 
many who deny f a i t h . Yet to do ju s t i c e to his position i t i s 
important to see that he never refers to i t as more than a germ. For 
the s p i r i t u a l counsellor i t i s a point to which to appeal; f o r the 
troubled individual i t i s a place on which to stand; but, on i t s own, 
i t i s not enough f o r a man's entire r e l i g i o u s l i f e . The metaphor 
must be extended to speak of the f l o u r i s h i n g , or blooming, of a 
mature r e l i g i o u s l i f e . "Religion i s , indeed, more than morality, 
and the l i f e of f a i t h i s more than the l i f e of ideals. Yet true 
f a i t h - or the true knowledge of God - can only realise i t s e l f i n us 
as we follow these ideals. I t i s i n them, as i n a glass darkly, that 
we can see the God whose presence i n us created them f o r us and 
inspired us to seek them as the images of Himself." ( i b i d p 226). 
F u l l knowledge of God, even so f a r as that i s possible to man i n t h i s 
l i f e , i s not the same as the di r e c t i n t u i t i o n of moral values. But 
i t i s not something beside them, i t i s something which comes through 
them. The l i f e of moral idealism cannot be content with i t s e l f but 
points beyond i t s e l f . 
For the purpose of the present study B a i l l i e ' s use of morality 
i n his early work i s important f o r at least two reasons. I n the 
f i r s t place he sees i t as an approach to man from God. Like Oman 
i n his use of the 'Supernatural 1, B a i l l i e passes without much question 
from asserting the r e a l i t y of moral conviction to speaking of God. 
Nevertheless, i t i s clear that he sees the existence of morality and 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of moral conviction as manifestations of God's grace 
to the world. Secondly, he speaks of the r e a l i s a t i o n of f a i t h as a 
g i f t of God. This i s much nearer to t r a d i t i o n a l language of grace. 
Speaking of the value i n times of doubt of continuing to obey the 
demands of morality, he makes the point that the assurance of f a i t h 
which the doubter seeks comes from God, not from a human act of w i l l . 
"When i t comes to a man, though i t has arisen out of his 'doing the 
w i l l ' of God, yet somehow i t comes as a g i f t at which the seeker can 
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only wonder, because he has not wrought i t himself, and i f he has 
found i t at l a s t , i t has also found him." ( i b i d p l 6 l ) . Indeed the 
seeker may never a t t a i n to f a i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y a r t i c u l a t e form, 
"And i f and when he does, i t i s not altogether as an achievement, but 
as an 'experience 1, a revelation, a g i f t of God which has gradually 
or suddenly come to him while he 'waited f o r God' i n the path of duty 
and love." ( i b i d p 162). 
The l a s t two quotations show that B a i l l i e intended to keep the 
i n i t i a t i v e of God i n the experience of f a i t h . Yet that i n i t i a t i v e 
i s not too prominent i n the early work. Furthermore, though a 
d e f i n i t e l y Christian background i s assumed, the person of. Christ 
appears rather l a t e i n the work. Certainly by the time of 'God was 
i n Christ', twenty-one years l a t e r , he has adopted a much more 
Christocentric position. As he does so there occurs that change i n 
his a t t i t u d e to morality to which we have already referred. 
So f a r f a i t h has been presented as the conviction of goodness at 
the heart of the universe. The individual comes to personal insight 
of t h i s through his apprehension of moral demand which i n some sense 
comes from outside himself and can be seen as the approach of God. 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the highest, because truest, expression of a wider 
phenomenon; i t i s the growing to maturity of the 'germ of f a i t h 1 
present i n the recognition of moral demand. The maturing process 
comes from the clearer recognition of the moral demand and greater 
personal commitment to i t . 
Yet c l e a r l y t h i s i s not a l l that C h r i s t i a n i t y involves. B a i l l i e 
seems to want to say more, even i n the early book where he does not, 
at least very c l e a r l y , do so. He knows that Christian experience 
involves more than the obedience of a morally sensitive man, and that, 
i n any case, man does not always choose the highest when he sees i t . 
Christians speak of divine assistance, or grace; they also experience 
forgiveness f o r moral f a i l u r e s ; and they associate such assistance 
and forgiveness with Jesus. He thus comes to speak more of grace 
and less of morality, and, at the same time, develops his Christology. 
I n 'Faith i n God1 he gives the impression that i n spite of 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s man can at least make a good attempt at l i v i n g up to the 
moral ideals which he recognises. I n any case there i s no problem 
about urging him to do so. Later he was much less happy about t h i s , 
or at least about i t s sufficiency. I n a series of unpublished 
lectures delivered i n 1947 under the t i t l e 'Beyond Morality' his thought 
shows a d i s t i n c t and s i g n i f i c a n t development. Though he s t i l l stresses 
the necessary connection between morality and r e l i g i o n he gives f a r 
more attention to the need f o r grace. N.H.G. Robinson comments, 
"... i t i s d i f f i c u l t to deny that the centre of gravity i n the moral 
realm has moved .for. B a i l l i e from the moral endurance of man to the 
prevenient grace of God." (Theologians of Our Time: Donald B a i l l i e 
E.T. LXXIV p 359)• I t i s i n these lectures that he introduces the 
idea, which was l a t e r to f i g u r e i n 'God was i n Christ', of the 
'paradox of moralism'. "Writers on ethics" he comments "have often 
spoken of 'the paradox of hedonism1 - the f a c t that the quest of 
happiness defeats i t s e l f . But they have not so often noticed what 
I c a l l 'the paradox of moralism' - the f a c t that the quest of goodness 
defeats i t s e l f . " (God was i n Christ p 121n). I n f a c t the moralistic 
approach tends to lead to Pharisaism.''' Elsewhere we f i n d him pointing 
out that the true saints have known themselves to be dependent on the 
grace of God and have not given too much thought to t h e i r own moral 
e f f o r t . Paradoxically i t has only been when they were so dependent 
that they have been 'free' to make any response to the moral id e a l . 
"Instead of concentrating on t h e i r own characters, they have been 
God-centred. They have been less conscious of themselves than of God, 
less conscious of an ethic or an ideal than of the w i l l of God, the 
love of God, which called out the response of t h e i r f a i t h and love." 
(Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the V i l l reprinted 
from S.J.T. Yol 4 No 2, 1951, i n The Theology of the Sacraments 
pp 127ff p 136. This i s one of the lectures 'Beyond Morality' 
mentioned above). 
This development i n his thought i s seen most cl e a r l y i n his 
Christology. Here we see him r e f l e c t i n g the main problems of Christian 
1. Robinson questions t h i s , and asks..whether there i s not a range 
of natural morality which would condemn Pharisaism as i t s e l f 
moral f a i l u r e ? cf op c i t p 259 n6. 
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theology i n the f i r s t half, of t h i s century. There seems to he a 
constraint i n his thought leading him to a greater Christological 
concentration, stressing Jesus' uniqueness and work. Yet the l a t e r 
writings are often developments of e a r l i e r insights, and there i s 
always the refusal to re j e c t what i s good i n e a r l i e r positions or to 
over-stress the uniqueness of Christ or the exclusiveness of Christ-
i a n i t y . 
The early work presents Jesus c h i e f l y as the 'Supreme Believer 1. 
Given that f a i t h develops from moral i n s i g h t , he i s faced with the 
question of the significance of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus. He sees the 
problem summed up i n Lessing's dictum 'contingent truths of h i s t o r y 
can never be made the proof of necessary truths of reason 1 ( c i t e d 
Faith i n God p 233)• Such c r i t i c i s m , he suggests, has missed the 
point that C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not concerned with 'truths of reason 1, but 
with personal i n s i g h t . I n his own metaphor, what i s needed i s aid 
to the development of the 'germ of f a i t h ' so that i t might blossom 
in t o mature rel i g i o u s l i f e . 
The development of any individual's religious l i f e i s largely 
dependent on what i s presented to him from the past through past 
exponents of the t r a d i t i o n of f a i t h . Even then the basic insight i s 
not reduceable to words. To reduce r e l i g i o n to words i s not only to 
impoverish i t but to lead to contradictions and confusion. The r e a l i t y 
must be experienced by the individual f o r himself, and f o r t h i s the 
only adequate vehicle i s personality. Through the personalities of 
believers, individuals or groups, the experience of f a i t h can be passed 
on. This i s the great strength of a book l i k e the Psalter, which 
"... not only transmits i n words the truths which i t s writers 
discovered or believed: i t brings us into contact with the very hearts 
of those believing men i n ancient I s r a e l - with the warm and beating 
heart of f a i t h i t s e l f . " ( i b i d p 236). 
I t i s here i n the succession of believers, again remarkably l i k e 
Oman, that he places Jesus, and i n c i d e n t a l l y adumbrates the Christology 
which he was to work out i n 'God was i n Christ'. I n Jesus, human 
f a i t h - and B a i l l i e stresses that i t was human f a i t h - i s raised to 
such a pi t c h that there met i n Him two processes, the process of God's 
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willingness to reveal himself and the process of mankind's;search f o r 
God. Thus B a i l l i e writes, "Now, i f there should ever i n the course 
of history arise a Supreme Believer, he would, of course, at the same 
time be a supreme discoverer of divine r e a l i t y , and his discovery would 
be to other men a supreme example of the 'revelation' which, as we 
saw, they so much need." ( i b i d p 237)• And l a t e r , "... a l i f e of 
perfect human f a i t h , being indeed a perfect r e a l i s a t i o n of divine 
values i n human conditions would be a perfect revelation of God to 
man. I t would be a presentation to us of God as He r e a l l y i s , or at 
least as f a r as the human soul i n th i s earthly l i f e can ever know Him 
at a l l . ... i t would 'show us the Father'. I t would be not simply a 
perfect f a i t h i n God f o r our i m i t a t i o n , but at the same time, and ipso 
facto, a perfect revelation of f a i t h ' s Object ..." ( i b i d p 240). This 
revelation, coming through the personality of Jesus, could not be 
separated from Him. I t was passed to Jesus' contemporaries by His 
personality, and to succeeding generations by the 'story' of His 
personality. 
B a i l l i e l a t e r strengthened t h i s position, but, before proceeding 
with his development, i t i s worth noting certain inadequacies, or 
perhaps i l l o g i c a l i t i e s , here. I n t r a d i t i o n a l orthodox terms the 
most perfect l i f e available f o r the Christian i s the l i f e of the saints 
i n heaven. That presumably would be as near as man can get to being 
a 'supreme believer' or 'supreme discoverer', there one might expect 
to f i n d 'perfect f a i t h ' or 'perfect r e a l i s a t i o n of divine values i n 
human conditions 1. And yet i t has not been part of orthodox thought 
to see that heavenly l i f e of the believer as 'a perfect revelation of 
God i n man1. I t i s d i f f i c u l t , therefore, to see why that approximation 
to that heavenly l i f e possible on earth should ever become 'a perfect 
revelation of f a i t h ' s Object'. What i s missing here i s some stress 
on what might be called the God-ward side of the incarnation, or the 
divine i n i t i a t i v e . Later I s h a l l suggest that t h i s weakness persists 
i n B a i l l i e ' s Christology. 
I n his l a t e r work B a i l l i e saw weaknesses i n his early statement 
of the case, but he did not abandon i t , he rather strengthened i t . 
He argued then that while the sacred story with Jesus at the centre 
remains the essential expression of the Christian view of his t o r y , 
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"... i t i s not simply a story of human seeking and f i n d i n g , of 
s p i r i t u a l progress and discovery, with Jesus as the climax. That i s 
a true story from i t s own point of view ... (hut i t i s also) ... a 
story with a ' p l o t 1 . God's eternal plan which 'was made f l e s h 1 i n 
Jesus Christ." (God was i n Christ p 78)• This raises the problem of 
the believer's r e l a t i o n to the h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c . 
B a i l l i e i s certain that we cannot e n t i r e l y r e j e c t the h i s t o r y 
and keep Christ as a symbol or myth. I n certain areas i t i s possible 
to speak of 'myth' i n expressing Christian f a i t h , but statements 
about the l i f e of Jesus are not of t h i s sort. He notes with approval 
that even Bultmann i n s i s t s on the concrete h i s t o r i c a l f a c t of God's 
incursion into human his t o r y i n the person of Jesus of Nazareth and 
his death i n the cross.''' Clearly t h i s must mean that the central 
f a c t of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s to some extent open to h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m . 
However t h i s does not leave the simple believer at the mercy of the 
h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c . I n 1927 he was pointing out that the facts of 
hist o r y cannot be approached without any presuppositions. I d e a l l y 
there i s some 'sympathy' between the h i s t o r i a n and his subject matter, 
he cannot approach i t coldly. So, i n the case of Jesus, how much of 
his personality 'comes across 1 depends on the approach. The earnest 
seeker "... has a kind of insight that penetrates d i r e c t l y to that 
h i s t o r i c a l Figure, and makes him v i r t u a l l y independent of a l l 
historians as regards the central f a c t . " (Faith i n God p 248). 
Indeed to some extent f a i t h i s the basis of the h i s t o r i c a l judgement 
rather than being determined by i t . 
Later he developed t h i s l i n e of thought pointing out that the 
inte r p r e t a t i o n of his t o r y demanded a vantage point. The Christian has 
such a vantage point i n his view of Christ and the significance of his 
story. I n the ancient world C h r i s t i a n i t y was able to give meaning to 
history by i t s insistence on t h i s 'story' i n which the Divine had come 
into h i s tory, and so i t rose above cyclic views of history. 
Similarly, i n the modern world the believer i s able to r i s e above 
purely humanistic and evolutionary views of progress. " I t i s not 
only that h i s t o r y remains a vast undifferentiated chaos of non-
1. cf 'God was i n Christ 1 p ^19f. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t d e t a i l unless we approach i t with some pr i n c i p l e of 
selection, some i n t e r e s t , some questions to ask, and therefore some 
•values' to dictate the questions. There i s also the fu r t h e r 
perception that h i s t o r y has no ultimate meaning, no pattern or 
d i r e c t i o n - that indeed the human race on earth has no hi s t o r y i n the 
true sense at a l l - unless some temporal point or points i n i t can be 
found to possess absolute significance i n the prophetic or 'eschato-
l o g i c a l 1 sense; unless an absolute time-scheme a Heilsgeschichte, a 
'sacred hi s t o r y ' can be perceived i n i t by f a i t h . " (God was i n Christ 
P 73f). 
But, i n the l i g h t of more modern theology, there remains a 
further question. Given that h i s t o r i c f a c t i s v i t a l f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
how much actual h i s t o r y i s needed and how are we dependent on i t ? 
Here we have to do both with the reaction against the simple 'Jesus 
of History' movement; and also with the complementary insistence that 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not prim a r i l y concerned with h i s t o r y as a succession 
of facts ( H i s t o r i e ) , but with 'salvation h i s t o r y ' , that i s with a 
p a r t i c u l a r strand of h i s t o r y which, with i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , becomes 
a feature of the present f o r the hearer (Geschichte). Thus i t i s 
the present 'impact' of the kerygma that i s of prime importance, not 
the h i s t o r i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y of the documents. 
Perhaps B a i l l i e i s nearer to the l a t t e r position than he i s 
w i l l i n g to admit. His treatment of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m could point 
i n that d i r e c t i o n . The argument which we have j u s t outlined seems 
i n f a c t to be c i r c u l a r . The believer approaches the h i s t o r i c a l 
material which has brought him the Gospel i n the confidence of the 
Gospel which the material has brought. The f a i t h and understanding 
of Christ which he now has becomes the vantage point of his h i s t o r i c a l 
c r i t i c i s m . But such f a i t h and understanding arises from his present 
' e x i s t e n t i a l ' relationship with the t r a d i t i o n of 'salvation-history'. 
Further, the lectures 'Beyond Morality' present a much more e x p l i c i t 
and enthusiastic commendation of the e x i s t e n t i a l approach than appears 
i n his published works. That such an understanding of B a i l l i e i s 
possible i s shown i n Bultmann's comment on 'God was i n C h r i s t 1 . " I n 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which i n my terminology I l i k e to c a l l 
' e x i s t e n t i a l 1 , I f e e l myself deeply at one with him, and have found 
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i t r i c h l y rewarding." (From a l e t t e r w r i t t e n a f t e r B a i l l i e * s death 
quoted i n 'Theology of the Sacraments' p 35). 
However i t i s clear that B a i l l i e did not want to go too f a r i n 
that d i r e c t i o n . However important i t may be that the believer has 
now an e x i s t e n t i a l experience of the Gospel, i t i s also important to 
keep the fact that t h i s i s an experience of the Jesus who then l i v e d 
i n Nazareth. This i s an important element i n the Gospel of the 
grace of God by which man i s saved. B a i l l i e i s f a r from happy about 
the reaction against the Jesus of History movement. 
I t i s not that he i s u n w i l l i n g to see f a u l t s and l i m i t a t i o n s i n 
some presentations of i t . He i s w i l l i n g , f o r instance, to see that 
many re-constructions of the Jesus of History were naive, and f a i l e d 
to do j u s t i c e to his s p i r i t u a l stature. Further, he i s aware that i n 
the work of some Liberal Protestants a sentimental attachment to the 
personality of Jesus became a substitute f o r the revelation of God. 
Yet such cri t i c i s m s are not enough to condemn the attempt to f i n d the 
h i s t o r i c a l Jesus, nor do they detract from the importance of what i s 
then found. Indeed the f a u l t was that some exponents of the movement 
had not done t h e i r work well enough. Had they done so they would 
have found not only that the real Jesus was a greater figure than they 
allowed, but also that his own teaching discouraged a 'Jesus-cult 1, 
that he pointed to the Father who 'sent' him, and that he gave no 
support to the idea that to deal with himself was somehow an easier 
option than to deal with the father. 
There were other cr i t i c i s m s of the movement with which B a i l l i e 
did not agree, or which he thought were too extreme. Thus he cannot 
agree that the New Testament has no biographical interest i n the 
person of Jesus. There i s , i t i s true, l i t t l e encouragement f o r the 
humanistic in t e r e s t i n the development of personality, but there i s 
a strand of New Testament teaching which presents Jesus as the great 
example of Christian l i v i n g . Certainly i n the work of Luke there 
seems to be a biographical i n t e r e s t , and i t i s hard to see how t h i s 
could be avoided i n a f a i t h which sets such store by p a r t i c u l a r 
h i s t o r i c a l events. 
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More important are the positive benefits which the movement 
gained f o r theology when sympathetically understood. B a i l l i e stresses 
two points of great importance. F i r s t he points out that the 'Jesus 
of History"means not j u s t a concentration on the things Jesus of 
Nazareth said and did during his earthly l i f e , i t also refers to his 
'human-ness'. Those who contrast f a i t h and h i s t o r y normally take 
references to the 'Jesus of History' to mean an attempt to provide a 
kind of photograph. Not only would that be d i f f i c u l t , but i t would 
be poor history f o r i t would leave the 'depths' of his person out 
of account, and these are the features most important f o r f a i t h . 
Setting aside f o r a moment the question of how one i s to reach those 
'depths' anyway, B a i l l i e can j u s t l y argue that the humanity of Jesus 
i s of v i t a l importance f o r orthodox f a i t h . I n t h e i r reaction against 
a false l i b e r a l i s m , and t h e i r impatience with the attempt to get 
accurate biographical d e t a i l s , some theologians, he p a r t i c u l a r l y 
refers to Brunner and Barth, put undue stress on the Deity of Jesus. 
The 'theology of the Word' i s not always s u f f i c i e n t l y a theology of 
'the Word made f l e s h ' . I n making t h i s point B a i l l i e i s simply 
defending his e a r l i e r stress on the human f a i t h of Jesus. 
Secondly the 'Jesus of History 1 movement drew attention to the 
importance of revelation i n the work of atonement. B a i l l i e disagrees 
strongly with Kierkegaard's suggestion that, " I f the contemporary 
generation had l e f t behind them nothing but the words, 'we believe 
that i n such and such a year God appeared among us i n the humble 
fi g u r e of a servant, that He l i v e d and taught i n our community, and 
f i n a l l y died', i t would be more than enough." (Kierkegaard: Philosoph-
i c a l Fragments pp 51££ and 87» c i t e d God was i n Christ p 49)• I n 
the same vein he c r i t i c i s e s Bultmann f o r l i m i t i n g his in t e r e s t i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l revelation to the one great event of the cross, and 
making l i t t l e of the h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e of Jesus. While i t i s true 
that Jesus came to 'do' something and not j u s t to 'show' something, 
i t i s wrong to set the two i n too great an antithesis. Salvation i s 
at least p a r t l y by i l l u m i n a t i o n , "... God saves us by revealing 
Himself to us, enlightening our minds with the knowledge of Himself, 
not i n a 'Gnostic 1 sense, but by that method which was so intolerable 
and incredible to the Gnostics, the way of Incarnation i n a real 
human l i f e . " ( i b i d p 49)• To concentrate on the cross alone i s 
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a r t i f i c i a l , "Surely the saving work of Christ i s not confined to what 
happened at the end of His l i f e , but extends back over the whole of 
His l i f e , and we cannot understand the meaning of His death unless 
we remember whose death i t was, not only i n an •eschatological 1 but 
i n a purely h i s t o r i c a l sense." ( i b i d p 220). 
Some v e i l i n g remains. The 'Jesus of History' cannot be used as 
a ' p r o o f . Man i s s t i l l dependent on revelation i n the sense of the 
i n t e r n a l witness of the Holy S p i r i t . Yet t h i s i s a witness to the 
Jesus whose l i f e and personality can, at least to some extent, be 
found by the methods of the 'Jesus of History' school. Certainly 
the rediscovery of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus brought comfort to many i n a 
c r i t i c a l age, and breathed l i f e i n t o the dogmas. "And I cannot 
believe that t h i s rediscovery, coming i n the time of need as a 
v e r i t a b l e revelation with a rejuvenating power, was from the Christian 
point of view a delusion, or was anything less than a recovery of 
something which i s v i t a l to Christian f a i t h . " ( i b i d p 52f). 
Such a defence of the importance of the 'Jesus of History', and 
such a positive estimate of the contribution of Liberal Protestantism 
were uncommon i n 1948• But B a i l l i e knew that he could not stop there. 
Even to speak of Jesus as revealing God was to go much fu r t h e r than 
to speak of Him as the Supreme Believer, f o r i t involves a judgement 
of his person; and the Gospel speaks of the action of God as well as 
the revelation of God. I t i s necessary therefore to go on to 
Christology and the doctrine of Atonement. "A true Christology" 
writes B a i l l i e , " w i l l t e l l us not simply that God i s l i k e Christ, 
but that God was i n Christ. Thus i t w i l l t e l l us not only about the 
nature of God, but about His a c t i v i t y , about what He has done, 
coming the whole way f o r our salvation i n Jesus Christ; and there i s 
no other way i n which the Christian t r u t h about God can be expressed." 
( i b i d p 66f. his i t a l i c s ) . 
Though the present study i s not p r i m a r i l y concerned with 
Christology, i t w i l l be necessary to look at B a i l l i e ' s thought on 
t h i s subject because i t i s so closely bound with his teaching on 
grace. 
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He begins by r u l i n g out various over-simplifications, such as 
that Jesus was r e a l l y God a l l the time and not r e a l l y a man at a l l 9 or 
that he was an intermediate being, or that he was a man who became 
God. To do j u s t i c e to a l l the evidence Christian orthodoxy i n s i s t s 
that he was God and man. Can we go any further? 
However much one may i n s i s t on saying 'God and man', i t seems that 
the human mind must begin from one or the other. V/e can begin from 
God and work down, or we can begin from man and work up. I n reaction 
against the 'Jesus of History 1 movement much current theology, and 
again B a i l l i e refers p a r t i c u l a r l y to Brunner and Barth, tended to 
begin from God. But, as v/e have seen, B a i l l i e was much more kindly 
disposed towards the 'Jesus of History' movement. He had i n any 
case already committed himself i n 'Faith i n God' to begin from the 
human picture of Jesus as the 'Supreme Believer'. And here we may 
note that whatever appreciative comments he made about l a t e r theology, 
and however much genuine development there may have been i n his thought, 
t h i s early work sets the pattern f o r his thinking. The use of the 
'paradox of Grace', which i s the chief feature of 'God was i n Christ', 
i s the working out and defending i n face of new theological circum-
stances of what had been i m p l i c i t twenty years e a r l i e r . Furthermore, 
not only had he committed himself to the human s t a r t i n g point, he had 
also committed himself to working with moral rather than ontological 
categories. These presuppositions seem to govern his approach to 
the modern Christological theories which he discusses i n 'God was 
i n Christ'. 
Thus he rejects modern attempts to use the concept of 
'anhypostasia' because he thinks i t does not do j u s t i c e to the 
humanity of Jesus, and rejects Kenoticism because of i t s commitment 
to ontological categories. I n passing one might note that i n 
constantly r e f e r r i n g to 'anhypostasia' as 'impersonal humanity' -
though he admits t h i s might not be the correct meaning - he may not 
be doing j u s t i c e to either the ancient or the modern exponents of 
t h i s view. Much of what would now be meant by 'personality 1 would 
be included not i n 'hypostasis' but i n 'phusis', i n terms of the 
classical debates. I t appears that what the humanity of Jesus 
lacked, according to t h i s view, i s not 'personality* but 'concrete 
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existence' u n t i l i t s p o s s i b i l i t y of such existence was appropriated 
by the Divine Word. I t seems that the theory i s used i n t h i s sense 
by Barth. Similarly, though i n r a i s i n g the stock c r i t i c i s m s of 
Kenoticism he shows the serious d i f f i c u l t i e s which that view must 
face, i t i s noticeable that he does not consider the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
moralising the ontological categories, or i n t e r p r e t i n g them i n some 
psychological way, as explored by Forsyth and Weston. 
The other suggestion he considers, rather strangely i t seems to 
me, i s Heim's use of the category of 'Leadership 1. Here Jesus i s 
presented as the great 'Leader' who enters in t o 'I-Thou' relations 
with each of his followers through the Holy S p i r i t and demands t h e i r 
complete obedience. I n fact Heim does not seem to deal with the 
t r a d i t i o n a l problems of Christology, and perhaps B a i l l i e ' s reason f o r 
looking at t h i s theory at a l l i s that i t does stress the human Jesus. 
I t also gives B a i l l i e the opportunity to point out that Jesus did not 
demand b l i n d obedience, as the 'Leader' i n Heim's model does, but 
attempted to lead men to personal insight of the t r u t h . As we have 
seen t h i s i s a theme dear to B a i l l i e . 
As he admits the discussion of other views has only been a 
clearing of the ground preparatory to p u t t i n g his own, based on the 
'paradox of grace'. There i s , he suggests, an analogy between the 
paradox which the Christian knows i n himself i n the experience of grace, 
and the r e l a t i o n of God and man i n Jesus. " I t s essence l i e s i n the 
conviction which a Christian man possesses, that every good thing i n 
him, every good thing he does, i s somehow not wrought by himself but 
by God. This i s a highly paradoxical conviction, f o r i n ascribing 
a l l to God i t does not abrogate human personality nor disclaim 
personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Never i s human action more t r u l y and f u l l y 
personal, never does the agent f e e l more perfect l y free, than i n 
those moments of which he can say as a Christian that whatever good 
was i n them was not his but God's." Here he argues may be "... a 
clue to the understanding of that perfect l i f e i n which the paradox 
i s complete and absolute, that l i f e of Jesus which, being the 
perfection of humanity, i s also, and even i n a deeper and p r i o r sense, 
the very l i f e of God Himself. I f the paradox i s a r e a l i t y i n our 
poor imperfect l i v e s at a l l , so f a r as there i s any good i n them, 
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does not the same or a similar paradox, taken at the perfect and 
absolute p i t c h , appear as the mystery of the Incarnation?" ( i b i d 
pp 114» 117). He supports t h i s suggestion by reference to the 
existence of paradox over wide areas of Christian thought and 
experience, and p a r t i c u l a r l y refers to the b e l i e f i n providence and 
the doctrine of God's creation out of nothing. 
Some idea of paradox seems inherent i n Christian theology. I f 
one allows that God created a l l and gave, or gives, i t an independence 
over against himself, there i s always the question of the co-
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of God and man. The idea of paradox has been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n twentieth century theology. However, 
the word can have several meanings- or shades of meaning, which may 
occasionally merge int o each other. I n w r i t i n g about the mysteries 
of r e l i g i o u s l i f e such merging may not be too important, but i t might 
be misleading i f the idea i s to be used as the basis f o r important 
theological constructions. 
Strangely, at the point where he comes nearest to giving a 
d e f i n i t i o n , B a i l l i e puts together antinomy, d i a l e c t i c a l contradiction, 
and paradox. He then quotes Sergius Bulgakov, "An antinomy 
simultaneously admits the t r u t h of two contradictory, l o g i c a l l y 
incompatible, but ontologically equally necessary assertions. An 
antinomy t e s t i f i e s to the existence of a mystery beyond which the human 
reason cannot penetrate. This mystery nevertheless i s actualised and 
l i v e d i n r e l i g i o u s experience." (Sergius Bulgakov: The Wisdom of God 
p l l 6 n . c i t e d God was i n Christ p 108f). But there are i n f a c t two 
possible d e f i n i t i o n s here: the holding of two truths which are, or 
appear to be, contradictory, and the holding of a mystery which i s 
beyond human understanding but i s realised i n e x i s t e n t i a l r e l i g i o u s 
experience. The f i r s t can be put i n the propositional form 'both x 
and not-x', while the other need not be i n t h i s form. B a i l l i e never 
c l a r i f i e s his own use of the term but seems, either knoAiringly or not, 
more frequently to favour the second. That i s paradox does not 
necessarily involve contradiction, but we have to deal with a mystery 
which may include more than one t r u t h ; or perhaps we should speak of 
a t r u t h with several poles or facets. 
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Several c r i t i c s have noticed t h i s lack of c l a r i t y . J.L. Hick, 
r e f e r r i n g to one of B a i l l i e * s stock examples, comments, "That God 
created a l l things ex n i h i l o i s not a self-contradictory statement; i t 
does not contain withi n i t s e l f l o g i c a l l y incompatible components. I t 
i s 'paradoxical' only i n the sense that i t i s empirically unverifiable 
and therefore de f i d e . " (S.J.T. Vol 11, 1958, p 4). Another c r i t i c , 
J.L.M. Haire believes that some element of contradiction can be kept 
f o r 'creatio ex n i h i l o 1 , but argues that the element of contradiction 
i n the d i f f e r e n t examples of paradox which B a i l l i e uses to support 
his case i n 'God was i n Christ* i s not always the same, and that 
B a i l l i e has f a i l e d to work out the s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between 
them.''" 
I n the sense of a mystery located i n the realm of reli g i o u s 
experience and asserted ' e x i s t e n t i a l l y ' paradox i s found throughout 
B a i l l i e ' s work. I n a sense i t i s present i n his stress on morality and 
the counsel to the doubter to 'do r i g h t ' expecting to f i n d comfort and 
eventually f a i t h through moral experience. I t i s present i n his 
acknowledgement that moral categories do not apply to God as they 
apply i n human a f f a i r s but that, though only symbolic, they must be 
used. And i t i s present also i n his argument that f a i t h i s i m p l i c i t 
i n r e ligious experience and not deduced from i t . 
Perhaps his f u l l e s t sustained use of paradox i s i n the l a s t 
chapter of 'Faith i n God1 where he looks at the problem of suffering 
and providence. He points out that the Christian who suffers w i l l 
assert that nothing which b e f a l l s him i s beyond God's love and care, 
but w i l l also recognise suffering as e v i l and commit himself to struggle 
against i t . F i n a l l y he points here, as he does i n 'God was i n 
Christ', to a number of other paradoxes. There i s the apparent 
contradiction between j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h and morality. I n the 
teaching of Jesus there i s the assurance that the Kingdom has come and 
the necessity to f i g h t f o r i t ; and the teaching that prayer includes 
both asking God f o r things and the confidence that he already knows 
what i s best. I n the l i f e of Jesus, of course, the supreme paradox 
i v 
i s the cross, and B a i l l i e stresses Jesus fear and abhorence of i t but 
1. cf S.J.T. Vol 17, 1964, P 307f. 
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acceptance of i t as the w i l l of God. 
This sort of thing i s eloquent and moving i n the discussion of 
Christian experience, and i n that realm i s probably inevitable. 
B a i l l i e returns to the paradox of grace i n the a r t i c l e 'Philosophers • 
and Theologians on the Freedom of the W i l l ' , to which we have already 
referred. The problem i s to reconcile a dependence on grace with 
j human freedom. His solution i s to suggest that the normal notions of 
freedom used i n moral discussion may not be enough. Might i t not be 
that there i s a freedom beyond morality which i s expressed not i n the 
a b i l i t y to perform t o t a l l y undetermined actions but i n w i l l i n g 
obedience t o , and dependence on, God. This seems to be the experience 
of the saints. " I t seems pla i n then, that there i s a quite luminous 
and p r a c t i c a l t r u t h underlying the mysterious statement that only by 
the aid of divine grace can a man be free to do and be what he ought to 
do and be. I t means at least t h i s , as a mere matter of psychological 
description: that the best kind of l i v i n g , or the f i n e s t type of 
character, does not come through sheer v o l i t i o n a l e f f o r t to realise an 
ide a l , but i n a more i n d i r e c t way, as the f r u i t of a l i f e of f a i t h i n 
God." (op c i t p 136f). This seems a version of the idea that when a 
man i s set free by God he i s not set free to become anything, that 
would lead back to sin and bondage, but he i s free to become the man 
God intended him to be. I n the language of the Genesis story, he i s 
restored to the state of un-fallen Adam understood as 'non-posse 
peccare 1. Though the Christian would say that he i s i n the process 
of being restored to t h i s state rather than that he i s i n i t . Put i n 
th i s way there are marked s i m i l a r i t i e s here to the thought of Quick. 
However, given that t h i s describes Christian experience, the 
question arises whether t h i s provides an adequate approach to the 
person of Christ. At a much e a r l i e r stage we referred to the fig u r e 
of concentric c i r c l e s to i l l u s t r a t e what seems to be B a i l l i e ' s idea 
of the operation of grace i n the world. I t i s found i n growing 
degrees of i n t e n s i t y i n the whole of creation; i n mankind as the peak 
of creation; i n believers as those who have responded to i t ; and 
uniquely i n Christ. But does t h i s scheme keep the uniqueness of 
Christ? I s he s t i l l presented as the 'Supreme Believer'? I t hardly 
seems enough that he should be the great recipient of grace. For 
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orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y he must also be presented as the great bearer 
of grace, and as himself the source of grace. 
I t i s f o r reasons such as th i s that Hick suggests that B a i l l i e 
i s f i n a l l y l e f t with adoptionism. He notices two areas of confusion 
i n B a i l l i e ' s thought. F i r s t i n his use of the terra 'divine*. I t 
i s possible to say that a l l men are divine i n so f a r as God operates 
within them, but i n the case of Jesus we do not want such an 
adjectival use but must rather use a substantive such as 'Deity 1. 
Though B a i l l i e has noted that i t i s more congenial to Christian 
theology to speak of Jesus as God than as divine, Hick does not 
believe that he has consistently observed the d i s t i n c t i o n , and suggests 
he has tended to speak of the 'Divi n i t y of Christ' using the word i n an 
adjectival sense. "For the essence of B a i l l i e ' s suggestion i s that 
'God was i n Christ' i n the sense i n which He i s i n a l l good men, namely 
as i n s p i r i n g them, through the paradox of His grace withi n them to good 
works." (op c i t p 6 ) . The re s u l t i s that Christ's uniqueness i s 
reduced to one of degree of divinely enabled performance. 
Secondly, he presents B a i l l i e ' s position with a dilemma regarding 
the paradox of grace. On the one hand he must take a s t r i c t l y 
predestinarian view "... by which God determines man's choices even 
whilst such choices remain, from a human point of view, free and 
responsible decisions." (op c i t p 8). This, according to Hick, leads 
to a conception of i r r e s i s t i b l e grace and completely rules out human 
freedom. On the other hand he can adopt a more moderate form of the 
'paradox of grace' and say that when a man chooses r i g h t l y , he i s i n 
fa c t allowing the grace of God, which i s always available, to operate 
within him. I n t h i s case God i s not over-ruling human freedom. He 
suggests that B a i l l i e chooses the second. Thus Christ i s presented 
as the one man who has always allowed God's grace to work i n him. He 
i s therefore d i f f e r e n t from others i n degree, not i n kind. But 
though B a i l l i e has refused the s t r i c t predestinarian view of the 
'paradox of grace* he comes very close to i t "... and allows i t to 
spread a f i l m of protective ambiguity over his argument." ( i b i d p 8) 
Hick concludes with the suggestion, which Haire accepts, that the 
paradox of grace i s he l p f u l i n understanding the human experience of 
Jesus, but leaves his deity untouched. Perhaps t h i s i s what we 
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should expect since we have seen that B a i l l i e prefers to begin 
from the humanity, and that his thinking on the paradox of grace 
begins with the experience of believers and was, as i t were, put out 
from there to explain Jesus. 
However, i t would be grossly unfair to B a i l l i e to imagine that 
he had not anticipated t h i s sort of c r i t i c i s m of his view and t r i e d to 
defend against i t . Though we natura l l y know the paradox f i r s t i n 
human experience, he asserts that there i t i s merely a r e f l e c t i o n of 
the supreme example i n Jesus. I n him i t exists at a perfect p i t c h 
and our experience of i t derives i n some way from h i s . I t i s only 
i n seeking an explanation that v/e move i n the opposite di r e c t i o n . 
Furthermore he goes on to argue that early Christian experience of 
grace led in e v i t a b l y to the doctrine of the T r i n i t y which includes 
the conception of the pre-existence of Christ. I n t h i s way a l l non-
Christian experience of grace - and v/e have noted his reluctance to 
over stress the uniqueness or exclusiveness of C h r i s t i a n i t y - can 
also be a t t r i b u t e d to Jesus. Clearly he intends more than a merely 
h i s t o r i c a l p r i o r i t y f o r Jesus, but he does not seem to notice that, 
i f these arguments are followed, i t would be more natural to speak of 
the 'grace of Jesus', which seems to 'distance' him from the 
experience which others have. 
Hick's c r i t i c i s m s were answered by John B a i l l i e . Two points 
from t h i s answer are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . John B a i l l i e argues 
that , i n his brother's opinion, when a difference of degree i s 
'taken at the absolute p i t c h ' - which v/as Donald B a i l l i e ' s phrase -
i t i s already a difference i n kind. " I have, ... heard my brother 
say that i t i s misleading i n such a connexion to r e l y too much on 
the f a m i l i a r d i s t i n c t i o n between degree and kind (or sense), because 
the absolute and perfect d i f f e r s from the imperfect and r e l a t i v e not 
merely i n degree but i n kind, j u s t as i n f i n i t y and e t e r n i t y are no 
mere prolongation of the f i n i t e and temporal, but belong to another 
order of being." (S.J.T. Vol 11, 1958 p 265). But t h i s hardly seems 
a satisfactory argument. I n speaking of an absolute paradox and 
a p a r t i a l or incomplete paradox one i s presumably speaking of the 
same sort of thing - a paradox. Yet I do not think i t would be 
generally accepted that the i n f i n i t e i s the same sort of thing as 
the f i n i t e , or that e t e r n i t y i s the same sort of thing as time. 
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Indeed we shall see l a t e r that, i n another context, Donald B a i l l i e 
himself makes the generally accepted theological point that e t e r n i t y 
i s not mere extension of time. That some greater difference i s at 
least assumed seems to he implied by the argument that the unique 
sense i n which Jesus' experience of the paradox of grace must be 
construed i s , following H.H. Mackintosh, i n terms of his work and 
vocation. I t was Jesus' unique vocation to be the saviour of the 
world, i t i s not ours. 
Secondly, he suggests that, faced with Hick's dilemma, his 
brother would have chosen s t r i c t predestinarianism. The understanding 
of prevenient grace which Hick puts forward as the moderate version 
of the paradox of grace i s not paradoxical at a l l . I t i s merely a 
matter of o f f e r and acceptance. He concludes, rather grandly, " I t 
i s perhaps not surprising that Professor Hick should suspect my brother 
of leaning too much towards a humanitarian and too easily non-
paradoxical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Incarnation, i f he attributes to him 
so humanitarian and so l i t t l e paradoxical a view of that r e l a t i o n of 
grace to f r e e - w i l l which he took to be a r e f l e c t i o n , and thus a 
pointer to the understanding, of the union of Godhead and manhood i n 
Christ." ( i b i d p 269f). 
As f a r as the paradox of grace i s concerned John B a i l l i e seems 
to have got the better of t h i s argument. As we saw from the a r t i c l e 
'Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the W i l l ' , Donald 
B a i l l i e has a f a r deeper understanding than Hick allows. For his 
view freedom i s not l o s t but gained by dependence on divine grace. 
That which i s normally termed freedom, the a b i l i t y to perform 
undetermined actions, represents a ' f a l l e n ' state i n comparison with 
the sinlessness, 'non posse peccare', which i s God's plan and the 
purpose f o r which man was created. I t i s the idea expressed i n the 
phrase 'whose service i s perfect freedom'. However, t h i s i s s t i l l 
to deal with the experience of the human Jesus. There i s no 
suggestion of Deity there, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how i t could 
be provided by t a l k of vocation. 
B a i l l i e , as we have seen, did not l i k e the ontological 
categories of Chalcedon, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how he can 
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a f f i r m the Deity of Jesus, which he clear l y wants to a f f i r m , 
without something l i k e them. His own view does not seem to keep 
i n the person of Christ anything 'continuous with Godhead'."'' He 
mentions one other attempt to do t h i s i n terms of grace - Aquinas 
d i s t i n c t i o n between g r a t i a h a b i t u a l i s , which a l l men have and which 
Christ therefore had as a man, and g r a t i a unionis which only Christ 
had and which maintained his 'continuity with Godhead'. B a i l l i e 
comments that "... t h i s seems an a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n . " (God was 
i n Christ p 128). I t may indeed be a r t i f i c i a l , but i t does seem to 
be a recognition that there i s an i n f i n i t e q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n 
between God and man, even i f the man should be the greatest of saints. 
Aquinas has t r i e d to keep t h i s . B a i l l i e , f o r a l l his protestations, 
seems to have l o s t i t and to have f a l l e n into some form of adoptionism. 
However, that was c l e a r l y not his in t e n t i o n , and we must take account 
of the f a c t that he wishes to keep a f u l l Chalcedonian Christology 
as we turn to consider his thought on atonement. 
1. I n view of the admiration which both B a i l l i e s appear to have 
f o r H.R. Mackintosh and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r his use of the idea 
of 'vocation' with i t s stress on ' w i l l ' i n his Christology, i t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Gore had c r i t i c i s e d Mackintosh's 
a t t i t u d e to Chalcedonian 'substance* thinking on precisely the 
lines suggested above, i e that to dispense with 'substance' was 
to dispense with the element of 'continuity with Godhead'. 
Accepting that 'substance' thinking could be unethical, and 
arguing that 'substance' should be taken to mean 'real thing', 
he asserts "... when we speak of the Son and the S p i r i t as 'of 
one substance' with the Father, we mean that they belong to the 
one real being which we c a l l God; and when we speak of Christ 
as of one substance with us, we mean that He took the real being 
of man,...." I n the end B a i l l i e does not seem able to keep the 
f i r s t of these assertions. cf C. Gore: The Reconstruction of 
Belief. One Vol ed i t i o n 1926, pp 848-865. 
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I f Jesus i s the unique hearer and source of God's grace or 
•personal influence', we are led to return to our o r i g i n a l questions 
and to ask i n what way we are benefitted by th i s grace and how i t 
works? That the whole process of incarnation, death, and resurrection 
was 'for us men and f o r our salvation' i s axiomatic, but how i s the 
salvation effected and i n what does i t consist? 
B a i l l i e has already given some answers to these questions i n his 
stress on revelation. This not only gives us the important vantage 
point from which to regard h i s t o r y , which we noted, but, more 
importantly, i t gives us a better idea of the nature of God. B a i l l i e 
had never suggested that God was simply a law-giver. There i s always 
a much greater personal warmth i n his approach than that. Yet i n 
his e a r l i e r work i t i s not always clear why he has not stopped short 
at the conception of God as giver and up-holder of the moral law. 
I n f a c t , of course, he has assumed much more from scripture and the 
Christian t r a d i t i o n than he always acknowledged. Later he put much 
more stress on revelation with the whole process of the incarnation 
and death of Jesus as i t s climax. He writes "The whole story i n the 
Bible suggests not so much phrases l i k e 'human quest' as phrases l i k e 
'divine revelation', 'divine vocation', 'divine v i s i t a t i o n ' . " (God 
was i n Christ p 64). And w r i t i n g l a t e r of the death of Jesus he says 
"When His early followers spoke of His death on the cross as a supreme 
expression of love f o r men, i t was not so much of the love of Jesus 
that they spoke as of the love of God who sent Him." ( i b i d p 68, cf 
p 184f). From seeing Jesus thus as the revelation of God and i n t e r -
preting his person by means of the 'paradox of grace', B a i l l i e then 
uses that paradox to describe God, "He i s the One v/ho gives us what He 
demands of us, provides the obedience that He requires..." ( i b i d p 144). 
Later he dwells at length on the revelation i n Jesus of God's concern 
f o r outcasts and sinners. The best authenticated feature of the 
record of Jesus i s that men were astonished by "...Kis habit of 
intercourse with men and women of doubtful character and by His 
at t i t u d e to them. ...He appeared to be more interested i n these 
people than i n anybody else, and He p r a c t i c a l l y said that God was 
too." ( i b i d p 182). 
From speaking of the revelation of God i n Jesus i n t h i s way, 
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he goes on, i n a manner reminiscent of Leonard- Hodgson, to speak of 
the development of the doctrine of the T r i n i t y . Jesus' followers, 
having experienced the paradox of grace themselves through his 
personality, made two discoveries: they found that the experience 
did not come to an end when he was no longer physically with them, 
and they found that i t also came to others who had never known him i n 
the f l e s h by means of the 'story' about him and t h e i r own witness to 
him. Thus the doctrine of the T r i n i t y was developed. 
However, important though a l l t h i s i s , i t i s necessary to go 
beyond the idea of revelation. The New Testament witness, and the 
l i f e and teaching of Jesus himself, point to the importance of an act 
of God. Jesus did not merely come to 'show' something, but to 'do' 
something. Perhaps more important, revelation on i t s own would not 
answer the need f o r forgiveness or explain the Christian's conscious-
ness of being forgiven. 
The need f o r , and experience of, forgiveness seems to be the 
Achilles heel of any theological system based exclusively on morality. 
I n speaking of the 'paradox of moralism' B a i l l i e pointed out that 
the quest f o r goodness i s self-defeating. However, there i s a 
fur t h e r complication i n the moral approach. The more a man 
recognises what he ought to do and ought to be, the more conscious 
he i s of the need f o r forgiveness. But the moral law i t s e l f does 
not provide f o r forgiveness. The thoroughly good man cannot forgive 
himself, forgiveness must come from outside.''' 
B a i l l i e recognised t h i s point i n 'Faith i n God', though i t i s 
dealt with there i n l i t t l e more than a side. C h r i s t i a n i t y , he notes, 
deals with our sins, and f o r that something more than the sympathy 
and example of a great comrade or leader i s required. When a man 
becomes conscious of his sins the need i s "... to believe i n a God 
who cannot only win us back from our e v i l ways and make the best of 
the e v i l we have wrought, but i n some sense b l o t out our past sins, 
drown them i n His mercy, turn our sorrow f o r them into the joy of 
1. I t w i l l be recalled that t h i s same point was made, with a 
quotation from P.T. Forsyth, i n the c r i t i c i s m of fiashdall. 
cf p 124f above. 
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forgiveness. But how can there be a r e a l forgiveness of sins, 
which w i l l be of any real comfort to the penitent, unless he can by 
f a i t h r i s e up to lose himself i n the love of a God who i s not simply 
a great Comrade, but i n some sense the very source of the moral law 
which has been broken?" (op c i t p 292). 
Later he commented on the apparent absence i n the modern world 
of any sense of sin or f e l t need f o r forgiveness, and the tendency to 
dismiss such conceptions as morbid r e l i c s of past ways of thought 
now to be outgrown. However, he argued, f o r serious people i n a 
generation which had witnessed two world wars such an a t t i t u d e could 
only be apparent. The use of psychological jargon about a 'moral-
f a i l u r e complex1 or a 'moral i n f e r i o r i t y complex1 could not gloss 
over a deeper d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which C h r i s t i a n i t y t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
recognised as a consciousness of s i n . Certainly psychiatric t r e a t -
ment could provide a cure f o r some complexes by tracing them to h a l f -
forgotton and frequently t r i v i a l early experiences. I n other words 
by showing that the complex had no r e a l foundation. But the 
consciousness of s i n , he argued, was not of that sort, "For i n t h i s 
case the malaise has a real foundation, which i s not t r i v i a l or 
innocent but s o l i d and e v i l : the f a c t of moral f a i l u r e , the f a c t 
that a man has disobeyed his conscience, betrayed his ideals, tarnished 
his character, l o s t his b a t t l e . These are hard facts, and the s t i n g 
i s not taken out of them when they are faced i n the l i g h t of day. 
That makes them look worse instead of better." (God was i n Christ 
p I64). Such a malaise cannot be solved simply on the l e v e l of 
morality, but only when i t i s seen as a personal offence against God 
who offers forgiveness to those who could not i n moral honesty 
forgive themselves. 
Such forgiveness i s not an easy overlooking of f a u l t s . We 
know that much from human relationships. While i n a shallow f r i e n d -
ship a s l i g h t may be casually disregarded, where a r e a l l y deep and 
genuine love exists a betrayal causes a deeper hurt and can only be 
forgiven at great cost to the one who forgives. Strangely the 
greater the love, the greater the l i k e l i h o o d of forgiveness; but also, 
the greater the love the deeper the hurt and the greater the cost of 
forgiveness. But the love of God i s perfect, thus, " I f I have 
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betrayed i t , that i s the ultimate betrayal. That i s what has to be 
wiped out, and such an 'atonement1 must be the most d i f f i c u l t , the 
most supernatural, the c o s t l i e s t thing i n the world." ( i b i d p 175)• 
I t i s t h i s cost, t h i s atonement, that the New Testament finds i n the 
death of Jesus. There we f i n d the Old Testament s a c r i f i c i a l 
terminology taken up and applied to him as the costly s a c r i f i c e 
provided by God's f o r g i v i n g love to expiate the sins of the penitent. 
This does not mean that Jesus himself always cl e a r l y saw his 
death i n t h i s way. As f a r as he was concerned the cross was accepted 
as part of the w i l l of God which he accepted by f a i t h . B a i l l i e 
suggests that towards the end of his ministry he applied to himself 
the deutero-Isaianic prophecies of the Suffering servant, arguing that 
had he not done so i t i s d i f f i c u l t to explain why these ideas became 
so prominent i n early Christian thought. However, f o r Jesus himself, 
i n the plainest h i s t o r i c a l sense, he died f o r sinners i n so f a r as i t 
was his love f o r them which led his enemies to execute him. As we 
noted above the indisputable f a c t about him, which we saw as a signal 
revelation of the love of God, i s that unlike normal Rabbis he 
associated with sinners and social outcasts and assured them of God's 
concern and willingness to forgive. I n human terms i t was t h i s 
behaviour which led to his death. Here there are passages i n B a i l l i e 
which could have been w r i t t e n by Rashdall. 
But i t i s most noticeable, and B a i l l i e makes t h i s point at some 
length, that his followers did not i n t e r p r e t his death i n terms of 
Jesus' love f o r men, but i n terms of God's love, God's forgiveness, 
and God's act of redemption. Furthermore t h i s i s interpreted as a 
costly, s a c r i f i c i a l , love. However, they make no contrast between 
the love of God and the wrath of God, and do not have the idea that 
God's at t i t u d e was changed from wrath to love bv_ the death of Christ. 
I t i s not that God's wrath i s not r e a l . B a i l l i e refuses Dodd's 
suggestion that the wrath of God i s somehow to be understood as the 
working out of impersonal forces apart from God. Rather his wrath 
i s not something to be propitiated and changed to mercy i t i s "... 
id e n t i c a l with the consuming f i r e of inexorable divine love i n r e l a t i o n 
to our sins." ( i b i d p 189). As Denney had done, he points out that 
the Greek /^r^/Wto^'means 'reconciliation' .and does not have the idea 
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of 'payment1 which normally attaches to the English word 'atonement', 
at least i n popular usage. Furthermore he i n s i s t s on the New 
Testament emphasis on the i n i t i a t i v e of God i n the act of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
Following Dodd he argues that the idea of p r o p i t i a t i o n i n the / 
group of words (Romans 5s24s 1 John 2:2, 4*10) i s i n accordance with 
pagan usage but out of place i n the New Testament where the meaning 
must be governed by the stress on God's love and i n i t i a t i v e . 
Indeed, he argues, even i n the Old Testament the pagan idea of 
p r o p i t i a t i o n had been l e f t behind since i t was God who provided the 
r i t u a l of s a c r i f i c e . Thus the basic idea i s of 'covering' or 'wiping 
out' that which comes between man and God. I n the Old Testament of 
course man had to provide the vi c t i m . "But t h i s i s the amazing new 
fac t which emerges when we come to the New Testament: that God even 
provides the v i c t i m that i s offered, and the v i c t i m i s His own Son, the 
Only-begotten. I n short, ' i t i s a l l of God': the desire to forgive 
and reconcile, the appointing of means, the provision of the vi c t i m as 
i t were from His own bosom at i n f i n i t e cost. I t a l l takes place 
withi n the very l i f e of God Himself: ..." ( i b i d p 188). 
Thus v/e see the death of Jesus, as an event i n history capable 
of being explained i n purely h i s t o r i c a l terms, being given an 
int e r p r e t a t i o n which traces i t back to God the Father i n heaven, and 
thus sets i t i n the context of e t e r n i t y . Now, i n similar terms to 
Quick, B a i l l i e sets himself to consider the r e l a t i o n of the two. I t 
i s not a case of dropping one side. "To reduce the importance of 
the h i s t o r i c a l event would be contrary to every i n s t i n c t of Christian 
f a i t h ; and yet i t seems impossible to say that the divine sin-bearing 
was confined to that moment of time, or i s anything less than eternal." 
( i b i d p 190). We have been prepared f o r t h i s by his treatment of 
forgiveness and of the nature of God. Forgiveness, v/e saw, must 
always be costly to the one who forgives; and i t i s of the nature of 
God to be f o r g i v i n g and thus to bear the cost, even before the 
h i s t o r i c a l event of Calvary. 
Here we are brought to a recurring problem f o r theology, the 
r e l a t i o n of hi s t o r y and et e r n i t y , and what we can mean by et e r n i t y . 
For B a i l l i e , to speak of God as eternal means, "... not that God has 
-260-
no r e l a t i o n to time and no experience of i t ... "but that, while 
embracing time i n His experience, while knowing past, present and 
future, God i s not confined, as we are, w i t h i n the l i m i t s of temporality 
and successiveness, hut transcends these l i m i t s , so that He can 
experience past, present and future a l l i n one. ... (He) ... has a 
d i r e c t ' v e r t i c a l ' r e l a t i o n to each moment of our temporal experience; 
..." ( i b i d p 191). Thus to say that God was uniquely present i n the 
passion of Jesus does not mean that He was unforgiving before that, or 
that His work of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n does not go on i n every age. " I t i s 
not that the h i s t o r i c a l episode i s a mere symbol of something 'timeless 1! 
i t i s actually a part (the incarnate part) of the eternal divine s i n -
bearing." ( i b i d p 191f ) o Later he adds that i t i s not enough to say 
that God eternally foresaw, or planned, the work of atonement, "... i t 
must i n the l a s t analysis be an eternal work of atonement, supratemporal 
as the l i f e of God i s , but not 'timeless' as an abstraction i s ; 
appearing incarnate once, but touching every point of h i s t o r y , and 
going on as long as sins continue to be committed and there are sinners 
to be reconciled." ( i b i d p 194n). 
The idea here i s of God's eternal forgiveness - f o r which he 
must bear the cost - 'breaking i n ' to the temporal sequence at one 
unique point. Again one could speak i n terms of revelation and say 
that here the v e i l i s temporarily drawn a,side to show what i s always 
true of God. This eternal aspect, he suggests, has not been 
stressed t r a d i t i o n a l l y , at least i n the West and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
Protestantism, f o r fear of denying the uniqueness of the cross. I t 
has further been obscured by false ideas of the need f o r p r o p i t i a t i o n . 
Hov/ever he i s able to quote from various sources to show that the 
basic idea has nevertheless frequently found expression, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the realm of eucharistic theology. 
Thus he interprets atonement, as Quick had done, exclusively i n 
terms of the s a c r i f i c i a l model, with the cross as the unique 'coming 
i n to time' of the cost which God's forgiveness must always pay. But 
there i s a noticeable difference i n 'tone' i n that where Quick 
emphasises the more Catholic idea of the Christian being taken up into 
the perfect l i f e offered to God, B a i l l i e has a more Protestant stress 
on the costliness to God. 
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He alludes "briefly to the close connection between death and 
resurrection i n Pauline thought, by which we have a picture of an 
eternal c o n f l i c t with e v i l which i s also an eternal v i c t o r y . This, 
as he says, i s near to Aulen's 'Christus V i c t o r 1 thinking."'" Else-
where he had noted that some New Testament interpretations of the 
cross are drawn from other than the s a c r i f i c i a l realm. I n spite 
of the eloquence with which he puts his position, and the wealth of 
B i b l i c a l quotations and allusions, i t seems a weakness that he has 
not considered these other interpretations more seriously. He i s 
ruled by the idea that a l l must be seen i n terms of personal relations 
and, since sin and the element of cost must be considered, he finds 
the s a c r i f i c i a l model most suitable f o r his purpose. Probably he 
would suggest that the legal metaphors would be less personal, and 
to that extent less suitable. Nevertheless the f a c t that the Pauline 
use of the law, and the great themes of sin-bearing and ransom are 
passed over almost casually must be considered a major weakness i n 
h i s position. 
The stress on personal relationships appears again when we turn 
t o his treatment of sacraments. I t seems to be c h i e f l y through the 
sacraments that he sees God's grace 'coming home1 to the believer. 
Thus he welcomes the increased in t e r e s t i n sacramental theology which 
he saw i n current Christian thinking, and, i n his own t r a d i t i o n , the 
practice of more frequent communion. 
We have seen that he accepted the idea of a 'sacramental universe'. 
There could be nothing odd or superstitious about the use of material 
elements f o r a s p i r i t u a l end. Indeed the suspicion of such 'oddness' 
betrayed a false d i s t i n c t i o n between the s p i r i t u a l and the material. 
Such a d i s t i n c t i o n , he thought, was basically un-Christian. The 
whole of creation owed i t s existence to God and was thus suitable to 
express his relationship to man. The grea,t d i s t i n c t i o n was between 
l i f e l i v e d i n r e l a t i o n to him, and l i f e l i v e d on a purely natural l e v e l . 
Whether or not material elements were f i t t i n g l y used to express t h i s 
relationship depended not on themselves but on t h e i r use. This, he 
thought, could be c l a r i f i e d i f the concept of ' s p i r i t u a l ' i n the New 
1. cf 'God was i n Christ' p 199? 
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Testament was understood by the modern concept of 'personal 1. 
Then "... there need be nothing u n s p i r i t u a l , because there need be 
nothing impersonal, i n the r e l i g i o u s use of material elements as 
•sensible signs* and thus as instruments of divine grace." (The 
Theology of the Sacraments p 49)• I * 1 f a c t , i n human terms, material 
things such as g i f t s are commonly used to express a personal r e l a t i o n -
ship and, quite apart from the sacraments, sense experience and 
metaphors from i t , such as 'hearing the Word1, are commonly used i n 
Christian worship. 
The particular sacramental acts of tha Christian church, and he 
l i m i t s himself t-c the Beminlcal sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, 
are not taken a r b i t r a r i l y from the 'sacramental universe'. They go 
back to the i n s t i t u t i o n of Jesus and thus 'place' C h r i s t i a n i t y 
h i s t o r i c a l l y . They establish a clear connection v/ith the 'Word made 
fl e s h ' , and they are, at least, seals on the promises of Jesus. This 
i s essentially so even i f i t should not be possible to trace them to 
the ipssissima verba of Jesus. What i s behind them i s the whole act 
of the incarnation, death and resurrection. Once more here, as 
throughout his work on sacraments, he i s remarkably close to the 
thinking of Quick, though again with a difference i n 'tone' due to an 
apparently greater concern f o r h i s t o r y . Thus, though he professes 
that one need not be too worried i f h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m should prove 
that Jesus did not i n s t i t u t e the sacraments - since they would remain 
as a response to and, presumably, vehicle of the entire episode of 
the incarnation - he does i n f a c t believe that both can be traced back 
to Jesus. One suspects that his a t t i t u d e to them would have been 
d i f f e r e n t were t h i s r e a l l y not possible. 
However, although the sacraments depend on the incarnation and 
are i n a sense a l i n k between the modern believer and that h i s t o r i c a l 
episode, he does not accept the idea of the church and sacraments as 
an 'extension of the incarnation' i n the sense i n which i t i s often 
put. This theory suggests that salvation somehow depends on the fact 
of the incarnation rather than on the once f o r a l l nature of the acts 
of the Incarnate. Furthermore i t implies the non-Biblical antithesis 
between s p i r i t and matter which i s somehow overcome by the infusion of 
s p i r i t i n t o matter. As we have j u s t seen B a i l l i e does not accept 
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that d i s t i n c t i o n ; the incarnation was not the infusion of the s p i r i t u a l 
i n t o the material, hut God's entering humanity. Furthermore, 
orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y i n s i s t s that Jesus remains incarnate, i n that 
having become man he remains man, but that that humanity i s removed 
from us - i n t r a d i t i o n a l terms i t i s i n heaven u n t i l the Parousia. 
The 'Body of Christ' language i n the epistles, which i s often quoted 
i n support of 'extension of the incarnation' thinking, B a i l l i e holds 
to he metaphorical. 
This does not mean that Christ i s permanently absent from his 
church. Nor does i t mean that a l i n k with the 'Jesus of History' 
must be maintained by a 'pipe-line' theory of Apostolic Succession. 
He i s present to the church through the Holy S p i r i t working through 
the Word and Sacraments. This i s d i f f e r e n t both from his incarnate 
presence and from his future coming. "Christ" i s present with us, 
yet not i n the way i n which He was present i n the days of His f l e s h , 
and again not i n the way i n which we s h a l l enjoy His immediate 
presence i n the f i n a l consummation. I n t h i s interim period He i s 
present with us through the Holy S p i r i t i n the Church." ( i b i d p 69). 
During t h i s period the church i s 'on a journey 1 and needs the sacraments 
both to look back to that h i s t o r i c a l episode from which i t takes i t s 
beginning, and to look forward to the f i n a l enjoyment of the Kingdom 
of God. 
But what of the Protestant emphasis on f a i t h ? Here again, 
without using the expression, B a i l l i e ' s thought seems to be controlled 
by the 'paradox of grace'. The sacraments, he suggests, do not 
depend on f a i t h , but they operate through f a i t h , and that f a i t h , 
though i t i s f u l l y human, i s created by God. He i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s 
by a parable of a small boy entrusted to a nursery governess which i s 
worth quoting at length. "When she arrives the l i t t l e fellow i s 
taken into the room where she i s , and l e f t i n her care. But she i s 
strange to him, he does not t r u s t her, but looks d i s t a n t l y at t h i s 
strange woman from the opposite corner of the room. She knows that 
she cannot do anything with him u n t i l she has won his confidence. 
She knows she has to win i t . The l i t t l e boy cannot manufacture i t , 
cannot make himself t r u s t the governess. His f a i t h i n her i s 
something which he cannot create - only she can create i t . And she 
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knows that she cannot create i t by f o r c i n g i t ; she has to respect 
the personality of the c h i l d ; and to t r y to take the ci t a d e l by storm 
would be worse than useless, and would produce fear and d i s t r u s t 
instead of confidence. 
"She sets about her task gently, using various means - words, 
gestures and smiles, and perhaps g i f t s , a l l of which convey something 
of the kindness of her heart. U n t i l at l a s t the l i t t l e fellow's 
mistrust i s melted away, she has won his confidence, and of his own 
free w i l l he responds to her advances and crosses the f l o o r to s i t on 
her knee. Now that her graciousness, using a l l these means, has 
created his f a i t h , she can carry on the good work she has begun." 
( i b i d p 53). 
Turning to the sacrament of Baptism he acknowledges that the 
B i b l i c a l evidence f o r the actual words of i n s t i t u t i o n i s poor. 
However t h i s i s compensated f o r by i t s clear place i n the l i f e and 
teaching of Jesus and the e a r l i e s t New Testament t r a d i t i o n . As f o r 
the manner of baptism, he agrees that t o t a l immersion i s excellent 
symbolism f o r the motif of death and resurrection, and has a very 
powerful psychological effe c t at the moment of administration. Yet 
the sacrament i s also intended to express ideas of cleansing and the 
outpouring of the S p i r i t which are better symbolised by the spr i n k l i n g 
of water. Moreover, while the psychological effect at the moment 
i s important, the intention and f a i t h with which the sacrament i s 
performed are more important. 
He defends i n f a n t Baptism, at least f o r the children of 
believers, on the grounds that i t s i g n i f i e s entry i n t o the church. 
To deny i t would seem to mean that there i s no such thing as Christian 
childhood, and that children of Christians were outside the covenant. 
I n f a c t Christian Baptism i s seen as the f u l f i l m e n t both of Jewish 
proselyte Baptism, i n which the children of the Gentile convert who 
was becoming a Jew were baptised with him, and also of circumcision, 
i n which the children of believers were given the sign of the 
covenant. 
This raises the question of how the c h i l d i s benefitted i f i t 
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has no conscious f a i t h . B a i l l i e suggests that such a question 
betrays a false individualism. The c h i l d i s part of a human family, 
and part of the church family. The benefits of the sacrament operate 
i n response to the f a i t h of the parents and the church. By t h i s 
sacrament the ch i l d i s brought in t o the environment of the church 
and there finds the 'personal influence' of grace. To the suggestion 
that a Christian home and church might provide t h i s influence apart 
from the sacrament of Baptism he re p l i e s , "... there must be a re a l 
and important difference between the environment given to a c h i l d by 
a Church which takes infa n t baptism seriously and the environment 
given by a Church which denies t h i s sacrament to infants. A Church 
which practises i n f a n t baptism with r e a l b e l i e f and understanding 
inevitably has an a t t i t u d e to i t s children which makes i t i n a 
peculiar sense a means of grace to them; and every time the sacrament 
i s administered to an infant ' i n the face of the congregation 1 the 
Church, and especially the parents are brought afresh i n t o that 
a t t i t u d e . I n such a Church a c h i l d i s indeed brought through 
baptism into a new and supernatural environment." ( i b i d p 85f). 
This i s a l l good impressive, serraonic, w r i t i n g , but i t seems to 
me to be not at a l l convincing. I t would be extremely d i f f i c u l t to 
argue that churches of the Baptist denomination do not provide the 
environment indicated, or that they would not say a l l these things 
about a service of in f a n t dedication taken seriously. He also seems 
to come dangerously near to j u s t i f y i n g the sacrament as a useful 
visual aid to others rather than f o r i t s benefit to the recipient. 
His r e a l case seems to be the B i b l i c a l background, the f a c t that the 
sacrament i s part of the t r a d i t i o n of the church, and the suggestion 
that there i s such a thing as Christian childhood and that the 
children of Christians should be seen to be i n the covenant. He i s 
on much surer ground when he speaks of the benefits to the c h i l d of 
growing i n a Christian environment, being surrounded by the love and 
care of parents and church, and thus being led to f a i t h of i t s own. 
Thus the i n i t i a t i v e of God has preceded man's f a i t h . "Surely i t 
i s i n subsequent f a i t h going on r i g h t through a man's l i f e t hat, 
above a l l the sacrament becomes efficacious and a channel of the 
grace of God." ( i b i d p 89). I n that case, as he says, more needs 
to be made of confirmation or i t s equivalent. 
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I n his approach to the Eucharist he i s clear l y influenced by 
Roman and Anglo-Catholic thinking. I t i s worth noting at t h i s point 
that the only expression of his thought we have i s from posthumously 
published lectures delivered i n a Presbyterian s e t t i n g . He thus, 
perhaps n a t u r a l l y , affirms the Reformation p r i n c i p l e , "... that the 
existence of a sacrament depends e n t i r e l y on the word of promise, so 
that i t i s not anything i n the material element, but e n t i r e l y the 
divine Word that can make water or bread and wine sacramental." ( i b i d 
p 43)• He also has several references to Calvin and to the 
Westminster Confession. He seems keen to make sure that the 
Reformed t r a d i t i o n should not appear to compare unfavourably with 
a more Catholic emphasis. Speaking of the Catholic t r a d i t i o n he 
writes, "Surely we are not going to be content with believing less 
than they do - content with a smaller, poorer b e l i e f . " And l a t e r , 
"Surely we cannot be content to say that Roman Catholics or Anglo-
Catholics make the divine presence i n the sacrament more real than we 
do." ( i b i d pp 93» 97) • Presumably, i n view of the audience addressed, 
some allowance must be made f o r rhetoric here. 
Having asserted that the whole action of the sacrament, not simply 
the words, must be a dramatic symbol, he deals as Quick had done with 
two major problems - the Real Presence, and the Eucharistic Sacrifice. 
As we have noted on several occasions he recognises degrees of 
God's presence quite apart from the sacraments. God i s not contained 
i n his creation but he i s present to i t . The degree of t h i s presence 
may be said to be more 'personal' to man than to the rest of creation, 
and more 'personal' s t i l l to believers. I t i s t h i s type of presence, 
a presence on a 'personal' l e v e l where some degree of re c i p r o c i t y i s 
at least possible, that he finds i n the sacraments. He i l l u s t r a t e s 
t h i s with a point from Marcel on the use of the word 'with'. Tables 
and chairs can be juxtaposed and are then said to be 'alongside 1 or 
'next to' each other, but they are not said to be 'with' each other. 
People may s i m i l a r l y be said to be 'alongside' or 'next to' each other, 
but i f they enter in t o a more personal relationship they are said to 
be 'with' each other. 
I t i s i n t h i s l a t t e r form that God i s 'with' his people i n the 
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eucharist. Such a presence, B a i l l i e argues, must be described as 
objective and not merely subjective. God i s r e a l l y present. The 
believer does not have to conjure him from his own subjective emotions. 
He i s as t r u l y present to f a i t h as the elements are to sense. "... 
that i s the most real presence conceivable f o r a divine r e a l i t y i n 
t h i s present world. The most objective and penetrating kind of 
presence that God can give us i s through f a i t h . ... St. Paul's prayer 
f o r his friends at Ephesus i s 'that Christ may dwell i n your hearts 
through f a i t h 1 . That i s how Christ dwells i n men's hearts i n t h i s 
present world." ( i b i d p 101). But such a presence i s i n f a c t a 
'presence i n absence' since sacraments only have value f o r the church 
during i t s time of pilgrimage. The presence of Christ i n the 
eucharist brings together the memory of his past presence i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l episode of the incarnation, and the anticipation of his 
return i n glory. 
The question of s a c r i f i c e , he notes, i s a much more d i v i s i v e one. 
But he believes that, apart from the Church of Rome, the differences 
are not as s i g n i f i c a n t as they seem. Problems are caused by 
emotional responses to such words as 'priest' and ' a l t a r ' ; and there 
i s a perfectly j u s t i f i a b l e revulsion against the Roman doctrine of 
the Mass i n i t s medieval form. I t i s t h i s h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned 
revulsion which i s reflected i n the refusal to use the idea of 
sa c r i f i c e which i s found i n the great Protestant Confessions. Here 
he quotes the Anglican Thirty Hine A r t i c l e s , and the Presbyterian 
Westminster Confession. 
He rejects the view that Jesus' words 'this do i n remembrance of 
me' should be interpreted s a c r i f i c i a l l y . 'Remembrance1, he agrees, 
should probably have a much stronger meaning than i s normal i n the 
English 'memorial', but i t does not go so f a r as re-presenting. 
Yet there i s a sense, he believes, i n which s a c r i f i c e or o f f e r i n g i s 
involved i n the eucharist. He points out that most Christians 
would be happy to speak of a s a c r i f i c e of worship, prayer, or praise, 
and of the s a c r i f i c i a l o f f e r i n g of the believer's l i f e to God. 
However, such giving to God i s not something which man can do apart 
from Christ. These offerings can only be made i n union with His 
one o f f e r i n g . 
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At t h i s point he repeats a l o t of the discussion about the 
relationship between hi s t o r y and et e r n i t y which we have already 
seen i n dealing with his thought on atonement."'" He argues again 
tha t , while i t i s true that Christ once bore our sins i n time, 
"... we cannot say that God's bearing of sin was confined to that 
moment. I n some sense i t i s an eternal a c t i v i t y or passion of 
God's, and i t has i t s dir e c t ' v e r t i c a l * r e l a t i o n to every moment of 
our s i n f u l human hi s t o r y ; ..." ( i b i d p 117)• One way of expressing 
t h i s i s i n the concept of Christ's heavenly intercession so prominent 
i n the epistle to the Hebrews. But t h i s , of course, i s seen as a 
pleading of the efficacy of His death. Thus i t i s only i n union 
with Him, and i n the power of his s a c r i f i c e , that Christians can 
make t h e i r lesser sac r i f i c e s . 
Gathering his thoughts on the subject he asks f i n a l l y , "... may 
we not say something l i k e t h i s : that i n the sacrament, Christ Himself 
being t r u l y present, He unites us by f a i t h with His eternal s a c r i f i c e , 
that we may plead and receive i t s benefits and o f f e r ourselves i n 
prayer and praise to God? I f we can say t h i s , then surely we... 
have our doctrine of eucharistic s a c r i f i c e . " ( i b i d p 118). This, he 
argues, with many quotations, i s i n accord with much modern Anglo-
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox thought. As we might expect Quick i s 
quoted here. More surprisingly perhaps, though perhaps more useful 
i n a Presbyterian assembly, similar comments are quoted from Calvin. 
I t could be argued against him that the s i m i l a r i t i e s which he 
thus claims to f i n d i n d i f f e r e n t schools of thought are not so great 
as he would l i k e to think. Quick seems to have a much richer 
doctrine, coming from a more full-blooded acceptance of the instrument-
a l i t y of the sacraments. Calvin, on the other hand, seems to think 
most natural l y not of the work of Christ being somehow brought down to 
man i n the sacrament, but rather of man being somehow taken up in t o 
heaven whex^ e Christ remains. B a i l l i e seems to f a l l uneasily between 
the two, and to confuse the matter somewhat by occasionally using the 
language of devotion to gloss over a theological point. Though 
doubtless he could argue that such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s f a l s e . 
1. with 'Theology of the Sacraments' p l l 6 f , cf 'God was i n 
Christ 1 p 190ff 
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Of the theologians covered i n t h i s study Denney i s cl e a r l y the 
purest representative of the Protestant position. He regains the 
orthodox Protestant stress on the objective act of God seen as 
substitutionary atonement, refusing the weaker idea of representation 
on the grounds that i t indicates that something i s put forward from 
man's side. His uneasy a t t i t u d e to the person of the Holy S p i r i t 
and his ambivalence about the sacraments seem to come from an aversion 
to any suggestion of substance thinking. His v/hole approach however 
shows that he sees his position to be under attack, and he i s keen to 
show that i t i s nevertheless the correct and only B i b l i c a l view. I t 
can be said of him that he i s inclined to state his opponents views i n 
ways which make i t easier f o r him to destroy them."^ " Nevertheless he 
i s not i n d i f f e r e n t to c r i t i c i s m s of his own position. 
I have attempted to show that his use of 'l e g a l 1 metaphors i s 
2 
by no means insensitive, and that the whole approach t y p i f i e d by 
'substitution' thinking has greater strength than i s often allowed. 
Further, I t r i e d to suggest that, i n spite of the r e a l criticisms 
urged against i t , t h i s sort of approach i s dealing with man's predic-
ament at a f a r deeper l e v e l than i t s c r i t i c s allow, and often at a 
3 
deeper l e v e l than many of the c r i t i c s manage themselves. I n Oman's 
phrase exponents of t h i s view show themselves w i l l i n g to l i v e i n the 
•half l i g h t s ' , and to move towards 'the dim vistas of man's s p i r i t u a l 
horizon'. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , and surely s i g n i f i c a n t , that even such 
opponents of t h i s view as Rashdall and Quick are obliged to admit that 
i t i s true to Paul. 
I t seems somewhat s u p e r f i c i a l to argue that the modern mind no 
longer works with such a high conception of law.^" Such c r i t i c i s m 
overlooks the f a c t that the metaphor of lav/ i s a metaphor, and that 
that relationship, since God remains f a i t h f u l , Reid goes on, 
following Barth, to work t h i s out i n terms of God nevertheless 
beholding even s i n f u l man ' i n Christ'. 
1. cf Reid op c i t p 90. 
2. cf supra pp J8ff. 60. 
3. cf supra pp 119-128 
4. cf P.W. D i l l i s t o n e : The Christian Understanding of Atonement 
pp 203-215 and supra p 60. 
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i t i s used very c a r e f u l l y and i n a well defined way "by Denney. I t 
might also be d i f f i c u l t to argue that modern man's a t t i t u d e to law 
has changed so much that he does not at least demand that things 
should be ' f a i r 1 . 
S imilarly a good deal of unnecessary confusion seems to be 
introduced into the question by discussions on the moral worth of 
r e t r i b u t i v e punishment, and on the use of the phrase 'penal' i n 
r e l a t i o n to the sufferings of Christ. Retribution may not be the 
sole aim of punishment i f the inte n t i o n i s to re-establish the wrong-
doer i n society. Yet to omit the element of r e t r i b u t i o n completely 
would be to t r e a t the offender as one who i s unable to pay f o r his 
offence, or as one who cannot be expected to behave d i f f e r e n t l y . I n 
t h i s way a c h i l d i s frequently not punished f o r some misdemeanour on 
the grounds that 'one cannot expect anything else from a c h i l d ' . 
But to extend t h i s a t t i t u d e would not be a help i n the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
of offenders where one aim i s to show that they are, or can be, 
responsible members of society. That i s that they are precisely not, 
as children, those from whom nothing else can be expected. The idea 
that punishment has been borne, or payment made, i s a strong 
psychological factor. Though t h i s i s not to argue that there i s any 
equivalence between the sufferings of Christ and those due to man. 
Such c r i t i c i s m gains strength by pushing the metaphor farther than 
i t was intended that i t should go. 
I t must also be pointed out, as we saw Denney point out, that to 
describe Jesus' sufferings as 'penal' does not imply a vindictive"'' 
punishment. But i t c e r t a i n l y involves an acknowledgement of Jesus' 
real entering i n to that area of suffering and death which i s the 
o 
'penalty' of s i n appointed by God. Indeed one of the most impressive 
features of Denney's work i s his serious approach to death as a 
s p i r i t u a l f act and experience, and not simply as the running down of 
a physical organism. 
1. I use the word 'vindictive' here i n i t s general sense of 
' s p i t e f u l ' , not i n the sense of 'vindicating' which i s i n f a c t 
the idea Denney has i n mind. 
2. This i s worked out i n V. Taylor: Jesus and His Sacrifice esp. 
pp 285-290. I n a footnote on p 286 Taylor gives an impressive 
l i s t of defenders of the 'penal' nature of Jesus' sufferings, 
including Denney. 
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Nevertheless the tide was running against Denney's type of 
theology. I n Liberal Protestantism a new a t t i t u d e to man, which 
owed more to evolution than to the Bible, combined with a revulsion 
against the supposed immorality of Protestant orthodoxy."'" The idea 
of sin changed. I t was now seen as weakness or wrong decisions, 
but neither the Protestant stress on culpable r e b e l l i o n leading to 
judgement, nor the Catholic stress on the tained nature which 
A 
separated man from God, was kept. The God-man relationship was 
regarded from the manward side and theology took i t s s t a r t i n g point 
from man's religious i n s t i n c t s . This led to the high ethical 
idealism of Rashdall, but even on i t s own terms i t lacked depth i n 
the form i n which Rashdall stated i t . I t did not r e a l l y look seriously 
at man's religious s t r i v i n g s . 
But i t i s from t h i s background, and perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y from 
the recognition of the f a i l u r e of Rashdall's type of approach, that 
there has emerged what I believe can be referred to as a t h i r d general 
view of grace. I t s representative as f a r as t h i s study i s concerned 
was John Oman, and i t i s f o r that reason that I consider him the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t and i n f l u e n t i a l of the theologians studied. As we saw 
grace here i s characterised as persuasion, and i t i s seen as coming 
through the whole natural order. This view shares features with the 
other views, but arises p a r t l y from the weaknesses, real and supposed, 
found i n them. I t also has characteristics of i t s own such that i t 
can be seen as a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t approach. 
In a polemical sense i t i s a reaction against the conception of 
grace which Oman refers to as 'omnipotence directed i n a stra i g h t 
l i n e by omniscience'. Whether grace was seen i n terms of w i l l and 
the establishing of a relationship, or of s p i r i t and the overcoming 
of t a i n t , i t had become possible to speak of i t as some kind of force 
which could be i n c o n f l i c t with man and somehow over-rule him. The 
long arguments from Augustine and Pelagius onward had established 
the p r i o r i t y of the divine i n i t i a t i v e . But the idea of man being 
over-ruled, even by God, was not a welcome one to Liberal Protestants. 
1. There was also the idea, which we sha l l take up l a t e r , that 
fresh Bible study had shown the 'orthodox' ideas to be fal s e . 
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There i s not s u f f i c i e n t material available to permit much 
discussion of any other 'means of grace'. We have noted the high 
regard he has f o r the community of believers and i t s t r a d i t i o n s . 
I t i s w i t h i n t h i s community that the 'story' of Jesus i s passed on, 
and the sacraments are administered, thus c a l l i n g others in t o the 
experience of the 'paradox of grace* and enabling them to enter the 
benefits of the work of Christ. The Bible he sees has authority 
because of i t s h i s t o r i c a l nearness to the incarnation. " I t represents 
the inner c i r c l e of witnesses to that episode. Not, of course, 
merely i n the sense of h i s t o r i c a l eye-witnesses, but also i n the sense 
of witnesses to the meaning of Christ, ... since our eyes never looked 
upon Jesus i n the f l e s h , we are ultimately dependent on the testimony 
of those who were eye-witnesses, and that i s what i s behind the New 
Testament." ( i b i d p 57). The Old Testament would presumably be 
valued as the witness to e a r l i e r experiences of God, and as the . 
scripture of the f i r s t Christian church. We saw his appreciation 
of the Psalms as conveying to l a t e r readers the personal f a i t h and 
experience of those who f i r s t wrote and used them. As f a r as 'orders' 
are concerned, he denies any 'pipe-line' theory, but argues that the 
sacraments which point back to the incarnation "... can only be 
celebrated i n the redeemed community which i t created, and only by 
those who within that community have been set apart i n a succession 
which connects us through the ages with the origins of our r e l i g i o n . " 
( i b i d p 66). 
Several c r i t i c i s m s of his thought have been made i n passing. 
The nature of the material available makes more general c r i t i c i s m s 
d i f f i c u l t , since there are some questions which he does not raise or 
to which he alludes b r i e f l y as adjuncts to other discussions. His 
treatment of sin i s perhaps the most important of these f o r our 
present purposes. He treats i t eloquently and at length as man's 
i n a b i l i t y , without divine grace, to do what he ought to do. The 
nearest he gets to a d e f i n i t i o n i s to see i t as man's inherent s e l f -
centredness.''" But he seems to pay no attention at a l l to the concept 
of sin as a ' r a c i a l ' e n t i t y , and l i t t l e to the element of r e b e l l i o n . 
Thus we do not f i n d the idea of the s o l i d a r i t y of the human race i n 
1. cf 'God was i n Christ' p 204f 
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culpable reb e l l i o n against God. As N.H.G. Robinson has noted, i t 
i s not clear whether his ideas of 'enabling grace' would be strong 
enough to deal with these concepts."'' Yet i t could not be said that 
the concept of r a c i a l sin i s denied. The s i t u a t i o n i s of a piece 
with his selective approach to the interpretations of the doctrine 
of the atonement which, as we saw, enabled him to omit certain 
important emphases. 
On a more positive note we referred at the beginning to his 
mediating position. At the time he was w r i t i n g t h i s showed 
considerable independence of judgement. He refused to be stampeded 
by the reaction against Liberal Protestantism, or to accept the sort 
of polarising of the options which was sometimes associated with 
'Barthianism*, and l a t e r with the demythologising programme of 
Bultmann with i t s exclusive concentration on the cross as the one 
great eschatological moment i n hist o r y . Thus he keeps both the 
importance of the h i s t o r i c f a c t s , open to c r i t i c i s m , and the 
importance of the decision of f a i t h . His appeal to moral conviction 
might be c r i t i c i s e d by l a t e r theologians and philosophers. Yet, as 
we saw, he put i t with careful q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and came to see i t s 
l i m i t a t i o n s . I t i s hard to believe that at the bottom of t h i s he 
i s not appealing to something which i s true about man as created by 
God and as a recipient of grace. 
Perhaps his greatest strength and the chief feature of his 
theology i s i n his use of the paradoxes of r e l i g i o n , summed up i n 
the 'paradox of grace'. The v a r i a t i o n i n his understanding of 
paradox, to which we drew attention, perhaps weakened i t s e f f e c t i v e -
ness as a theological t o o l . I t might fu r t h e r be argued that he i s 
only dealing with one type of reli g i o u s experience. I n spite of his 
obvious sympathy towards Catholic theology and several quotations from 
Eastern Orthodox sources, his thinking, and probably his own experience, 
remained on the moral rather than the mystical side of Ch r i s t i a n i t y . 
Nevertheless, on that side, the s e n s i t i v i t y which he shows towards 
deep personal experience gives: his work considerable religious 
strength. 
1. op c i t p 257 n 
-271-
V I I I CONCLUSION 
The purpose of t h i s study has been to consider the work of 
certain representative B r i t i s h theologians of the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s 
century c h i e f l y through an examination of t h e i r treatment of that 
group of questions which cluster around the central subject of grace. 
I n t h i s conclusion I s h a l l not attempt to arrive at solutions to 
these questions from which one could say that certain positions are 
'ri g h t * while others are 'wrong*. I intend rather to show a d r i f t 
which I believe i s discernible i n the theologians studied, which i s 
related to wider theological movements, and which has continued to 
the present. 
I t i s widely accepted that the most s i g n i f i c a n t theological 
movement of the period was the so-called *neo-orthodox* r e v i v a l 
associated with the work of Karl Barth. Very broadly speaking t h i s 
movement developed from certain inadequacies i n Liberal Protestantism 
and seemed f o r a time to have t o t a l l y discredited Liberalism as a 
theological force. More recently, probably as I have suggested 
before the death of B a i l l i e and c e r t a i n l y since, 'Barthianism' has 
i t s e l f l o s t ground. I t has been replaced by a new and d i f f e r e n t 
Liberalism which yet has close family resemblances to that i n vogue 
before 1914« At the same time there has been a move away from the 
once fashionable stress on the 'Word of God1, f i r s t to a greater 
i n t e r e s t i n the church, and more recently to what might be called a 
broader sacramentalism undergirded by ideas such as that of a 
sacramental universe. I am aware that what i s often called 'Barthianism* 
i n England, and what i s therefore intended i n t h i s o u t l i n e , may not be 
very closely related to the work of Barth himself; that some have argued 
that Barth has ra r e l y been properly read and understood i n t h i s country; 
and that the apparent r i s e and f a l l of 'Barthianism' may to some extent 
be traced to non-theological factors. Nevertheless the broad o u t l i n e , 
I think, remains. 
I n r e l a t i o n to the subject of t h i s work I believe that, as well 
as t h i s general movement i n theological method and outlook, one must 
also consider the existence of two broad approaches to the subject of 
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grace - the Protestant and the Catholic - from which there seems 
recently to have emerged a t h i r d . I am conscious that I have on 
several occasions, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to the work of Quick, 
drawn attention to the danger of analysing and l a b e l l i n g d i f f e r e n t 
theological 'schools'. I am aware of that danger now, and i n 
o f f e r i n g outlines of Protestant and Catholic approaches to the 
subject I do not suggest that these exist as water-tight compartments, 
or that i t i s not possible f o r one person to see the value of both 
sides. Indeed I would want to assert that often a Protestant thinker 
does give weight to a t y p i c a l l y Catholic stress, and vice versa, 
though i t i s usually a d i f f e r e n t weight and often with a d i f f e r e n t 
terminology. But i t i s wrong, I believe, to go to the opposite 
extreme and say that a l l apparent differences are terminological and 
that there are no basic divisions. I f these qu a l i f i c a t i o n s are 
accepted i t can be h e l p f u l to have outlines of d i f f e r e n t possible 
approaches as generalisations and i t i s easiest to distinguish between 
the Protestant, or s o t e r i o l o g i c a l , approach, on the one hand, and the 
Catholic, or ecclesiological, one on the other. 
The Protestant moves most nat u r a l l y i n the moral realm with a 
stress on the human w i l l . I n t h i s t r a d i t i o n grace i s predominantly 
a proclamation of forgiveness f o r the rebellious w i l l , a forgiveness 
which i s received i n an intensely personal way. The epitome of the 
Christian l i f e i s found i n the experience of conversion. I t need 
not be a p a r t i c u l a r l y sudden instantaneous event and i s c e r t a i n l y not, 
at least i n the majority of cases, t o t a l l y unprepared f o r . Yet there 
i s a d i s t i n c t element of discontinuity, a sense that God has intervened. 
The picture i s of a w i l l which has been 'at odds' with God, either i n 
straightforward r e b e l l i o n , or i n an attempt to come to terms with God 
through works i n such a way that man has a claim against God. Then, 
wi t h the experience of grace as forgiveness, comes the consciousness 
of release from g u i l t , r e l i e f from the necessity of struggling f o r 
s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n before God, and an overwhelming sense of gratitude 
w i t h a consciousness that a l l i s of God and that man's only response 
i s f a i t h . 
I t should not be necessary to say that f a i t h here i s not mere 
i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f but personal commitment. I t i s more f i d u c i a 
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than assensus. though i t must have cognitive implications as the 
commitment i s based on the conviction that God i s true to his word."*" 
I t i s a misunderstanding of the Protestant position so to state f a i t h 
that i t becomes a kind of work. For t h i s t r a d i t i o n there i s a 
d i s t i n c t contrast between grace and works» 
The forgiveness 'which i s thus proclaimed and received i s made 
possible by the objective act of God i n Christ. The sin which stood 
between God and man has been dealt with and thus removed, i t has not 
simply been overlooked. Thus f o r t h i s way of thinking there i s a 
heavy concentration on the actual death of Christ. I t i s an objective 
act outside of us by which we are benefitted. The easiest ways of 
explaining t h i s are through legal metaphors, ideas of substitution 
and p r o p i t i a t i o n . The chief stress i s on what God has done i n Christ 
'for us 1, i n contrast to the more Catholic stress of what Christ does 
'i n us'. 
However, i t would be misleading to over-emphasise these more 
objective elements - and here we see the dangers of over-analysis 
mentioned above - f o r the Protestant also stresses s a n c t i f i c a t i o n . 
Phrases such as 'to receive Christ' or 'to l e t Christ into the heart' 
are characteristic of the most extreme Protestant piety. The t r u t h 
i s that the Protestant does not r e a l l y distinguish between an imputed 
and an imparted righteousness i n terms of actual Christian l i v i n g . 
He c e r t a i n l y i n s i s t s that the sinner i s declared righteous i n v i r t u e 
of the death of Christ and the righteousness of Christ 'which i s 
imputed to him. But there i s no suggestion that the new convert 
should then, as i t were, stop to consider the next step. The process 
of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i n e v i t a b l y follows and i n t h i s process righteousness 
i s imparted to the Christian. I d e a l l y at least i t should be possible 
to speak of progress i n s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , but, and here i s the 
d i s t i n c t i o n from some forms of Catholicism, such s a n c t i f i c a t i o n or 
imparted righteousness never becomes the basis of his position before 
God. 
Enough has already been said of the possible weaknesses of t h i s 
1. The classical expression of the Protestant view of f a i t h i s 
found i n Calvin: I n s t i t u t e s 3:2:1-7. 
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position. I t can stress the death of Christ to the exclusion of 
his l i f e . I t can be stated i n excessively external ways. I t tends 
to individualism and a minimising or ignoring of the corporate element 
i n C h r i s t i a n i t y . The natural stress on the Word of pardon leads to a 
great stress on preaching, so that the church can become merely a 
gathering to hear the word of God, and that alone. The sacraments 
become acted sermons and there i s a loss of the mystical element. But 
these are possible dangers of t h i s approach, they need not be inevitably 
associated with i t . Furthermore the great strengths, and the consider-
able New Testament support of the position, should not be overlooked. 
The Reformers saw t h i s as the basic New Testament view of the f a i t h 
which they believed had been overladen with error. 
The t y p i c a l Catholic position can also be put i n general terms. 
Here the stress i s on the a c t i v i t y of the i p i r i t of God. There i s a 
d i f f e r e n t basic view of s i n , and the Catholic works with a d i f f e r e n t 
contrast. Here si n i s seen less as r e b e l l i o n and more as impurity or 
t a i n t . I t i s not a matter of a wrong choice, or a series of wrong 
choices, but more of a corrupt nature. This cannot simply be i d e n t i f i e d 
with the Protestant conception of a rebellious w i l l , though some would 
say that i t can include i t . But the chief feature i s that here there 
i s a contrast between grace and nature, rather than grace and works. 
Grace i s now seen as that which raises the whole of l i f e to a super-
natural l e v e l . I n t r a d i t i o n a l terms i t moves i t back towards i t s 
pre-fallen state and brings a l i t t l e nearer the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r man 
of choosing that glorious future which was always God's plan f o r him. 
Grace i s thus seen i n term3 of s p i r i t , and the reception of grace i s 
not the acceptance of a proclamation of forgiveness with a consequent 
redirection of the w i l l , but the reception of a s p i r i t u a l power which 
i s able to deal with the corruption of man's nature. 
The d i f f e r e n t framework i n which the Catholic Christian i n t e r -
prets grace leads to d i f f e r e n t expectations of re l i g i o u s experience 
and a d i f f e r e n t 'tone 1 of Christian l i f e . There i s less of an 
expectation of a once-for-all experience, but there might be 
continuing, and ever deepening, appreciation of personal sinfulness 
and a desire to a t t a i n to a state of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n or release from s i n . 
The power f o r t h i s s a n c t i f i c a t i o n i s l i k e l y to be found through a 'high 1 
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view of the church and especially the sacraments. The church i s now 
the s p i r i t f i l l e d community, and the sacraments are the means by which 
grace i s experienced. Such experience may be expected to lead to a 
new habitus as, through no merit of his own but purely through grace, 
the process of s a n c t i f i c a t i o n progressively f i t s the believer f o r 
f u l l e r worship of God by a transformation of his corrupt nature.^" 
Nov/ we see the other side of the Protestant emphases mentioned 
above. Instead of a stress on the once-for-all objective act of the 
cross, there i s a f u l l e r appreciation of the whole l i f e of Christ as 
the means of salvation, often, especially i n the period under review, 
accompanied by ideas of a broadly 'Christus V i c t o r 1 type of thinking 
about the atonement. Instead of the stress on what Christ has done 
'for us 1, there i s the continuing stress on what Christ continues to 
do ' i n us 1. Furthermore t h i s general approach can deal f a r more 
easily with ethics. The Protestant Christian tends to f i n d e t hical 
demands embarrassing since they are inclined either to come from an 
i m i t a t i o n of Christ, which reminds him of inadequate views of atone-
ment, or from attempts to obey the law, which he i s apt to dismiss as 
•works-righteousness 1. 
But t h i s view too has i t s dangers. I t can be asked whether i t 
r e a l l y does j u s t i c e to the B i b l i c a l view of s i n as rebe l l i o n and breach 
of relationship, or whether i t i s simply concentrating on the effects 
of sin rather than i t s root cause. More important i s the danger that 
i t w i l l move from the 'dynamic' view of the r e l a t i o n of God and man 
found i n the New Testament to adopt a more 'substantial' view. For 
such a view the uniqueness of the work of Christ and the proclamation 
of pardon must almost inevitably be dulled. This i s seen at i t s 
extreme when substance thinking i s applied to the eucharist and grace 
i s seen as a kind of ' s t u f f . Though, once more, i t must be 
emphasised that these are only possible dangers. 
1. I f t h i s outline of the Catholic position i s broadly correct 
there should be no surprise about the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Catholics 
i n the current charismatic r e v i v a l . While Protestants discover 
an element which has largely been absent from t h e i r f a i t h , 
Catholics merely experience an awakening of what has always 
been present, though often dormant, i n t h e i r s . 
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Th e contrast between the two views can be brought out by t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t views of man, coming from d i f f e r e n t understandings of the 
image of God. The Protestant view i s ' r e l a t i o n a l ' . Man i s 
constituted by his answerability to God, that i s i n terms of his w i l l 
to hear or to refuse to hear, to obey or to refuse to obey, God's 
word. He can only r i g h t l y be a man i n his r e l a t i o n to God, and could 
he ever be completely outside t h i s relationship he would cease to be 
a man. The problem then arises of what can one say about those who 
refuse t h i s relationship? I s the relationship such that even i n 
t h e i r refusal to l i s t e n or obey they are yet related to God, or i s 
such a d e f i n i t e , w i l f u l , disobedience possible that one must say that 
some cease to be t r u l y human? 
The Catholic view can deal with t h i s problem by saying that man 
continues to exist outside the relationship with God by v i r t u e of 
some 'substance' i n his being. I n f a c t his being i s substantiated. 
The r e l a t i o n a l aspect i s not ignored, i t i s s t i l l asserted that man 
is out of his proper relationship with God, but the question has 
changed, i t now becomes how to restore man to that relationship. I n 
other words attention has moved from what man _is to what he must do. 
This gives s t a b i l i t y to man's being at the expense of seeing him as 
sharing the being of God. But the B i b l i c a l view i s that man does not 
share being with God, he rather derives being from God. The re s u l t 
of substantiating man i s that grace i s also substantiated, the way 
i s now open f o r separate 'graces' as donna superaddita, one substance 
i s added to another. A second resu l t i s the introduction of the 
contrast that we have already seen between grace and nature. The 
Thomistic dictum that 'grace does not destroy nature but completes i t ' 
overcomes t h i s contrast. But i t i s a contrast that the Protestant 
would not allow i n the f i r s t place, since he sees grace and nature as 
d i f f e r e n t i n q u a l i t y , and argues that the true B i b l i c a l contrast i s 
grace and works.^ 
1. An i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s Protestant l i n e from an unusual source 
i s found i n G.K. Chesterton who begins one of his short stories 
with the words "A man and an atheist were standing on a doorstep.." 
I have not been able to trace the exact source of t h i s , 
2. The argument of the l a s t two paragraphs i s heavily indebted to 
J.K.S. Reid: 'Our L i f e i n Christ' chap 2. Where I have stopped 
short with the implication that the existence of a man who refuses 
his relationship with God i s nevertheless s t i l l constituted by 
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The way forward seemed to l i e with a view which acknowledged God's 
a c t i v i t y throughout the whole of creation, and which analysed i t 
by the use of personal terms. 
Basically t h i s approach i s the appeal to a general religious 
apprehension, a numinous sense, or a consciousness that there i s 
•something more1 to man's experience of the world, and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
of other people. I n modern terminology t h i s i s described as an 
experience ' i n depth'. When analysed i t appears as an i n t u i t i o n of 
some basal un i t y undergirding the universe and our experience of i t . 
H.D. Lewis has argued that r e f l e c t i o n on our experience of the universe 
i n such moments of insight seems to bring us to a point "... where the 
universe displays some unity of a 'supra-rational' character whose 
mystery we can never reduce." (Our Experience of God p 40)« Those 
who argue i n t h i s way are keen to point out that the things and 
people experienced are the same f o r the believer as f o r the non-
believer, but the believer 'sees more' i n them, he experiences them 
2 
'i n depth'. For Oman th i s was expressed as that experience of the 
Supernatural through the natural which i s always open to those who 
w i l l have i t . 
Thus f o r t h i s approach grace i s always present. I t comes i n 
experiences of 'a power not ourselves which makes f o r righteousness 1 
p o t e n t i a l l y open to a l l . There i s here a bringing together of the 
ideas of revelation and grace. This., I believe, i s perfectly 
reasonable i n i t s e l f , since revelation and grace may be considered 
as the formal and material aspects of the same conception. The 
question must arise, however, whether t h i s very general approach i s 
an adequate treatment of revelation. 
I n the early part of t h i s century such an approach had the 
apologetic advantage of being a protest against a too aggressive 
s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e . Against the cold matter of fa c t approach 
1. The basic texts seem to have been R. Otto: 'The Idea of the 
Holy 1 and M. Buber ' I and Thou' 
2. cf "The Believer finds i n the most f a m i l i a r experiences of 
l i f e a meaning and a presence which the unbeliever does not 
f i n d i n them;..." John B a i l l i e : 'Our Knowledge of God' p 55• 
-281-
which seemed to be s c i e n t i f i c such an a t t i t u d e to the world took 
account of the more than matter of f a c t feelings of which most people 
are i n a r t i c u l a t e l y aware, and restored some a i r of mystery, or even 
d i v i n i t y , to the universe. More recently i t s apologetic value i s 
that i s can allow f o r a good deal of secularism and, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when stated i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms, i t can f i n d i n a basically 
immanental view of God the experiences which were previously 
associated with an experience of transcendence."'' Thus, paradoxically, 
one i s urged to experience transcendence * i n depth*. Not the least 
of i t s virtues i s that i t i s an appeal to a general not a specific 
experience, that i s one which i s at least p o t e n t i a l l y open to a l l , 
and i t thus enables the Christian to account f o r the genuine rel i g i o u s 
experiences found i n non-Christian re l i g i o n s or philosophies« 
This type of approach seems to have affected i n some measure 
most theology f o r the l a s t f i f t y years at least, and i t s influence i s 
apparent i n Quick and Donald B a i l l i e . Of the two views previously 
mentioned i t i s c l e a r l y nearest to the Catholic, and i t i s perhaps 
best seen as a weakened and extended Catholicism. I t has clear 
a f f i n i t i e s with the t r a d i t i o n of Logos theology, and can appeal 
nat u r a l l y to sacramentalism, especially i f the sacraments are set 
against a background of a sacramental universe - a l i n e taken i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways by both Quick and B a i l l i e . But the approach has 
certain obvious weaknesses. The chief of these, which I mentioned 
2 
i n c r i t i c i s m of Oman, i s that there seems to be no good reason why 
the experience, or sense of transcendence ' i n depth', should be 
interpreted i n a Christian way at a l l . 
A p a r t i c u l a r example of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s provided, at a l a t e r 
period, by the differences between R.W. Hepburn and H.D. Lewis. 
Hepburn i n 'Christianity and Paradox' (1958)» argued that what i s 
generally taken to be a rel i g i o u s experience or sense of the numinous 
1. A reductio ad absurdum argument against t h i s approach i s 
provided by A. Kee's suggestion that i t i s possible to speak 
of experience of transcendence i n purely secular terms, 
appealing to Jesus but discarding b e l i e f i n God. cf 'The Way 
of Transcendence' (1971) 
2. cf supra p 174* 
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i s open to non-believers, and that i t i s possible f o r the non-
believer to r e t a i n a 'religious orientation of mind 1. He i s saying 
i n effect that one can have the experience without being forced to 
adopt the Christian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . Lewis, whose book 'Our 
Experience of God1 (1959) begins from an awareness of the Supernatural 
very similar to Oman's, i s naturally not happy with t h i s , though he 
recognises i t s force. However i n answer to i t he can only say that 
Hepburn has got the experience wrong, or at least has wrongly 
interpreted i t . The experience i t s e l f , Lewis claims, i s not neutral. 
To say that i t i s "... i s only possible i f we exclude what i s v i t a l i n 
t h i s experience. I t i s not any impression of awe or 'quite 
inexpressible strangeness 1 which constitutes the sense of the holy 
... ( i t ) ... i s the peculiarly religious one of f i n d i n g God i n some 
way present i n the world, and whatever f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be 
i n order here i t i s cert a i n l y not one which leaves i t open whether 
God exists or not." (op c i t p 102)^ This hardly seems a f a i r 
argument, and i n any case tends to undermine Lewis's, and Oman's, 
entire position which seems to depend on the experience being, i n 
pr i n c i p l e at lea s t , universal. My own opinion i s that we have i n 
Lewis the position which i s implied i n Oman, and that i t i s not 
possible to distinguish i t from an avowedly non-Christian religious 
2 
position such as Hepburns. 
Exponents of the view under discussion though they begin with 
something l i k e Oman's 'Supernatural realm' go on most nat u r a l l y to 
3 
speak of 'God', and to use personal terms. I n doing so i t seems 
that they are taking much more from what they tend to c a l l 'special 
revelation' than they always allow. There i s the f u r t h e r problem 
1. This i s remarkably similar to Oman's attempt to distinguish the 
'sacred Holy 1 from the 'undifferentiated Holy' (cf supra p 137)• 
Lewis's treatment of Hepburn i s similar to Oman's of Otto 
(cf The Natural and the Supernatural p 471ff. J.T.S. Vol XXV 
pp 275-286). : 
2. An alternative position would be that of John B a i l l i e , who 
suggests that many who consider themselves atheists are r e a l l y 
Christians (cf Our Knowledge of God p 52f). 
3. cf "... i t i s always i n t r i g u i n g to look out f o r the f i r s t appear-
ance of the personal pronoun. I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to describe 
r e a l i t y as we experience i t i n some u n i f i e d way. Nor i s i t 
d i f f i c u l t to apply to i t the term 'God', ... the t r i c k i s to 
establish continuity i n usage between the normal use of the word 
'God' and the new use. This theological sleight of hand i s 
regularly exposed by the sudden appearance of the pronoun 'he' 
to describe a r e a l i t y which hitherto has been described as ' i t ' . " 
(A. Kee op c i t p 42). 
-283-
that on t h e i r terms i t becomes increasingly d i f f i c u l t to separate 
God from his creation,''" or to give anything l i k e the t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e 
to Jesus. Here i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the difference between Oman 
and B a i l l i e . Oman, as I argued above, sees Jesus c h i e f l y as the 
supreme prophet. B a i l l i e , having begun from a similar position, 
develops the way of thinking which I have suggested could be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the figure of concentric c i r c l e s i n which there i s , as 
2 
i t were, a greater concentration of grace i n Jesus. I n t h i s way an 
attempt i s made to preserve the uniqueness of Jesus, though, again as 
I mentioned above, i t i s s t i l l not clear whether he i s s t i l l j u s t the 
great recipient of grace or whether he can be seen as the great bearer 
and source of grace.^ 
F i n a l l y t h i s general approach seems to have an inadequate view 
of sin and forgiveness. I f grace i s persuasion, and i f i t i s open to 
man to 'see* i t merely by what might be termed a d i f f e r e n t way of 
looking at the world, then i t appears possible f o r man simply to 
decide to allow himself to be persuaded. The power of s i n , whether 
i n the Protestant sense of a radical r e b e l l i o n , or i n the Catholic 
sense of a disabling t a i n t , i s l o s t . Sin thus becomes mere weakness 
i n need of strength, or i n t e l l e c t u a l dullness i n need of enlightenment. 
And the way to such strength or enlightenment does not seem d i f f i c u l t 
to f i n d . Gone i s the aweful fear of the Lord and the Protestant's 
deep psychological experience of repentance. Gone too i s the sense 
of God's aweful holiness and the Catholic's conviction of personal 
unworthiness and impurity. One feels that t h i s l i n e of approach has 
not yet considered how serious a thing sin i s . 
I t i s perhaps to be expected from t h i s that the conception of 
forgiveness i s also weakened. Man i s assured of the goodness of the 
'Supernatural realm' and i t s (or his) kindness towards him. I t i s 
merely asked that man should ' f i t i n ' with i t , that he recognise the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of grace and know that he i s 'accepted'. I t i s not easy 
1. Some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved here are set out, i n the complex 
form of a dialogue, i n Austin Farrer's 'Faith and Speculation 1 (1967) 
chaps X and XI 
2. cf supra p 229f 
3. cf supra p 250f 
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to a l l y t h i s with t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of forgiveness, largely because 
i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y personal, though personal language i s used. 
Forgiveness seems to demand that there i s one who forgives as well 
as one who i s forgiven. As we have seen, p a r t i c u l a r l y from Denney 
and B a i l l i e , there i s usually an element of cost to be borne by the 
forgiver and the re s u l t i s restored personal intimacy. But can one 
be forgiven i n any meaningful sense by the 'Supernatural realm', or 
the 'Ground of being'? Furthermore, i n t r a d i t i o n a l terms, while 
the sinner himself i s forgiven and accepted, the sin i s not so much 
accepted as dealt with. Traditional ideas of atonement include some 
element of reparation. The view of grace being discussed allows 
that the consequences of sin may continue. This keeps to some 
extent the idea that the forgiven man i s both j u s t i f i e d and a sinner, 
and thus suffers f o r his sins, but i t omits the t r a d i t i o n a l note of 
some f i n a l act of God outside of man. I t does not, i n Forsyth's 
f i n e phrase, 'se t t l e i n a f i n a l way the issue between a holy God and 
the sin of man'. I t i s t h i s complex of ideas - the personal element 
of forgiveness, the note of reparation, and the note of f i n a l i t y -
which i s kept, with whatever complication i n i t s expression, by the 
t r a d i t i o n a l formulations. 
The view which comes to such clear expression i n Oman has 
continued, with variations, much beyond the period covered by t h i s 
study. Yet t h i s was not the only s i g n i f i c a n t movement. 'There was 
also, as we have noted on several occasions, a movement back to the 
Bible. For our purposes the most s i g n i f i c a n t elements of th i s were 
the re-discovery of the B i b l i c a l idea of s a c r i f i c e , accompanied by a 
move away from ideas of p r o p i t i a t i o n which had been, often rather 
unthinkingly, read i n to the s a c r i f i c i a l language. These ideas 
seemed to indicate a movement away from the idea of Jesus as our 
substitute toward that of Jesus as our representative."*" This had 
the advantage of bringing his whole l i f e into consideration and often 
le^,d to Christus Victor type of thinking on the atonement even when 
that phrase was not used. 
We saw, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n dealing with Quick, the move away from 
1. Two most i n f l u e n t i a l works were F.G.N. Hicks: 'The Fullness of 
Sacrifice' (l930), and V. Taylor: 'Jesus and His Sa c r i f i c e 1 
(1937). 
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substitutionary and p r o p i t i a t o r y ideas of s a c r i f i c e . I t was 
pointed out that the Old Testament knew several d i f f e r e n t types of 
s a c r i f i c e , that even when they dealt with sin they only covered 
ceremonial sins, and that they c h i e f l y embodied the idea of the 
worshipper's o f f e r i n g of himself to God. The laying of the worship-
pers hands on the head of the v i c t i m symbolises i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with 
the p u r i t y of the o f f e r i n g , not a transfer of sins. Indeed, i t was 
frequently pointed out that the only animal on which sins were l a i d 
- the scapegoat on the Day of Atonement - was not i n f a c t s a c r i f i c e d . 
More p o s i t i v e l y , i n regard to s a c r i f i c e and over a wider f i e l d of 
Old Testament studies, more attention was paid to the idea of 
representation and corporate personality, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
seeing Jesus as the representative man was explored. 
A most i n f l u e n t i a l piece of work i n a l l t h i s was C.H. Dodd's 
investigation of the ti\fafflct<r6<M. group of words."'' These words i n the 
New Testament (Rom 3:25. 1 John 2:2, 4:10)> had been taken to imply 
p r o p i t i a t i o n and interpreted i n terms of p r o p i t i a t o r y s a c r i f i c e , with 
Jesus seen as a substitute suffering i n man's place to turn away the 
wrath of God. Dodd argued that though the p r o p i t i a t o r y idea was 
the common one i n pagan usage i t could not apply to Judaism. There 
Yahweh had provided the s a c r i f i c i a l cultus and, quite apart from the 
view of God which p r o p i t i a t i o n seemed to imply, i t seemed i l l o g i c a l 
that God should, as i t were, appear on both sides of the equation at 
once, providing the p r o p i t i a t i o n to turn away his own wrath. Instead, 
Dodd argued, the basic idea should be a covering or expiation of s i n . 
Thus God i s seen as providing the means of dealing with that d e f i l e -
ment which separates man from himself. This l i n e of argument seems 
to have been accepted almost with r e l i e f . As we have seen both 
Quick and B a i l l i e accept i t without question. But i t has not been 
universally accepted, and i t i s probable that p r o p i t i a t i o n should not 
2 
so easily be bowed o f f the stage. 
Equally important, and, I would think, of more l a s t i n g value, 
1. J.T.S. Vol XXXII pp 352-360. also 'The Bible and The Greeks' 
(1935) PP 82-95. 
2. cf L. Morris: 'The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross' (1955) 
chaps IV and V. and D. H i l l 'Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings' 
(1967)0 pp 23-48. Though H i l l i s less happy about a c u l t i c 
background of 'p r o p i t i a t i o n * and prefers to f i n d i t i n 
4 Mace. 17:22. 
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was the re-discovery that the chief point of sa c r i f i c e was the 
release of l i f e , not j u s t the death of the vi c t i m . The pure l i f e , 
acceptable to God, was released and made available to the worshipper. 
He, i n some way, participated i n i t and thus offered himself to God. 
The implications of t h i s f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the death of Jesus are 
clear, and are p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r l y stated by Quick. The l i f e 
released i s made available to man, or man participates i n i t , through 
the sacraments. 
This i s perhaps the best expression of atonement and grace to be 
found during the period. But there are various ways i n which i t 
might be put. In the form i n which Quick states i t i t has close 
s i m i l a r i t i e s with what I have described as the t h i r d general view of 
grace. This seems to come about largely because Quick seems to 
begin his thinking from ideas of worship, and p a r t i c u l a r l y from the 
eucharist. Furthermore, as we have noted, he begins from the back-
ground idea of the sacramental universe. I n other words there i s a 
tendency to l i n k sacraments with creation rather than redemption. 
This seems to be borne out by his reluctance to consider the h i s t o r i c a l 
details of the i n s t i t u t i o n of the eucharist. Deeply rooted himself 
i n the Catholic t r a d i t i o n and conscious, as we saw, of the vit i u m of 
sin , when he turns to the means of grace his apparent indifference to 
history seems to betray him. He probably did not f u l l y reckon with 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h i s a t t i t u d e could detract from the c e n t r a l i t y 
of Jesus. I n t h i s respect B a i l l i e , who i s i n many ways sim i l a r to 
Quick i n his treatment of the sacraments, has corrected him. B a i l l i e 
s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n k s sacraments with Jesus, they are not j u s t taken from 
a sacramental universe. 
We must fur t h e r add that, i f i t i s to be accepted as giving the 
best expression of ideas of atonement and grace, the s a c r i f i c i a l 
model must be extended to include other ideas. I consider that 
Denney has established the c e n t r a l i t y of substitution i n some form. 
We noted too that Dodd's attempt to remove ideas of p r o p i t i a t i o n 
t o t a l l y did not convince a l l ; and that the 'penal' idea should also 
be kept. 
I t seems probable that the description of s a c r i f i c e given by 
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Quick i s f a r too pure and i d e a l i s t i c . While i t may be accepted 
that the animal v i c t i m was not punished as a substitute, i t seems 
equally clear that i t nevertheless was a substitute i n that i t 
represented the pure o f f e r i n g which the worshipper should have given. 
Furthermore i t i s l i k e l y that most worshippers would think, at least 
p a r t l y , of p r o p i t i a t i o n . I n contrasting s a c r i f i c i a l and subs t i t u t i o n -
ary views of atonement i t i s false to concentrate simply on the death 
of Jesus. At i t s best the substitutionary idea indicates that his 
whole l i f e , including his death, was a substitute. I t was given by 
God j u s t as the s a c r i f i c i a l cultus v/as. As a substitute he l i v e d a 
human l i f e and endured, by God's appointment, the 'penal' suffering 
of death. I n that he has died as a substitute the believer's death 
i s not of the same qu a l i t y . The believer dies as one who i s i n 
the continuous process of sharing the risen l i f e of Christ, which may 
be seen as the s a c r i f i c i a l l i f e released by death. The believer 
remains of course 'simul justus et peccator', but he i s seen now 
'i n Christ', his death i s not therefore as i t would have been. 
Put i n t h i s way substitutionary thinking can take up and express 
the ideas linked v/ith the s a c r i f i c i a l view. Then jus t i c e i s also done 
to the legal thinking and the note of f i n a l i t y found i n the New 
Testament. I t might be possible then to reverse Quick's approach 
and to see the substitutionary, or as he would say j u r i d i c a l , model 
including the best ideas of the s a c r i f i c i a l one. 
Fi n a l l y , B a i l l i e ' s most important contribution to the discussion 
i s his use of the paradox of grace. I have suggested that i t might 
not be such a good s t a r t i n g point f o r the understanding of the person 
of Jesus as B a i l l i e thought, but i n i t s own sphere, as a description 
of the believer's experience of grace, i t i s most h e l p f u l . Where 
Quick with his Catholic background has the danger of f a l l i n g into 
substance thinking, B a i l l i e working v/ith the category of w i l l avoids 
that danger. But he also seems to get beyond Oman's treatment of 
the apparent c o n f l i c t between grace and freedom. Oman states the 
t r a d i t i o n a l impasse "... the greater the preponderance of the w i l l 
that aids, the more destructive i t must be f o r the w i l l that i s 
aided." (Vision and Authority p 115)• For Oman therefore the only 
release from t h i s problem i s to reduce the divine w i l l to 'persuasion'. 
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B a i l l i e was able to go beyond t h i s . He saw that i n actual Christian 
experience there was no sense of any destruction of the human w i l l 
but rather a completion or f u l f i l m e n t . He indicates that there 
need be no c o n f l i c t but rather a d i f f e r e n t understanding of freedom. 
That the believer may glimpse - and i t may be that i n t h i s l i f e 
there i s never more than a glimpse - a region of experience beyond 
what we normally c a l l freedom. A region of experience i n which man 
i s set free by God to w i l l the w i l l of God, and i n the performance of 
i t to f i n d his f u l f i l m e n t . To know t h i s i s to be 'in Christ' and 
to experience the grace of Christ. 
